



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 27, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-01 Officers per District '21 v. '22

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Aldersperson Silverstein requested that the CPD provide the number of officers in each district one year ago vs. current number.

Please see the table on the following page.

***Number of officers in each district now and one year ago, as of 21 Oct 2022***

<b>Officers Assigned to Districts</b>		
	<b>PP 11 17 OCT 2022</b>	<b>PP 11 14 OCT 2021</b>
001	229	231
002	250	259
003	237	256
004	253	263
005	255	252
006	325	266
007	318	282
008	264	274
009	265	263
010	267	289
011	330	296
012	239	248
014	195	201
015	231	278
016	189	193
017	194	190
018	260	298
019	248	269
020	173	172
022	203	199
024	188	207
025	267	291
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5380</b>	<b>5477</b>

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 3, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 02 Affinity Officers

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Reboyras requested that the CPD provide the number of Affinity Officers in each district and which districts have Affinity Officers.

The Consent Decree requires 1 Affinity Officer for every police district. There are currently 21 Police Officers assigned to the role of Affinity Officer: 1 for Districts 001 thru 024. The 025th District currently has a vacancy which will be filled according to our selection and hiring process. The vacancy will be filled before the close of 2022.

Additionally, there are 2 Police Officers assigned as Affinity Officers serving at the airports, 1 for each airport. There are 2 Police Officers assigned as Affinity Officers currently serving in the Mass Transit Unit (CTA).

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 27, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID** 57-03 Bureau of Patrol POs

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Tabares requested that the CPD provide the number of officers assigned to the Bureau of Patrol.

*Number of officers assigned to BOP (DLE and non-DLE)*

<b>Officers Assigned to BOP</b>	
DLE	5,380
Non-DLE	450
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>5,830</i>

Note: DLE stands for District Law-Enforcement.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 26, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-04 Bureau of Detectives

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Tabares requested that the CPD provide the number of detectives assigned to the Bureau of Detectives.

As of October 24, 2022, there are 1,068 detectives assigned to units within the Bureau of Detectives.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 27, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-05 Watch Personnel

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Tabares requested that the CPD provide the number of officers assigned across all watches.

Please see the table on the following page.

***Officers assigned to each watch***

<b>Officers Assigned by Watch - BOP</b>					
	1st Watch	2nd Watch	3rd Watch	4th Watch	<i>Total</i>
001	70	53	63	32	218
002	71	64	80	23	238
003	54	51	69	48	222
004	59	66	71	49	245
005	N/A	85	102	55	242
006	82	88	92	53	315
007	85	81	106	43	315
008	73	71	80	32	256
009	68	54	86	37	245
010	60	69	84	37	250
011	88	75	107	54	324
012	65	59	63	42	229
014	60	47	49	38	194
015	50	60	70	43	223
016	48	46	47	33	174
017	45	50	66	21	182
018	54	48	53	39	194
019	64	57	70	47	238
020	46	42	54	18	160
022	54	49	56	33	192
024	38	61	48	32	179
025	65	67	76	51	259
211	N/A	N/A	42	42	84
212	N/A	N/A	23	23	46
213	N/A	N/A	29	29	58
214	N/A	5	N/A	33	38
215	N/A	5	N/A	24	29
715	N/A	26	24	42	92
716	N/A	7	N/A	N/A	7
057	N/A	N/A	N/A	23	23

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



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Superintendent of Police

**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 5, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 06 Title Codes

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Tabares requested that the CPD provide the number of officers assigned to title code Patrol, Sgt., Lt, Captain, Detective, and FTO, since 2019.

<b>Title</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>2020</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>
<b>PO</b>	9820	9487	8973	8553
<b>Det</b>	1146	1111	999	1107
<b>FTO</b>	269	241	206	201
<b>Sgt</b>	1277	1260	1203	1206
<b>LT</b>	262	249	228	258
<b>Captain</b>	31	21	27	28

Note: These are filled (not budgeted) and taken as of on or around 1 Nov each year.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.





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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 27, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-07 Downed Beats

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Tabares requested that the CPD provide the weekly number of downed beats in all districts.

Currently, the CPD does not track this data.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 3, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 08 Force Review Unit

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Tabares requested that the CPD provide the number of Officers in the Force Review Unit.

As of October 27, 2022, TRED (Tactical Review and Evaluation Division) has 43 members.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 26, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-09 Detective Assignments

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Tunney requested that the CPD provide the number of detectives assigned to each Area.

As of October 24, 2022, of the 1,068 detectives assigned to the Bureau of Detectives, 911 are assigned to the Area Detective Division. Manpower is divided as follows:

Area One- 241  
Area Two- 192  
Area Three- 157  
Area Four- 185  
Area Five- 136  
Total- 911

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 26, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-10 Hijacking Arrests

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Tunney requested that the CPD provide the number of offenders arrested for carjackings.

As of October 24th, 2022, there were a total of one-thousand three hundred twenty (1,320) offenders arrested for carjackings and other motor vehicle theft related crimes. This resulted in the following number of charges:

Vehicular Hijacking- 219  
Possession of Stolen Vehicle- 442  
Criminal Trespass Vehicle- 659  
Total Charges- 1,320

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 26, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-11 Hijacking Charges

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Tunney requested that the CPD provide the number of offenders charged for carjacking.

As of October 24th, 2022, 219 offenders were charged with vehicular hijacking.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 26, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-12 Juveniles and Carjackings

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Tunney requested that the CPD provide the number of juveniles arrested for carjackings.

As of October 24<sup>th</sup>, 2022, of the two-hundred nineteen (219) arrested for vehicular hijacking, one-hundred seventeen (117) arrests were juvenile offenders.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 25, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID#** 57-13 CTA Assignment

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Tunney and Waguespack requested that the CPD provide the number of officers working CTA.

Unit 701 - Public Transportation Section

1 - Commander  
1 - Captain  
3 - Lieutenants  
17 - Sergeants  
112 - Police Officers

Unit 704 - Transit Security Team

11 - Explosive Detection Canine Handler  
30 - Police Officers

Unit 702 - Voluntary Special Employment Program (VSEP)

1 January to 24 October 2022 (Worked)

5,181 - CTA

1,327 - CTA Extension

6,508 officers worked CTA for the 297 days YTD

Average Number Per Day: 21

Note: CTA and CTA Extension are deployment categories for officers volunteering to work special employment. CTA is the initial category offered to officers. Officers are only allowed to work a certain amount of CTA deployments. Once the period closes out for officers to volunteer for CTA, an additional category, "CTA Extension", is created to offer officers another opportunity to work shifts that were not filled in the initial CTA category. Officers are not restricted on the amount of deployments they can work in the CTA Extension category.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.





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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 27, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-14 Metrics CW Teams

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Aldersperson Tunney requested that the CPD provide the metrics used to determine the assignment of citywide teams.

As it pertains to teams within the Bureau of Counter-Terrorism (Gang/Gun and Narcotics Teams), personnel are assigned to locations with emerging violence trends, heightened gang activity, direct requests for support from District Commanders through Inter-Department Support Service Requests (IDSSRs), and based on intelligence of emerging/retaliatory violence and possible threats to public safety gathered through BCT's intelligence teams and federal partners.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 5, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 15 Detectives

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Aldersperson Tunney requested that the CPD provide the difference in numbers of Detectives from 2020-2022.

The following data indicates the number of detectives budgeted for in 2020-2022:

- 2020 – 1,196
- 2021 – 1,192
- 2022 – 1,192

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 26, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-16 Clearance Rates

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Tunney requested that the CPD provide the clearance rates for cases that have been solved.

The following clearance rate percentages are as of October 24<sup>th</sup>, 2022.

- Aggravated Battery with Firearm- 12%
- Robbery- 22.21%
- Burglary- 14.98
- Vehicular Hijacking- 38.28%
- Homicide- 49.47%

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



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Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 5, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 17 Events Denied

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Tunney requested that the CPD provide the number of special events denied by CPD.

CPD does not deny or approve special events but, does verify security plans for only approved special events.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 3, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 18 Events Approved

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Tunney requested that the CPD provide the number of special events approved by CPD.

Attached you will find the Special Events Section's comparison of events for 2021 and 2022. The Special Events Section is on schedule to have processed 638 Memos and 101 IAPs (Incident Action Plans) by the end of 2022. Please note, the totals for November 2022 and December 2022 are events that have approved permits. That comes out to a total of 739 events for the year. The totals are divided into following four sections:

- **Memo:** a memo is a smaller event that can be handled by district personnel with occasional department resources.
- **Notice:** A notice is an Incident Action Plan that requires coordinated department, city, state or federal resources.
- **File:** This is an order specifically for presidential escorts, the Chicago Marathon, New Year's Eve and Emergency Mobilization Plans.
- **Escort:** An escort is an order written for all dignitary visits that utilize department resources. Escorts require the coordination of department resources, often working in conjunction with diplomatic security teams, Capitol Police and U.S. Secret Service.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.

**SPECIAL EVENTS SECTION**  
2022 / 2021 Year over Year Comparison

<b>2022</b>	<b>JAN</b>	<b>FEB</b>	<b>MAR</b>	<b>APR</b>	<b>MAY</b>	<b>JUN</b>	<b>JUL</b>	<b>AUG</b>	<b>SEP</b>	<b>OCT</b>	<b>NOV</b>	<b>DEC</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
MEMO	3	12	19	76	76	43	90	124	129	39	17	10	<b>638</b>
NOTICE	0	2	5	3	12	14	15	14	16	12	5	3	<b>101</b>
FILE	1	2	3	2	3	2	4	2	1	3	0	0	<b>23</b>
ESCORT	0	0	7	1	5	1	10	3	10	4	0	0	<b>41</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>156</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>803</b>

<b>2021</b>	<b>JAN</b>	<b>FEB</b>	<b>MAR</b>	<b>APR</b>	<b>MAY</b>	<b>JUN</b>	<b>JUL</b>	<b>AUG</b>	<b>SEP</b>	<b>OCT</b>	<b>NOV</b>	<b>DEC</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
MEMO	8	0	15	23	15	29	71	95	94	79	35	24	<b>488</b>
NOTICE	3	1	2	2	2	2	7	12	15	9	6	4	<b>65</b>
FILE	2	2	1	4	1	2	1	0	1	3	1	0	<b>18</b>
ESCORT	0	0	1	1	0	3	0	1	9	3	1	4	<b>23</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>594</b>

<b>% CHANGE</b>	<b>JAN</b>	<b>FEB</b>	<b>MAR</b>	<b>APR</b>	<b>MAY</b>	<b>JUN</b>	<b>JUL</b>	<b>AUG</b>	<b>SEP</b>	<b>OCT</b>	<b>NOV</b>	<b>DEC</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
MEMO	-63%	1200%	27%	230%	407%	48%	27%	31%	37%	-51%	-51%	-58%	31%
NOTICE	-100%	100%	150%	50%	500%	600%	114%	17%	7%	33%	-17%	-25%	55%
FILE	-50%	0%	200%	-50%	200%	0%	300%	200%	0%	0%	-100%	0%	28%
ESCORT	0%	0%	600%	0%	500%	-67%	1000%	200%	11%	33%	-100%	-100%	78%



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Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 24, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 20 Pride Costs

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Aldersperson Tunney requested that the CPD provide the summation of costs for the Pride Parade for 2022.

The Chicago Police Department incurred \$998,219.49 in overtime for the 2022 Pride Parade.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 27, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-21 Asset Forfeiture

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Aldersperson Waguespack requested that the CPD provide the total amount in the asset forfeiture fund and where those funds are being disbursed.

As of October 16<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Bureau of Counter-Terrorism holds an asset forfeiture fund of \$4,523,446.62. All IL state asset forfeiture funds are spent according to rules and regulations set forth in ISP guidelines. All funds must be used for expenditures in furtherance of investigations that have a narcotics nexus. In that regard, funds are used for training, technology, investigations, supplies, etc. to reduce narcotics trafficking and overall violence as a result thereof.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.





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Superintendent of Police

**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 27, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-23 Shooting Incidents

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Moore requested that the CPD provide the number of shootings for districts in his ward year to date.

**Shooting incidents in 006th, 007th, and 008th District YTD 01 Jan - 23 Oct 2022**

District	Count
006	200
007	218
008	125

Please note that these figures are for the entirety of each district. There has been a total of 134 shooting victims in the 17<sup>th</sup> ward over the same span of time.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 1, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID#** 57 – 24 Grant Info

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Moore requested that the CPD provide a breakdown of grant money and what amount is carryover.

Approximately \$95M of the CPD grant budget is carryover which are grants budgeted in prior years that carryover between city fiscal years. Most grants are on 3-year cycles and projects are determined at the time of application, CPD then has 3 years to complete the projects. Carryover is a regular part of the grants budget and annually we see that in the budget, however as a result of delays during COVID-19 many grants were extended even beyond the typical 3-year performance period so CPD shows more grant carryover.

Attached is a breakdown of the CPD grants as provided by PSA.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.

Grant Name	FUND(S)	2022 ACTUALS	2023 RECOMMENDED	INCREASES
<b>Law Enforcement Responses to Mental Illness and Substance Use</b>		<b>\$3,893,000</b>	<b>\$5,029,000</b>	<b>\$1,136,000</b>
CHICAGO SOUTHSIDE EARLY DIVERSION PROJECT	0W49	\$134,000	\$134,000	
COMPREHENSIVE OPIOID ABUSE SITE-BASED PROGRAM 2019	0W52	\$765,000	\$0	
COMPREHENSIVE OPIOID ABUSE SITE-BASED PROGRAM 2023	G404	\$0	\$1,600,000	
CONNECT AND PROTECT 2021	G296/G304	\$867,000	\$867,000	
CONNECT AND PROTECT 2023	G418/G419	\$0	\$1,300,000	
JUSTICE AND MENTAL HEALTH COLLABORATION	0V89	\$627,000	\$251,000	
OPIOID OVERDOSE REVERSAL PROJECT: FIRST RESPONDERS COMPREHENSIVE ADDICTION AND RECOVERY	0V75	\$1,500,000	\$877,000	
<b>Improving Responses to Gender-Based Violence</b>		<b>\$1,237,000</b>	<b>\$1,924,000</b>	<b>\$687,000</b>
IMPROVING CPD RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SEXUAL ASSAULT AND STALKING 2020	0N00	\$981,000	\$697,000	
IMPROVING CPD RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SEXUAL ASSAULT AND STALKING 2023	G394	\$0	\$1,000,000	
IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DATING, AND STALKING PROGRAM: IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSES	0W55	\$30,000	\$0	
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN - DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESPONSE: VAWA - DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 2022	G178/G179	\$137,000	\$0	
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN - DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESPONSE: VAWA - DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 2023	G409/G410	\$0	\$137,000	
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: VAWA -	G198/G	\$89,000	\$0	

SEXUAL ASSAULT 2022	227			
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: VAWA - SEXUAL ASSAULT 2023	G401/G402	\$0	\$90,000	
<b>Victim Services</b>		<b>\$579,000</b>	<b>\$242,000</b>	<b>\$337,000</b>
LAW ENFORCEMENT-BASED VICTIM SPECIALIST PROGRAM	0W53	\$579,000	\$242,000	
<b>Juvenile Justice</b>		<b>\$500,000</b>	<b>\$1,097,000</b>	<b>\$597,000</b>
STRENGTHENING INTERNET CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN INVESTIGATIVE CAPACITY	TBD	\$0	\$620,000	
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT PROJECT	G061	\$500,000	\$477,000	
<b>Crime Prevention and Reduction</b>		<b>\$8,664,000</b>	<b>\$11,051,000</b>	<b>\$2,387,000</b>
EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG): JAG 2018	0V50	\$2,060,000	\$1,280,000	
JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE	0W56	\$43,000	\$0	
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT CRIME GUN INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION 2022	G290	\$700,000	\$700,000	
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT CRIME GUN INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION 2023	G389	\$0	\$700,000	
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT PREVENTION: VEHICLE THEFT, PREVENTION AND RESPONSE	0W50	\$804,000	\$714,000	
OPERATION LEGEND	G059	\$3,500,000	\$3,500,000	
PAUL COVERDELL FORENSIC SCIENCE IMPROVEMENT 2022	G181	\$500,000	\$500,000	
PAUL COVERDELL FORENSIC SCIENCE IMPROVEMENT 2023	G416	\$0	\$500,000	
PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS 2022	G333	\$57,000	\$57,000	
PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS 2023	G452		\$100,000	
SEXUAL ASSAULT KIT INITIATIVE 2020	G060	\$1,000,000	\$1,000,000	
SEXUAL ASSAULT KIT INITIATIVE 2023	G390	\$0	\$1,000,000	
SMART POLICING INITIATIVE 2023	G398	\$0	\$500,000	
SOLVING COLD CASES WITH DNA	G391	\$0	\$500,000	
<b>Traffic Safety</b>		<b>\$3,395,000</b>	<b>\$2,627,000</b>	<b>\$768,000</b>
IDOT SUSTAINED TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM (STEP) 2022	G023	\$1,255,000	\$0	

IDOT SUSTAINED TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM (STEP) 2023	G199	\$790,000	\$790,000	
IDOT SUSTAINED TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM (STEP) 2024	G415	\$0	\$1,300,000	
IMPAIRED DRIVING PREVENTION TRAINING 2023	TBD	\$92,000	\$92,000	
IMPAIRED DRIVING PREVENTION TRAINING 2024	G403	\$0	\$150,000	
INJURY PREVENTION 2022	G025	\$130,000	\$0	
INJURY PREVENTION 2023	G196	\$130,000	\$130,000	
INJURY PREVENTION 2024	G388	\$0	\$165,000	
LOCAL ALCOHOL PROGRAM 2022	G024	\$496,000	\$0	
LOCAL ALCOHOL PROGRAM 2023	G195	\$502,000	\$0	
<b>Officer Mental Health &amp; Wellness</b>		<b>\$321,000</b>	<b>\$517,000</b>	<b>\$196,000</b>
LAW ENFORCEMENT MENTAL HEALTH AND WELLNESS ACT 2019	0W54	\$71,000	\$17,000	
LAW ENFORCEMENT MENTAL HEALTH AND WELLNESS ACT 2021	G294	\$125,000	\$125,000	
LAW ENFORCEMENT MENTAL HEALTH AND WELLNESS ACT 2022	G238	\$125,000	\$125,000	
LAW ENFORCEMENT MENTAL HEALTH AND WELLNESS ACT 2023	G395	\$0	\$250,000	
<b>Police Officer Hiring</b>		<b>\$39,708,000</b>	<b>\$60,026,000</b>	<b>\$20,318,000</b>
COPS 2017 HIRING PROGRAM	0V49/ 0V84	\$3,009,000	\$0	
COPS 2020 HIRING PROGRAM	G019/ 0N74	\$13,451,000	\$13,348,000	
COPS 2021 HIRING PROGRAM	G214/G 215	\$11,624,000	\$16,998,000	
COPS 2022 HIRING PROGRAM	G169/G 170	\$11,624,000	\$17,527,000	
COPS 2023 HIRING PROGRAM	G396/G 397	\$0	\$12,153,000	
<b>Support for Pandemic-related Law Enforcement Response</b>		<b>\$6,340,000</b>	<b>\$6,037,000</b>	<b>\$303,000</b>
EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG): CORONAVIRUS EMERGENCY	010C	\$6,340,000	\$6,037,000	

SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING				
<b>Community Policing</b>		<b>\$2,583,000</b>	<b>\$3,300,000</b>	<b>\$717,000</b>
BJA BODY WORN CAMERAS: BODYWORN CAMERA 2022	G236/G 237	\$0	\$0	
BJA BODY WORN CAMERAS; BODYWORN CAMERA 2023	G392/G 393	\$0	\$1,700,000	
BYRNE CRIMINAL JUSTICE INNOVATION PROGRAM: INNOVATIONS IN COMMUNITY-BASED CRIME REDUCTION	0W88	\$328,000	\$0	
BYRNE DISCRETIONARY COMMUNITY PROJECT	TBD	\$500,000	\$500,000	
COMMUNITY POLICING DEVELOPMENT 2021	G291	\$125,000	\$0	
COMMUNITY POLICING DEVELOPMENT 2022	G292	\$125,000	\$0	
COMMUNITY POLICING DEVELOPMENT 2023	G399	\$0	\$350,000	
COMMUNITY POLICING DEVELOPMENT DE-ESCALATION GRANT PROGRAM	TBD	\$250,000	\$250,000	
COPS TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT PROGRAM	TBD	\$500,000	\$500,000	
POLICE REFORM AND RACIAL JUSTICE	0P87	\$175,000	\$0	
SAFE ROUTES TO SCHOOLS	0W92	\$150,000	\$0	
TECHNOLOGY OPPORTUNITIES: INNOVATION FOR PUBLIC SAFETY	0V69	\$430,000	\$0	
<b>Terrorism Preparedness, Response and Recovery</b>		<b>\$59,059,298</b>	<b>\$67,420,000</b>	<b>\$8,360,702</b>
COMPLEX COORDINATED TERRORIST ATTACK	0V72	\$200,000	\$0	
PORT SECURITY 2017	0V59/ 0V85	\$82,000	\$0	
PORT SECURITY 2018	0V87/ 0V88	\$280,000	\$0	
PORT SECURITY 2019	0Z73	\$1,291,000	\$1,291,000	
PORT SECURITY 2021	G173/G 174	\$130,000	\$130,000	
PORT SECURITY 2022	G171/G	\$1,500,000	\$0	

	172			
PORT SECURITY 2023	G384/G 385	\$0	\$1,600,000	
TRANSIT SECURITY 2018	0V91	\$427,000	\$0	
TRANSIT SECURITY 2019	0Z69	\$916,000	\$682,000	
TRANSIT SECURITY 2020	G018	\$8,230,000	\$1,037,000	
TRANSIT SECURITY 2021	G239	\$5,138,000	\$5,138,000	
TRANSIT SECURITY 2022	G235	\$650,000	\$650,000	
TRANSIT SECURITY 2023	G400	\$0	\$8,500,000	
UASI 2017	0V27	\$1,029,000	\$0	
UASI 2018	0V61	\$922,000	\$0	
UASI 2019	0W96	\$5,859,000	\$3,512,000	
UASI 2020	0W59	\$5,729,298	\$5,366,000	
UASI 2021	G092	\$7,429,000	\$7,267,000	
UASI 2022	G188	\$19,247,000	\$19,247,000	
UASI 2023	G386	\$0	\$13,000,000	
<b>Support for Other Critical Policing Initiatives</b>		<b>\$12,192,000</b>	<b>\$14,117,000</b>	<b>\$1,925,000</b>
ASSET FORFEITURE: FEDERAL	657/0B1 7	\$1,303,000	\$1,303,000	
ASSET FORFEITURE: STATE	191	\$2,113,000	\$2,113,000	
BULLETPROOF VESTS PARTNERSHIP - BJA 2021	G295	\$0	\$0	
BULLETPROOF VESTS PARTNERSHIP - BJA 2022	G277/G 278	\$0	\$0	
EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG): JAG 2019	0V99	\$2,229,000	\$2,021,000	
EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG): JAG 2020	G016	\$1,942,000	\$1,652,000	
EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG): JAG 2021	G197	\$2,251,000	\$2,239,000	
EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG): JAG 2022	G212	\$2,318,000	\$2,276,000	
EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG): JAG 2023	G420	\$0	\$2,400,000	
INITIATED RESEARCH AND EVALUATION ON FIREARM VIOLENCE: NIJ RESEARCH EVALUATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT	0W57	\$23,000	\$0	
PUBLIC SAFETY PRIVATE SUPPORT	0P87	\$0	\$100,000	
PUBLIC SAFETY PRIVATE SUPPORT	0P87	\$13,000	\$13,000	

		<b>\$138,471,298</b>	<b>\$173,387,000</b>	<b>\$34,915,702</b>
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**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 5, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 25 Exempt Demographic

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Villegas requested that the CPD provide the percentage of Hispanics in exempt ranks.

21% of exempt rank Officers are Hispanic.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 3, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 26 Shotspotter Data

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Aldersperson Villegas requested that the CPD provide ShotSpotter data, guns recovered, evidence recovered, etc.

Please see attached.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.

## SHOTSPOTTER EVENTS & ASSOCIATED DATA: 10 Feb 2017 - 30 Sep 2022

**Figure.1 Life Saving Awards - Primary & Secondary ShotSpotter Event Types Chicago Police Department  
February 10, 2017 - September 30, 2022**

DISTRICT	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022 YTD	GRAND TOTAL
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	0	1	1	2	2	3	9
3	0	0	1	4	1	3	9
4	0	0	3	1	3	0	7
5	0	0	0	2	0	1	3
6	0	8	10	2	7	6	33
7	2	0	4	2	4	1	13
8	0	0	2	1	1	0	4
9	0	1	1	4	0	1	7
10	0	1	0	2	5	2	10
11	3	1	2	4	3	5	18
12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15	0	0	3	0	1	1	5
16	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25	0	1	1	1	1	1	5
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>125</b>

Totals are provided for incidents resulting in a Life-Saving Award associated with a ShotSpotter alert. Awards with a status of FINAL or PENDING APPROVAL are counted.

**SHOTSPOTTER EVENTS & ASSOCIATED DATA: 10 Feb 2017 - 30 Sep 2022****Figure.2 Life Saving Awards - Primary ShotSpotter Event Types Chicago Police Department  
February 10, 2017 - September 30, 2022**

DISTRICT	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022 YTD	GRAND TOTAL
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	0	1	0	2	1	2	6
3	0	0	1	4	0	1	6
4	0	0	3	0	2	0	5
5	0	0	0	2	0	1	3
6	0	6	9	2	2	3	22
7	0	0	2	2	1	0	5
8	0	0	1	1	1	0	3
9	0	0	1	2	0	0	3
10	0	0	0	1	3	2	6
11	2	1	2	1	1	4	11
12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15	0	0	2	0	1	0	3
16	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25	0	1	1	1	1	1	5
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>79</b>

Totals are provided for incidents resulting in a Life-Saving Award associated with a ShotSpotter alert. Awards with a status of FINAL or PENDING APPROVAL are counted.

## SHOTSPOTTER EVENTS & ASSOCIATED DATA: 10 Feb 2017 - 30 Sep 2022

**Figure.3 Firearm Recoveries - Primary & Secondary ShotSpotter Event Types Chicago Police Department  
February 10, 2017 - September 30, 2022**

DISTRICT	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022 YTD	GRAND TOTAL
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	0	6	10	28	31	24	99
3	0	16	50	61	72	33	232
4	0	28	63	73	76	43	283
5	0	46	43	83	88	51	311
6	8	45	54	86	90	51	334
7	58	42	51	82	101	42	376
8	0	21	42	68	55	28	214
9	8	26	48	76	57	61	276
10	1	27	37	76	62	36	239
11	26	36	38	79	66	28	273
12	1	0	1	0	0	0	2
14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15	8	29	28	49	42	24	180
16	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22	0	0	0	0	3	0	3
24	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
25	2	14	20	40	54	31	161
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>336</b>	<b>485</b>	<b>802</b>	<b>798</b>	<b>452</b>	<b>2985</b>

Totals are counted by unique firearm recoveries associated with a ShotSpotter alert.

**SHOTSPOTTER EVENTS & ASSOCIATED DATA: 10 Feb 2017 - 30 Sep 2022****Figure.4 Firearm Recoveries - Primary ShotSpotter Event Types Chicago Police Department  
February 10, 2017 - September 30, 2022**

DISTRICT	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022 YTD	GRAND TOTAL
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	1	6	9	24	20	19	79
3	0	9	36	42	43	25	155
4	0	17	45	58	46	21	187
5	0	41	36	55	70	30	232
6	6	27	40	62	68	21	224
7	24	31	36	58	62	23	234
8	0	11	27	53	34	18	143
9	5	16	41	54	41	33	190
10	3	23	25	38	40	21	150
11	13	28	18	47	37	15	158
12	1	1	2	2	2	2	10
14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15	2	21	27	39	36	18	143
16	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22	0	2	2	2	3	0	9
24	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
25	0	13	18	37	42	30	140
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>247</b>	<b>362</b>	<b>572</b>	<b>546</b>	<b>276</b>	<b>2058</b>

Totals are counted by unique firearm recoveries associated with a ShotSpotter alert.

**SHOTSPOTTER EVENTS & ASSOCIATED DATA: 10 Feb 2017 - 30 Sep 2022****Figure.5 Arrests - Primary & Secondary ShotSpotter Event Types Chicago Police Department  
February 10, 2017 - September 30, 2022**

DISTRICT	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022 YTD	GRAND TOTAL
1	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
2		15	9	28	20	25	97
3		29	58	64	36	23	210
4	1	48	87	66	54	40	296
5		34	46	71	70	38	259
6	7	67	60	87	60	36	317
7	60	46	64	74	56	38	338
8	1	20	44	63	54	28	210
9	16	27	52	71	64	40	270
10	2	39	69	82	52	32	276
11	52	56	63	103	67	25	366
12			4				4
14			1				1
15	12	35	29	53	49	21	199
16				4			4
17					1		1
18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20			2				2
22			4		5		9
24				2			2
25	6	22	38	46	69	43	224
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>438</b>	<b>630</b>	<b>815</b>	<b>657</b>	<b>389</b>	<b>3087</b>

Totals are counted by unique arrests associated with a ShotSpotter alert.

**SHOTSPOTTER EVENTS & ASSOCIATED DATA: 10 Feb 2017 - 30 Sep 2022****Figure.6 Arrests - Primary ShotSpotter Event Types Chicago Police Department  
February 10, 2017 - September 30, 2022**

DISTRICT	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022 YTD	GRAND TOTAL
1	0	0	2	1	0	1	4
2	1	12	8	26	14	18	79
3	0	13	36	37	23	20	129
4	0	25	55	42	35	19	176
5	1	32	32	57	47	29	198
6	5	49	48	60	40	17	219
7	23	35	46	42	23	16	185
8	0	13	29	49	39	17	147
9	8	13	33	51	40	21	166
10	7	34	64	56	37	21	219
11	17	43	31	51	28	10	180
12	3	3	6	13	7	3	35
14	0	3	1	0	2	0	6
15	3	22	25	40	35	17	142
16	0	1	2	2	7	1	13
17	0	0	0	0	2	1	3
18	0	0	2	1	1	0	4
19	1	3	1	1	2	0	8
20	0	0	0	1	2	0	3
22	0	4	3	3	5	1	16
24	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
25	2	13	24	33	44	36	152
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>318</b>	<b>448</b>	<b>567</b>	<b>433</b>	<b>248</b>	<b>2086</b>

Totals are counted by unique arrests associated with a ShotSpotter alert.



## SHOTSPOTTER EVENTS & ASSOCIATED DATA: 10 Feb 2017 - 30 Sep 2022

**Figure.7 Evidence Recoveries - Primary & Secondary ShotSpotter Event Types Chicago Police Department  
February 10, 2017 - September 30, 2022**

DISTRICT	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022 YTD	GRAND TOTAL
1				1	1		2
2		107	214	317	386	195	1219
3		134	295	522	575	382	1908
4		253	540	665	833	583	2874
5		382	436	677	766	476	2737
6	53	360	447	634	702	440	2636
7	214	237	362	514	619	402	2348
8	3	215	373	688	495	310	2084
9	49	204	375	516	485	422	2051
10	8	151	257	462	557	389	1824
11	136	212	200	415	509	351	1823
12		10	3	1	5	5	24
14		4		3	5	3	15
15	68	179	196	325	332	154	1254
16					1	12	13
17		2			3	6	11
18							0
19							0
20							0
22		2	2	5	15	11	35
24				4			4
25	21	206	257	369	423	283	1559
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>552</b>	<b>2658</b>	<b>3957</b>	<b>6118</b>	<b>6712</b>	<b>4424</b>	<b>24421</b>

Totals represent unique ShotSpotter alert events associated with a firearm-related evidence recovery: BULLET / AMMO / MAGAZINE, EXPENDED SHELL, FIREARM, FIRED BULLET, or MAGAZINE.

**SHOTSPOTTER EVENTS & ASSOCIATED DATA: 10 Feb 2017 - 30 Sep 2022****Figure.8 Evidence Recoveries - Primary ShotSpotter Event Types Chicago Police Department  
February 10, 2017 - September 30, 2022**

DISTRICT	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022 YTD	GRAND TOTAL
1	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
2	0	93	173	278	261	119	924
3	0	108	235	413	475	278	1509
4	0	180	385	546	648	428	2187
5	0	366	364	572	644	352	2298
6	44	247	355	513	485	352	1996
7	126	204	260	343	449	262	1644
8	2	181	287	582	379	253	1684
9	39	157	337	404	381	297	1615
10	7	130	206	274	415	258	1290
11	71	180	122	311	342	263	1289
12	0	1	3	1	2	4	11
14	0	0	0	1	5	3	9
15	44	144	189	290	285	128	1080
16	0	0	0	0	1	7	8
17	0	1	0	0	2	6	9
18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
22	0	2	0	5	10	4	21
24	0	0	0	4	0	0	4
25	10	188	223	337	361	250	1369
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>343</b>	<b>2182</b>	<b>3139</b>	<b>4875</b>	<b>5146</b>	<b>3264</b>	<b>18949</b>

Totals represent unique ShotSpotter alert events associated with a firearm-related evidence recovery: BULLET / AMMO / MAGAZINE, EXPENDED SHELL, FIREARM, FIRED BULLET, or MAGAZINE.

# Shooting Incidents & ShotSpotter Events with Evidence Recovery

## Chicago Police Department

### February 10, 2017<sup>1</sup> - September 30, 2022

Data are accurate as of October 19, 2022

Note<sup>1</sup>: ShotSpotter technology was deployed asynchronously across select Districts beginning in Districts 07, 06, 09, 10, 11, and 15 in early 2017 and continuing in Districts 03, 04, 05, 08, 25, and 02 in early 2018.

Note<sup>2</sup>: Data is grouped by District of shooting incident.

Note<sup>3</sup>: Totals are provided for shooting incidents with personal injury.

Note<sup>4</sup>: Outdoor shooting incidents are those occurring on a street, sidewalk, or alley, or on a City, commercial, or residential lot or grounds, as recorded in the incident case report.

Note<sup>5</sup>: SST Associated incidents are those with at least one associated ShotSpotter alert event.

Note<sup>6</sup>: Shots Fired Associated incidents are those with at least one associated PERSON SHOT, SHOTS FIRED (OV), or SHOTS FIRED call for service event type.

Note<sup>7</sup>: Evidence recoveries are associated with shooting incidents by case number and exclude inventories of prisoner property and documents.

Request: Flores - If there was a shooting, how many times did we get only a SST alert, only a SHOTS or SHOTSFI CFS, and how many times did we get both. Additionally, when there is a SST alert related to a shooting, how many times do we also collect evidence.

**Shooting Incidents & ShotSpotter Events with Evidence Recovery**  
**Chicago Police Department**  
**February 10, 2017<sup>1</sup> - December 31, 2017**

District <sup>2</sup>	Total Shooting Incidents <sup>3</sup>	Outdoor Shooting Incidents <sup>4</sup>	SST Associated Incidents <sup>5</sup>	Shots Fired Associated Incidents <sup>6</sup>	SST & Shots Fired Associated Incidents	SST Associated Incidents	
						Incidents with Evidence Recovery <sup>7</sup>	% Incidents with Evidence Recovery
01	13	8	0	13	0	0	--
02	102	85	0	98	0	0	--
03	176	146	1	173	1	1	100%
04	148	130	1	142	1	1	100%
05	148	120	0	141	0	0	--
06	171	127	14	167	14	13	93%
07	180	141	82	178	80	81	99%
08	142	120	8	141	8	8	100%
09	146	121	23	143	22	22	96%
10	218	196	10	215	10	9	90%
11	309	269	100	302	95	98	98%
12	109	92	4	108	4	4	100%
14	56	47	0	55	0	0	--
15	227	198	45	223	45	42	93%
16	16	13	0	16	0	0	--
17	21	16	0	20	0	0	--
18	15	10	0	13	0	0	--
19	21	18	0	21	0	0	--
20	8	8	0	8	0	0	--
22	86	71	1	85	1	1	100%
24	24	21	0	24	0	0	--
25	149	128	12	146	12	12	100%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,485</b>	<b>2,085</b>	<b>301</b>	<b>2,432</b>	<b>293</b>	<b>292</b>	<b>97%</b>

**Shooting Incidents & ShotSpotter Events with Evidence Recovery**  
**Chicago Police Department**  
**January 1, 2018 - December 31, 2018<sup>1</sup>**

District <sup>2</sup>	Total Shooting Incidents <sup>3</sup>	Outdoor Shooting Incidents <sup>4</sup>	SST Associated Incidents <sup>5</sup>	Shots Fired Associated Incidents <sup>6</sup>	SST & Shots Fired Associated Incidents	SST Associated Incidents	
						Incidents with Evidence Recovery <sup>7</sup>	% Incidents with Evidence Recovery
01	21	15	0	19	0	0	--
02	94	78	41	91	40	40	98%
03	153	132	49	150	48	46	94%
04	112	92	57	107	56	52	91%
05	196	158	90	186	88	87	97%
06	186	157	103	183	102	101	98%
07	187	149	92	180	88	91	99%
08	115	99	45	109	42	44	98%
09	131	102	57	128	55	56	98%
10	170	150	62	166	61	59	95%
11	340	308	115	334	112	111	97%
12	86	73	2	84	2	2	100%
14	64	58	1	62	1	1	100%
15	185	165	60	177	59	55	92%
16	18	14	0	18	0	0	--
17	46	37	0	43	0	0	--
18	19	17	0	19	0	0	--
19	19	17	0	18	0	0	--
20	8	6	0	8	0	0	--
22	83	66	1	77	1	1	100%
24	33	25	0	30	0	0	--
25	108	96	45	105	44	44	98%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,374</b>	<b>2,014</b>	<b>820</b>	<b>2,294</b>	<b>799</b>	<b>790</b>	<b>96%</b>

**Shooting Incidents & ShotSpotter Events with Evidence Recovery**  
**Chicago Police Department**  
**January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019<sup>1</sup>**

District <sup>2</sup>	Total Shooting Incidents <sup>3</sup>	Outdoor Shooting Incidents <sup>4</sup>	SST Associated Incidents <sup>5</sup>	Shots Fired Associated Incidents <sup>6</sup>	SST & Shots Fired Associated Incidents	SST Associated Incidents	
						Incidents with Evidence Recovery <sup>7</sup>	% Incidents with Evidence Recovery
01	16	11	0	16	0	0	--
02	71	55	30	70	30	30	100%
03	118	98	74	115	72	71	96%
04	146	114	108	143	105	103	95%
05	165	133	105	157	99	100	95%
06	192	152	120	186	118	117	98%
07	173	127	84	166	81	82	98%
08	122	102	57	119	56	56	98%
09	122	106	75	119	74	74	99%
10	164	148	84	160	83	82	98%
11	295	260	139	288	134	135	97%
12	78	66	1	76	1	1	100%
14	42	36	1	41	1	1	100%
15	154	136	80	148	76	80	100%
16	13	10	0	11	0	0	--
17	31	28	0	30	0	0	--
18	25	22	0	24	0	0	--
19	17	12	0	15	0	0	--
20	11	8	1	11	1	1	100%
22	69	53	2	67	2	2	100%
24	23	19	0	23	0	0	--
25	99	84	48	91	43	48	100%
<b>Total</b>	2,146	1,780	1,009	2,076	976	983	97%

**Shooting Incidents & ShotSpotter Events with Evidence Recovery**  
**Chicago Police Department**  
**January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020<sup>1</sup>**

District <sup>2</sup>	Total Shooting Incidents <sup>3</sup>	Outdoor Shooting Incidents <sup>4</sup>	SST Associated Incidents <sup>5</sup>	Shots Fired Associated Incidents <sup>6</sup>	SST & Shots Fired Associated Incidents	SST Associated Incidents	
						Incidents with Evidence Recovery <sup>7</sup>	% Incidents with Evidence Recovery
01	35	30	1	33	1	1	100%
02	112	88	63	105	61	62	98%
03	210	160	117	204	112	115	98%
04	234	186	143	224	137	138	97%
05	209	167	144	197	137	137	95%
06	250	186	142	239	137	136	96%
07	304	232	167	295	161	160	96%
08	154	127	77	143	74	75	97%
09	194	159	108	186	104	104	96%
10	258	222	134	249	128	131	98%
11	450	399	231	431	220	228	99%
12	139	119	3	137	3	3	100%
14	56	53	1	55	1	1	100%
15	209	166	91	200	87	89	98%
16	25	17	2	24	2	2	100%
17	66	62	2	66	2	1	50%
18	29	24	0	28	0	0	--
19	22	15	0	20	0	0	--
20	11	11	0	11	0	0	--
22	112	83	6	112	6	6	100%
24	49	42	0	49	0	0	--
25	131	105	71	127	67	70	99%
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,259</b>	<b>2,653</b>	<b>1,503</b>	<b>3,135</b>	<b>1,440</b>	<b>1,459</b>	<b>97%</b>

**Shooting Incidents & ShotSpotter Events with Evidence Recovery**  
**Chicago Police Department**  
**January 1, 2021 - December 31, 2021<sup>1</sup>**

District <sup>2</sup>	Total Shooting Incidents <sup>3</sup>	Outdoor Shooting Incidents <sup>4</sup>	SST Associated Incidents <sup>5</sup>	Shots Fired Associated Incidents <sup>6</sup>	SST & Shots Fired Associated Incidents	SST Associated Incidents	
						Incidents with Evidence Recovery <sup>7</sup>	% Incidents with Evidence Recovery
01	56	48	2	55	2	2	100%
02	148	126	77	143	75	77	100%
03	258	196	138	250	133	138	100%
04	251	192	154	239	150	148	96%
05	263	197	178	246	166	173	97%
06	310	241	184	297	176	176	96%
07	331	259	220	318	214	210	95%
08	173	134	102	163	99	96	94%
09	208	177	122	204	120	117	96%
10	279	241	161	266	150	157	98%
11	474	410	276	466	272	270	98%
12	142	113	7	139	7	7	100%
14	63	54	1	62	1	1	100%
15	177	144	79	172	78	78	99%
16	27	18	1	26	1	1	100%
17	54	50	0	53	0	0	--
18	48	43	0	45	0	0	--
19	31	25	0	29	0	0	--
20	10	10	0	9	0	0	--
22	104	79	8	103	8	6	75%
24	35	30	0	35	0	0	--
25	113	91	70	106	65	69	99%
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,555</b>	<b>2,878</b>	<b>1,780</b>	<b>3,426</b>	<b>1,717</b>	<b>1,726</b>	<b>97%</b>



**Shooting Incidents & ShotSpotter Events with Evidence Recovery**  
**Chicago Police Department**  
**January 1, 2022 - September 30, 2022<sup>1</sup>**

District <sup>2</sup>	Total Shooting Incidents <sup>3</sup>	Outdoor Shooting Incidents <sup>4</sup>	SST Associated Incidents <sup>5</sup>	Shots Fired Associated Incidents <sup>6</sup>	SST & Shots Fired Associated Incidents	SST Associated Incidents	
						Incidents with Evidence Recovery <sup>7</sup>	% Incidents with Evidence Recovery
01	44	35	0	42	0	0	--
02	96	78	48	94	47	47	98%
03	158	121	76	153	74	75	99%
04	136	108	86	132	86	85	99%
05	136	97	95	125	90	92	97%
06	180	144	109	175	107	104	95%
07	206	161	120	196	118	116	97%
08	118	102	68	114	65	61	90%
09	155	126	96	149	91	93	97%
10	169	152	94	168	94	90	96%
11	286	236	155	277	147	153	99%
12	94	74	4	91	4	4	100%
14	31	23	1	29	1	1	100%
15	87	72	42	84	40	41	98%
16	12	8	0	10	0	0	--
17	41	28	0	40	0	0	--
18	39	34	0	37	0	0	--
19	23	20	0	20	0	0	--
20	13	11	0	12	0	0	--
22	73	53	8	68	8	8	100%
24	27	24	0	27	0	0	--
25	66	53	38	62	37	36	95%
<b>Total</b>	2,190	1,760	1,040	2,105	1,009	1,006	97%



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 5, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 27 Officer Tenure

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Lee requested that the CPD provide the average tenure of sworn officers, broken down by ethnic group.

Average Tenure CPD Sworn Officers= 15.5 Years on Job

Average Tenure of CPD Sworn Officers by demographic:

Black	Average 14 years on job
Asian	Average 12 years on job
Hispanic	Average 11 years on job
White	Average 15.5 years on job

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

---

**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 5, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 28 2023 Headcount

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Reilly requested that the CPD provide the changes in headcount projected for 2023.

CPD has averaged 610 separations (retire/resign) per year over the last 5 years. PSA is projecting 1200 hires in 2023.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

---

**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 5, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 29 2023 Vacancies

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Aldersperson Reilly requested that the CPD provide the number of funded vacancies and breakdown for 2023.

Please see attached as provided by PSA.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.

**Current and Recommended Vacancies for BFY2023**  
**057 - Chicago Police Department**  
*As of September 26, 2022*

DEPT	FUND	DIVISION	SECTION	SUBSECTION	SCHEDULE	GRADE	UNION (Y/N)	TITLE CODE	TITLE DESCRIPTION	PAY TYPE	BUDGETED PAY RATE	
057	0W53	280Z	380Z	0000	BX	13	N	3521	CRIME VICTIM ADVOCATE	Annual	\$52,956.00	1
	0W59	280V	380V	0000	BX	17	N	9119	SR INTEL ANALYST	Annual	\$75,996.00	1
	0100	2005	3004	0000	1	0	N	9684	DEPUTY DIR	Annual	\$130,152.00	1
											\$166,956.00	1
			3021	4020	3	0	N	0311	PROJECTS ADMINISTRATOR	Annual	\$108,816.00	1
				4021	3	0	N	0311	PROJECTS ADMINISTRATOR	Annual	\$108,816.00	1
								1645	ASSOCIATE STAFF ATTORNEY	Annual	\$66,840.00	1
					B	13	Y	0708	FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT OFFICER	Annual	\$59,184.00	5
								1617	PARALEGAL II	Annual	\$59,184.00	2
					E	4	Y	9016	POLICE LEGAL OFFICER II	Annual	\$133,968.00	2
				4022	B	13	Y	0711	PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER	Annual	\$59,184.00	2
					BX	16	N	0729	INFORMATION COORD	Annual	\$69,984.00	2
						17	N	0790	PUBLIC RELATIONS COORD	Annual	\$75,996.00	1
				4025	1	0	N	9684	DEPUTY DIR	Annual	\$135,456.00	1
					3	0	N	0289	SAFETY ADMINISTRATOR	Annual	\$100,500.00	1
					B	13	Y	6122	SAFETY SPECIALIST	Annual	\$59,184.00	2
			3427	4040	B	12	Y	0303	ADMINISTRATIVE ASST III	Annual	\$53,952.00	1
					D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	7
						2A	Y	9165	POLICE OFFICER (ASSIGNED AS DETECTI..	Annual	\$82,728.00	1
					E	3	Y	9171	SERGEANT	Annual	\$118,836.00	4
					GY	8	N	1126	SENIOR PERFORMANCE ANALYST	Annual	\$75,852.00	1
								1141	PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS ANALYST	Annual	\$75,852.00	1
				4042	B	11	Y	3130	LABORATORY TECHNICIAN III	Annual	\$49,176.00	1
					D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	6
			3429	0000	3	0	N	0306	ASST DIR	Annual	\$90,084.00	1
								0311	PROJECTS ADMINISTRATOR	Annual	\$108,816.00	4
					B	12	Y	9101	COMMUNITY ORGANIZER-CAPS	Annual	\$53,952.00	6
					BX	15	N	1910	INFORMATION SERVICES COORD	Annual	\$63,780.00	2
						16	N	0309	COORD OF SPECIAL PROJECTS	Annual	\$69,984.00	1
								3099	HATE CRIME VICTIM ADVOCATE	Annual	\$69,984.00	1
						17	N	1927	AREA COORD - CAPS	Annual	\$75,996.00	2
			3437	0000	D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	1
					E	3	Y	9171	SERGEANT	Annual	\$118,836.00	1
		2007	3430	0000	3	0	N	9752	COMMANDER	Annual	\$175,944.00	1
					BX	18	N	0722	DIGITAL MEDIA SPEC-CPD	Annual	\$81,552.00	1
					D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	15
					GY	8	N	1141	PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS ANALYST	Annual	\$75,852.00	1
			3435	0000	D	2A	Y	9165	POLICE OFFICER (ASSIGNED AS DETECTI..	Annual	\$82,728.00	1
					E	3	Y	9171	SERGEANT	Annual	\$118,836.00	1
			3441	0000	D	3	Y	9160	POLICE OFFICER (ASSIGNED AS SECURIT..	Annual	\$121,806.00	6

**Current and Recommended Vacancies for BFY2023**  
**057 - Chicago Police Department**  
*As of September 26, 2022*

DEPT	FUND	DIVISION	SECTION	SUBSECTION	SCHEDULE	GRADE	UNION (Y/N)	TITLE CODE	TITLE DESCRIPTION	PAY TYPE	BUDGETED PAY RATE								
057	0100	2012	3283	0000	B	12	Y	0303	ADMINISTRATIVE ASST III	Annual	\$53,952.00	1							
						16	Y	9117	CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYST	Annual	\$78,252.00	1							
			3321	0000	3	0	N	9752	COMMANDER		Annual	\$175,944.00	1						
									B	8	Y	0833	PERSONAL COMPUTER OPERATOR I	Annual	\$37,224.00	2			
						10	Y	9116		POLICE ADMINISTRATIVE CLERK	Annual	\$44,808.00	32						
						D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	587						
							2	Y	9155	POLICE OFFICER (PER ARBITRATION AW..	Annual	\$79,974.00	1						
									9164	POLICE OFFICER / FLD TRNG OFFICER	Annual	\$79,974.00	67						
					E	3	Y	9171	SERGEANT	Annual	\$118,836.00	51							
						5	Y	9175	CAPTAIN	Annual	\$147,306.00	1							
					I	12	Y	9122	DETENTION AIDE	Annual	\$48,588.00	37							
						3322	0000	BX	17	N	9120	DIGITAL INTEL ANALYST		Annual	\$75,996.00	5			
			D	1	Y							9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	1			
					2A			Y	9165	POLICE OFFICER (ASSIGNED AS DETECTI..	Annual	\$82,728.00	16						
			E	3	Y	9171	SERGEANT	Annual	\$118,836.00	6									
				4	Y	9173	LIEUTENANT	Annual	\$133,968.00	1									
			2016	3274	0000	D	2A	Y	9165	POLICE OFFICER (ASSIGNED AS DETECTI..		Annual	\$82,728.00	7					
										GY	8	N	1141	PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS ANALYST	Annual	\$75,852.00	1		
				3282	4280	D	2A	Y	9165	POLICE OFFICER (ASSIGNED AS DETECTI..		Annual	\$82,728.00	2					
										4285	D	2A	Y	9165	POLICE OFFICER (ASSIGNED AS DETECTI..		Annual	\$82,728.00	5
															4286	D	1	Y	9161
					2A	Y	9165	POLICE OFFICER (ASSIGNED AS DETECTI..	Annual	\$82,728.00	1								
				3287	4278	D	2A	Y	9165	POLICE OFFICER (ASSIGNED AS DETECTI..		Annual	\$82,728.00	12					
										4279	D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	2	
						2	Y	9151	POLICE OFFICER (ASSIGNED AS TRAFFIC ..			Annual	\$79,974.00	4					
					E	3	Y	9171	SERGEANT	Annual	\$118,836.00	1							
						4287	D	2A	Y	9165	POLICE OFFICER (ASSIGNED AS DETECTI..		Annual	\$82,728.00	3				
					4295	D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER		Annual	\$56,040.00	7					
							2A	Y	9165	POLICE OFFICER (ASSIGNED AS DETECTI..		Annual	\$82,728.00	11					
					E	3	Y	9171	SERGEANT		Annual	\$118,836.00	1						
			3291			4306	3	0	N	9234	FORENSIC FIREARM/EVIDENCE IDENT TE..		Annual	\$117,840.00	2				
					D						2	Y	9163	POLICE OFFICER(ASGND AS LATENT PRI..		Annual	\$79,974.00	11	
									9206	POLICE OFFICER (ASSIGNED AS EVIDENC..		Annual	\$79,974.00	23					
				3	Y		9166	POLICE OFFICER(ASGND AS SUPVGV LATE..		Annual	\$121,806.00	1							
							9201	POLICE FORENSIC INVESTIGATOR I		Annual	\$121,806.00	1							
							9213	FIREARMS IDENT TECH I		Annual	\$121,806.00	1							
		E		3	Y		9171	SERGEANT		Annual	\$118,836.00	2							
		4307	B	10	Y	4238	PROPERTY CUSTODIAN		Annual	\$44,808.00	11								
							11	Y	4239	SUPERVISING PROPERTY CUSTODIAN		Annual	\$49,176.00	1					
				D	1	Y				9161	POLICE OFFICER		Annual	\$56,040.00	1				

**Current and Recommended Vacancies for BFY2023**  
**057 - Chicago Police Department**  
*As of September 26, 2022*

DEPT	FUND	DIVISION	SECTION	SUBSECTION	SCHEDULE	GRADE	UNION (Y/N)	TITLE CODE	TITLE DESCRIPTION	PAY TYPE	BUDGETED PAY RATE		
057	0100	2016	3291	4307	E	3	Y	9171	SERGEANT	Annual	\$118,836.00	1	
				3294	0000	D	2A	Y	9165	POLICE OFFICER (ASSIGNED AS DETECTI..	Annual	\$82,728.00	10
		2028	3330	0000	E	3	Y	9171	SERGEANT	Annual	\$118,836.00	1	
				0000	E	4	Y	9173	LIEUTENANT	Annual	\$133,968.00	1	
			3334	0000	D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	40	
				0000	E	3	Y	9171	SERGEANT	Annual	\$118,836.00	1	
			3338	4220	4220	D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	1
					4221	D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	8
				4222	4222	E	3	Y	9171	SERGEANT	Annual	\$118,836.00	1
					4222	D	2	Y	9154	POLICE OFFICER (ASSGN AS HELICOPT..	Annual	\$79,974.00	1
				4223	4223	D	2	Y	9169	POLICE OFFICER (ASGND AS MOUNTED P..	Annual	\$79,974.00	11
					4223	D	2	Y	9168	POLICE OFFICER (ASGND AS MARINE OFF..	Annual	\$79,974.00	13
				4224	4224	D	2	Y	9152	POLICE OFFICER (ASSIGNED AS CANINE ..	Annual	\$79,974.00	11
					4224	D	2	Y	9153	POLICE OFFICER/EXPLSV DETECT K9 HN..	Annual	\$79,974.00	1
				4225	4225	E	3	Y	9171	SERGEANT	Annual	\$118,836.00	1
					4225	D	3	Y	9158	EXPLOSIVES TECHNICIAN I	Annual	\$121,806.00	3
			4227	4227	D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	20	
				4227	E	3	Y	9171	SERGEANT	Annual	\$118,836.00	3	
			3339	4218	4218	D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	11
					4218	D	2A	Y	9165	POLICE OFFICER (ASSIGNED AS DETECTI..	Annual	\$82,728.00	2
				4226	4226	B	16	Y	9117	CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYST	Annual	\$78,252.00	2
					4226	D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	13
		4229		4229	D	2A	Y	9165	POLICE OFFICER (ASSIGNED AS DETECTI..	Annual	\$82,728.00	2	
				4229	E	3	Y	9171	SERGEANT	Annual	\$118,836.00	1	
		3423		4290	4290	E	3	Y	9171	SERGEANT	Annual	\$118,836.00	1
					4290	D	2	Y	9126	POLICE TECHNICIAN	Annual	\$79,974.00	2
				4291	4291	D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	56
					4291	E	3	Y	9171	SERGEANT	Annual	\$118,836.00	2
			4292	4292	D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	36	
				4292	D	2A	Y	9165	POLICE OFFICER (ASSIGNED AS DETECTI..	Annual	\$82,728.00	1	
			4293	4293	E	3	Y	9171	SERGEANT	Annual	\$118,836.00	2	
				4293	D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	17	
			4294	4294	D	2A	Y	9165	POLICE OFFICER (ASSIGNED AS DETECTI..	Annual	\$82,728.00	2	
				4294	B	12	Y	0101	ACCOUNTANT I	Annual	\$53,952.00	1	
		4294	4294	D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	16		
			4294	D	0303	Y	0303	ADMINISTRATIVE ASST III	Annual	\$53,952.00	1		
		2037	3063	4132	4132	B	10	Y	0431	CLERK IV	Annual	\$44,808.00	7
						B	11	Y	9224	FINGERPRINT TECHNICIAN II	Annual	\$49,176.00	2
						B	13	Y	9197	WARRANT AND EXTRADITION AIDE	Annual	\$59,184.00	3
						B	13	Y	9225	FINGERPRINT TECHNICIAN III	Annual	\$59,184.00	1

**Current and Recommended Vacancies for BFY2023**  
**057 - Chicago Police Department**  
*As of September 26, 2022*

DEPT	FUND	DIVISION	SECTION	SUBSECTION	SCHEDULE	GRADE	UNION (Y/N)	TITLE CODE	TITLE DESCRIPTION	PAY TYPE	BUDGETED PAY RATE												
057	0100	2037	3063	4132	B	14	Y	9003	CRIMINAL HISTORY ANALYST	Annual	\$64,992.00	5											
					BX	14	N	9194	DIGITAL RETRIEVAL SPEC	Annual	\$58,116.00	9											
						18	N	0394	ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGER	Annual	\$81,552.00	2											
					4133	B	10	Y			0235	PAYMENT SERVICES REPRESENTATIVE	Annual	\$44,808.00	1								
									4238	PROPERTY CUSTODIAN	Annual	\$44,808.00	4										
									12	Y	0432	SUPERVISING CLERK	Annual	\$53,952.00	1								
									14	Y	9003	CRIMINAL HISTORY ANALYST	Annual	\$64,992.00	1								
									BX	13	N	0841	MANAGER OF DATA ENTRY OPERATORS	Annual	\$52,956.00	1							
									18	N	0394	ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGER	Annual	\$81,552.00	1								
					3066	4137	E	4	Y	9173	LIEUTENANT	Annual	\$133,968.00	1									
					3069	4139	B	16	Y	9117	CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYST	Annual	\$78,252.00	2									
															GY	8	N	1141	PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS ANALYST	Annual	\$75,852.00	8	
							4143	D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	4								
																E	3	Y	9171	SERGEANT	Annual	\$118,836.00	1
																GY	8	N	1141	PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS ANALYST	Annual	\$75,852.00	2
					2040	3350	0000	1	0	N	9796	DEPUTY CHIEF	Annual	\$183,984.00	1								
																3	0	N	0311	PROJECTS ADMINISTRATOR	Annual	\$84,888.00	2
								B	13	Y	1617	PARALEGAL II	Annual	\$59,184.00	3								
																BX	15	N	1912	PROJECT COORD	Annual	\$63,780.00	3
								G	7	Y	0193	AUDITOR III	Annual	\$77,772.00	2								
																1646	ATTORNEY	Annual	\$77,772.00	1			
																GY	7	N	1125	PERFORMANCE ANALYST	Annual	\$69,564.00	7
								8	N	1126	SENIOR PERFORMANCE ANALYST	Annual	\$75,852.00	9									
															2903	RESEARCH AND POLICY ANALYST - CPD	Annual	\$81,552.00	2				
															9	N	2903	RESEARCH AND POLICY ANALYST - CPD	Annual	\$81,552.00	2		
								3355	4355	B	12	Y	0303	ADMINISTRATIVE ASST III	Annual	\$53,952.00	1						
																		D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual
								3358	4361	B	12	Y	0303	ADMINISTRATIVE ASST III	Annual	\$53,952.00	1						
																		14	Y	1359	TRAINING OFFICER	Annual	\$64,992.00
					D	1	Y			9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	49									
															2	Y	9164	POLICE OFFICER / FLD TRNG OFFICER	Annual	\$79,974.00	3		
															9170	POLICE OFFICER AS ARMORER	Annual	\$79,974.00	1				
	G	7	Y	1646	ATTORNEY	Annual	\$77,772.00			1													
	GY	9	N	9024	PROJECT STRATEGY MANAGER - CPD	Annual	\$81,552.00			1													
	4362	1	0	N	9684	DEPUTY DIR	Annual			\$152,652.00	1												
								D	3			Y	9156	PO SUPVG SUBST ABUSE CNSLR	Annual	\$121,806.00	1						
								G	7			Y	3534	CLINICAL THERAPIST III	Annual	\$77,772.00	9						
	4364	B	14	Y	3897	COMMUNITY OUTREACH COORD	Annual	\$64,992.00	1														
										E	3	Y	9171	SERGEANT	Annual	\$118,836.00	1						



**Current and Recommended Vacancies for BFY2023**  
**057 - Chicago Police Department**  
*As of September 26, 2022*

DEPT	FUND	DIVISION	SECTION	SUBSECTION	SCHEDULE	GRADE	UNION (Y/N)	TITLE CODE	TITLE DESCRIPTION	PAY TYPE	BUDGETED PAY RATE				
057	0100	2040	3624	4153	GY	9	N	9024	PROJECT STRATEGY MANAGER - CPD	Annual	\$81,552.00	7			
				4154	3	0	N	1127	CHIEF PERFORMANCE ANALYST	Annual	\$100,500.00	1			
					D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	1			
					GY	8	N	1126	SENIOR PERFORMANCE ANALYST	Annual	\$75,852.00	3			
				3627	4158	D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	4		
				3629	4159	3	0	N	0306	ASST DIR	Annual	\$121,404.00	1		
						8780	DIR OF RESEARCH AND PLANNING	Annual	\$128,856.00	1					
						D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	2		
				0610	2028	3336	0000	D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	22
								2	Y	9153	POLICE OFFICER/EXPLSV DETECT K9 HN..	Annual	\$79,974.00	3	
								E	3	Y	9171	SERGEANT	Annual	\$118,836.00	1
				0740	2028	3335	0000	D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	50
								2	Y	9153	POLICE OFFICER/EXPLSV DETECT K9 HN..	Annual	\$79,974.00	4	
	3338	4228	D					3	Y	9158	EXPLOSIVES TECHNICIAN I	Annual	\$121,806.00	2	
	G396	2983	3983	0000	D	1	Y	9161	POLICE OFFICER	Annual	\$56,040.00	75			
	G400	2921	3921	0000	D	2	Y	9153	POLICE OFFICER/EXPLSV DETECT K9 HN..	Annual	\$79,974.00	11			
<b>Total Vacancies</b>												<b>1,669</b>			



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 5, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 30 Cut Vacancies

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Reilly requested that the CPD provide the number of vacancies being cut and what positions (job titles) are being eliminated.

There are no vacancies/job titles being cut or eliminated.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 5, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 31 Non-Union Raises

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Reilly requested that the CPD provide the number of non-union employees to receive salary increases in 2023 budget.

As provided by PSA, there are 3 non-union employees receiving a salary increase in the 2023 budget.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 5, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 32 Outsourced Services

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Reilly requested that the CPD provide the description of outsourced services projected for 2023.

Services outsourced include subject matter experts, trainers and curriculum developers, independent assessments, and policy development.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 26, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 33 Zero Based Budgeting

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Reilly requested that the CPD provide a list of savings and cost-efficiencies due to zero-based budgeting.

The Office of Budget and Management did not have departments do Zero-Based Budgeting for the 2023 Budget. However, the Department worked closely with OBM and OPSA to ensure that all needs of CPD were met efficiently and effectively.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



CITY OF CHICAGO

CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT

# MEMORANDUM

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 28, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-34 Don’t Block the Box Citations

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Reilly requested that the CPD provide the number of citations issued for “Don’t Block the Box”, “Riding a Bicycle in Sidewalk”, and E-scooter violations for 2020, 2021, and 2022 year to date.

### Traffic Citations YTD 01 Jan - 30 Sep 2022

Statute	Statute Description	2020	2021	2022 YTD
9-40-120	Obstruction of Intersection	30	17	8
9-52-020	Riding bicycles on sidewalks and certain roadway	0	3	2
Any Violation where Vehicle Make is MINISCOOTER		19	8	12

### Administrative Notices of Violation YTD 01 Jan - 30 Sep 2022

Statute	Statute Description	2020	2021	2022 YTD
9-52-020	Riding bicycles on sidewalks and certain roadway	417	109	72

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



CITY OF CHICAGO

CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT

# MEMORANDUM

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 27, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-35 Drag Racing Citations

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Reilly requested that the CPD provide the number of citations issued for violating Sections 9-12-090 (Drag Racing), 9-12-100 (Drifting), and 9-76-140 (illegal exhaust system) of the Municipal Code for 2020, 2021, and 2022 year to date.

Please note, 9-12-090 and 9-12-100 were added to CPD's list of charges used in the Arrest and Traffic Stop applications on Oct 25, 2022. Before this change, CPD officers issued citations for Street Racing under state law 625 ILCS 5/11-506-A.

### Traffic Citations YTD 01 Jan - 30 Sep 2022

Statute	Statute Description	2020	2021	2022 YTD
9-76-140(A)	Muffler Cut Out, Bypass, etc - Violation	20	6	11
9-76-140(B)	Muffler - Excessive Fumes or Smoke	10	1	3
9-12-090	Drag Racing	0	0	0
9-12-100	Drifting	0	0	0
625 ILCS 5.0/11-506-A	Street Racing	4	3	1



CITY OF CHICAGO

CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT

### Administrative Notices of Violation YTD 01 Jan - 30 Sep 2022

Statute	Statute Description	2020	2021	2022 YTD
9-76-140(A)(1)	Exhaust System - Good Working Condition	10	2	1
9-76-140(A)(3)	Exhaust System - Federal Noise Emission Req	1	0	0
9-76-140(B)	Exhaust System - Excessive Fumes or Smoke	0	0	1
9-12-100	Drifting - Vehicle Impoundment	0	0	3

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.





CITY OF CHICAGO

CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT

# MEMORANDUM

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 27, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-36 Section 8-32-070 Citations

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Reilly requested that the CPD provide the number of citations issued for violating Section 8-32-070 (music and amplified sound) of the Municipal Code for 2020, 2021, and 2022 year to date.

### Traffic Citations YTD 01 Jan - 30 Sep 2022

Statute	Statute Description	2020	2021	2022 YTD
8-32-070	Music and Amplified Sound	0	0	0

### Administrative Notices of Violation YTD 01 Jan - 30 Sep 2022

Statute	Statute Description	2020	2021	2022 YTD
8-32-070	Music and Amplified Sound	35	12	15

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 5, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 37 Intelligence Technology

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Reilly requested that the CPD provide the following information: What investments are being made in intelligence gathering technology in regards to tech, personnel, and training?

**Equipment:**

- Trackers
- Cell phone data extraction and analysis
- Covert equipment
- Surveillance equipment
- Surveillance vehicles
- Plate reading technology

**Personnel:**

- Techlab has approximately 10 technicians

Training:

- Basic computer knowledge and computer security
- Computer networks and security
- Cell phone data extraction and applications
- Tracking software
- Data analysis applications
- Use of all covert equipment

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 24, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 38 EAP Participation

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Aldersperson Knudsen requested that the CPD provide the number of CPD members/staff utilizing mental health services. The below table indicates participation in services provided by the Professional Counseling Division by all Department members, year to date as of October 14, 2022:

<b>UNIT ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ACTIVITIES</b>			
	<b>This week:</b>	<b>Last week:</b>	<b>Year to date</b>
<b>MENTAL HEALTH</b>			
Department members served	157	134	6,998
Family members served	59	64	2,711
<b>ALCOHOL/SUBSTANCE ABUSE*</b>			
Department and family members served:	470	472	17,553
<b>PEER SUPPORT</b>			
Department and family members served:	463	439	15,865
<b>CHAPLAINS</b>			
Department and family members served:	237	316	11,180

*The numbers in the chart above reflect the number of individual sessions by service type. This could include consultations, group debriefings, and trainings. Each number is a reflection of total contacts by clinicians within the professional counseling division.*

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 27, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-39 911 Calls

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Mitts requested that the CPD provide the list of 911 calls for districts in her ward.

Please see the attachment.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.

# REQUESTS THROUGH THE CHAIR: 2022

List of 911 calls in 011th, 015th, and 025th District YTD 01 Jan - 23 Oct 2022

Call Type	District		
	011	015	025
DOMESTIC DISTURBANCE	4970	4097	4155
DISTURBANCE	3763	2732	4114
PARKING VIOL. 1	1629	1768	4966
MISSION	3265	2301	1853
SELLING NARCOTICS	5337	1675	402
CHECK WELL BEING	2789	1912	2605
EMS	3562	1602	1683
AUTO ACCIDENT PD	2074	1317	2886
EL CHECK [OV]	4065	1915	14
DISTURBANCE - MUSIC/NOISE	1613	1101	3171
PARKING VIOL. 2	1348	908	3433
PREMISE CHECK [OV]	1158	400	4079
SHOT SPOTTER	1878	1188	1823
PERSON WITH A GUN	2419	1352	1051
BATTERY IP	1796	1209	1637
ALARM BURGLAR	1659	1198	1578
PERSON DOWN	2667	868	889
DOMESTIC BATTERY	1741	1256	1310
ALARM COMMERCIAL	1407	609	1856
SUSPICIOUS AUTO NO OCC.	1306	853	1448
ASSAULT IP	1292	836	1187
SPECIAL ATTENTION	1546	870	886
SUSPICIOUS PERSON	1036	736	1395
INFO. FOR THE POLICE	1123	882	1154
STREETS & SAN BLUE CARD	1119	664	1044
DETAIL	1241	1018	492
MENTAL HEALTH DISTURBANCE	966	778	918
ASSIST CITIZEN	1070	594	943
POD MISSION	459	1969	39
PARK CHECK [OV]	329	435	1508
ASSIST CITIZEN (OV)	738	719	762
AUTO ACCIDENT PI	851	471	839
VOOP - Cindy Bischof' Law	798	628	658
THEFT REPORT	705	631	729
SHOTS FIRED	873	407	626
OVER DOSE	1275	348	230
CRIMINAL TRESPASS IP	830	471	550
SUSPICIOUS AUTO WITH OCC	622	328	845
FIRE	706	438	498
STREETS & SAN PINK CARD	846	418	337

REQUESTS THROUGH THE CHAIR: 2022

PERSON WITH A KNIFE	682	471	391
MISSING PERSON	569	522	445
BATTERY JO	630	381	497
COMMUNITY CONCERNS	102	169	1195
RECKLESS DRIVING	375	248	828
VICE COMPLAINTS IP	599	194	486
RECOVERED STOLEN AUTO	631	344	301
EL PLATFORM CHECK [OV]	805	424	1
TRANSPORT (OV)	480	251	369
CRIM DAM. TO PROP RPT	437	313	330
OUTDOOR ROLL CALL	367	475	224
FOOT PATROL (OV)	225	206	633
ASSAULT JO	360	249	422
ROBBERY JO	489	221	246
PRISONER TRANSPORT	422	255	261
PERSON CALLING FOR HELP	363	250	324
VIOLATION ORDER OF PROT	345	241	344
PERSON WANTED	398	247	238
BATTERY REPORT	283	296	292
AUTO ACCIDENT (ON VIEW)	306	260	252
BURGLARY IP	326	222	251
AUTO THEFT REPORT	273	283	224
MUNICIPAL ORD. VIOLATION	226	150	376
DUI DRIVER	167	97	487
AMBULANCE (OV)	458	155	135
LOST PROPERTY	210	225	298
ALARM PANIC	255	139	324
ASSAULT REPORT	255	232	217
CRIM DAM. TO PROP IP	281	201	216
THREATENING SUICIDE	276	133	289
ANIMAL VICIOUS	226	226	244
THEFT IP	173	153	361
DECEPTIVE PRAC. REPORT	121	201	358
SEX OFFENSE OTHER	297	145	219
MAN SLUMPED OVER WHEEL	251	127	280
BURGLARY REPORT	238	176	235
CRIM DAM. TO PROP JO	246	182	220
SCHOOL VISITATION:Non-Supv. personnel	83	389	143
THEFT JO	205	133	268
BUS CHECK [OV]	48	471	74
POINT WEAPON (OV)	200	201	190
FIREWORKS	169	130	280
LIC PLT READER ARMED DANGEROUS	370	145	43



REQUESTS THROUGH THE CHAIR: 2022

HUNCHLAB (OV)	459	1	
PROSTITUTION	340	12	43
SHOTS FIRED (OV)	207	100	62
FOUND PROPERTY	124	94	147
CFD ASSIST	154	94	116
TRAFFIC CONTROL	115	75	156
Narcotics Loitering	115	180	48
GANG DISTURBANCE	77	39	214
CTA RIDE (OV)	196	96	32
POLICE EMERG. EVENT REQUEST	62	119	128
ALARM HOLD UP	92	53	158
CHILD LEFT ALONE	82	59	162
ROBBERY REPORT	119	96	83
PURSUIT FOOT (OV)	179	81	35
PERSON STABBED	161	82	42
PERSON SHOT	157	72	43
CRIM SEX ASSLT RPT	71	91	93
GENERIC (CHANGE PRIORITY)	119	63	73
BATTERY VICTIM INJ.	126	82	44
ANIMAL ABUSE	58	55	129
HOLDING OFFENDER	31	16	195
TELEPHONE THREATS	73	79	86
DRAG RACING	69	15	128
ASSIST POLICE	69	52	88
TELEPHONE HARASSMENT	46	60	103
SCHOOL PREMISE CHECK: Supv. Personnel	104	88	16
LOCK OUT	70	67	60
AUTO THEFT JO	87	56	47
OPEN DOOR	76	49	65
TOW	77	38	64
ELUDE (OV)	50	73	47
WIRES DOWN	47	34	76
ATTEMPT SUICIDE	53	30	61
AUTO THEFT IP	50	48	41
CHILD ABUSE	43	32	48
ROBBERY IP	61	29	28
DISTURBANCE - BARKING	34	29	52
BURGLARY JO	51	27	36
ALARM AUTO	15	15	82
TRANSPORT	35	51	26
CRIMINAL TRESPASS JO	51	24	35
VICE COMPLAINTS ROUTINE	91	4	13

REQUESTS THROUGH THE CHAIR: 2022

CRIM SEX ASSLT JO	51	27	26
ANIMAL BITE	25	29	49
MISSING PER. TENDER AGE	35	30	37
SEARCH WARRANT	18	40	35
WEAPONS VIOLATION	67	12	14
SCHOOL CROSSING	64	13	9
AUTO THEFT & RECOVERY	35	26	21
BATTERY (ON VIEW)	29	33	17
HOLDING OFFENDER (CITZ.)	31	20	28
ON VIEW	23	21	32
HAZ MAT	36	17	20
GUN TURN IN	25	14	31
CRIM DAM. TO PROP (OV)	25	20	21
ALARM BUS	30	13	22
DEATH REMOVAL	27	19	19
DISTURBANCE-LARGE GATHERING	28	23	13
DEATH INVESTIGATION	8	46	6
CRIMINAL TRESPASS RPT.	24	12	23
DECEPTIVE PRACTICE IP	16	10	26
INJURED PERSON REPORT	19	13	18
PERSON DOWN (OV)	27	7	11
FIRE (ON VIEW)	24	13	6
TOW (OV)	20	10	12
CRIM SEX ASSLT IP	20	8	11
ARSON IP	19	5	14
ALARM OTHER	12	13	10
SUSPICIOUS OBJECT	8	11	16
HEAT WELL BEING CHECK	12	8	14
KIDNAPPING REPORT	9	13	11
NOTIFICATION	5	14	14
ROBBERY (ON VIEW)	15	11	6
THEFT (ON VIEW)	8	11	13
ARSON REPORT	15	5	10
FOUND PERSON	12	9	9
KIDNAPPING I/P	9	9	12
STRIPPING AUTO I/P	14	3	12
10-1	15	7	6
Positive Youth Interaction		28	
10-1 OV	17	6	3
TRAFFIC PURSUIT (ONVIEW)	13	9	4
BOMB THREAT	8	11	4
KIDNAPPING J/O	14		9
LOST PERSON	7	3	11

REQUESTS THROUGH THE CHAIR: 2022

GAMBLING	11	7	2
PEEPING TOM	6	5	9
ALARM FIRE	6	6	4
ANIMAL FIGHTING	8	1	7
MISSING RETURNED	5	8	3
PUBLIC SAFETY CONCERNS	2	5	9
SAFE PASSAGE (OV)	10	3	3
ADMIN. NOTICE OF ORD. VIOL.	5	2	8
FORGERY	5	2	8
CURFEW VIOLATION	1	5	8
Gang/Narcotics Loitering	5	6	3
ROBBERY VICTIM INJURED	11	2	1
SWAT INCIDENT	6	6	2
CHILD ABDUCTION	4	6	3
EXPLOSION	4	2	7
Gang Loitering	10	1	2
POLICE HELICOPTER NOTIFY	4	6	3
CRIM SEX ASSLT (OV)	7	1	3
SUSPICIOUS PERSON (OV)	2	1	8
ASSAULT (ON VIEW)	4	5	1
AUTO THEFT (ON VIEW)	8	1	1
CRIMINAL TRES. (OV)	2	3	5
MENTAL UNAUTH ABSENCE	1	9	
ARSON JO	3	5	1
BANK HOLD UP ALARM	3		6
BURGLARY (OV)	4	1	4
UNATTENDED PACKAGES	4	2	3
ALARM CARBON MONOXIDE	2	2	3
PLAN 1-5	2	4	1
PROTEST	1	1	5
WHEEL CHAIR TRANSPORT	2		4
DOA REMOVAL		4	1
MARINE DISTRESS	5		
ALARM CAB	3	1	
CAR CARAVANNING	3		1
FIRE 10-1	4		
HOMELAND SECURITY	3	1	
REVENUE STEAL		1	3
ABANDONED BUILDINGS (ON VIEW)	3		
DEATH UNKNOWN	1		2
DETOX TRANSPORT	1	1	1
SEAT BELT ENFORCEMENT		3	
SUSPICIOUS MAIL	2		1

**REQUESTS THROUGH THE CHAIR: 2022**

ALARM CTA TRAIN	2		
Drone		1	1
ENCAMPMENT VISIT	1		1
EXPLOSIVE DEVICE	1	1	
PARK CHECK	2		
Plate			2
Recovery		2	
SURGE MISSION		2	
TRAIN CRASH			2
TRUANT	1		1
AUTO THFT & REC (ON VIEW)	1		
EMS 10-1	1		
ESCAPE PRISONER		1	
POLICE DRILL		1	
POLLING PLACE CHECK	1		
REVENUE EMERGENCY	1		
SMOKING ORDINANCE	1		
Steal		1	
TRAFFIC VIOLATOR BOND (OV)			1
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>88493</b>	<b>57675</b>	<b>78438</b>



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 24, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 40 Emergency Call Prioritization

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Aldersperson Mitts requested that the CPD provide the criteria used to determine the priority of 911 calls.

Please see attached - General Order G03-01-01, Section IV. Dispatch Procedures.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.

Per General Order G03-01-01:

Using the following protocol, the PCAD system automatically organizes and prioritizes each event prior to dispatch. Unless extenuating circumstances exist, dispatchers will follow the OEMC protocol listed below when dispatching assignments:

**1. PRIORITY 0 - POLICE (10-1) and FIRE UNIT CALLS FOR EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE:** Involves any life-threatening circumstances which have the potential to compromise the safety and well-being of police, EMS, or fire units. Dispatchers will follow the procedures enumerated in Item III-B-2 of this directive and assign the closest available unit for all Priority 0 calls.

**2. PRIORITY 1 - IMMEDIATE DISPATCH:** A response to a call for service that:

- a. An imminent threat to life, bodily injury, or major property damage/loss, **or**
- b. Is deemed necessary by Department guidelines.

**3. PRIORITY 2 - RAPID DISPATCH:** a response to a call for service:

- a. In which timely police action which has the potential to affect the outcome of an incident, **or**
- b. Is deemed necessary by Department guidelines.

**4. PRIORITY 3 - ROUTINE DISPATCH:** A response to a call for service that does not involve an imminent threat to life, bodily injury, or major property damage/loss, and a reasonable delay in police action will not affect the outcome of the incident.

a. Priority 3 assignments may be delayed in dispatching:

- (1) When compelling circumstances exist;
- (2) During watch changes; and
- (3) During assignment pending (backlog) situations when the number of calls for service exceeds the number of available field units.

**NOTE:** The dispatcher or call taker will inform the citizen that a field unit will respond to the call for service as soon as resources permit. These assignments will be dispatched within a reasonable period of time.

**5. PRIORITY 4 - ADMINISTRATIVE DISPATCH:** Used to process requests for service that:

a. The field unit initiates (e.g., beat community meeting, beat team meeting, problem solving, foot patrol, etc.). When initiating an administrative assignment, an officer will provide the dispatcher with the specific reason for that assignment, (e.g., beat meeting).

b. The dispatcher will accurately enter the specific event code into the PCAD system for each administrative assignment.

**6. PRIORITY 5 - ALTERNATE RESPONSE:** A response to a call for service that conforms to Alternate Response Section strategies enumerated in the Department directive entitled "Alternate Response Section Case Reporting Policy" and does **not** otherwise require the dispatch of a field unit.



# RADIO COMMUNICATIONS



<b>ISSUE DATE:</b>	13 July 2016	<b>EFFECTIVE DATE:</b>	13 July 2016
<b>RESCINDS:</b>	10 April 2013 Version		
<b>INDEX CATEGORY:</b>	03 - Field Operations		
<b>CALEA:</b>			

## I. PURPOSE

This directive outlines:

- A. Department's Radio Communications System.
- B. uniform broadcasting procedures.

Department members will refer to the Special Order titled "[Radio Communications](#)" for an overview of the Radio Communications System.

## II. GENERAL PROCEDURES

- A. With the integration of the Data Radio Network into the Department's Radio Communication System, **MEMBERS WILL ENSURE THAT ANY PDT DISPATCH FUNCTION IS ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED/REPEATED OVER VOICE RADIO.**
- B. Unless extenuating circumstances exist, a dispatcher will dispatch all assignments to field units by voice radio over the assigned police radio channel.
- C. If a field unit is equipped with a portable data terminal (PDT), the assignment will also be sent via the police computer aided dispatch (PCAD) system to that field unit's specific data terminal.
- D. When contacting the dispatcher for service, the member will give his radio call identification number, e.g., "711."
- E. When paged, the member will answer with his radio call identification number.
- F. A member who has received and understood a radio transmission will acknowledge it with his or her radio call identification number and appropriate code, e.g.:
  - 1. A one-officer unit: "711, 10-99."
  - 2. A two-officer unit: "711, 10-4."
- G. Members who receive their assignments by voice radio and, if equipped, via a PDT, will:
  - 1. maintain contact with the dispatcher.
  - 2. report any changes in availability status to the dispatcher via voice radio only. Changes in availability status are subject to the approval of the dispatcher and/or field supervisor.
  - 3. if equipped, clear the assignment via the PDT and voice radio.
- H. A member who requests a change in availability status for any reason not covered by an assignment, will:
  - 1. notify the dispatcher of a change in status via voice radio only.
  - 2. include the reason for (or nature of) the change and the member's specific street location.

- I. When transmitting on the Voice Radio Communications System, members **will use Department-issued radios ONLY.**
  - 1. Radios will be operated on the primary channel unless the dispatcher directs that a different channel be used.
  - 2. If operational considerations dictate that a field unit contact another unit on a different channel, the field unit must obtain permission from the dispatcher on the primary channel before switching to another channel.
  - 3. Radios will not be turned off during an assignment unless:
    - a. unusual circumstances exist,
    - b. approval has been obtained from a supervisor, and
    - c. the dispatcher is notified.
  - 4. Radios will be turned off during actual appearance at court/hearings and beat community meetings after notifying the dispatcher.
- J. When the assigned unit is staffed by one officer or if an officer requests assistance, dispatchers will assign an assist unit according to the protocol listed in Item IV-B-2-b of this directive. This does not preclude additional units from assisting officers in emergencies.
- K. Occasionally, a radio- or PDT-equipped unit may fail to respond to a page because of a malfunction. When a malfunction occurs, members will:
  - 1. promptly investigate a silent radio or blank PDT screen for mechanical failure;
  - 2. notify the dispatcher by the quickest means. The dispatcher will notify the member's immediate supervisor of the equipment malfunction; and
  - 3. request repair service or a replacement radio/PDT/MDT in accordance with Department directives.
- L. An officer responding to an on-view incident will:
  - 1. immediately notify the dispatcher via voice radio (on the primary channel) and include the following information:
    - a. type of incident, and
    - b. address of incident.
  - 2. respond according to the provisions in the General Order entitled "Preliminary Investigations" and related directives unless relieved of this responsibility by a supervisor assigned to the district of occurrence.
- M. When making a vehicle stop, officers should, if circumstances indicate, inform the dispatcher of the following:
  - 1. reason for stop
  - 2. location of stop
  - 3. vehicle's license plate number and state of issuance
  - 4. vehicle color, year, make, body-style
  - 5. number of occupants.
- N. The dispatcher will be responsible for:
  - 1. preparing the appropriate computer aided dispatch (CAD) event record.



2. issuing an RD number, if necessary.
- O. The Chief, Bureau of Patrol:
1. is authorized to issue bureau-level directives that list those actions of patrol units that require a notification of status to the radio zone dispatcher, (e.g., citizen assists, foot patrol, premise checks, etc).
  2. will specify those actions when a unit will be taken out of service.

### III. SPECIFIC PROCEDURES

#### A. Completion of Preliminary Investigation

1. Officers will:
  - a. report an accurate or approximate address to the dispatcher if:
    - (1) the dispatched location of the assignment:
      - (a) is different from the assignment's actual location, **or**
      - (b) was dispatched using intersecting streets only.
    - (2) the preliminary investigation has moved to a different location.
  - b. supply the dispatcher with the appropriate Illinois Uniform Crime Reporting (IUCR) code when the investigated incident requires a case report.
  - c. **immediately** return to service upon completing each assignment by:
    - (1) informing the dispatcher that they are available for further assignments.
    - (2) providing the appropriate number-letter code as listed in the Miscellaneous Incident Reporting Table [CPD-11.484](#), if applicable.
  - d. follow the procedures outlined in the Department directive entitled "[Portable Data Terminal](#)" when required to work overtime and need the continued use of a PDT.
  - e. notify their zone dispatcher by radio or PDT, if equipped, upon completion of the assignment when they have worked overtime.
2. Dispatchers will:
  - a. monitor the status of units on assignment from the previous watch.
  - b. notify the appropriate supervisor if assigned personnel have terminated their tour of duty and have **not** informed the dispatcher of the results of their assignment.

#### B. Emergency Radio Calls For Assistance

1. Officers will:
  - a. precede their radio call sign with the word, "Emergency,"  
**EXAMPLE:** "Emergency 715 - Police officer needs assistance (10-1), 5648 S. Paulina," or "Emergency - 725 - Ambulance required for injured person at 6852 S. Ashland," or "Emergency - 712 - Woman with a gun, 6120 S. Racine."  
**NOTE:** The specific circumstances of an emergency may affect a field unit's call for assistance. Dispatchers should be aware that some urgent transmissions may not conform verbatim to the procedure enumerated in this item.
  - b. not impede emergency transmissions.

- c. notify the dispatcher when responding as an assist unit, e.g., "733 assisting."
- d. respond when an emergency call is simulcast over a City-wide channel ending with a zone number with:
  - (1) their beat number;
  - (2) the words: "assisting in" ; and
  - (3) the district's zone number.

**EXAMPLE:** Dispatcher: "All units in the 7th District and City-wide: Officer needs assistance (10-1) 5648 S. Paulina, Zone 6." Radio Unit: "9603 assisting in Zone 6."

- 2. Dispatchers will:
  - a. give immediate attention to all emergency radio transmissions from officers seeking assistance.
  - b. order all other officers to standby.
  - c. dispatch the nearest available patrol units.
  - d. utilize the "Simulcast" broadcast so that all radio-equipped units in the vicinity may respond.
  - e. end the "Simulcast" broadcasts with the zone number.

**C. Missed Radio Call Procedures**

- 1. When a radio-equipped unit assigned to the Bureau of Patrol fails to respond to **a minimum of three separate pages** in an estimated one-minute period, the dispatcher will:
  - a. immediately notify the member's supervisor;
  - b. prepare a redline event notification and notify the City-wide 7 dispatcher; and

**NOTE:** The City-wide 7 dispatcher will notify the OEMC communications operations manager.
  - c. ensure that an immediate telephone notification is made to the unit of the unresponsive radio - equipped unit.
- 2. The unresponsive radio unit's immediate supervisor will ensure that an immediate investigation is conducted, including a check of the officer's radio and PDT, and take appropriate action.
- 3. The unresponsive radio - equipped unit's commanding officer will ensure that appropriate action is taken.

**D. Wanted Message Procedure**

- 1. Wanted messages are classified into two types:
  - a. **PRELIMINARY WANTED MESSAGE (QUICK FLASH)** - a brief message transmitted via radio providing descriptions or other pertinent information on wanted persons, motor vehicles, or property taken in a specific crime.
  - b. **FORMAL WANTED MESSAGE** - a preliminary wanted message given to the City-wide 3 dispatcher, then forwarded to the appropriate radio zone for rebroadcast.
- 2. Wanted messages will be sent for:
  - a. criminal or quasi-criminal incidents when:

(1) a definitive description of a wanted person or vehicle is available, **and**

(2) there is a strong probability of apprehension of the offender(s).

b. noncriminal incidents when exigent circumstances exist, e.g., lost or missing children.

**E. Notification Procedures**

In addition to the notifications required in the Department directive entitled "Preliminary Investigations," a field unit will make the following notifications for any major crime or significant incident shortly after such occurrences come to the attention of the police:

1. **PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION** - information normally transmitted over a field unit's primary radio frequency, **then forwarded** to the Crime Prevention and Information Center (CPIC) by OEMC personnel.

2. **FORMAL NOTIFICATION** - all available information is conveyed via telephone to CPIC.

**F. Open Transmitter Key**

Open transmitter keys interfere with the transmission of all other officers attempting to contact the dispatcher.

1. Officers must be especially alert for open transmitter keys so as not to endanger other officers.

2. Dispatchers will note the identification set number of any radio with an open transmitter key and notify the appropriate supervisor to identify the radio's operator and alleviate the situation.

**G. Traffic Crash Investigations**

911 call takers or dispatchers will attempt to ascertain if a traffic crash is a Type "A" or Type "B" and dispatch units in accordance with existing directives.

**H. Patrol Activity**

1. Supervisory personnel may:

a. access data from the OEMC's PCAD system, via the PCAD work station, **and**

b. obtain information concerning the activity of patrol units relative to productive/non-productive time and current status.

2. District executive officers and field supervisors will:

a. review data related to productive/nonproductive patrol time.

b. ensure efficient time-management techniques are practiced.

**IV. DISPATCH PROCEDURES**

A. Dispatchers are:

1. provided with a means of determining which police units are available for assignment.

2. authorized to assign police units.

3. to the extent possible, required to maintain beat integrity in the assignment of units.

B. Using the following protocol, the PCAD system automatically organizes and prioritizes each event prior to dispatch. Unless extenuating circumstances exist, dispatchers will follow the OEMC protocol listed below when dispatching assignments:

1. **PRIORITY 0 - POLICE (10-1) and FIRE UNIT CALLS FOR EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE:** involves any life-threatening circumstances which have the potential to compromise the safety and well-being of police, EMS, or fire units. Dispatchers will follow the procedures enumerated in Item III-B-2 of this directive and assign the closest available unit for all Priority 0 calls.
2. **PRIORITY 1 - IMMEDIATE DISPATCH:** a response to a call for service that:
  - a. involves an imminent threat to life, bodily injury, or major property damage/loss, **or**
  - b. is deemed necessary by Department guidelines. **Dispatchers will assign primary and assist units to Priority 1 calls in the following order:**
    - (1) rapid response unit or beat unit from the beat of occurrence,
    - (2) tactical unit,
    - (3) rapid response sergeant,
    - (4) sector sergeant,
    - (5) tactical sergeant,
    - (6) other field supervisor, and
    - (7) closest available unit.
3. **PRIORITY 2 - RAPID DISPATCH:** a response to a call for service:
  - a. in which timely police action which has the potential to affect the outcome of an incident, or
  - b. is deemed necessary by Department guidelines.

**NOTE:** To ensure beat integrity, dispatchers will adhere to the protocol enumerated in Item IV-B-2-b when assigning primary and assist units to Priority 2 calls.
4. **PRIORITY 3 - ROUTINE DISPATCH:** a response to a call for service that does not involve an imminent threat to life, bodily injury, or major property damage/loss, and a reasonable delay in police action will not affect the outcome of the incident.
  - a. Priority 3 assignments may be delayed in dispatching:
    - (1) when compelling circumstances exist;
    - (2) during watch changes; and
    - (3) during assignment pending (backlog) situations when the number of calls for service exceeds the number of available field units.

**NOTE:** The dispatcher or call taker will inform the citizen that a field unit will respond to the call for service as soon as resources permit. These assignments will be dispatched within a reasonable period of time.
  - b. To ensure beat integrity, dispatchers may:
    - (1) give a beat unit multiple Priority 3 assignments, but **only** when the beat unit **is clear** from its last assignment;
    - (2) hold Priority 3 assignments pending the return of beat units; and
    - (3) **NOT** give a Priority 3 assignment to a beat car off its assigned beat without the permission of that unit's supervisor.

5. **PRIORITY 4 - ADMINISTRATIVE DISPATCH:** used to process requests for service that:
- a. the field unit initiates (e.g., beat community meeting, beat team meeting, problem solving, foot patrol, etc.). When initiating an administrative assignment, an officer will provide the dispatcher with the specific reason for that assignment, (e.g., beat meeting).
  - b. the dispatcher generates for administrative purposes. The dispatcher will accurately enter the specific event code into the PCAD system for each administrative assignment.

**NOTE:** To ensure beat integrity, dispatchers will attempt to relegate Priority 4 messenger assignments to the nearest available rapid response unit.

6. **PRIORITY 5 - ALTERNATE RESPONSE:** a response to a call for service that conforms to Alternate Response Section strategies enumerated in the Department directive entitled "Alternate Response Section Case Reporting Policy" and does **not** otherwise require the dispatch of a field unit.

C. If the beat unit is unavailable and is not expected to return within a reasonable time period, the:

1. **beat unit** will advise his or her sector sergeant of any anticipated extended period of unavailability.
2. **sector sergeant**, after consulting with the rapid response sergeant, will designate a rapid response unit, incident car, squadrol, or other district field unit to cover the beat and inform the dispatcher of the change of assignment.

**NOTE:** Before designating a field unit not under the sector sergeant's direct supervision, the sector sergeant will first confer with the unit's supervising sergeant.

- D. The dispatcher will contact the field supervisor for guidance when a radio assignment backlog exists.
- E. If a rapid response unit is on a nonemergency assignment and another nonemergency call for service is received at or near its location, dispatchers may assign the call to that unit.
- F. To the extent possible, officers will receive single assignments on their beats/sectors. However, when operational needs dictate, an officer may be given:
1. multiple assignments.
  2. an assignment outside the unit's assigned beat, sector, or district.
- G. A police officer will **not** refuse any radio assignment. If an officer refuses a radio assignment, the dispatcher will notify the officer's supervisor who will take appropriate action.
- H. Any changes in the priority protocol enumerated in Item IV-B are subject to the approval of the Chief, Bureau of Patrol.

## V. RESPONSIBILITIES

- A. Field officers will:
1. be alert for radio calls and PDT messages;
  2. acknowledge radio calls and PDT messages without delay;
  3. carefully listen to and read the message as appropriate;
  4. respond immediately to radio calls and PDT messages; and
  5. accept assignments at once and without dispute.

- a. An officer may advise the dispatcher of circumstances that make it inadvisable to accept an assignment.
  - b. The decision of the dispatcher will be final unless altered by a supervisor.
6. report conditions to the dispatcher when they are the first unit to arrive on the scene of a PRIORITY 0 or an emergency PRIORITY 1 incident.
  7. make themselves available for further assignment immediately after an assignment is completed.
  8. inform the dispatcher that they are proceeding to the location of the next assignment **at the completion of each previous assignment. Officer safety is the primary purpose for this rule.**
- B. Field supervisors will:
1. monitor the radio and PDT to ensure that assignments are consistent with the policy regarding beat integrity; and
  2. upon notification from OEMC of uncompleted assignments from the previous watch:
    - a. instruct the dispatcher to reassign those assignments to the appropriate field units; and
    - b. determine the reason for the uncompleted assignments and take appropriate action.
  3. monitor radio assignments pending (RAP) and:
    - a. acknowledge receipt of radio assignments pending (RAPs) from the OEMC zone dispatchers by providing his or her beat number;
    - b. perform a check of district resources via PDT to determine if any field units can be released from assignments currently holding them down;

**NOTE:** This includes tactical, incident, and saturation teams working in the district.
    - c. request a status check of all field units via zone radio, if necessary;
    - d. repeat steps V-B-3-a through c periodically, until RAP is ended; and
    - e. note in the supervisor's management log (CPD-11.455) the time the RAP started, efforts made to end the RAP, and the time the RAP ended.

**NOTE:** Pending the significance of the RAP, supervisors may deny lunches, personals, station assignments, and other nonemergency police functions until the RAP is over.
  4. in order to serve a specific and appropriate police function, direct a dispatcher:
    - a. **not** to assign a call for service to a specific unit.
    - b. to reassign a call for service from one unit to another unit. When a unit is outside a supervisor's immediate area of responsibility, that supervisor must consult with the unit's immediate supervisor before directing a dispatcher to reassign that unit's assignment.
 

**NOTE:** **Radio silence by a supervisor implies consent with the dispatcher's assignment of a unit to a call for service.**
  5. override an OEMC dispatch of a field unit if the call for police service may be referred to the Alternate Response Section based upon criteria outlined in the Department directive entitled "Alternate Response Section Case Reporting Policy."

- a. The appropriate Miscellaneous Incident Code Number (1-19), along with the letter S (Sam), describing the police action, will be given to the OEMC dispatcher by the field supervisor reassigning an OEMC dispatch to the Alternate Response Section for police service.
  - b. If an event is dispatched to a field unit by OEMC and is subsequently designated S-Sam and sent to ARS by a field supervisor, that event will be investigated by ARS. If an ARS supervisor determines that the event did not meet ARS qualifications per General Order 04-01-01, titled "Alternate Response Section Case Reporting Policy," and should have been dispatched, the ARS commanding officer will send a report documenting the event to the Crime Prevention and Information Center (CPIC).
- C. The station supervisors will ensure that:
- 1. the watch assignment line-up (unit roster), including the tactical teams, is submitted to OEMC at least one hour prior to each respective roll call via the PCAD system. Any changes to the watch assignment line-up after it has been submitted must be entered in the PCAD system as they occur.  
**NOTE:** Station supervisors will submit the watch assignment line-up via facsimile message only if the PCAD system is inoperable.
  - 2. assignments dispatched from the OEMC are consistent with the policy regarding beat integrity.

(Items indicated by *italic/double underline* were added or revised)

Authenticated by KC

Eddie T. Johnson  
Superintendent of Police

16-036 TSS



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 26, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 41 Settlements

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Vasquez requested that the CPD provide the amount paid out towards settlements over the last 5 years and the breakdown of these complaints.

CPD defers to the Department of Law regarding amounts paid out for settlements and breakdown of these complaints.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.





**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 26, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-42 Officer Complaints

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Aldersperson Vasquez requested that the CPD provide the breakdown of the type of complaints made by officers against other officers.

Please see the attachment.

Note: The analytical report in the attachment does not distinguish "cop vs. cop" log number investigations from those in which a CPD Supervisor (sworn member) reports the misconduct of another sworn member. The "cop vs. cop" element is captured in the narrative section of the allegation(s).

## Count of Cop vs Cop Cases Received

Role = 'Reporting Party: Subject' for Sworn Member  
Cases Received from 01 Jan 2022 to 15 Sep 2022  
Source Data: CMS

Full Year	
2020	2021
197	296

YTD (01 Jan to 15 Sep)		
2020	2021	2022
146	152	179

% Breakdown by Category Group	
001 - Verbal Abuse	2.8%
002 - Alcohol/Drug Abuse	2.2%
003 - Civil Rights Violation	0.9%
004 - Arrest/Lockup Incidents	1.2%
005 - Excessive Force	1.6%
006 - Bribery/Official Corruption	0.3%
007 - Traffic	0.2%
008 - Crime/Misconduct	5.0%
009 - Conduct Unbecoming Violations	5.9%
010 - Operations/Personnel Violations	74.8%
012 - Supervisory Responsibilities	1.0%
015 - Drugs/Substance Abuse	0.5%
017 - Medical Integrity	1.0%
024 - Domestic Incidents	2.6%

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 26, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-43 False Statement Accusations

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Aldersperson Vasquez requested that the CPD provide the number of accusations for false statements made for each year, over the last five years.

Please see the report on the following page.

Note: Rule 14 violations can only be captured once a finding of "sustained" is reached.

## Sustained Rule 14 Violations

Bureau of Internal Affairs  
Analytical Section

Sustained Rule 14 Violations  
By Year Closed and Discipline  
Years 2018 to 2021 and ytd 2022  
Source Data: CRMS and CMS

Run Date:  
25 Oct 2022

	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>2020</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>Total</b>
001-One Day Suspension	0	1	0	0	0	1
200-SU over 30 days	0	2	0	0	1	3
400-Separation	7	5	2	4	1	19
800-Resigned	2	7	3	4	1	17
<b>Total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>40</b>

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 26, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-44 Rule 14 Separations

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Aldersperson Vasquez requested that the CPD provide the number of officers removed due to Rule 14 violations

Please see the report on the following page.

Note: Rule 14 violations can only be captured once a finding of "sustained" is reached.

## Sustained Rule 14 Violations

Bureau of Internal Affairs  
Analytical Section

Sustained Rule 14 Violations  
By Year Closed and Discipline  
Years 2018 to 2021 and ytd 2022  
Source Data: CRMS and CMS

Run Date:  
25 Oct 2022

	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>2020</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>Total</b>
001-One Day Suspension	0	1	0	0	0	1
200-SU over 30 days	0	2	0	0	1	3
400-Separation	7	5	2	4	1	19
800-Resigned	2	7	3	4	1	17
<b>Total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>40</b>

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 5, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 46 Civilian Positions

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Martin requested that the CPD provide the number and description of civilian positions that are occupied by sworn officers.

PSA cannot provide exact numbers. While officers might be assigned to do civilian work, they also do work that can be done only by sworn officer, making it hard to provide the exact numbers. Attached you will find job descriptions for titles that have been identified as titles that have been part of the Department's civilianization efforts in order to return officers to sworn duties.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Code: 9120**  
Family: Public Safety  
Service: Public Safety  
Group: Police Service  
Series: Police General Duty

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## **CLASS TITLE: DIGITAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYST**

### **CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CLASS**

Under general supervision, the class performs specialized technical and analytical work to provide support to detectives with post-crime investigations and investigative leads by leveraging technology resources; and performs related duties as required

The work of the Digital Intelligence Analyst is of a highly confidential nature due to the restricted and classified information sources that will be accessed within the Area Technology Centers (ATC). Positions in this class report to a sworn or civilian member of higher rank, typically a Sergeant of Police.

### **ESSENTIAL DUTIES**

- Uses established protocols to search and collect devices for any information that can be used to support investigations in a manner that maintains its integrity and a proper chain of custody
- Conducts digital forensic examinations of digital media sources
- Recovers, repairs, clarifies and analyzes audio and video information for the purposes of supporting investigations
- Synthesizes information into actionable reports for detectives and investigative staff that establishes links between criminals and crime groups or patterns of criminal activity
- Logs caseload into Tableau application to log where and what type of cases the Area Technology Centers investigate
- Assists investigators in the review of audio and video evidence and other digital media sources
- Performs document conversion and extraction in support of an investigation
- Tests new forensic software, creating test data sets, and test scripts and documents findings
- Conducts on-site forensic analysis previews of digital evidence
- Collects, preserves, labels, catalogs, and stores evidentiary items for presentation in criminal proceedings in accordance with legal standards and best practices
- Presents findings as testimony or in affidavits regarding chain of custody, processing and analysis of digital evidence
- Troubleshoots, repairs, assembles, and disassembles digital media devices to access evidence
- Prepares and maintains accurate records and reports and manages computer databases
- Conducts research concerning proprietary audio and video codecs and file formats, locates and acquires proprietary viewers/players, and installs, configures, and operates viewers and players
- Stays abreast of tools, techniques, and trends in digital forensic analysis and participates in trainings, webinars, and other activities for professional development purposes
- Provides recommendations for changes to departmental policy or procedure and the purchase of equipment as it relates to digital forensics
- Provides courtroom testimony regarding the information recovered, as required

**NOTE:** *The list of essential duties is not intended to be inclusive; there may be other duties that are essential to particular positions within the class.*



**MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS****Education, Training, and Experience**

- Graduation from an accredited college or university with a Bachelor's degree, plus one (1) year of work experience conducting digital forensic examinations and analyses, or an equivalent combination of education, training, and experience

**Licensure, Certification, or Other Qualifications**

- A valid State of Illinois driver's license is required
- As a condition of employment position(s) must be able to obtain and maintain SECRET Clearance issued by the Department of Homeland Security

**One of the following certifications is preferred**

- Certified Forensic Video Technician (CFVT) from LEVA International, Inc.
- Forensic Video Certification from International Association for Identification (IAI)
- Computer Examiner from the International Association of Computer Investigative Specialists
- LEVA Level I – Law Enforcement and Emergency Services Video Association
- Attendance at video forensic vendor courses (i.e., INPUT-ACE, Resvid, Ocean Systems, Amped Software and/or DiVRT)

**WORKING CONDITIONS**

- General office environment

**EQUIPMENT**

- Standard office equipment (e.g., telephone, printer, photocopier, fax machine, calculator, adding machine)
- Computers and peripheral equipment (e.g., personal computer, computer terminals, hand-held computer)

**PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS**

- No specific requirements

**KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS, ABILITIES, AND OTHER WORK REQUIREMENTS****Knowledge**

Comprehensive knowledge of:

- \*tools and techniques used in the collection and processing of digital evidence
- \*analytical techniques used in the development and dissemination of actionable information
- \*operating in a Windows environment, including paths, folder / file structures and extensions.
- \*various computer based media players such as Windows Media Player, VLC, ALSHOW and GOM
- law enforcement databases, including assessing data and appropriate dissemination of information
- \*Microsoft Office application suite, including Excel, PowerPoint, Word
- tools, techniques, and equipment used in the handling, copying, and clarification of video and audio

- video and audio recording using a variety of media including computer-based editing
- the use of a non-linear video editor
- tools, techniques, and best practices in the acquisition of digital multimedia evidence
- the structure of digital files and how to transfer them
- federal, state, and local laws related to the collection, preservation, and handling of digital evidence
- specialized equipment and software to extract and process data such as writeblockers, Cellebrite

Some knowledge of:

- Geographic Information System (GIS) software such as ESRI, ArcGIS
- specialized software (Tableau)

Knowledge of applicable City and department policies, procedures, rules, and regulations

### **Skills**

- \*ACTIVE LISTENING - Give full attention to what other people are saying, take time to understand the points being made, ask questions as appropriate, and not interrupt at inappropriate times
- \*ACTIVE LISTENING – Give full attention to what other people are saying, take time to understand the points being made, ask questions as appropriate, and not interrupt at inappropriate times
- \*CRITICAL THINKING - Use logic and reasoning to identify the strengths and weaknesses of alternative solutions, conclusions, or approaches to problems
- \*COORDINATION WITH OTHERS - Adjust actions in relation to others' actions
- \*COMPLEX PROBLEM SOLVING – Identify complex problems and review related information to develop and evaluate options and implement solutions
- \*JUDGEMENT AND DECISION MAKING – Consider the relative costs and benefits of potential actions to choose the most appropriate one

### **Abilities**

- COMPREHEND ORAL INFORMATION - Listen to and understand information and ideas presented through spoken words and sentences
- SPEAK - Communicate information and ideas in speaking so others will understand
- WRITE – Communicate information and ideas in writing so others will understand
- COMPREHEND WRITTEN INFORMATION - Read and understand information and ideas presented in writing
- RECOGNIZE PROBLEMS - Tell when something is wrong or is likely to go wrong
- IDENTIFY PATTERNS – Identify or detect a known pattern (a figure, object, word, or sound) that is hidden in other distracting material

### **Other Work Requirements**

- ADAPTABILITY - Able to adapt to different environments and roles while remaining alert and ready to take intelligent action in the event of a security crisis or situation

- **DEPENDABILITY** - Demonstrate reliability, responsibility, and dependability and fulfill obligations
  - **ATTENTION TO DETAIL** - Pay careful attention to detail and thoroughness in completing work tasks
- 

All employees of the City of Chicago must demonstrate commitment to and compliance with applicable state and federal laws, and City ordinances and rules; the City's Ethics standards; and other City policies and procedures.

The City of Chicago will consider equivalent foreign degrees, accreditations, and credentials in evaluating qualifications.

\* May be required at entry.

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City of Chicago  
Department of Human Resources  
June, 2020



**Code: 9122**  
Family: Public Safety  
Service: Public Safety  
Group: Police Service  
Series: Police General Duty Series

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## **CLASS TITLE: DETENTION AIDE**

### **CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CLASS**

Under general supervision, responsible for the custody, care, and processing of prisoners in the central detention and district lock-ups of the Chicago Police Department until processing is completed and ensures that the detention facility and equipment are properly maintained, and performs related duties as required

### **ESSENTIAL DUTIES**

- Photographs prisoners detained at Police facilities using an electronic photograph system
- Fingerprints prisoners by taking impressions using the manual ink method and/or the electronic live scan/biometric fingerprint scanners
- Searches prisoners using proper pat-down procedures and operates a hand held scanner during searches to ensure only permitted items are brought into the detention facility
- Asks screening questions and observes prisoners to ensure they are physically fit before admission to the detention facility
- Escorts prisoners to detainment cells and locks and unlocks cells
- Performs security checks by inspecting detention cells at frequent intervals to ensure order, discipline and the safety of prisoners
- Maintains control of uncooperative and unruly detainees
- Makes appropriate notifications when prisoners are injured or need medical attention
- Uses a personal computer to update and maintain prisoner information in the Citizen Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting (CLEAR) system
- Inventories personal property of prisoners and prepares receipts for items inventoried
- Updates and maintains records to document distribution of meals, visitations and other activities in detention facilities
- Operates a meat slicing machine and follows standard food sanitary procedures in preparing and dispensing sandwiches to prisoners at designated meal times
- Ensures the detention facility is kept clean and orderly and equipment is properly maintained
- Maintains control logs and prepares statistical reports documenting operational activities within the detention facility

**NOTE:** *The list of essential duties is not intended to be inclusive; there may be other duties that are essential to particular positions within the class.*

### **MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS**

#### **Education, Training, and Experience**

- High School graduation or General Development Test (GED) certificate. Willingness and ability to perform the duties of the job. Persons offered employment must successfully pass a job-training program.

**Licensure, Certification, or Other Qualifications**

- Must be at least 21 years of age at the time of application
- Successful candidates must pass a drug screen, background investigation and required Pre-employment exams prior to appointment

**WORKING CONDITIONS**

- Police facility and prisoner detention lockup environment

**EQUIPMENT**

- Standard office equipment (e.g., telephone, printer, photocopier, fax machine, calculator)
- Computers and peripheral equipment (e.g., personal computer, computer terminals)
- Personal protective equipment
- Handcuffs
- Meat slicing machine
- Hand held scanner
- Electronic live scan/biometric fingerprint scanners
- Electronic photograph system

**PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS**

- Ability to quickly bend, stretch, twist, or reach out with one's body, arms, and/or legs
- Ability to move one's hands and arms to grasp or manipulate objects
- Ability to stand for extended periods of time
- Ability to lift up to 100 pounds
- Ability to maintain control of uncooperative detainees

**KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS, ABILITIES, AND OTHER WORK REQUIREMENTS**

**Knowledge**

Some knowledge of:

- applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and guidelines
- safety and security principles and practices
- applicable computer equipment and software
- law enforcement procedures

Knowledge of applicable City and department policies, procedures, rules and regulations

**Skills**

- ACTIVE LISTENING – Understand the implications of new information for both current and future problem-solving and decision making
- CRITICAL THINKING - Use logic and reasoning to identify the strengths and weaknesses of alternative solutions, conclusions, or approaches to problems

- MANAGEMENT OF MATERIAL RESOURCES - Obtain and see to the appropriate use of equipment, facilities, and materials needed to do certain work
- COORDINATION WITH OTHERS - Adjust actions in relation to others' actions

**Abilities**

- COMPREHEND ORAL INFORMATION - Listen to and understand information and ideas presented through spoken words and sentences
- SPEAK - Communicate information and ideas in speaking so others will understand
- COMPREHEND WRITTEN INFORMATION - Read and understand information and ideas presented in writing
- WRITE - Communicate information and ideas in writing so others will understand
- REASON TO SOLVE PROBLEMS - Apply general rules to specific problems to produce answers that make sense

**Other Work Requirements**

- INITIATIVE- Demonstrate willingness to take on job challenges
- SELF-CONTROL - Maintain composure, keep emotions in check even in very difficult situations, control anger, and avoid aggressive behavior
- DEPENDABILITY - Demonstrate reliability, responsibility, and dependability and fulfill obligations
- ATTENTION TO DETAIL - Pay careful attention to detail and thoroughness in completing work tasks

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All employees of the City of Chicago must demonstrate commitment to and compliance with applicable state and federal laws, and City ordinances and rules; the City's Ethics standards; and other City policies and procedures.

The City of Chicago will consider equivalent foreign degrees, accreditations, and credentials in evaluating qualifications.

\* May be required at entry.

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City of Chicago  
Department of Human Resources  
September 2011



**Code: 9194**  
Family: Legal and Regulatory  
Service: Public Safety  
Group: Police Service  
Series: Police General Duty

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## **CLASS TITLE: DIGITAL RETRIEVAL SPECIALIST – CPD**

### **CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CLASS**

Under general supervision, receives, researches, and responds to requests for video evidence received in the Video Unit of the Chicago Police Department (CPD), and performs related duties as required.

### **ESSENTIAL DUTIES**

- Receives a variety of internal and external information and subpoena requests for video footage (e.g., body worn cameras, in-car video systems, and other video records)
- Reviews video requests to identify requested information and follows up with requestors (e.g., State's Attorney's Office, Law Offices, department legal staff, etc.) to clarify request specifics to ensure requests are completed appropriately
- Researches events on multiple data systems and identifies responsive evidence to the requests
- Extracts video evidence and distributes electronic files
- Retrieves and catalogs body worn camera and in-car videos
- Uploads and shares requested information onto a digital evidence management system
- Ensures video evidence is collected in a timely manner and within the required timeframes
- Records all requests into databases and prepares documents for electronic storage for later retrieval
- Coordinates with department personnel to keep track of requests that are in process and completed
- Sorts, batches, and files documents and video evidence information
- Scans and edits documents for electronic storage
- Prepares, formats, prints, and faxes various reports on processed work
- Prepares productivity reports
- May testify and attend court, as required
- May train new digital retrieval specialists

**NOTE:** *The list of essential duties is not intended to be inclusive; there may be other duties that are essential to particular positions within the class.*

### **MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS**

#### **Education, Training, and Experience**

- Graduation from an accredited college or university with a Bachelor's Degree, plus two years of work experience in digital media, retrieving and processing video footage and/or document, records and file management experience; or an equivalent combination of education, training, and experience.

#### **Licensure, Certification, or Other Qualifications**

- None

**WORKING CONDITIONS**

- General office environment

**EQUIPMENT**

- Standard office equipment (e.g., telephone, printer, photocopier, fax machine, calculator)
- Computers and peripheral equipment (e.g., personal computer, computer terminals, hand-held computer)
- Digital evidence and file management systems

**PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS**

- No specific requirements

**KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS, ABILITIES, AND OTHER WORK REQUIREMENTS****Knowledge**

Moderate knowledge of:

- digital video and audio recording devices and the variety of methods of exporting and analyzing files
- digital imaging methods used for evidentiary purposes
- \*clerical methods, practices, and procedures, including data entry
- \*applicable computer software packages (Microsoft Office Suite/365)

Some knowledge of:

- legal and criminal justice procedures with relation to the presentation and interpretation of digital evidence
- applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and guidelines
- PC, server, and cloud storage systems
- computer hardware and data transfer

Knowledge of applicable City and department ordinances, policies, procedures, rules, regulations, and ordinances

**Skills**

- \*ACTIVE LEARNING - Understand the implications of new information for both current and future problem-solving and decision-making
- \*ACTIVE LISTENING - Give full attention to what other people are saying, take time to understand the points being made, ask questions as appropriate, and not interrupt at inappropriate times
- \*CRITICAL THINKING - Use logic and reasoning to identify the strengths and weaknesses of alternative solutions, conclusions, or approaches to problems
- \*ATTENTION TO DETAIL – Finding accurate information requires concentration minds or behavior

**Abilities**

- COMPREHEND ORAL INFORMATION - Listen to and understand information and ideas presented through spoken words and sentences



- SPEAK - Communicate information and ideas in speaking so others will understand
- COMPREHEND WRITTEN INFORMATION - Read and understand information and ideas presented in writing
- WRITE - Communicate information and ideas in writing so others will understand
- MAKE SENSE OF INFORMATION - Quickly make sense of, combine, and organize information into meaningful patterns
- ORGANIZE INFORMATION - Arrange things or actions in a certain order or pattern according to a specific rule or set of rules (e.g., patterns of numbers, letters, words, pictures, mathematical operations)
- REACH CONCLUSIONS - Combine pieces of information to form general rules or conclusions (includes finding a relationship among seemingly unrelated events)

**Other Work Requirements**

- DEPENDABILITY - Demonstrate reliability, responsibility, and dependability and fulfill obligations
- INITIATIVE - Demonstrate willingness to take on job challenges
- ATTENTION TO DETAIL - Pay careful attention to detail and thoroughness in completing work tasks
- ANALYTICAL THINKING - Analyze information and using logic to address work or job issues and problems

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All employees of the City of Chicago must demonstrate commitment to and compliance with applicable state and federal laws, and City ordinances and rules; the City's Ethics standards; and other City policies and procedures.

The City of Chicago will consider equivalent foreign degrees, accreditations, and credentials in evaluating qualifications.

\* May be required at entry.

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City of Chicago  
Department of Human Resources  
July, 2022



**Code: 4238**

Family: Facility

Service: Operation and Construction Service  
Group: Building, Custodial and Operation Group

Series: Custodial

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## **CLASS TITLE: PROPERTY CUSTODIAN**

### **CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CLASS**

Under general supervision, maintains an inventory of supplies, equipment and confiscated property in a unit storeroom, departmental yard, evidence room, or mailroom, and performs related duties as required

### **ESSENTIAL DUTIES**

- Receives, stores, issues and delivers a large and varied stock of materials including confiscated physical property
- Conducts physical inventories to balance stock against unit inventory records
- Inspects goods delivered against receiving reports
- Prepares inventory reports for confiscated property
- Receives sorts and delivers mail to department wide facilities
- Operates a remote terminal to enter, update and retrieve inventory data
- Operates a departmental vehicle to deliver document, evidence and intra-departmental mail
- Answers telephone inquiries regarding confiscated prisoner property
- Prepares and submits daily trip forms including time, location and mileage information
- Prepares work reports and maintain a clean and safe work area,

**NOTE:** *The list of essential duties is not intended to be inclusive; there may be other duties that are essential to particular positions within the class.*

### **MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS**

#### **Education, Training, and Experience**

- Two years of combined work experience performing clerical, storekeeping, inventory control or personal computer work

#### **Licensure, Certification, or Other Qualifications**

- A valid driver license from the State of Illinois is required

### **WORKING CONDITIONS**

- General office environment
- Exposure to outdoor weather conditions

### **EQUIPMENT**

- Standard office equipment (e.g., telephone, printer, photocopier, fax machine)
- Communication equipment (e.g., two-way radio, pager system)
- Flashlight, safety vest
- Hand tools (e.g., hammer, screwdriver)

### **PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS**

- Ability to lift and carry 25 to 50 pound including mail bags and boxes, recovered property, furniture, office supplies and equipment (some positions may require the ability to transport weight at least 10 feet and place on a hand cart to load vehicles)
- Ability to stand and walk for extended or continuous periods of time
- Ability to climb staircases, ladders and, and/or step stools
- Ability to bend, stretch, twist or reach out with one's body arms and legs
- Ability to operate a personal computer and related equipment

### **KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS, ABILITIES, AND OTHER WORK REQUIREMENTS**

#### **Knowledge**

Some knowledge of:

- inventory and control methods, practices, and procedures
- basic computer operations

Knowledge of applicable City and department policies, procedures, rules, and regulations

#### **Skills**

- ACTIVE LEARNING – Understand the implications of new information for both current and future problem-solving and decision-making
- ACTIVE LISTENING - Give full attention to what other people are saying, take time to understand the points being made, ask questions as appropriate, and not interrupt at inappropriate times
- CUSTOMER SERVICE SKILLS – Interact and communicate with customers in a courteous and helpful manner, speaking distinctly, answering questions and resolving issues

#### **Abilities**

- COMPREHEND ORAL INFORMATION - Listen to and understand information and ideas presented through spoken words and sentences
- SPEAK - Communicate information and ideas in speaking so others will understand
- COMPREHEND WRITTEN INFORMATION - Read and understand information and ideas presented in writing
- WRITE - Communicate information and ideas in writing so others will understand

#### **Other Work Requirements**

- INITIATIVE - Demonstrate willingness to take on job challenges
- DEPENDABILITY - Demonstrate reliability, responsibility, and dependability and fulfill obligations
- ATTENTION TO DETAIL - Pay careful attention to detail and thoroughness in completing work tasks

---

All employees of the City of Chicago must demonstrate commitment to and compliance with applicable state and federal laws, and City ordinances and rules; the City's Ethics standards; and other City policies and procedures.

The City of Chicago will consider equivalent foreign degrees, accreditations, and credentials in evaluating qualifications.

\* May be required at entry.

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City of Chicago  
Department of Human Resources  
September, 2015



**Code: 9116**  
Family: Public Safety  
Service: Public Safety  
Group: Police Service  
Series: General Duty

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## **CLASS TITLE: POLICE ADMINISTRATIVE CLERK**

### **CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CLASS**

Under supervision, performs administrative work in support of a District Station supervisor and/or an assigned police district watch operation, and performs related duties as required

### **ESSENTIAL DUTIES**

- Provides customer service to the public via the telephone or through front desk interaction responding to inquiries and providing referral services
- Initiates police written reports from citizens
- Receives incoming telephone and voice radio calls from officers in the field requesting information
- Performs record and warrant checks, logs and processes served warrants, and verifies warrant status with outside agencies
- Scans and copies arrest records for distribution to different divisions and determines whether a copy may be released to the press; processes new fingerprint cards
- Checks various law enforcement databases for verification of information including (i.e., license plates, arrestee data, names, and case reports)
- Distributes and collects hand radios, Tasers, and keys to Police vehicles
- Processes and distributes incoming crime, traffic reports and transmittal records
- Assists the public in filling out reports and applications, and collects monies for warrants and permits
- Provides outside agencies with crime and arrest reports after determining that the information may be released
- Performs a wide variety of routine clerical work including filing, billing, checking, and recording information on records
- Maintains a variety of statistical records; compiles and tabulates statistical data, and prepares simple statistical reports
- Performs record keeping for various funds and expenditures
- Maintains personnel and payroll records of departmental personnel; processes a variety of forms to initiate changes in records
- Maintains inventory records of recovery evidence and detainee property, processes storage and retention schedules, and resolves record keeping errors
- Orders office supplies and submits expense claims
- Prepares letters, memorandums, financial reports, and other materials from oral direction, rough draft, copy, notes or transcribing machine recordings
- Sorts and files documents and records maintaining alphabetical, index, and cross reference files
- Receives, sorts, and distributes incoming and outgoing correspondence
- Schedules appointments and various meetings
- Issues, receives, types, and processes various applications, permits, and other forms

- Assists in the training of new personnel

**NOTE:** *The list of essential duties is not intended to be inclusive; there may be other duties that are essential to particular positions within the class.*

## MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS

### Education, Training, and Experience

- Two years of clerical experience or an equivalent combination of education, training, and experience

### Licensure, Certification, or Other Qualifications

- Previous Law Enforcement experience preferred

## WORKING CONDITIONS

- General office environment

## EQUIPMENT

- Standard office equipment (e.g., telephone, printer, photocopier, fax machine, calculator)
- Computers and peripheral equipment (e.g., personal computer, computer terminals)
- Two-way radio

## PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS

- None

## KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS, ABILITIES, AND OTHER WORK REQUIREMENTS

### Knowledge

Moderate knowledge of:

- \*procedures and methods used in clerical and administrative practices
- \*intake and customer service methods, practices, and procedures
- \*alphabetical or numerical classification of information
- \*English language spelling, punctuation, and grammar
- \*applicable computer software packages and applications
- geographical locations in the City

Knowledge of applicable City and department policies, procedures, rules, and regulations

### Skills

- \*ACTIVE LEARNING - Understand the implications of new information for both current and future problem-solving and decision-making
- \*ACTIVE LISTENING - Give full attention to what other people are saying, take time to understand the points being made, ask questions as appropriate, and not interrupt at inappropriate times

### Abilities

- COMPREHEND ORAL INFORMATION - Listen to and understand information and ideas presented through spoken words and sentences

**CLASS TITLE: POLICE ADMINISTRATIVE CLERK**

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- SPEAK - Communicate information and ideas in speaking so others will understand
  - WRITE - Communicate information and ideas in writing so others will understand
  - COMPREHEND WRITTEN INFORMATION - Read and understand information and ideas presented in writing
  - RECOGNIZE PROBLEMS - Tell when something is wrong or is likely to go wrong
- 

All employees of the City of Chicago must demonstrate commitment to and compliance with applicable state and federal laws, and City ordinances and rules; the City's Ethics standards; and other City policies and procedures.

The City of Chicago will consider equivalent foreign degrees, accreditations, and credentials in evaluating qualifications.

\* May be required at entry.

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City of Chicago  
Department of Human Resources  
December, 2021



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 5, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 47 Civilianization

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Martin requested an update on the ongoing civilianization work at the CPD.

Attached is a breakdown of new positions for civilians in the 2023 budget to support the Consent Decree in lieu of sworn officers.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Performance Analyst - 7**

3 will be assigned to Reform Performance Section to analyze performance indicators related to less complex consent decree topics. 4 will be assigned to the Reporting Section to lead drafting of public reports (e.g., CPD Annual Report)

**Senior Performance Analyst - 5**

Senior Performance Analysts gather information and conduct data analyses in support of the Audit Section's mission to provide quality, independent, and objective assessments of CPD operations.

**Chief Performance Analyst - 4**

These will supervise teams of three members (a mix of Senior Performance Analysts, Auditor III's and II's, and Performance Analysts) and manage the completion of high priority projects related to the Department's consent decree compliance, ensuring that projects progress according to plan.

**Senior Performance Analyst - 4**

2 will be assigned to Sentiment and Communications Section to develop and analyze results from surveys. 2 will be assigned to Reform Performance Section to analyze performance indicators related to more complex consent decree topics (e.g., use of force, accountability, etc.)

**Paralegal - 3**

These members will provide the first level of review of documentation to be shared during any meetings and site visits with the IMT and OAG.

**Project Coordinator - 3**

These positions will assist the project strategy managers with implementation of established project plans for the consent decree. They will maintain project documentation, coordinate schedules for all internal and external meetings, prepare status reports regarding projects, and assist with preparation of site visits.

**Auditor III - 2**

Auditor IIIs perform the same function as Senior Performance Analysts. However, as unionized positions, I expect that they will draw from a different applicant pool than the SPA position—specifically, experienced auditors currently working in other City departments.

**Project Administrator - 2**

The senior project managers will supervise assigned consent decree cross functional teams overseeing project plans, task assignments among outside unit members, timelines, and coordination of meetings, and site visits.

**Research and Policy Analyst - CPD - 2**

Additional positions will support the expanded mission of R&D and fulfill the expanded scope of R&D and the continued community engagement as part of the consent decree and requested by the IMT/OAG

**Attorney - 1**

An Attorney will provide legal counsel to the department to the training division on ensuring that courses are developed in line with department policies and state laws.

**Chief Performance Analyst - 1**

1 will supervise the Reform Performance Section.

**Coordinator of Research and Evaluation - 1**

The Coordinator of Research and Evaluation position in PCD/EAP is needed to conduct surveys, collect data, and generate and prepare reports for program evaluations.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 24, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 48 Catalytic Converters

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Martin requested that the CPD provide recommendations for catalytic converters legislation.

CPD is currently working with the Department of Law to expand enforcement options for those who possess and try to sell catalytic converters.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 5, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 50 CIT Stats

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Aldersperson Sigcho Lopez requested that the CPD provide the number of Officers in the CIT Unit and the stats on the decreasing number of arrests due to the CIT.

As of October 27<sup>th</sup>, the Crisis Intervention Unit (Unit 143) has 30 officers.

CIT Reports totals include all CIT reports and the total number that indicated an arrest was made. The Arrest Application does not have an indicator for CIT related events.

<b>CIT REPORTS</b>	
<b>YEAR</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
2021	5,473
01 Jan - 30 Sept 2022	6,126

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 26<sup>th</sup> 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-52 2020 AARs

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Taylor requested that the CPD provide the after-action reports pertaining to the 2020 riots (OIG, IMT, and CPD).

Please see attached:

- Report on Chicago's Response to George Floyd Protests and Unrest (OIG)
- The City of Chicago's and The Chicago Police Department's Responses to Protests and Unrest under the Consent Decree (IMT)
- After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department's Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 12, 2020 (CPD)
- Superintendent Brown's response to the OIG report

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS  
EASTERN DIVISION**

**STATE OF ILLINOIS,**

**Plaintiff,**

**v.**

**CITY OF CHICAGO,**

**Defendant.**

**Case No. 17-cv-6260**

**Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr.**

**Special Report: The City of Chicago's and the Chicago Police Department's Responses to  
Protests and Unrest under the Consent Decree (May 2020 – November 2020)**

The Independent Monitor Margaret A. Hickey and the Independent Monitoring Team submit the attached *Special Report: The City of Chicago's and the Chicago Police Department's Responses to Protests and Unrest under the Consent Decree (May 2020 – November 2020)*.

Dated July 20, 2021

/s/Margaret A. Hickey

Margaret A. Hickey

Schiff Hardin LLP

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Chicago, IL 60606

Telephone: (312) 258-5500

Facsimile: (312) 258-5600

mhickey@schiffhardin.com

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The undersigned attorney hereby certifies that, on July 20, 2021, she caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing **Special Report: The City of Chicago's and the Chicago Police Department's Responses to Protests and Unrest under the Consent Decree (May 2020 – November 2020)** to be filed electronically with the Court's CM/ECF system, which caused an electronic copy of this filing to be served on counsel of record.

/s/Margaret A. Hickey \_\_\_\_\_  
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**Independent** | Chicago Police  
**Monitoring Team** | Department  
Consent Decree

The City of Chicago's and  
The Chicago Police Department's  
Responses to Protests and Unrest  
under the Consent Decree

(May 2020 – November 2020)

Report Date: July 20, 2021

*A Special Report by the Independent Monitoring Team*

## MONITORING UNDER THE CONSENT DECREE

In August 2017, the Office of the Illinois Attorney General sued the City of Chicago in federal court regarding civil rights abuses by the Chicago Police Department, which led to a Consent Decree, effective March 1, 2019. On March 1, 2019, the federal court appointed Maggie Hickey as the Independent Monitor. Ms. Hickey leads the Independent Monitoring Team, which assesses the City's compliance with the Consent Decree's requirements.<sup>1</sup>

The overall purpose of the Consent Decree, as provided by ¶12, has guided and will continue to guide our monitoring efforts:

*2. The State, the City, and the Chicago Police Department . . . are committed to constitutional and effective law enforcement. In furtherance of this commitment, the Parties enter into this Agreement to ensure that the City and CPD deliver services in a manner that fully complies with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the State of Illinois, respects the rights of the people of Chicago, builds trust between officers and the communities they serve, and promotes community and officer safety. In addition, this Agreement seeks to ensure that Chicago police officers are provided with the training, resources, and support they need to perform their jobs professionally and safely. This Agreement requires changes in the areas of community policing; impartial policing; crisis intervention; use of force; recruitment, hiring, and promotions; training; supervision; officer wellness and support; accountability and transparency; and data collection, analysis, and management.<sup>2</sup>*

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<sup>1</sup> For more information on the Consent Decree and the Independent Monitoring Team, see the [Appendix A](#) below. More information is also available on the Independent Monitoring Team's website (<https://cpdmonitoringteam.com/>) and on the Office of the Illinois Attorney General's Consent Decree website (<http://chicagopoliceconsentdecree.org/about/>).

<sup>2</sup> We cite the relevant paragraphs of the Consent Decree throughout this report. The Consent Decree is available on the Independent Monitoring Team's website: <https://cpdmonitoringteam.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/FINAL-CONSENT-DECREE-SIGNED-BY-JUDGE-DOW.pdf>. See also *Chicago Police Consent Decree Resources*, [www.chicagopoliceconsentdecree.org/resources/](http://www.chicagopoliceconsentdecree.org/resources/).



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## Executive Summary

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This report addresses the City of Chicago’s (City’s) and the Chicago Police Department’s (CPD’s) response to protests and unrest under the Consent Decree. Specifically, this report focuses on the City’s and the CPD’s response to events between May 2020 and November 2020. During this review we heard from many City and CPD personnel, and members of Chicago’s communities, including people who participated in protests. We greatly appreciate the cooperation that we received from members of the City, the CPD, and Chicago’s communities. We understand the challenges facing each person during COVID-19, which makes us even more grateful for the significant number of people who cooperated with this review. We heard many differing opinions, accounts, and perspectives—many of which were in direct opposition. Most accounts, however, reflected that the City and the CPD were not prepared for the scale of protests and unrest that occurred.<sup>3</sup>

To adequately assess the City’s and the CPD’s responses, we sought to understand the various locations, timelines, sizes, and scope of the protests, unrest, and other challenges facing Chicago. According to many City and CPD personnel and members of Chicago’s communities, the vast majority of protests and people participating in protests have been peaceful, and protests typically occurred (and continue to occur) without destruction of property, arrests, or physical conflict between police, protesters, or others. Between May and November 2020, there were also significant, likely unprecedented, levels of unrest. We heard from many officers, City personnel, and other Chicagoans that they feared for their lives and the lives of their friends and families during some of the unrest. And we also heard from protesters that they feared for their safety and lives when they saw how some officers responded to First Amendment protected activity. As demonstrated in and out of Chicago since May 2020, to protect safety and rights of people in Chicago—including the First Amendment right to protest—the City and the CPD

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<sup>3</sup> In this report, we use the words “protest” and “unrest” to refer to broad categories of conduct. Because individuals within the same crowd can be engaging in different conduct, we use more specific language to describe specific conduct, when applicable, such as marching, chanting, vandalizing, or looting. In general, we use the term “protest” to refer to protected First Amendment speech and speech that may not be protected but is nonetheless non-violent toward people or property. Examples of “protests” include demonstrations, marches, pickets, chants, and civil disobedience. *See, e.g.*, Chicago Municipal Code § 10-8-334(a) (“Public Assembly”). Protests may be intended to disrupt traffic, businesses, communities, or City personnel, including police. In general, we use the word “unrest” to refer to groups of people who are engaging in unlawful activity, such as threats, throwing projectiles, assaults, batteries, looting, arson, and destruction of property. *See, e.g.*, 720 ILCS 5/25-1 (“Mob action”); 720 ILCS 25-4 (“Looting by individuals”). For additional discussion and guidance regarding protected and unprotected speech, see the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois’s guide, *Know Your Right to Protest in Chicago* (May 2015), which is available at [https://www.aclu-il.org/sites/default/files/know\\_your\\_right\\_to\\_protest\\_in\\_chicago.pdf](https://www.aclu-il.org/sites/default/files/know_your_right_to_protest_in_chicago.pdf).

must sufficiently plan and prepare for protests and other gatherings, while accounting for the potential for unrest caused by individuals seeking to do or incite violence or from improper responses from officers, or both.

This report provides (1) a summary of major events; (2) our analysis of the City's and the CPD's ongoing efforts and challenges regarding planning and preparation, policies, training, and accountability and transparency; and (3) our corresponding recommendations for how the City and the CPD can simultaneously move toward compliance under the Consent Decree and better prepare for responding to protests and potential unrest. In this executive summary, we provide an overview of (1) the timeline of protests, unrest, and other events in 2020; (2) Chicago protests and unrest during the COVID-19 pandemic and other challenges; and (3) our analysis and recommendations.<sup>4</sup>

## TIMELINE OF PROTESTS, UNREST, AND OTHER EVENTS IN 2020

On May 25, 2020, then-Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin murdered George Floyd by pinning him to the ground with his knees for more than nine minutes.<sup>5</sup> People across Chicago, the country, and the world responded with large, sustained, and record-breaking protests and movements regarding policing and social and racial justice.<sup>6</sup> In May and June 2020, the District of Columbia and 24

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<sup>4</sup> We provided drafts of this report to the City and the Office of the Illinois Attorney General's Office, collectively the Parties, on June 11, 2021, per ¶¶661–65. After receiving preliminary feedback from the City and the OAG, the IMT provided an updated draft to the Parties on July 8, 2021. The Parties both provided written feedback on July 16, 2021, which are attached to this report. See [Attachment 1](#) (OAG comments) and [Attachment 2](#) (City comments).

<sup>5</sup> Derek Chauvin was convicted of second-degree unintentional murder, third-degree murder, and second-degree manslaughter on April 20, 2021. See Laurel Wamsley, *Derek Chauvin Found Guilty of George Floyd's Murder*, NPR (April 20, 2021), <https://www.npr.org/sections/trial-over-killing-of-george-floyd/2021/04/20/987777911/court-says-jury-has-reached-verdict-in-derek-chauvins-murder-trial>.

<sup>6</sup> See, e.g., Suyin Haynes, *As Protesters Shine a Spotlight on Racial Injustice in America, the Reckoning Is Going Global*, TIME MAGAZINE (June 11, 2020), <https://time.com/5851879/racial-injustice-protests-europe/>; *How George Floyd's death reverberates around the world*, ECONOMIST (July 8, 2020), <https://www.economist.com/international/2020/06/08/how-george-floyds-death-reverberates-around-the-world>; Katy Watson, *Brazil's Racial Reckoning: 'Black Lives Matter Here, too'*, BBC NEWS (July 25, 2020), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-53484698>; Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui, and Jugal Patel, *Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (July 3, 2020) (citing four polls), <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html>. Estimates on participation vary. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), for example, there were more than 10,600 demonstration events across the US between May 24, 2020, and August 22, 2020. See *US Crisis Monitor Releases Full Data for Summer 2020*, ACLED (August 31, 2020), <https://acleddata.com/2020/08/31/us-crisis-monitor-releases-full-data-for-summer-2020/>. Many of the protests called for various changes in the name of social and racial justice, including increased police accountability and reform

states, including Illinois, called in the National Guard.<sup>7</sup> During the same period, about 80 municipalities, including the City of Chicago, instituted curfews.<sup>8</sup> Chicago—and many other cities—experienced unprecedented unrest. While the totals and nexus are contested and difficult to measure, many people were killed nationwide in or during protests, counter protests, and unrest.<sup>9</sup>

Protests continued in Chicago in varying sizes and intensity throughout 2020 and into 2021, often with thousands of participants.<sup>10</sup> The specific events that sparked nationwide protests and unrest—which occurred outside of Chicago—appeared to evolve into protests and unrest in Chicago that related directly to the CPD, including Chicago’s own history with racial and social injustice, police misconduct and excessive uses of force, and the responses to protests and unrest.<sup>11</sup> Chicago also experienced protests—and in some cases unrest—in response to local policing in 2020, such as the following:

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for daily policing and responses to protests. Many of these calls for action included or related to requirements across the Consent Decree.

<sup>7</sup> See Alexandra Sternlicht, *Over 4,400 Arrests, 62,000 National Guard Troops Deployed: George Floyd Protests By the Numbers*, FORBES (June 2, 2020), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexandra-sternlicht/2020/06/02/over-4400-arrests-62000-national-guard-troops-deployed-george-floyd-protests-by-the-numbers/?sh=e8cf228d4fe1>.

<sup>8</sup> See Jack Arnholz, Ivan Pereira, and Christina Carrega, *US protests map shows where curfews and National Guard are active*, ABC NEWS (June 4, 2020), <https://abcnews.go.com/US/locations-george-floyd-protests-curfews-national-guard-deployments/story?id=70997568>.

<sup>9</sup> See, e.g., Lois Beckett, *At least 25 Americans were killed during protests and political unrest in 2020*, THE GUARDIAN (October 31, 2020), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/31/americans-killed-protests-political-unrest-acled>; Todd Lighty, Gary Marx, Christy Gutowski, and William Lee, *Chicago’s 2020 unrest: A Tribune investigation documents the scope of the damage and its lingering impact on neighborhoods, businesses*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (June 2, 2021) (“The Tribune found that 15 people were shot and killed in crimes tied to the unrest. Most of the homicides occurred Sunday, May 31 — the height of the destruction. In addition, at least 53 people were shot and wounded during one of the most turbulent periods in Chicago history.”), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/ct-chicago-2020-looting-unrest-damage-george-floyd-police-killing-20210602-olbvqmfylna3jarumzonp5zkqe-htmlstory.html>.

<sup>10</sup> See, e.g., *Dozens Gather in Chicago to Protest Killing of Daunte Wright*, AP NEWS (April 13, 2021), <https://apnews.com/article/breonna-taylor-death-of-daunte-wright-laquan-mcdonald-shootings-police-5f4b6ce0f5703e32c975c2219235e231>; Evelyn Holmes, *Chicago protest Logan Square: After thousands march for justice in Adam Toledo CPD killing, police prepared for more rallies*, ABC7 EYEWITNESS NEWS (April 17, 2021), <https://abc7chicago.com/adam-toledo-logan-square-protest-chicago-park/10522103/>.

<sup>11</sup> See, e.g., *Chicago’s summer of looting and unrest and how the city is still reeling*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (October 6, 2020), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-cb-george-floyd-fallout-impact-chicago-20201006-lkndggmch5emjiefplywhcaeou-story.html>; Jon Burge and *Chicago’s legacy of police torture*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (September 19, 2018), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-jon-burge-chicago-police-torture-timeline-20180919-htmlstory.html>; Chicago Police Accountability Task Force, *Recommendations for Reform: Restoring Trust between the Chicago Police and the Communities they Serve, Report* (April 2016) [https://chicagoatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF\\_Final\\_Report\\_4\\_13\\_16-1.pdf](https://chicagoatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF_Final_Report_4_13_16-1.pdf).

- The officer-involved shooting of Latrell Allen in Chicago on August 9, 2020.<sup>12</sup>
- The officer-involved shooting of Miguel Vega in Chicago on August 31, 2020.<sup>13</sup>
- The officer-involved shooting of Marc Nevarez in Chicago on October 23, 2020.<sup>14</sup>

Protests also continued to emerge in Chicago in response to national events, which included the following:

- the shooting and killing of Rayshard Brooks in Atlanta, Georgia, on June 12, 2020;<sup>15</sup>
- the shooting of Jacob Blake in Kenosha, Wisconsin, on August 23, 2020;<sup>16</sup>
- the charging decision regarding the shooting and killing of Breonna Taylor in Louisville, Kentucky, on September 23, 2020;<sup>17</sup> and
- the shooting and killing of Walter Wallace Jr. in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on October 26, 2020.

The City also saw other large-scale protests, demonstrations, or crowds.<sup>18</sup> Some were unrelated to racial justice or policing, such as Mexican Independence Day

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<sup>12</sup> See Liz Nagy, *Protestors say that Latrell Allen bond is unjust, call for police budget to be slashed by 75%*, ABC7 EYEWITNESS NEWS (August 14, 2020), <https://abc7chicago.com/protestors-say-latrell-allens-%241m-bond-is-unjust-without-cpd-body-cam-footage/6371332/>.

<sup>13</sup> See Madeline Buckley, *Marchers demand justice for Miguel Vega: 'My family waits for the Chicago Police Department to show their face and speak to us,'* CHICAGO TRIBUNE (September 5, 2020), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-pilsen-protest-miguel-vega-20200906-2y3avwtshjehpd5jlsyq55f7b4-story.html>.

<sup>14</sup> See Evelyn Holmes, *Protesters say deadly force was unnecessary in Little Village police shooting; COPA investigating*, ABC7 EYEWITNESS NEWS (October 24, 2020), <https://abc7chicago.com/chicago-police-shooting-little-village-news-marc-nevarez/7299560/>.

<sup>15</sup> See Toluse Olorunnipa, Jon Silman, Maura Ewing, and Kevin Williams, *Third consecutive weekend of anti-racism protests expands to suburbs, as 'Blue Lives Matter' demonstrators push back*, WASHINGTON POST (June 13, 2020) (“The third weekend of protests in Chicago turned to a side of the city that rarely gets people marching in the street: Jefferson Park, a neighborhood located on the far north-west side of the city known primarily as a bedroom community populated by many police, firefighters and blue-collar workers. Hundreds of demonstrators showed up with signs Saturday for the first time, surprising many of the residents.”), [https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/third-consecutive-weekend-of-anti-racism-protests-expands-to-suburbs-as-blue-lives-matter-demonstrators-push-back/2020/06/13/81ef674a-ada7-11ea-94d2-d7bc43b26bf9\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/third-consecutive-weekend-of-anti-racism-protests-expands-to-suburbs-as-blue-lives-matter-demonstrators-push-back/2020/06/13/81ef674a-ada7-11ea-94d2-d7bc43b26bf9_story.html).

<sup>16</sup> See *Timeline: The Jacob Blake Shooting and the Unrest That Followed*, NBC CHICAGO (August 27, 2020), <https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/timeline-the-jacob-blake-shooting-and-the-unrest-that-followed/2329811/>.

<sup>17</sup> See CBS 2 Chicago Staff, *Live Updates: Breonna Taylor Protests in Chicago*, CBS NEWS CHICAGO (September 23, 2020), <https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2020/09/23/live-updates-breonna-taylor-protests-in-chicago/>.

<sup>18</sup> See, e.g., Michelle Gallardo, *'Reclaim Pride': Thousands march on Chicago's North Side to amplify Black, trans voices*, ABC7 EYEWITNESS NEWS (June 28, 2020), <https://abc7chicago.com/pride-2020-reclaim-march-chicago-amrch-today-trans/6278094/>; *Chicago Protests: Juneteenth Celebrations, Pritzker Plans to Make State Holiday*, NBC CHICAGO (June 20, 2020),

and protests against COVID-19 precautions and lockdowns.<sup>19</sup> Chicago also braced for other large-scale protests during and after the 2020 presidential election. While tensions were high—and the City, the CPD, and Chicago’s communities publicly prepared—there were large peaceful crowds, sometimes celebratory, and there were comparatively few police contacts with protesters or crowds.

Since then, large-scale protests have continued nationally and in Chicago.<sup>20</sup> The country has also continued to experience unrest. The world watched, for example, as the U.S. Capitol was overrun on January 6, 2021, demonstrating the stakes involved with insufficient planning and preparation for protests and the potential for unrest with large crowds.<sup>21</sup>

## CHICAGO PROTESTS AND UNREST DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND OTHER CHALLENGES

There were many unique aspects to the protests and unrest that followed the murder of George Floyd, including the impact of COVID-19, corresponding lockdowns and mask mandates, and the widespread use of public and private social-media applications. Ultimately, the City and the CPD must protect all people in Chicago and their rights, including their First Amendment rights in a content-neutral and consistent manner.<sup>22</sup> This also requires utilizing available resources to protect the

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<https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/chicago-protests-juneteenth-celebrations-pritzker-plans-to-make-state-holiday/2292809/>.

<sup>19</sup> See, e.g., Sam Kelly and Carly Behm, *City closes streets in downtown, Little Village amid Mexican Independence Day celebrations*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (September 16, 2020), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/2020/9/15/21439232/mexican-independence-day-traffic-street-closures-downtown>.

<sup>20</sup> See, e.g., Liz Nagy, *Chicago ‘Back the Blue’ rally in Jefferson Park draws hundreds of supporters, counter-protestors*, ABC7 EYEWITNESS NEWS (September 16, 2020) <https://abc7chicago.com/back-the-blue-rally-chicago-police-department-black-lives-matter/6427076>; Jesse Kirsch and Liz Nagy, *Adam Toledo shooting: Logan Square march, rally calls for police reform after release of video showing teen killed by CPD*, ABC7 EYEWITNESS NEWS (April 16, 2021), <https://abc7chicago.com/adam-toledo-video-chicago-police-shooting-protest/10518968/>; Madeline Kenney, *Justice for Anthony Alvarez rally met by counter protesters in Jefferson Park*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (May 29, 2021), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/metro-state/2021/5/29/22460135/justice-for-anthony-alvarez-rally-met-by-counter-protesters-in-jefferson-park>.

<sup>21</sup> See, e.g., *Statement of Inspector General Michael A. Bolton United States Capitol Police Office of Inspector General*, COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (April 15, 2021), <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HA/HA00/20210415/111443/HHRG-117-HA00-Wstate-BoltonM-20210415.pdf>.

<sup>22</sup> See, e.g., ¶¶2, 6 (“In this Agreement, the City commits to ensuring that police services are delivered to all of the people of Chicago in a manner that fully complies with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the State of Illinois, respects the rights of all of the people of Chicago, builds trust between officers and the communities they serve, and promotes community and officer safety. The City also commits to providing CPD members with the resources

right to peaceful assembly; the safety of the protesters, counter-protesters, and non-protesters, and the right to move freely on the public way.<sup>23</sup> Efficient responses to protests and potential unrest are also required to ensure that the City and the CPD can simultaneously allocate sufficient resources to other critical services throughout Chicago.<sup>24</sup> As a result, the City, the CPD, and other City entities had an obligation to respond effectively and proportionately in spite of countless and unprecedented challenges.

These challenges included the following:

- Large, widespread, and often simultaneous First Amendment activity and demonstrations, including counter demonstrations;<sup>25</sup>
- Lack of typical coordinated organization and permit procedures for planned protests (due to the City's restriction on issuing permits due to COVID-19), making it more difficult to identify planned protests or to accurately anticipate the turnout for each protest and the corresponding response required;
- A rise in protests organized without the City's and the CPD's knowledge and a rise in protests spontaneously growing in size or changing in purpose;
- Widespread use of public and private social-media, causing protests to grow unpredictably and, in some cases, contributing to the spread of false information (e.g., false claims of military arsenals and impersonating officials);<sup>26</sup>

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and support they need, including improved training, supervision, and wellness resources.”), 7, 51, and 163.

<sup>23</sup> See, e.g., Donald Morrison, *Cars Have Hit Protesters More than 100 Times This Year*, WALL STREET JOURNAL (October 25, 2020), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/cars-have-hit-protesters-more-than-100-times-this-year-11603645201>; Laurel Wamsley and Bobby Allyn, *Neo-Nazi Who Killed Charlottesville Protester Is Sentenced to Life in Prison*, NPR (June 28, 2019), <https://www.npr.org/2019/06/28/736915323/neo-nazi-who-killed-charlottesville-protester-is-sentenced-to-life-in-prison>.

<sup>24</sup> See, e.g., ¶¶2 and 6–7.

<sup>25</sup> See, e.g., Jonathon Berlin and Kori Rumore, *How the weekend unfolded: Timeline of Chicago protests, looting and unrest*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (June 1, 2020), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-viz-george-floyd-protest-chicago-timeline-20200531-lfkd7p6ejbennfezhxk2u5kkmm-story.html>; Sun-Times Staff, *Chicago protests of George Floyd death, looting and aftermath live blog: June 2, 2020*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (June 2, 2020), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/2020/6/2/21278084/chicago-protests-looting-george-floyd-live-blog>.

<sup>26</sup> See, e.g., Lourdes Duarte, *How police, experts say crowds used social media to coordinate looting in Chicago*, WGN 9 (August 10, 2020), <https://wgntv.com/news/wgn-investigates/how-police-experts-say-crowds-used-social-media-to-coordinate-looting-in-chicago/>; Sarah E. Needleman and Sebastian Herrera, *Social Media Becomes Battleground Over Days of Street Protests*, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (June 1, 2020), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/social-media-becomes-battleground-over-days-of-street-protests-11591018647>.

- People seeking to co-opt protests and create unrest, including various disruptive tactics, and an increased difficulty in differentiating between protesters and people committing violence because of the increased anonymity from widespread mask use;<sup>27</sup>
- Unrest, including premeditated crimes, crimes of opportunity, looting, arson, use of explosives, motor-vehicle thefts, driving vehicles into buildings, destruction and theft of police property (including body-worn cameras, radios, badges, Tasers, vehicles, and firearms), interfering with radio transmissions, and general damage to private and public property—including grocery stores and pharmacies—and armed vigilantism;<sup>28</sup>
- Various criminal activity, including homicides, bomb threats, robberies, and increased rates of violent crime, including shootings and assaults on police officers;<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> See, e.g., *Homeland Threat Assessment*, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (October 2020) (“Exploitation of Lawful and Protected Speech and Protests. During the course of developing the HTA we began to see a new, alarming trend of exploitation of lawful protests causing violence, death, and destruction in American communities. This anti-government, anti-authority and anarchist violent extremism was identified by DHS in September 2019 when we published our Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence. As the date of publication of this HTA, we have seen over 100 days of violence and destruction in our cities. The co-opting of lawful protests led to destruction of government property and have turned deadly.”), [https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2020\\_10\\_06\\_homeland-threat-assessment.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2020_10_06_homeland-threat-assessment.pdf).

<sup>28</sup> According to the CPD, between May 29, 2020, and June 2, 2020, for example, there was over \$700,000 in damage to CPD vehicles, including 19 totaled vehicles, with a replacement cost of over \$1,400,000. See also *Looting & Civil Unrest Videos*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT YOUTUBE PAGE, <https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLni-cuMjWzIDUJVUecBCDXWw1UGTPOAS2>; Chicago Digital Team, *Illinois man faces federal charges after he allegedly brought explosives to protests in Chicago, Minneapolis*, ABC7 EYEWITNESS NEWS (June 2, 2020), <https://abc7chicago.com/matthew-rupert-chicago-protests-riot-minneapolis/6227294/>; Manny Ramos, *Small businesses hit by looting reflect on night of chaos: ‘It was kind of like ‘The Purge’*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (May 24, 2021), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/2021/5/24/22442221/protests-chicago-george-floyd-anniversary-small-businesses-looting-reflect-night-of-chaos-purge>.

<sup>29</sup> According to the CPD, “2020 was a year of unprecedented violence against Department members” and, aside “from the many officers who were seriously injured during violent confrontations” in response to protests and unrest, “there were seventy-nine (79) police officers shot or shot at over the course of the year.” *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department’s Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 15. See, e.g., Tom Schober, Sam Charles, and Matthew Hendrickson, *18 murders in 24 hours: Inside the most violent day in 60 years in Chicago*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (June 8, 2020), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/crime/2020/6/8/21281998/chicago-deadliest-day-violence-murder-history-police-crime>; Elvia Malaga, *A year later, families mourn relatives killed during violent weekend post-George Floyd protests*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (May 24, 2021), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/2021/5/24/22419771/protest-george-floyd-homicide-looting-tommie-gatewood-darius-maurice-jelks-jaquawn-newman-2020>; Paige Fry, *Lootings spread into neighborhoods as Chicago sees one of its most violent weekends with more than 80 shot*,



- Officer deaths (including from suicides and accidents), injuries (including from shootings, attempted stabbings, car accidents, and projectiles), over 3,200 COVID-19 cases,<sup>30</sup> doxing,<sup>31</sup> and sustained verbal abuse toward officers, including racial, gendered, and homophobic slurs, among others;<sup>32</sup>
- An unprecedented number of complaints to the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA) and videos of officers disregarding policies, including not wearing COVID-19 preventative masks; covering identifying information (including badge numbers and name tags); using excessive force; using racial, gendered, and homophobic slurs, among others;<sup>33</sup> and
- A spike in calls for service and shutdowns of various City services (in addition to COVID-19 shutdowns), including distributing City food, providing public transportation, and administering COVID-19 testing sites.<sup>34</sup>

As reflected in [Executive Summary Figure 1](#), in response to records in the Police Computer Aided Dispatch System, the City and the Office of Emergency Management and Communications provided information detailing the following number of calls for service labeled “PRTST” (protest), “LOOT” or “RIOT.” While there were significant challenges capturing data during many events, as detailed throughout this report, this figure still helps illustrate some of the widespread and ongoing challenges facing Chicago.<sup>35</sup>

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CHICAGO TRIBUNE (June 1, 2020), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-over-night-chicago-violence-looting-20200601-pdenxuvjefbszferfmvjkqm5y-story.html>.

<sup>30</sup> See Patrick Smith, *Chicago Police Turn Down City-Provided COVID-19 Vaccine*, WBEZ CHICAGO (May 3, 2021), <https://www.wbez.org/stories/chicago-police-turn-down-city-provided-covid-19-vaccine/9909c907-37bb-4dc5-adb0-feb7f3278c94>.

<sup>31</sup> Merriam Webster defines “doxing” as “publicly identifying or publishing private information about (someone) especially as a form of punishment or revenge” (<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dox>). In response to requests for information, the City and the CPD provided a few examples of doxing against CPD officers, such as repeated online posts of an officers’ home address, and internal messages and guidance regarding doxing.

<sup>32</sup> See, e.g., *Chicago Police Department, OFFICER DOWN MEMORIAL PAGE*, <https://www.odmp.org/agency/657-chicago-police-department-illinois>; Tom Schuba, *Video Shows Cops Fatally Shoot Man Who Stabbed Officer*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (October 1, 2020), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/crime/2020/10/1/21497997/police-shooting-video-shaon-jermy-ochea-warner-copa>; Luke Wilusz, Tom Schuba, and Jermaine Nolen, *2 Chicago Police Officers, Suspect Wounded in West Side Shootout*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (August 30, 2020), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/crime/2020/8/30/21407345/chicago-police-officers-suspect-shot-homan-square-west-side-polk-spaulding>.

<sup>33</sup> See *Protest Related Information*, CIVILIAN OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, <https://www.chicagocopa.org/data-cases/protest-related-information/>.

<sup>34</sup> See, e.g., Amanda Vinicky, *Chicago Public Schools Suspends Free Meals Due to Unrest*, WTTW NEWS (June 1, 2020), <https://news.wttw.com/2020/06/01/chicago-public-schools-suspends-free-meals-due-unrest>.

<sup>35</sup> We provide a list of all figures in this report in [Appendix B](#) (List of Special Report Figures).

## Executive Summary Figure 1.

## OEMC - Police Computer Aided Dispatch System (PCAD) Reports

(Provided November 20, 2020)

(May 29, 2020 – June 2, 2020; July 17, 2020; August 9, 2020; August 10, 2020; August 15, 2020; and August 16, 2020)

PCAD EVENTS ("PRTST")	PCAD EVENTS ("LOOT" OR "RIOT")	DATE	APPROX. NUMBER OF THE 22 DISTRICTS WITH EVENTS
2	0	Friday, May 29, 2020	1
17	14	Saturday, May 30, 2020	14
20	1,439	Sunday, May 31, 2020	22
14	1,027	Monday, June 1, 2020	22
0	262	Tuesday, June 2, 2020	22
5	0	Friday, July 17, 2020	4
2	2	Sunday, August 9, 2020	4
2	358	Monday, August 10, 2020	18
7	1	Saturday, August 15, 2020	6
4	1	Sunday, August 16, 2020	3

Moreover, many of these events occurred while the City and the CPD responded to or dealt with unrelated challenges and tragedies, including those related to COVID-19, such as hospitalizations, unemployment, increased needs for public food distributions, and hospital and personal protective equipment shortages.<sup>36</sup> There were also ongoing COVID-19 infections, illnesses, and deaths, including for essential workers and City personnel.<sup>37</sup>


<sup>36</sup> See, e.g., *Chicago Area Unemployment Statistics*, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (May 14, 2021), [https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LAUMT171698000000003?amp%253bdata\\_tool=XGtable&output\\_view=data&include\\_graphs=true](https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LAUMT171698000000003?amp%253bdata_tool=XGtable&output_view=data&include_graphs=true). See also *Police Board Statement on the Death of Thomas Johnson*, CHICAGO POLICE BOARD (April 14, 2020), [https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/cpb/provdrs/police\\_discipline/news/2020/april/police-board-statement-on-the-death-of-thomas-johnson.html](https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/cpb/provdrs/police_discipline/news/2020/april/police-board-statement-on-the-death-of-thomas-johnson.html); *CPD Releases 2020 Crime Numbers Showing Steep Increase in Shootings, Murders*, NBC5 CHICAGO (January 1, 2021), <https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/chicago-polices-2020-crime-numbers-show-steep-increase-in-shootings-murders/2406120/>; David Abrams et al., *Crime in Major U.S. Cities*, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, <https://citycrimestats.com/covid/>.

<sup>37</sup> See, e.g., *Fallen Officers From the COVID-19 Pandemic*, OFFICER DOWN MEMORIAL PAGE (May 28, 2021), <https://www.odmp.org/search/incident/covid-19>; CBS 2 Chicago Staff, *Memorial Service Held For CFD Paramedic Robert Truevillian, Third Active Duty CFD member To Die Of COVID-19*, CBS CHICAGO (December 28, 2020), <https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2020/12/28/memorial-service-underway-for-cfd-paramedic-robert-truevillian-third-active-duty-cfd-member-to-die-of-covid-19/>; Patrick Smith, *Chicago Police Turn Down City-Provided COVID-19 Vaccine*, WBEZ CHICAGO (May 3, 2021), <https://www.wbez.org/stories/chicago-police-turn-down-city-provided-covid-19-vaccine/9909c907-37bb-4dc5-adb0-feb7f3278c94>. See also Christy Gutowski, John Kielman, and Jonathon Berlin, *COVID-19's toll on Illinois' health care field: A memorial to 45 of those who died*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (September 20, 2020) ("More than 100 professionals working in the health care field have died in Illinois since COVID-19 began its deadly march through the state this past spring, according to public health officials, who said the exact figure is likely higher. They include nurses, doctors, medical assistants, technicians, therapists and other support staff who clean rooms, serve food and provide security."), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/ct-cb-health-care-workers-who-died-of-covid-20200918-wl2e6ilfo5fxl3eoxddwq4dy.htmlstory.html>.

Chicago also faced additional challenges that were harder to detect and measure, including the emotional toll of COVID-19, then-unknown likelihoods of transmission or vulnerabilities, and corresponding indefinite isolation, job-loss, unemployment, lack of income, resource shortages, and risk of personal, familial, and social exposure, serious illness, hospitalization, and death. Some officers, City personnel, and hospital personnel, for example, moved out of their homes to prevent infecting to their families or households.<sup>38</sup>

However, infection rates were trending downward at the end of May and the City was in the process of phasing businesses back after lockdowns.<sup>39</sup> As a result, many businesses were bringing back employees and restocking inventory during the first weekend of unrest.

Executive Summary Figure 2. Daily case, hospitalization, and death rates and daily cases, hospitalizations, and deaths for Chicago (March 2020, through December 2020)<sup>40</sup>



<sup>38</sup> See Nancy Loo, *Chicago reserves nearly 300 downtown hotel rooms for first responders*, WGN9 (March 31, 2020), <https://wgntv.com/news/coronavirus/chicago-reserves-nearly-300-downtown-hotel-rooms-for-first-responders/>.

<sup>39</sup> See Ill. Exec. Order No. 2020-38 (May 29, 2020), <https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/Executive-Orders/ExecutiveOrder2020-38.aspx>.

<sup>40</sup> *COVID Dashboard*, CITY OF CHICAGO, <https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/sites/covid-19/home/covid-dashboard.html>.

But during the unrest and transportation closures in May and June 2020, there were interruptions to testing locations, hospital services, emergency rooms, immediate-care clinics, and pharmacies.<sup>41</sup> In response, the City and the CPD coordinated additional security for mobile pharmacies throughout Chicago.<sup>42</sup> We also heard about victims of crime and possibly police violence who were sent to the hospital and unable to see their families for indefinite periods due to COVID-19 precautions. We also heard from people who were arrested, confined, and released without charges and potentially exposed to COVID-19 for hours without contact with their families, friends, or attorneys.

COVID-19 and vaccine distribution continues to challenge Chicago's communities and City resources into 2021. And increases in violent crime—including increases in carjackings, shootings, and homicides—have continued to impact Chicago.<sup>43</sup>

The City and the CPD have also continued to face challenges. Since May 2020, the City and the CPD have experienced significant turnover. The CPD, specifically, has faced challenges with retirements, including the First Deputy Superintendent in early August 2020, the Chief of Operations in August 2020, and the next First Deputy Superintendent in September 2020.<sup>44</sup> Likewise, the position of the City's Deputy Mayor for Public Safety was vacant for over seven months (October 2020 to

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<sup>41</sup> See, e.g., Lisa Schenker, *Chicago hospitals cancel appointments after weekend unrest*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (June 1, 2020) ("The medical shutdowns come as many hospitals are trying to restart outpatient services and elective surgeries after many of those services were paused because of COVID-19."), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-hospitals-cancellations-protests-floyd-chicago-20200601-o6hsftrwzcydcexwdgmgzspae-story.html>; Lisa Schenker, *'It's catastrophic': Chicago-area patients struggle to get medications as pharmacies close amid George Floyd unrest*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (June 3, 2020) ("The closures have made it difficult for many area residents with diabetes, heart problems, mental health disorders and drug addictions to get their medications."), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-chicago-south-side-pharmacy-closures-george-floyd-20200604-rzbtppqnvfuhb6nnxe4qo2ui4-story.html>. See also David Roeder, *Walgreens spends \$35 million to reopen looted Chicago stores*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (October 7, 2020), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/business/2020/10/7/21506607/walgreens-looting-reopen-chicago-stores-mobile-health-covid-testing-chatham>.

<sup>42</sup> See, e.g., Lynn Sweet and Brett Chase, *With residents desperate for prescriptions, Lightfoot, Duckworth push for looted pharmacies to reopen*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (June 2, 2020), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/politics/2020/6/2/21278704/chicago-looting-pharmacies-walgreens-cvs-walmart-ori-lightfoot-tammy-duckworth-prescription>.

<sup>43</sup> See Megan Hickey, *A Violent Trend: Increasing Numbers of Children Killed by Gun Violence in Chicago*, CBS CHICAGO (April 19, 2021), <https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2021/04/19/chicago-children-killed-gun-violence/>; Jermaine Nolen and David Struett, *Murders, carjackings spike in 1st 3 months of 2021, although overall crime down from last year, police say*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (April 1, 2021), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/crime/2021/4/1/22361767/chicago-police-department-crime-statistics-march-2021>.

<sup>44</sup> See Frank Main and Fran Spielman, *In Chicago, other cities, more cops are calling it quits, retiring amid anti-police backlash*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (January 15, 2021) ("In Chicago, 560 officers retired in 2020 . . . about 15% more cops retiring than during the previous year, when the num-

May 2021).<sup>45</sup> And in May 2021, the COPA Chief Administrator and the Mayor's Chief of Staff resigned.<sup>46</sup>

Even without the extraordinary challenges from the COVID-19 pandemic, there is no quick fix to the policing challenges that the City, the CPD, and Chicago's communities faced in 2020. While we believe that the City and the CPD are now better positioned to respond to large-scale protests and the potential for unrest, much more work is needed. The City and the CPD must better position themselves to protect First Amendment speech; limit uses of force and violence toward people and property; and simultaneously, keep resources available to continue to serve all people of Chicago by helping to prevent crime and respond to calls for service.

Further, the City and the CPD cannot succeed without the trust and confidence of Chicago's communities. Chicago's communities are needed to, among other things, identify, prevent, and solve crimes; recruit and encourage qualified officers who are sincerely committed toward community, impartial, constitutional, and procedurally just policing; and to communicate their concerns and needs. Likewise, reform and progress must have buy-in from all levels of the CPD to create a culture that allows for reform and adherence to, adaptation with, and even leading of national best practices.

To this end, the City and the CPD have much work ahead. We heard from many community members who expressed new fears, frustrations, confusion, pain, and anger regarding their experiences with officers during protests. We heard from community members who participated in protests—some for the first time—who

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ber of retirements rose by nearly 30%.”), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/2021/1/15/22229584/police-retirements-backlash-chicago-new-york-minneapolis-john-catanzara-fop-michael-lappe>. See also Fran Spielman, *Midterm correction, COVID-19 fatigue or mass exodus? Lightfoot's revolving door keeps spinning*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (May 9, 2021), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/city-hall/2021/5/9/22425232/chicago-mayor-lorilightfoot-administration-turnover-mid-term-cabinet>.

<sup>45</sup> See Frank Main and Fran Spielman, *Lightfoot's top advisor for public safety to resign after just a year in job, sources say*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (October 1, 2020), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/city-hall/2020/10/1/21497406/susan-lee-lori-lightfoot-public-safety-deputy-mayor-resign>; *Mayor Lori Lightfoot Names Celia Meza as City's Top Attorney, Fills Two Other Key City Hall Vacancies*, CBS CHICAGO (May 5, 2021), <https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2021/05/05/celia-meza-appointed-chicago-corporation-counsel-law-department-mayor-lori-lightfoot/>. See also Fran Spielman, *Midterm correction, COVID-19 fatigue or mass exodus? Lightfoot's revolving door keeps spinning*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (May 9, 2021), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/city-hall/2021/5/9/22425232/chicago-mayor-lorilightfoot-administration-turnover-mid-term-cabinet>.

<sup>46</sup> See Fran Spielman and Manny Ramos, *Police oversight agency chief resigns*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (May 5, 2020), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/2021/5/5/22421458/sydney-roberts-resigns-chicago-police-oversight-shootings-copa-civilian-office-accountability>; A.D. Quig, *Lightfoot replaces chief of staff, names new chief operating officer*, CRAIN'S CHICAGO BUSINESS (May 24, 2021), <https://www.chicagobusiness.com/government/lightfoot-replaces-chief-staff-names-new-chief-operating-officer>.

said that officers were verbally abusive toward them; pushed and shoved them; tackled them to the ground; pushed them down stairs; pulled their hair; struck them with batons, fists, or other nearby objects; hit them after they were “kettled” with nowhere to go or after being handcuffed; and sprayed them with pepper spray (OC spray) without reason.<sup>47</sup> Some reported needing medical care for their injuries or for the injuries of their families or friends—including injuries to heads, wrists, arms, knees, legs, eyes, faces, ribs, and noses. Many described having continued trauma from their experiences. Many also expressed fear and anxiety that unmasked officers potentially exposed them to COVID-19, including after officers took their masks during or after arrest. Several people also said that they were arrested, held for hours without being able to communicate with their family members, friends, or attorneys, and ultimately released without charges. Many people reported seeing CPD officers with their name plates and badge numbers covered. They also reported confusion about directions coming from the City, including the implementation of curfews, the discontinuation of service on Chicago Transit Authority trains and buses, and the raising of downtown bridges. And many community members expressed fear of retaliation from the CPD if they submitted formal complaints—or even exhibited reluctance to talk about their experiences with specific detail for that reason.

## ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In short, the City, like many other cities, was unprepared for the level of sustained protests and unrest downtown and throughout its neighborhoods, starting at the end of May 2020.<sup>48</sup> While the City and the CPD regularly plan, prepare, and respond to large crowds and events, the City’s and the CPD’s standard approach regarding protests and unrest was inadequate for responding to quickly evolving mass movements—often fueled by social media—during a pandemic and corresponding stay-at-home orders, economic crises, unemployment, and resource

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<sup>47</sup> The word “kettling” is often used to refer to different police actions, but in general, refers to “police action of surrounding a crowd of people in order to restrict them from moving or escaping.” *On Kettling*, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/kettling-police-tactic-history-meaning-usage>. Some protesters also said that they believed officers used tear gas and rubber bullets. According to the CPD, the CPD did not have or use flash-bang grenades, bean bag rounds, rubber bullets, or tear gas. *See, e.g., Report on the 2020 Protests & Civil Unrest*, MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS ASSOCIATION, INTELLIGENCE COMMANDERS GROUP (October 2020), <https://majorcitieschiefs.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/MCCA-Report-on-the-2020-Protest-and-Civil-Unrest.pdf>. Some CPD personnel said that the CPD does not carry this equipment and would not have been able to use the equipment even if officers thought that it would have been warranted.

<sup>48</sup> *See, e.g.,* Zoe Todd, *Handling of Public Protests a ‘Stress Test’ for Police Reform*, PBS FRONTLINE (September 18, 2020), <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/protests-trial-police-reform/>; *see also* Kim Barker, Mike Baker, and Ali Watkins, *In City After City, Police Mishandled Black Lives Matter Protests*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (March 20, 2021), <https://www.ny-times.com/2021/03/20/us/protests-policing-george-floyd.html>.

shortages. The City and the CPD had not dedicated sufficient attention or resources toward responding to protests and potential unrest since Chicago hosted the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in 2012.

As a result, the City, the CPD, and other City entities had to improvise, creating foreseeable issues—such as the difficulties of deploying mass numbers of officers to various critical locations within and outside of their districts. Many officers were deployed without their equipment, including radios, body-worn cameras, or protective gear and also without provisions for their basic needs, such as transportation or access to rest periods, restrooms, food, or water. The CPD, for example, repeatedly and indefinitely put all officers on 12-hour days, without days off throughout 2020. And since then, in response to protests, violence, and potential protests and unrest, the CPD has continued to put officers on 12-hour days and reduced days off during certain periods.<sup>49</sup>

Thus, even if the City and the CPD had predicted the level of protests and unrest after the death of George Floyd on May 25, 2020, the City and the CPD did not have the policies, reporting practices, training, equipment, data analysis, community engagement, or inter-agency coordination required to respond effectively. In other words, to respond to these foreseeable and unforeseeable challenges, the City and the CPD would have needed to allocate resources to large-scale and sustained protests and unrest *well in advance* of George Floyd's murder. For example, the CPD's lack of a staffed, trained, and equipped mobile-field-force team—similar to what existed in Chicago for the 2012 NATO Summit—left the CPD significantly unprepared during the summer of 2020.<sup>50</sup>

Without sufficient planning or preparation, many City personnel, officers, and local partners went beyond what would have been required of them if the City and the CPD had been better prepared and had sought to meet the moment with sufficient guidance, training, or guarantees of support. Many conducted themselves professionally and admirably under abnormally stressful circumstances. Likewise, large groups of Chicago communities came together—during the relatively early

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<sup>49</sup> See, e.g., Mugo Odigwe, *CPD Ending Daily Downtown Deployment With 12 Hour Days, Will No Longer Cancel Days Off*, CBS CHICAGO (June 1, 2021), <https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2021/06/01/cpd-ending-daily-downtown-deployment-with-12-hour-days-will-no-longer-cancel-days-off/>.

<sup>50</sup> Mobile Field Force teams are specifically trained for crowd management and for deterring, mitigating, and de-escalating violent individuals in crowds and maximizing the safety of officers, protesters, and bystanders. Properly trained, equipped, and certified Mobile Field Force teams can prevent untrained officers from using tactics that may further escalate tensions or unrest. In 2020, the CPD created the Critical Incident Response Team and Community Safety Teams and allocated some crowd management responsibilities to those teams. The IMT, the OAG, and others have continued to raise questions regarding these teams, and our recommendations regarding a Mobile Field Force are distinct from the broader set of functions and required training that the CPD has assigned to the Critical Incident Response Team and Community Safety teams.

and uncertain stages of a worldwide pandemic—to clean, rebuild, and shield their communities. We heard of and witnessed experiences of incredible bravery by sworn and non-sworn personnel, including City personnel who worked tireless nights, officers and other first responders who rushed toward danger to help others, and people who went out of their way to de-escalate conflicts between community members and community members and police.

But there were other consequences for the City and the CPD’s lack of preparation. Some officers engaged in various levels of misconduct and excessive force, many instances of which are still under investigation by the CPD’s Bureau of Internal Affairs (BIA) and by the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA).<sup>51</sup> There were instances of widespread unrest, which included homicides, shootings, and serious injuries to community members and police officers; hundreds of arrests; and millions of dollars in property damage.<sup>52</sup> There was also an increase in violent crime and destruction of public and private property—including pharmacies, grocery stores, and local businesses.<sup>53</sup> Although the numbers are disputed—and may have been overstated—at least some people who joined or encouraged unrest and violence appeared to have traveled to Chicago for that purpose.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> See *All Protest related Complaints by District of Incident*, CIVILIAN OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY (January 4, 2021), <http://www.chicagocopa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Protest-Complaints-District-Heatmap-1.png>; *Chicago Police the Target of 520 Complaints Since May*, NBC CHICAGO (November 13, 2020), <https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/chicago-politics/chicago-police-the-target-of-520-complaints-since-may/2370843/>.

<sup>52</sup> See, e.g., Todd Lighty, Gary Marx, Christy Gutowski, and William Lee, *Chicago’s 2020 unrest: A Tribune investigation documents the scope of the damage and its lingering impact on neighborhoods, businesses*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (June 2, 2021), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/ct-chicago-2020-looting-unrest-damage-george-floyd-police-killing-20210602-olbvgmfylna3jarumzonp5zkqe-htmlstory.html>.

<sup>53</sup> See, e.g., *Man Who Set Fire to Chicago Police Vehicle During Civil Unrest Pleads Guilty In Federal Court*, THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS (April 8, 2021), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/man-who-set-fire-chicago-police-vehicle-during-civil-unrest-pleads-guilty-federal-court>; *Federal Judge Convicts Man of Conspiring to Steal Cash From Chicago ATM*, THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS (February 17, 2021), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/federal-judge-convicts-man-conspiring-steal-cash-chicago-atm>; *Man Charged in Federal Court With Illegally Possessing Loaded Gun After Allegedly Looting Downtown Chicago Store*, THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS (August 28, 2020), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/man-charged-federal-court-illegally-possessing-loaded-gun-after-allegedly-looting>; *Two Men Charged in Federal Court With Looting Pharmacies in Chicago*, THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS (August 26, 2020), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/two-men-charged-federal-court-looting-pharmacies-chicago-0>; *Chicago Man Arrested on Federal Arson Charge for Allegedly Setting Fire to Chicago Police Vehicle*, THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS (June 2, 2020), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/chicago-man-arrested-federal-arson-charge-allegedly-setting-fire-chicago-police-vehicle>.

<sup>54</sup> See, e.g., Lauren FitzPatrick, *Outside agitators? Few arrested in Chicago after George Floyd’s death came from elsewhere* (July 4, 2020) (“About three of every four people arrested in the period around the protests and looting – 1,847 – gave the police Chicago addresses, and 230



According to various community members, during the spike in calls for service, many calls went unanswered.<sup>55</sup> Chicago communities also experienced a spike in violent crime in the first weekend of protests and unrest, with 85 people shot, resulting in 24 deaths.<sup>56</sup> Due to COVID-19 precautions, we heard that some people with injuries and victims of crime either turned down medical care that they would have otherwise sought or risked indefinite separation from their families and friends in seeking treatment, causing additional uncertainty and stress. Cities across the country had over one-billion dollars in claims from the destruction of property—on top of economic losses from COVID-19 and corresponding shut-downs and other precautions.<sup>57</sup> The total immediate and long-term costs from the

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more were from the suburbs . . . 40 people . . . were from out of state . . . [and] no ZIP code was provided in the data obtained under the state’s public records law for the remaining 371, which included juveniles.”), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/2020/7/4/21312969/outside-agitators-george-floyd-chicago-looting-matthew-rupert>; *Federal Criminal Complaint Charges Illinois Man With Traveling To Minnesota To Riot, Possession of Explosive Devices*, THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA (June 1, 2020) (referring to alleged conduct in Minneapolis and Chicago), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/pr/federal-criminal-complaint-charges-illinois-man-traveling-minnesota-riot-possession>; Jessica Villagomez, *6 out-of-town protesters arrested near Chicago Mayor Lori Lightfoot’s home where protesting has been effectively banned*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (August 23, 2020), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-lightfoot-arrests-20200823-ofbclfdylzbtrd6fci7u5wn3va-story.html>; *Federal Indictment Charges Three Individuals With Setting Fire to Chicago Transit Authority Van*, THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS (February 25, 2021), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/federal-indictment-charges-three-individuals-setting-fire-chicago-transit-authority-van>; *Two Individuals Charged in Federal Court With Illegally Possessing Loaded Handguns in Downtown Chicago*, THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS (June 2, 2020), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/two-individuals-charged-federal-court-illegally-possessing-loaded-handguns-downtown>.

<sup>55</sup> On December 18, 2020, in response to a request from June 10, 2020, the City and the OEMC said the following:

“OEMC does not have data or documentation responsive to the IMT’s requests specifically isolating lawful demonstrations or unrest, other supporting law enforcement entities, or events not responded to. Additionally, while there may have been individuals who called 911 but were unable to get through, OEMC would not have information on such instances. Any calls that OEMC receives which require a dispatch receive a dispatch.”

<sup>56</sup> See, e.g., *85 shot, 24 fatally, over Chicago’s most violent weekend of 2020*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (June 1, 2020), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/2020/6/1/21275944/chicago-weekend-shootings-most-violent-weekend-2020-may-29-june-1>.

<sup>57</sup> Notably, such estimates include insurance claims, rather than actual damage, and thus, may both under- and over-inclusive, as some claims may be inaccurate and not all damage was insured. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Kingson, *Exclusive: \$1 billion-plus riot damage is most expensive in insurance history*, AXIOS (September 16, 2020), <https://www.axios.com/riots-cost-property-damage-276c9bcc-a455-4067-b06a-66f9db4cea9c.html>. See also *Facts + Statistics: Civil Disorders*, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE (“A preliminary estimate of insured losses from [Property Claim Services] which is still subject to further evaluation, would be more than \$1 billion, marking it as the costliest civil disorder in U.S. history.”), <https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-civil-disorders>; Tim McNicholas, *2 Months After looting and Unrest, Many Chicago Businesses Still Need Help Rebuilding*, CBS CHICAGO (August 3, 2020), <https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2020/08/03/2-months-after-looting-and-unrest-many-chicago-businesses-still-need>

destruction of property remains unclear, and it is unclear how many businesses and corresponding jobs will not return.<sup>58</sup> The City also spent hundreds of millions of dollars on overtime.<sup>59</sup>

The City may also have spent a considerable amount to settle protest-related lawsuits. For example, the City settled a lawsuit brought by the Chicago Freedom School, in which it claimed the City issued an “illegal” cease and desist order because the Chicago Freedom School fed and helped protesters trapped downtown in May 2020.<sup>60</sup> The City later rescinded the cease and desist order.<sup>61</sup> The financial terms of that settlement are not public.

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[help-rebuilding/](#). There may also have even been increased COVID-19 infection rates. See Randall Valentine, Dawn Valentine, and Jimmie Valentine, *Relationship of George Floyd protests to increases in COVID-19 cases using event study methodology*, J. PUBLIC HEALTH (OXF) (August 5, 2020) (finding a positive and significant infection growth rate in six of eight cities), <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7454741/>. See also Gregory Neyman and William Dalsey, *Black Lives Matter protests and COVID-19 cases: relationship in two databases*, J. PUBLIC HEALTH (OXF) (November 20, 2020) (finding a statistically significant increase in case rates across 326 counties, participating in 868 protests, but the increase was “small in magnitude and likely due to limitations of significantly different population sizes in comparators”), <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7717330/>. Compare David Lazer, et al., *The State of the Nation: A 50-State COVID-19 Survey Report #10: The Pandemic and the Protests*, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION (August 10, 2020), <https://kateto.net/covid19/COVID19%20CONSORTIUM%20REPORT%2010%20PROTEST%20AUGUST%202020.pdf>.

<sup>58</sup> See, e.g., Todd Lighty, Gary Marx, Christy Gutowski, and William Lee, *Chicago’s 2020 unrest: A Tribune investigation documents the scope of the damage and its lingering impact on neighborhoods, businesses*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (June 2, 2021), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/ct-chicago-2020-looting-unrest-damage-george-floyd-police-killing-20210602-olbvgmfylna3jarumzonp5zkqe-htmllstory.html>; Ally Marotti and Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, *Chicago’s black-owned businesses face uphill battle to rebuild, even with outpouring of support after George Floyd death*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (June 5, 2020), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-black-owned-chicago-businesses-george-floyd-20200605-5e574nbq6fay-pcuvw62hwgk7r4-story.html>.

<sup>59</sup> See Gregory Pratt, *Chicago spent \$367 million on overtime in 2020, double what Mayor Lori Lightfoot budgeted*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (February 11, 2021), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-chicago-budget-overtime-20210211-ugjefdxggnhrjoz73ehktx6fy-story.html>.

<sup>60</sup> See Justin Lawrence, *City Settles Chicago Freedom School Lawsuit After Group Was Cited For Offering Food To Protesters Trapped Downtown*, BLOCK CLUB CHICAGO (July 4, 2020), <https://blockclubchicago.org/2020/07/04/city-settles-chicago-freedom-school-lawsuit-after-group-was-cited-for-offering-food-to-protesters-trapped-downtown/>.

<sup>61</sup> *License Order*, CITY OF CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AFFAIRS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION (July 3, 2020), <https://chicagofreedomschool.org/app/uploads/2020/07/Chicago-Freedom-School-rescind-CD-SIGNED.pdf>.

In another example, the City paid \$115,000 to settle two lawsuits alleging that CPD officers used excessive force during the protests.<sup>62</sup>

Other lawsuits are pending. Sixty plaintiffs, for example, filed a lawsuit in November 2020, alleging police abuses.<sup>63</sup> Two other people filed a lawsuit, alleging excessive force, in May 2021.<sup>64</sup> And in December 2020 and June 2021, there were lawsuits filed regarding events at the Brickyard Mall on May 31, 2020.<sup>65</sup>

An accounting of how much the lack of preparation cost and how much long-term damage was caused will continue to develop, and a full accounting may never be possible. On the one hand, despite a spike in shootings, homicides, and shootings at police, there were only a few officer-involved shootings during unrest. On the other hand, as reflected in [Executive Summary Figure 3](#), there was a spike in fire-arm pointing circumstances that occurred between May 31 and June 2, 2020, and for reasons detailed throughout this report, there was often no body-worn camera footage to review. Likewise, given the many reporting and tracking challenges, the actual number of use of force incidents may be unknowable, including how often personal OC spray was used.

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<sup>62</sup> See Heather Cherone, *City Pays \$115K to Settle 2 Lawsuits Alleging Excessive Force During Protests*, WTTW NEWS (January 19, 2021), <https://news.wttw.com/2021/01/19/city-pays-115k-settle-2-lawsuits-alleging-excessive-force-during-protests>.

<sup>63</sup> See Jeremy Goner, *Dozens file federal suit alleging Chicago police abused this year's protests over the death of George Floyd*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (November 19, 2020), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/criminal-justice/ct-chicago-police-protesters-federal-lawsuit-20201119-dldtv7hw45ekxgisifvojt6l4-story.html>.

<sup>64</sup> See Chuck Goudie, Barb Markoff, Christine Tressel, and Ross Weidner, *Federal lawsuits allege brutality against protesters by Chicago police*, ABC7 EYEWITNESS NEWS (May 26, 2021), <https://abc7chicago.com/federal-lawsuits-allege-brutality-against-protesters-by-chicago-police/10700074/>.

<sup>65</sup> See *Read the lawsuit filed against Chicago, police officers in Brickyard Mall arrest*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (December 23, 2020), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-brickyard-mall-arrest-lawsuit-20201223-iztt7surbze63aaon7m5cf4obq-htmlstory.html>; Jason Meisner, *In fall-out from last year's unrest, man pleads guilty to breaking into pharmacies; trio sue alleging police brutality at another looting scene*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (June 1, 2021), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/criminal-justice/ct-chicago-unrest-looting-guilty-plea-police-brutality-lawsuit-20210601-dah6u32p3rgpjnxanbwnnfuci-story.html>.

## Executive Summary Figure 3.

CPD Force Revision Division: Firearm Pointing Incidents (2020)<sup>66</sup>

Compliance with many of the Consent Decree requirements regarding, among others, community engagement, policy development, training, uses of force, accountability, and officer-wellness practices under development would have put the City and the CPD in a better position to respond to the protests and unrest.<sup>67</sup>

Specifically, with compliant policies, plans, training across levels, reporting, community engagement, and specific inter-entity agreements, the City and the CPD could better respond to large, sustained protests and predict, identify, prevent, and mitigate unrest. This would allow the City and the CPD to efficiently (1) build trust with Chicago's communities; (2) improve communications with Chicago's communities; (3) close the window for opportunists who might take advantage of or contribute to unrest; (4) protect businesses to allow them to continue to provide Chicago's communities with goods and services, including groceries and pharmaceuticals; and (5) allocate public resources and services to Chicago's communities, including public transit, education, food delivery, and crime prevention.

Throughout our review, and as reflected in this report, the IMT identified various issues with the City's and the CPD's responses to First Amendment activity. We recommended that the City and the CPD address many issues immediately, rather than waiting for this report. Since then, the City and the CPD have made deliberate efforts to improve their responses to protests and unrest through additional planning; purchasing and allocating equipment; developing and revising policies;

<sup>66</sup> *Chicago Police Department Force Review Division 2020 Year-End Report*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (April 28, 2021), <https://home.chicagopolice.org/wp-content/uploads/FRD-2020-Year-End-Report.pdf>.

<sup>67</sup> See, e.g., ¶266 ("CPD training will reflect its commitment to procedural justice, de-escalation, impartial policing, and community policing.").

providing refresher and revised training; and improving supervision. We understand that other City entities and partners have also continued to meet to identify ways to improve.

For example, the City, the CPD, the OAG, and the Coalition (which “includes the plaintiffs in the *Campbell* and *Communities United* lawsuits.”<sup>68</sup>) met several times and continue to review and revise CPD policies regarding responses to crowds; mass arrests and corresponding reporting; and responses to First Amendment activity. These discussions began after the Coalition filed a Notice of Intent to Initiate Enforcement Proceedings in July 2020.<sup>69</sup> Since then, the CPD has also conducted additional roll-call, eLearning, and in-person trainings, including crowd management techniques and mobile-field-force concepts. As of this report, the City, the City’s entities, the OAG, the Coalition, and the IMT are still meeting regularly to resolve First Amendment and Use of Force policy concerns.<sup>70</sup>

We reiterate our recommendations and provide additional recommendations throughout this report, including a summary list at the end of this Executive Summary. See [IMT’s Recommendations](#). In short, as demonstrated by the list below, the City and the CPD needed more effective plans, policies, trainings, and practices to adequately respond to large-scale protests and unrest:

- Prioritizing better data collection, analysis, and management to better inform reform efforts, priorities, and resource allocation;
- Better intelligence gathering and clear channels of internal, external, and community communication before, during, and after planned *and unplanned* events;

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<sup>68</sup> See *Memorandum of Agreement Between the Office of the Illinois Attorney General and the City of Chicago and Campbell v. City of Chicago Plaintiffs and Communities United v. City of Chicago Plaintiffs* (March 20, 2018), available at [http://chicagopoliceconsentdecree.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Executed\\_MOA.pdf](http://chicagopoliceconsentdecree.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Executed_MOA.pdf).

<sup>69</sup> Counsel for the Coalition, *Response to the Second Independent Monitor’s Report and Notice of the Coalition’s Intent to Initiate Enforcement Proceedings* (July 23, 2020), Case: 1:17-cv-06260, Document #:855, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

<sup>70</sup> Separately, starting in June 2020, the CPD and the Use of Force Community Working Group convened to discuss the CPD’s Use of Force policies. The last meeting was on June 16, 2021. These meetings relate to several Consent Decree requirements. For example, the CPD must “establish and maintain clear channels through which community members can provide input regarding CPD’s use of force policies and propose revisions or additions to those policies.” ¶160. We provided an assessment of the CPD’s relevant efforts through December 31, 2020, in our last monitoring report, concluding that the City and the CPD fell short of meeting a level of compliance. See *Independent Monitoring Report 3*, INDEPENDENT MONITORING TEAM (March 30, 2021), <https://cpdmonitoringteam.com/overview/reports-and-resources/third-semi-annual-independent-monitoring-report/>. We will provide an updated assessment for the City and the CPD’s efforts through June 30, 2021, in our next report, *Independent Monitoring Report 4*.

- Better inter- and intra-agency planning, training, and equipment acquisition and distribution for planned and unplanned events;
- A more effective command-and-control structure that provides for clear levels of responsibilities and proper documentation of decisions, operational actions, and results, including deployments, uses of force, injuries, property damage, officer wellness, and logistics.
- A more prompt and efficient deployment of personnel, including from external partners with clear command and control and rules of engagement;
- Continued development of CPD leadership;
- Formal, structured, and well-trained specialized, equipped, and certified mobile-field-force teams as rapid deployment units;
- Updated policies, forms, training, and supervision for First Amendment activity and crowd management for all responding officers and personnel, including the ability to differentiate between protected First Amendment and unlawful activity, to protect the former and prevent, mitigate, and deter the latter;
- Clear communications with community members, including protesters, and protest organizers regarding policies; time, place, and manner restrictions; and enforcement actions, including dispersal orders;<sup>71</sup> and
- Better support for officer safety and wellness through sufficient equipment, food and water, supplies, support, mental-health services, and rest.

At the time of this report, the City and the CPD continue to meet with members of Chicago's communities and with the Office of the Illinois Attorney General (OAG), the IMT, and the federal court to address many of these issues. As referenced above, the City and the CPD also continue to meet with the Coalition regarding the City's and the CPD's First Amendment policies and practices.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> See, e.g., *Know Your Right to Protest in Chicago*, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (ACLU) OF ILLINOIS (May 2015), [https://www.aclu-il.org/sites/default/files/know\\_your\\_right\\_to\\_protest\\_in\\_chicago.pdf](https://www.aclu-il.org/sites/default/files/know_your_right_to_protest_in_chicago.pdf).

<sup>72</sup> The Coalition "includes the plaintiffs in the *Campbell* and *Communities United* lawsuits." ¶1705. See also ¶1669; *Memorandum of Agreement Between the Office of the Illinois Attorney General and the City of Chicago and Campbell v. City of Chicago Plaintiffs and Communities United v. City of Chicago Plaintiffs* (March 20, 2018), available at [http://chicagopoliceconsentdecree.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Executed\\_MOA.pdf](http://chicagopoliceconsentdecree.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Executed_MOA.pdf). Specifically, the *Campbell* plaintiffs are represented by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law's MacArthur Justice Center; the University of Chicago Law School's Mandel Legal Aid Clinic; Shiller Preyar LLC; Samuels &

Of course, our review does not end with this Special Report, and there are still questions regarding what the City and the CPD have done, or plan to do, to better respond to protests and unrest. While we do not provide compliance assessments in this report, we will continue to do so in our semiannual reports until the City and the CPD reach full and effective compliance with the Consent Decree's requirements.<sup>73</sup> Our next Independent Monitoring Report, the fourth, will cover the City and the CPD's efforts through June 30, 2021. This review and analysis of the CPD's practices has and will continue to inform the IMT's recommendations and assessments for CPD policies, trainings, supervision, and practices under the Consent Decree.

Because the City's and the CPD's work to come into compliance with the Consent Decree is ongoing, in many ways, this Special Report provides a gap analysis of where the City is and where it needs to go to move closer toward full and effective compliance with the Consent Decree's requirements. This report is not a blanket disapproval or approval of the City's and the CPD's responses to recent protests and unrest. Instead, in this report, we refer to the relevant Consent Decree requirements and make recommendations for what the City and the CPD should do to reach full and effective compliance with the Consent Decree.<sup>74</sup> To this end, the City and the CPD must take ownership over the required reforms, honestly identify strengths and weaknesses, and adapt to the needs of Chicago's communities.

We are encouraged that the CPD did its own after-action review and After Action Report—covering the CPD's response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020, and June 12, 2020. In that report, the CPD acknowledges many of the areas that require improvement. The After Action Report states that the CPD “continues to deliberately implement certain policies, procedures, and systems that can safely, lawfully, and effectively facilitate future responses to both planned and unplanned

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Associates, Ltd.; Karchmar & Lambert, P.C.; Action Injury; and Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, and the *Campbell* plaintiffs include 411 Movement for Pierre Loury; Black Lives Matter Chicago; Blocks Together; Brighton Park Neighborhood Council, Chicago Urban League; Justice for Families—Black Lives Matter Chicago; Network 49; The Illinois State Conference of the NAACP, Chicago Westside Branch; Women's All Point Bulletin; and Chicago Urban League. Likewise, the *Communities United* plaintiffs are represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Illinois; Equip for Equality; and Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, and the *Communities United* plaintiffs include Communities United, Community Renewal Society, ONE Northside, and Next Steps, NFP.

<sup>73</sup> Our latest compliance assessments are in our Independent Monitoring Report 3. See *Independent Monitoring Report 3*, INDEPENDENT MONITORING TEAM (March 30, 2021), <https://cpd-monitoringteam.com/overview/reports-and-resources/third-semi-annual-independent-monitoring-report/>.

<sup>74</sup> See ¶1693. As cited throughout the report, we note that our recommendations are in line with the best practices recommended by many other agencies and after-action reports regarding responses to protests and unrest in 2020.

protests.”<sup>75</sup> The CPD further acknowledged that the CPD “must be as prepared to respond to large-scale, unplanned incidents . . . [which] is best accomplished through a deliberate, continuous cycle of improvement incorporating training, policy revisions, and regular preparedness drills.”<sup>76</sup>

We agree, and as detailed in this report, we believe that the City and the CPD can and must make immediate, deliberate, and transparent efforts—in compliance with the Consent Decree—to better protect and serve and to be accountable to Chicago’s communities.<sup>77</sup> We also believe that the City and the CPD should make many of their efforts transparent to help remedy the trust that may have been harmed, both with the public and City personnel, and to ensure that, in improving their ability to respond, the City and the CPD do not ignore either constitutional policing or concerns about over-policing and over-militarized responses, detached from communities, that inspired so many people to take to the streets.

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<sup>75</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department’s Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 2–3.

<sup>76</sup> *Id.* at 5.

<sup>77</sup> In the City’s response to this report and our recommendations, the CPD reports having made many relevant efforts. See [Attachment B](#). We look forward to reporting on the City’s and the CPD’s efforts and assessing compliance with the Consent Decree requirements in upcoming reporting periods and corresponding monitoring reports. We will report on the relevant evidence we have received through June 30, 2021, in our next report, Independent Monitoring Report 4.



## IMT's Recommendations

### Planning and Preparation

- Expand planning operations across all internal and external entities and partners by, among others, (1) establishing a multi-facet planning team, (2) modifying current planning template, and (3) conducting tabletop exercises for command personnel (¶704)
- Enhance intelligence gathering and dissemination capabilities by, among other things, (1) tracking national and international events that may impact Chicago, (2) improving social-media engagement, (3) conducting formal meetings with protest organizers and community stakeholders, and (4) engaging with Chicago's communities, stakeholders, and experts regarding the City's and the CPD's policing efforts and strategies (¶46)
- Continue New Forms of Community Engagement by, among other things, (1) clearly communicating time, place and manner restrictions; (2) conducting community-sentiment assessments; (3) engaging with community review of and comment on policies and training; (4) creating and maintaining community and business safety plans; (5) improving victim services (¶¶10, 49, 52, 115, 160, 511, 546)
- Create, train, and equip specialized Mobile Field Force Teams, with certified members, across all CPD areas (¶¶265–68)
- Better prepare for department-wide officer wellness and support, including providing and tracking body-worn cameras, protective

equipment, transportation, hydration, food, facilities, and relief (¶¶, 236–41, 381–86)

- Conduct a feasibility study regarding the acquisition, prioritization, allocation, and tracking of resources for officer wellness and responding to protests and unrest (¶¶377, 379)

### Policies

- Update and Develop Standard Operating Procedures for initiating Emergency Operations Center and Forward Command Posts, establishing clear roles and responsibilities for all levels of command (¶¶341–46, 354)
- Update and develop CPD policies, with an enhanced focus on (1) Use of Force, including mass arrests (¶¶153, 158–216, 218–19, 243–48, and 509), (2) First Amendment-related policies (¶208), (3) core policing values regarding ethical policing practices and a commitment to fair, unbiased and respectful interactions (¶¶54, 152, and 163); and (4) accountability (¶¶626, *et al.*)

### Training

- Develop training programs for leadership, commanders, and supervisors as teams on Mobile Field Force operations and rules of engagement (¶¶265–68)
- Provide adequate training for all officers on new or revised policies, including use of force, de-escalation, batons, and personal OC spray (¶¶265–68)
- Provide refresher training on (1) the people's right to record offic-

ers (¶58), (2) uniform requirements (¶347, 351, 433), (3) respectful interactions (¶52, 54, 56), (4) providing and requesting medical aid (¶173), and (5) arrestee rights (¶¶30–31, 35, 71)

### Accountability and Transparency

- Improve reporting and Improve reporting and documentation on uses of force, arrest, deployments, dispersals, officer wellness and safety, all injuries, and use of OC spray (¶566–67, 438, 528, 567, 581–82)
- Increase transparency regarding discipline, including decisions to relieve or not relieve officers of police powers (¶567)
- Address personnel needs across accountability systems, including COPA investigators, CPD Force Review Division, BIA, and CPD supervisor ratios (¶¶343, 356, 521, 575, 700)
- Allocate sufficient City and CPD resources to review and analyze data, including tagging and auditing body-worn-camera video footage (¶¶352–53, 576, 700)
- Continue to review and increase methods of transparency with Chicago's communities, regarding crime-reduction strategies, officer-involved shootings, and other police activities (¶¶10, 12, 17, 54, 334)
- Create After Action procedures—including body-worn camera review and opportunities for community engagement—after each operations plan (¶¶8–10, 347–51)

The CPD should also address the City of Chicago Office of the Inspector General's findings:  
(1) Address breakdowns in mass-arrest processes, (2) Improve use-of-force reporting, and (3) Fill gaps in policies

## Scope and Methodology

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As protests and unrest began in Chicago in 2020, related law-enforcement activities also increased, including contacts, tactics, and other practices and topics covered by the Consent Decree. This included uses of force—including the uses of impact weapons (*e.g.*, batons), oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray (also known as “pepper spray”)—foot pursuits, and individual and mass arrests. The rise in policing activity provided a nearly six-month stress test for the City’s and the CPD’s practices across the 10 topic areas of the Consent Decree.<sup>78</sup>

### Scope Figure 1: Consent Decree Topics

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|---|--|
| (1) Community Policing                  | (6) Training                                   |
| (2) Impartial Policing                  | (7) Supervision                                |
| (3) Crisis Intervention                 | (8) Officer Wellness and Support               |
| (4) Use of Force                        | (9) Accountability and Transparency            |
| (5) Recruitment, Hiring, and Promotions | (10) Data Collection, Analysis, and Management |

On June 5, 2020, during ongoing protests and unrest in Chicago—and amid growing concerns regarding the City of Chicago’s (City’s) and the Chicago Police Department’s (CPD’s) response to protests and unrest—the IMT announced that we would prepare this report.<sup>79</sup> To promote transparency under the Consent Decree, the IMT focused this Special Report on the City’s and the CPD’s responses to these events, including First Amendment activity, unrest, and related law-enforcement responses. While the City and the CPD continue to respond to large protests,

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<sup>78</sup> See, *e.g.*, ¶¶30–31 (prominently displaying arrestee rights); 48 (community partnerships, effective de-escalation, and community-oriented crime prevention strategies); 54–55 (prohibitions on discrimination based on protected classes); 86 (alternatives to arrest); 126 (crisis intervention training); 156–57 (sanctity of human life; professionalism; de-escalation; tactics to eliminate or reduce the use of force; only using force that is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances; prohibiting the use of force to punish or retaliate; stopping force when it is no longer necessary; truthfully and completely reporting all reportable uses of force; reporting excessive uses of force and violations of policy; accountability for violations; and promoting community trust); 163 (prohibiting the use of force to punish or retaliate against a person engaging in First Amendment activity); 165 (prohibiting deadly force except in circumstances where there is an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to an officer or another person); 173 (requesting and rendering medical aid); 175 (duty to intervene when another officer is using excessive force); 178 (prohibition on using carotid artery restraints or chokeholds unless deadly force is authorized); 229 (supervisors review all reportable uses of force); 246 (annual use-of-force training); 248 (pre-service promotional supervisory training); 352 (supervisors to enforce expectation that members perform duties consistent with procedural justice, de-escalation, impartial policing, and community policing); 411 (Traumatic Incident Stress Management Program); 587 (database to collect, maintain, integrate, analyze, visualize, and retrieve data for each CPD officer).

<sup>79</sup> See, *e.g.*, ¶643. See *Notice Regarding Special Report* (June 5, 2020), <https://cpdmonitoring-team.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2020-06-05-Notice-Regarding-Special-Report.pdf>.

crowds, and potential unrest in 2021, this review focuses on the major events from May 2020 through November 2020.<sup>80</sup>

Under ¶1667, the Independent Monitoring Team also coordinated and conferred with the Office of the Inspector General for the City of Chicago (Inspector General's Office or OIG) in connection with this Special Report. The Inspector General Office's corresponding report, which covers May 29 through June 7, 2020, is available [here](#).<sup>81</sup> As reflected in their report, the Inspector General's Office and the IMT focused on different areas:

*In recognition of their different sources and scopes of authority and jurisdiction, and in the interest of avoiding the duplication of efforts, OIG and the IMT undertook fact gathering jointly but are issuing separate reports with different areas of focus. OIG's report is issued pursuant to its City-spanning jurisdiction and mandate to, among other things, promote effectiveness and integrity in City operations, and the mandate of its Public Safety section to study policies, practices, programs, and training specific to CPD and Chicago's police accountability agencies. . . . The IMT's report arises from its duties to monitor compliance with the terms of the consent decree, and therefore focuses on topics covered by the consent decree.*<sup>82</sup>

The Inspector General made findings regarding (1) breakdowns in mass-arrest processes, (2) use-of-force reporting, and (3) gaps in policies:

First, the Inspector General's Office found breakdowns in the CPD's mass-arrest processes, including failure to arrest some offenders, unsubstantiated detention, release of some arrestees without charges, risks to officer safety, and risks to arrestee safety.<sup>83</sup>

Second, the Inspector General's Office found problems with the CPD's use of force reporting, including the CPD's failure to fulfill use-of-force reporting obligations and failing to provide clear and consistent guidance to officers on reporting obligations.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> See e.g., Tara Molina, *Sunday Night Was 'A Disaster': Large Crowds Bring 'Massive Chaos and Mayhem' To The Loop At End of July 4th Celebrations*, CBS2 CHICAGO (July 6, 2021), <https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2021/07/06/the-loop-crowds/>; Diane Pathieu, Ravi Baichwal, and Rob Elgas, *Thousands protest in downtown Chicago over Israel-Palestine conflict*, ABC7 EYEWITNESS NEWS (May 12, 2021), <https://abc7chicago.com/israel-palestine-and-conflict/10618870/>.

<sup>81</sup> *Report on Chicago's Response to George Floyd Protests and Unrest*, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE CITY OF CHICAGO (February 18, 2021), <https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/OIG-Report-on-Chicagos-Response-to-George-Floyd-Protests-and-Unrest.pdf>.

<sup>82</sup> *Id.* at 7–8.

<sup>83</sup> *Id.* at 66–93.

<sup>84</sup> *Id.* at 94–117.

Third, the Inspector General's Office found gaps in the CPD's policies, including those governing mass arrests, the oversight and review of uses of force, body-worn camera non-compliance, and violations of uniform policy, specifically obscured identifiers.<sup>85</sup>

In their report, the Inspector General's Office focused on many aspects and details of the early protests and unrest, including for example, decisions to raise bridges.<sup>86</sup> We do not duplicate those efforts here, and instead, refer readers to the Inspector General's Report in full. We provide some details regarding the same days of protests and unrest to provide context to later events and efforts, our analysis, and recommendations.

As detailed below, to review the City's and the CPD's responses to the events of last year, the IMT reviewed thousands of records, including reports, body-worn camera videos, and emails. As explained further below, combined, the IMT and the Inspector General's Office also conducted over 100 interviews. The vast majority of these interviews were conducted via video conferencing due to COVID-19. This included interviews with members of the public, including people who participated in protests, and representatives from the City, its entities, and other government partners. We also sought to corroborate statements from these interviews from various sources, and throughout this report, we site to public information when possible.

Overall, the IMT made over 70 requests (many of which included sub-requests), including requests for policies, training, emails, audio, video, and data. In response, the City provided over 10,000 records. Similar to our data requests for our Consent Decree monitoring efforts, the IMT experienced challenges receiving some records from the City. Still, we received a great deal of records from the

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<sup>85</sup> *Id.* at 118–26.

<sup>86</sup> The Inspector General's Office also recently released, among others, reports addressing the City's video release policy (September 2020), the CPD's and COPA's affidavit override processes (December 2020), and the CPD's disciplinary grievance procedures (May 2021). *See Review of Compliance with the City of Chicago's Video Release Policy for Use-Of-Force Incidents*, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE CITY OF CHICAGO (September 2020), <https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/OIG-Review-of-Compliance-with-the-City-of-Chicagos-Video-Release-Policy-for-Use-of-Force-Incidents.pdf>; *Evaluation of the Use of the Affidavit Override in Disciplinary Investigations of Chicago Police Department Members*, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE CITY OF CHICAGO (December 2020), <https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/OIG-Evaluation-of-the-Use-of-the-Affidavit-Override-in-Disciplinary-Investigations-of-CPD-Members.pdf>; *Review of the Disciplinary Grievance Procedure for Chicago Police Department Members*, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE CITY OF CHICAGO (May 2021), <https://igchicago.org/2021/05/20/review-of-the-disciplinary-grievance-procedure-for-chicago-police-department-members/>.

CPD—in addition to our general Consent Decree compliance records. Some records, however, were delayed. The emails we requested, for example, were received many months after our request.

### Community Interviews, Listening Sessions, and Other Community Input

The IMT hears from community members throughout our monitoring efforts. The IMT made additional efforts during this review to hear from community members regarding their experiences with the City and the CPD's responses to protests and unrest. The IMT's Community Engagement Team conducted interviews with community members and advocates to learn about their experiences during the protests and unrest.

Judge Robert Dow Jr also hosted two days of listening sessions, where 58 community members provided oral statements and 24 community members submitted written statements.<sup>87</sup> The full transcripts are available as [Appendix D](#) and [Appendix E](#), below.

We must note that many community members expressed reluctance to participate in interviews, with many referring to a fear of retaliation from the CPD. There were also a significant number of people who registered to participate during the Listening Sessions, but ultimately did not appear. Overall, the IMT appreciates all of the experiences that community members shared, which was critical for our review. We thank all those willing to share their experiences with Judge Dow and with us.

In addition to the IMT's regular meetings with the Coalition—consistent with ¶1669 of the Consent Decree—the IMT received input from the Coalition on the community's perspective on the events and issues discussed in this report via numerous meetings and related correspondence between the IMT, the City, the CPD, the OAG, and the Coalition.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> One of the most important ways in which the IMT heard community voices during our review was through the public Listening Sessions held by Judge Dow. See *Transcript of the August 19, 2020 Listening Session* (August 19, 2020), <https://cpdmonitoringteam.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/081920Listening-Sessions-FINAL-PROOFED.pdf>; and *Transcript of the August 20, 2020 Listening Session* (August 20, 2020), <https://cpdmonitoringteam.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/082020ListeningSession-Day-2-FINALPROOFED.pdf>.

<sup>88</sup> See, e.g., *Coalition's Notice of Filing Written Comments on the Response of the City of Chicago to the Protests since the Death of George Floyd* (Aug. 20, 2020), *Illinois v. City of Chicago*, No. 17-cv-6260, Docket No. 864. These included more than a dozen settlement conferences, most held by the Court, since July 23, 2020, when the Coalition filed its *Response to Second Independent Monitor's Report and Notice of the Coalition's Intent to Initiate Enforcement Proceedings*, Docket No. 855.

Scope Figure 2. The Coalition  
(*Campbell* Plaintiffs and *Communities United* Plaintiffs)

The Coalition (¶669)	
<i>Campbell</i> Plaintiffs	<i>Communities United</i> Plaintiffs
411 Movement for Pierre Loury Black Lives Matter Chicago Blocks Together Brighton Park Neighborhood Council Chicago Urban League Justice for Families— Black Lives Matter Chicago Network 49 The Illinois State Conference of the NAACP, Chicago Westside Branch Women’s All Point Bulletin Chicago Urban League	Communities United Community Renewal Society ONE Northside Next Steps, NFP
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Represented by</i></p> MacArthur Justice Center, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, the University of Chicago Law School Shiller Preyar LLC Samuels & Associates, Ltd. Karchmar & Lambert, P.C. Action Injury Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Represented by</i></p> American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Illinois Equip for Equality Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP

Issues of high priority to the Coalition have included (1) transparency and public accountability by way of this Special Report and the Listening Sessions held by the Court; and (2) improvements to the CPD’s policies regarding First Amendment activities, crowds, and uses of force, including with respect to effective communication with and respectful treatment of protesters, alternatives to arrest, restrictions on use of batons and OC spray, and adequate reporting of and accountability for policy violations. We expect our conversations with the Coalition on issues related to the Special Report to continue moving forward.

**Interviews of City, CPD, and Other Government Personnel**

During this review, we sought direct input from a variety of sources. This included members of Chicago’s communities, including people who participated in protests, and representatives from the City and its entities, including the CPD’s senior leadership, supervisors, and officers, as well as representatives from BIA, the Force

Review Division, Special Operations, the Crime Prevention and Information Center (CPIC); the Office of Emergency Management Communications (OEMC); COPA; and the Chicago Fire Department. We also received the Office of the Inspector General's notes from interviews of representatives from additional local entities, such as the Chicago Department of Transportation, the Cook County State's Attorney's Office, the Chicago Transit Authority, and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency.

Overall, the IMT and the Inspector General's Office conducted many interviews together and separately, resulting in over 100 interviews of community members, including the following:

- the Mayor;
- the Mayor's Chief of Staff;
- CPD Superintendent;
- CPD First Deputy Superintendent;
- CPD Chief of Operations;
- CPD Chief of Staff to the Superintendent;
- CPD Deputy Chiefs, including Deputy Chief's for each Area;
- CPD Commanders, including District Commanders;
- CPD sergeants;
- CPD officers;
- non-sworn CPD personnel; and
- representatives of collective bargaining units.

Given various organizational changes, at the time of the interview, many of these people were new to their positions or have since left those positions.

The IMT also interviewed representatives from other City agencies, including COPA and the Chicago Fire Department.

#### CPD Policy, Plan, and Training Review

As described in our monitoring reports, throughout this review, the City, the OAG, and the IMT continued to the policy, plan, and training development, review, and revision process under the Consent Decree.<sup>89</sup> In addition to these reviews, as referenced in our Analysis section, we also reviewed additional policies, plans, and training specific to this report.

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<sup>89</sup> The Consent Decree outlines the policy review process in ¶¶626–37 and the plan and training review processes in ¶¶638–41. Some policies require the CPD to obtain community input while they develop new or revised policies. *See, e.g.*, ¶¶52 and 160. For policy review, the City and the CPD must consult with the IMT and the OAG to develop the necessary policy or revision. The City and the CPD must then provide the IMT with the new or revised policy at least 30 days before the policy is scheduled to go into effect (¶¶627–28). The IMT and the OAG then

### Publicly Available Images, Reports, and Other Information

The IMT also reviewed a robust sampling of publicly available information, including press releases, news stories, and social-media posts, including videos, and photos. Social media posts from protesters and community members were incredibly helpful and gave an otherwise unavailable perspective to events. There were, of course, challenges. We tried to avoid crediting misinformation—such as accounts posting images and videos from other cities or time periods while falsely attributing the images to the 2020 protests and unrest in Chicago. Still, many posts, images, and videos were verifiable and helpful.

When applicable, we cite to publicly available information throughout this report. Many of these sources include references to a broader set of assertions, criticisms, or viewpoints, which are sometimes conflicting or even opposing one another. We do not address many of the assertions or viewpoints in these articles, reports, or datasets, nor do we cite sources as to adopt the position of all matters asserted. Instead, we include citations to public articles, reports, and data sets for specific references, examples, or illustrations of larger and ongoing dialogue and dialectic.

This also included various research and review of various after-action reports from around the country, such as the following:

- Baltimore, Maryland<sup>90</sup>
- Charleston, South Carolina<sup>91</sup>

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have 30 days to comment, with a possible 15-day extension (¶¶627–28). The City, the CPD, the OAG, and the IMT then have *at least* 30 days to resolve comments. If we are unable to come to a timely agreement, an entity may submit a formal objection, which triggers a “workout period” (¶1630). The entities then have an additional 30 days to resolve the issue before one of the Parties brings the issue to Judge Dow to resolve (¶1630). On the other hand, when the IMT and the OAG provide a “no objection” notice, then when applicable, the City and the CPD will post the new or revised policy for public comment for a minimum of 15 days (¶1633). The entities will then review and consider the public comments and agree to any changes before the City and the CPD finalize the policy (¶1633).

<sup>90</sup> See Jonathan Links, Katie O’Conor, and Lauren Sauer, *Recommendations for Enhancing Baltimore City’s Preparedness and Response to Mass Demonstration Events, Based on a Review and Analysis of the Events of April 2015*, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY (December 4, 2015), <https://mayor.baltimorecity.gov/news/press-releases/2015-12-11-johns-hopkins-university-after-action-report-documents-0>.

<sup>91</sup> See *Strengthening Charleston: Assessment of the Charleston Police Department Response to the May 30-31, 2020 Protests/Riots, Preliminary Report*, CITY OF CHARLESTON, SC (September, 2020), <https://www.charleston-sc.gov/strengthening-charleston-preliminary-report>; *Strengthening Charleston: Assessment of the Charleston Police Department Response to the May 30-31, 2020 Protests/Riots, Final Report*, CITY OF CHARLESTON, SC (February 2021), <https://www.charleston-sc.gov/DocumentCenter/View/28718/Strengthening-Charleston-Final-Report>.



- Cleveland, Ohio<sup>92</sup>
- Dallas, Texas<sup>93</sup>
- Las Vegas, Nevada<sup>94</sup>
- Los Angeles, California<sup>95</sup>
- Portland, Oregon<sup>96</sup>
- Raleigh, North Carolina<sup>97</sup>

Various cities and police departments also received external reviews of their responses to protests and unrest:

- Denver, Colorado<sup>98</sup>
- Los Angeles, California<sup>99</sup>
- New York, New York<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> See *May 30 Civil Unrest After-Action Review*, CITY OF CLEVELAND, OH (December 2020), <https://ewscripps.brightspotcdn.com/42/d8/9b2886474d6294744b57ec11e0b4/cdp-after-action-review-10.pdf>.

<sup>93</sup> See Reneé Hail, *Dallas Police Department After Action Report George Floyd Protest May 29, 2020 Thru June 1, 2020*, DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT (August 14, 2020), <https://dfw.cbslocal.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/15909545/2020/08/Final-After-Action-Report-1.pdf>.

<sup>94</sup> See *Protest and Civil Disorder Incidents, After-Action Report, May 29-June 13, 2020*, LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT.

<sup>95</sup> See *Safe LA Civil Unrest, 2020 After Action Report*, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (April 13, 2020), <https://ca-times.brightspotcdn.com/e7/24/ca83ff824f019d7e0b54eeadca04/2020-after-action-report.pdf>. See also *A Crisis of Trust, a National Police Foundation Report to the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners on the Los Angeles Police Department Response to First Amendment Assemblies and Protests Occurring May 27-June 7, 2020*, NATIONAL POLICE FOUNDATION (April 2021), <https://www.policefoundation.org/publication/a-crisis-of-trust-a-national-police-foundation-report-to-the-los-angeles-board-of-police-commissioners-on-the-los-angeles-police-department-response-to-first-amendment-assemblies-and-protests-occurri/>.

<sup>96</sup> See *Plaintiff's Notice of Fifth Periodic Compliance Assessment Report, United States of America v. The City of Portland, D. Or. Case no. 3:12-cv-02265-SI* (February 10, 2021), <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20476946/dojcompliance-report21121.pdf>.

<sup>97</sup> See *After Action Report - George Floyd Protests and Response May 30, 2020 - June 7, 2020*, RALEIGH POLICE DEPARTMENT CHIEF'S OFFICE - OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS INSPECTIONS UNIT (September 15, 2020), <https://cityofraleigh0drupal.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/drupal-prod/COR23/2020RPDAfterActionReview.pdf>.

<sup>98</sup> See Nicholas Mitchell, *The Police Response to the 2020 George Floyd Protests in Denver, and Independent Review*, DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR, [https://www.denvergov.org/files/assets/public/independent-monitor/documents/2020gfpreport\\_oim.pdf](https://www.denvergov.org/files/assets/public/independent-monitor/documents/2020gfpreport_oim.pdf).

<sup>99</sup> See Gerald Chaleff, *An Independent Examination Of The Los Angeles Police Department 2020 Protest Response* (March 10, 2021), at 74; *Read the full report on the L.A.P.D.'s response to the George Floyd protests*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (March 11, 2021), <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/03/11/us/lapd-george-floyd-protests-report.html>.

<sup>100</sup> See *Preliminary Report on the New York City Police Department's Response to the Demonstrations Following the Death of George Floyd*, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (July 10, 2020), <https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/2020-nypd-report.pdf>.

- Philadelphia, Pennsylvania<sup>101</sup>
- Portland, Oregon<sup>102</sup>
- Raleigh, North Carolina<sup>103</sup>

### Body Worn Camera, POD Cameras, and Radio Transmission

The IMT reviewed video footage and radio transmissions of protests, unrest, and the CPD's responses, and the resulting interactions between CPD officers and community members. After protests continued throughout 2020, members of the IMT viewed the City's and CPD's responses to protests live at the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC) and the Crime Prevention and Information Center (CPIC) on select dates.

We also observed body-worn-camera footage.<sup>104</sup> For CPD video, the IMT used the CPD's body-worn-camera database (Evidence.com) to view footage. The CPD's videos ranged in duration, with most clips being between five and 30 minutes, although some lasted hours. In general, many videos were of high visual and audio quality, allowing the IMT to reliably observe each event through the footage.

Unfortunately, the IMT was unable to consistently identify body-worn-camera footage related to a particular protest.<sup>105</sup> As explained further in this report, many events, including use-of-force incidents, were not appropriately logged with event numbers. Even when searching for body-worn-camera footage specifically related to a use-of-force event (as opposed to a broader protest event), the ability to locate and view the footage in the system was inconsistent. Additionally, while the body-worn-camera videos stored on Evidence.com have the potential to be tagged as a "Protest/Demonstration Video," the CPD rarely tagged them as such. Although it is unclear when the tag designation became available, a review of Evidence.com reveals that only 105 videos in the CPD's video catalogue, with the first tag occurring on February 19, 2020, and the last occurring on April 21, 2021.

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<sup>101</sup> See Benjamin Carleton, et al., *Philadelphia Police Department's Response to Demonstrations and Civil Unrest May 30-June 15, 2020*, CNA AND MONTGOMERY MCCracken (December 2020), [https://www.cna.org/CNA\\_files/PDF/IAA-2020-U-028506-Final.pdf](https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IAA-2020-U-028506-Final.pdf).

<sup>102</sup> See *Plaintiff's Notice of Fifth Periodic Compliance Assessment Report, United States of America v. The City of Portland, D. Or. Case no. 3:12-cv-02265-SI* (February 10, 2021).

<sup>103</sup> See *After-Action Recommendations for the Raleigh Police Department, May 30-31, 2020 Protests*, 21CP SOLUTIONS (November 2020), [https://www.cache.wral.com/asset/news/local/2020/11/10/19379608/20201110CMORaleighPoliceDepartment-External\\_ConsultantsReport-DMID1-5oth0r9xw.pdf](https://www.cache.wral.com/asset/news/local/2020/11/10/19379608/20201110CMORaleighPoliceDepartment-External_ConsultantsReport-DMID1-5oth0r9xw.pdf).

<sup>104</sup> The IMT also received body-worn-camera footage from the Cook County Sheriff's Office, which supported the City's response to protests and unrest.

<sup>105</sup> While the Office of the Inspector General for the City of Chicago identified body-worn-camera footage by focusing on RD numbers and event numbers related to arrests from May 29 to June 7, the IMT took a broader approach, in which we selected from a larger pool of videos from a longer date range.

To further complicate this review, many officers were not deployed with body-worn cameras, due to the deployment strategy employed by the CPD, which required officers to report to a central mobilization center without first retrieving their equipment—including their radios and body-worn cameras—from their districts. The CPD used this centralized mobilization center from about June 2 through about June 16.

Given these limitations, the IMT focused on reviewing video from protests and unrest on May 28–31, July 17, August 10, and August 15.<sup>106</sup> The IMT relied on the videos' thumbnail image to identify videos that were most likely to contain crowd-control events. For instance, where thumbnails displayed, for example, large crowds or officers in helmets, chest protectors, or elbow, forearm, and shin guards, or large crowds, the IMT would conduct an initial review to verify that the video actually depicted CPD interactions as part of a protest or crowd-control event.<sup>107</sup> Upon verification, the IMT included the videos for assessment.

Many of the protests lasted hours and involved separate concentrations of groups throughout the city. Although tagging deficiencies limited our ability to truly randomly select videos from all areas in Chicago on all days, part of our selection approach was designed to ensure a diverse sample of videos based on time and location. On the other hand, given the occurrences within a particular video, the IMT would at times select other body-worn-camera videos from the same event. This allowed us to better understand particular interactions from different vantage points for more in-depth review.

When reviewing videos, the IMT evaluated several different dynamics involving officer and community member communication, officer and community member tactics, uses of force, communications with crowds, and communication between officers. Of particular importance to our review was capturing the communication and physical interactions between officers and community members. Body-worn-camera videos often capture full conversations, including the tone of certain phrases.

In part, we used concepts of procedural justice to inform our assessment of communication and interactions defined by the Consent Decree. *See* ¶777.<sup>108</sup> For uses of force, we noted when it occurred and the type of force used, and in instances

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<sup>106</sup> Because there were few confrontations or complaints regarding the City or the CPD's response to protests in Chicago around the federal election in November 2020, we prioritized reviewing body-worn camera footage on the other dates.

<sup>107</sup> The CPD's "battle dress uniform (BDU)" is described in policy U04-01 Uniform and Appearance Standards, which may be found here: <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b9b-1562d157-70d15-62d1-a0e04429f1379599.html>.

<sup>108</sup> *See, e.g.*, Tom R. Tyler, *Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law*, CRIME AND JUSTICE, Vol 30, 283–357 (2003). Consent decree ¶777 tracks closely with the prevailing academic definitions of procedural justice.

where we felt the use of force was concerning, we forwarded those instances to COPA for further investigation. Finally, we used current training, policies, and best practices (per ¶1730) to assess officer tactics, including their responses to tactics by members of crowds that are sometimes designed to provoke confrontations with officers.

## Summary of Major Events

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This section provides a summary of major events in approximate chronological order. We begin with a brief history of major events in Chicago leading into 2020, and then provide an overview and sampling of major events in 2020. This summary is not a comprehensive account of any specific event, but focuses on the City's and the CPD's general responses to events around the key dates of May 25–31, July 27, August 10–11, August 15, and November 7, 2020.

### The Consent Decree

The protests and unrest that occurred in 2020 did not occur in a vacuum—either in the U.S. or in Chicago. Many cities have experienced their own challenges with police misconduct and issues created by a lack of transparency and accountability. In Chicago, it is important to understand the recent procedural history that led to the Consent Decree and the City and the CPD's focus on the COVID-19 pandemic and summer crime leading into the protests and unrest.

In its 2017 report, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) found that “the impact of CPD's pattern or practice of unreasonable force fall heaviest on predominantly black and Latino neighborhoods.”<sup>109</sup> The DOJ also found that people in many neighborhoods in Chicago lack confidence that “their police force cares about them and has not abandoned them, regardless of where they live or the color of their skin.”<sup>110</sup>

In December 2015, the U.S. Attorney General launched a broad civil rights investigation into the CPD's policing practices. The U.S. Department of Justice released the results of its investigation in January 2017, finding a longstanding, pervasive “pattern or practice” of civil rights abuses by the CPD.<sup>111</sup> Two separate class-action lawsuits followed: *Campbell v. City of Chicago* and *Communities United v. City of Chicago*.<sup>112</sup>

In August 2017, the OAG sued the City in federal court, seeking a Consent Decree that would address the DOJ's findings and recommendations. The case was assigned to federal Judge Robert Dow, Jr., who along with the OAG, sought input

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<sup>109</sup> DOJ Civil Rights Division and United States Attorney's Office Northern District of Illinois, *Investigation of Chicago Police Department* (January 13, 2017) at 4, <http://chicagopoliceconsentdecree.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/DOJ-INVESTIGATION-OF-CHICAGO-POLICE-DEPTREPORT.pdf>.

<sup>110</sup> *Id.* at 15.

<sup>111</sup> *Id.* at 4.

<sup>112</sup> See *Campbell v. Chicago*, N.D. Ill. Case No. 17-cv-4467 (June 14, 2017), and *Communities United v. Chicago*, N.D. Ill. Case No. 17-cv-7151 (October 4, 2017). Collectively, the plaintiffs of these two lawsuits are known in the Consent Decree as “the Coalition,” see ¶1669.

from community members and Chicago police officers and negotiated the Consent Decree with the City.

In March 2018, the Parties to the Consent Decree (the OAG and the City) also entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with a “broad-based community coalition committed to monitoring, enforcing, and educating the community about the Consent Decree (‘the Coalition’),” which “includes the plaintiffs in the *Campbell* and *Communities United* lawsuits.”<sup>113</sup>

On January 31, 2019, Judge Dow approved and signed a modified version of the Consent Decree, effective March 1, 2019.<sup>114</sup>

## Chicago’s History with Crowds, Protests, and Unrest

The City and the CPD respond to many protests every year in Chicago. According to some CPD personnel, for example, the 1st and 18th Districts (Downtown) regularly respond to protests—often multiple protests per week, especially in the summer months—and support frequent events with large crowds. The City and the CPD also regularly respond to many typical and large events without major incident or notoriety.<sup>115</sup>

The City and the CPD have responded to many high-profile protests, crowd events, and unrest. [Review Figure 1](#), below, provides some examples.

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<sup>113</sup> See *Memorandum of Agreement Between the Office of the Illinois Attorney General and the City of Chicago and Campbell v. City of Chicago Plaintiffs and Communities United v. City of Chicago Plaintiffs* (March 20, 2018), [http://chicagopoliceconsentdecree.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Executed\\_MOA.pdf](http://chicagopoliceconsentdecree.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Executed_MOA.pdf). Collectively, the plaintiffs of these two lawsuits are known in the Consent Decree as “the Coalition,” see ¶669

<sup>114</sup> More information on the IMT is available in [Appendix A](#).

<sup>115</sup> See, e.g., *Cultural Affairs and Special Events*, CITY OF CHICAGO, [https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/dca/supp\\_info/events.html](https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/dca/supp_info/events.html).

## Review Figure 1.

## Past City and CPD responses to large gatherings, protests, or unrest

July 1966	“Chicago West Side Riots”
April 1968	“Chicago Riots” after the murder of Martin Luther King, Jr.
August 1968	Democratic National Convention
June 1992	Chicago Bulls Championship
May 2012	North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit
June 2013	Chicago Blackhawks Championship
November 2015	Video release of Laquan McDonald’s murder
November 2016	Chicago Cubs Championship
October 2018	Officer Jason Van Dyke verdict/conviction

Chicago has also had more recent large-scale protests regarding police misconduct and accountability. For example, there were relatively recent protests and crowds regarding the following events in Chicago:

- The release of the video of the murder of Laquan McDonald by officer Jason Van Dyke on November 24, 2015<sup>116</sup>
- The second-degree murder conviction of Jason Van Dyke on October 5, 2018<sup>117</sup>

Chicago’s history with protests, unrest, and corresponding City and CPD responses may have added a unique dynamic, tone, and tenor to the Chicago’s 2020 protests.

<sup>116</sup> See Nausheen Husain, *Laquan McDonald timeline: The shooting, the video, the verdict and the sentencing*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (January 18, 2019), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/laquan-mcdonald/ct-graphics-laquan-mcdonald-officers-fired-timeline-html-story.html>.

<sup>117</sup> Don Babwin and Michael Tarm, *Chicago Verdict Comes 4 Years After Laquan McDonald’s Death*, AP NEWS (October 6, 2018), <https://apnews.com/article/shootings-jason-van-dyke-us-news-ap-top-news-chicago-fdc50b61df4e47bfb8c97ae1149d9c89>.

## Chicago 2020 - Leading up to Protests and Unrest

Leading up to the end of May 2020, much of the City's and the CPD's attention was on COVID-19, the plans for re-opening after the Stay at Home order ended, curbing violence, and preparing for the expectation of increased violence in the summer months. Overall, COVID-19 impacted everyone in Chicago and worldwide. Despite the many uncertainties regarding COVID-19 in the beginning of 2020—including the likelihood of infection, transmission, or serious harm—many City personnel, first responders, medical workers, essential workers, community members, and their families continued to serve Chicago throughout the continuing pandemic. As a result, thousands of people who served Chicago contracted COVID-19, and many lost their lives.

The CPD was also transitioning to new leadership. As referenced in our previous reports, the CPD has had three superintendents since the Consent Decree process began. Most recently, in April 2020, after a national search, former Chief of the Dallas Police Department David Brown became the Superintendent, taking over for Interim Superintendent Charlie Beck.<sup>118</sup>

As with many other states and cities, Illinois and the City began to take various precautions against the COVID-19 pandemic. Illinois Executive Orders regarding the COVID-19 pandemic response included, for example, the following:

- Executive Order Number 4 – prohibiting large gatherings of 1,000 or more
- Executive Order Number 5 and 6 – closing all public and private K-12 schools for educational purposes, except for schools operated by the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice, the Illinois State Board of Education, or the Illinois Department of Human Services
- Executive Order Number 7 – Prohibiting gatherings of 50 or more people and suspending on-premises consumption for bars and restaurants
- Executive Order 10 – “STAY AT HOME – All individuals must stay at home, with exceptions for essential activities, essential government functions, and essential businesses and operations. All non-essential business and operations must

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<sup>118</sup> See Fran Spielman and Frank Main, *City war on coronavirus puts selection of Chicago's new top cop on hold*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (July 20, 2020), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/coronavirus/2020/3/24/21192685/coronavirus-chicago-police-superintendent-search-delayed>.



cease, aside from Minimum Basic Operations. Business can continue with employees working from home. Local government units across the state must halt all evictions, and gatherings of more than 10 people are prohibited.”<sup>119</sup>

Throughout the pandemic, the CPD enforced many of the COVID-19 restrictions.<sup>120</sup> The City and the CPD also received various corresponding criticisms regarding the enforcement strategies, disparities, and compliance rates among officers.<sup>121</sup>

The CPD also issued General Messages, via its internal communication system, to remind officers to wear personal protective equipment (PPE). On April 1, 2020, for example, the CPD provided the following General Message referencing a video regarding personal protective equipment:

*\*\*TO BE READ AT ROLL CALL FOR 7 CONSECUTIVE DAYS\*\* Department members are advised that Streaming Video V055, “Personal Protective Equipment Demonstration” is available for viewing. The video includes the procedure to properly don and doff items contained in the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) kits. Department members can find this video posted under the ‘Streaming Videos’ tab on The Wire homepage.*

The City and the CPD continued to take and enforce COVID-19 precautions and restrictions throughout 2020, including responding to protests against those restrictions.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> See *Executive and Administrative Orders*, ILLINOIS.GOV, <https://www2.illinois.gov/government/executive-orders>.

<sup>120</sup> See, e.g., Grace Wong, *5 Chicago restaurants and bars cited and 2 parties shut down for coronavirus violations after weekend sweep*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (December 23, 2020), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/ct-coronavirus-violations-chicago-restaurants-shut-down-20201223-v5v7ludhurakzh7h4lc5judvay-story.html>; see also David Struett and Mitch Dudek, *City shuts down 300-person party in Wicker Park, other businesses for ‘egregiously’ violating COVID-19 restrictions*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (November 30, 2020), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/criminal-justice/ct-chicago-police-covid-gathering-violation-20210205-xzozrkyu4be3no6nntrgj5cw5y-story.html>.

<sup>121</sup> See, e.g., Pascal Sabino, *ACLU, Police Union Call On Lightfoot To Stop Citywide Checkpoints To Remind People Of Coronavirus Rules*, THE BLOCK CLUB (April 20, 2020), <https://blockclubchicago.org/2020/04/20/aclu-police-union-call-on-lightfoot-to-end-citywide-checkpoints-to-remind-people-of-coronavirus-rules/>; Jeremy Gorner, *Chicago police issued more dispersal orders on West Side in early days of stay-at-home order than other parts of the city, including the lakefront*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (April 24, 2020), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/ct-coronavirus-chicago-police-dispersals-20200424-vzv7qi72zfd25c4rxkquc5xtge-story.html>;

<sup>122</sup> See, e.g., Nancy Loo and Kelly Davis, *Protesters rally against Illinois stay-at-home order in Chicago Loop*, WGN9 (May 1, 2020), <https://wgntv.com/news/chicago-news/protest-against-illinois-stay-at-home-order-planned-in-chicago-loop-today/>.

Leading into Memorial Day weekend 2020, there were still countless closings and cancellations.<sup>123</sup> The City was preparing, however, to phase out restrictions.

Review Figure 2.

City of Chicago's phased re-opening (May 15, 2020)<sup>124</sup>



Concurrently, Chicago may have been experiencing a general drop in crime, but also a rise in shootings and homicides, including shootings of children.<sup>125</sup> Memorial Day 2020 weekend, for example, saw a spike in shootings.<sup>126</sup> In preparation for anticipated summer violence in Chicago, the City and the CPD set up the Summer Operations Center.<sup>127</sup>

<sup>123</sup> See Katherine Rosenberg-Douglas, *Running list of Chicago-area closings and cancellations because of coronavirus*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (May 4, 2020), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/ct-cb-coronavirus-chicago-illinois-cancellations-closings-20200304-xy3xn6grndu3hq7eyihpkznwi-story.html>.

<sup>124</sup> *Reopening Chicago*, CITY OF CHICAGO, <https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/sites/covid-19/home/reopening-chicago.html>.

<sup>125</sup> See, e.g., *Tracking Chicago Shooting Victims*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (comparing multiple years), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/data/ct-shooting-victims-map-charts-htmlstory.html>.

<sup>126</sup> See Jeremy Goner, *Chicago sees another spike in shootings, with most killings in first 3 months of year since 2017*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (April 1, 2021), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/criminal-justice/ct-prem-chicago-crime-first-quarter-2021-20210401-dprv6a7aj5g47m3vc74ovhlvaq-story.html>.


<sup>127</sup> See *City Launching New Summer Operations Center Ahead of Memorial Day Weekend*, CBS CHICAGO (May 22, 2020), <https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2020/05/22/city-launching-new-summer-operations-center-ahead-of-memorial-day-weekend/>.

## Protests and Unrest in 2020

This section presents an overview and sampling of the events that unfolded, along with the City's and the CPD's responses around the key dates of May 25–31, July 27, August 10–11, August 15, and November 7, 2020. It is not a definitive, detailed, complete history of everything that took place on those dates, but rather a sampling of what happened according to the data sources we consulted while conducting this review. Many of the details are from City and CPD personnel, who provided accounts of events, their actions, and the actions of their supervisors, subordinates, and peers. We note that we received conflicting or imprecise accounts of timelines. In many cases, we have included such conflicts to demonstrate the differing perspectives and chaotic nature of events. For relevant days, we also provide feedback we heard from Chicago's communities. Finally, we provide summaries of relevant reviews of body-worn camera footage.

Throughout the report we also refer to Chicago neighborhoods and CPD areas and districts, as reflected in [Review Figure 3](#) on the following page.

Review Figure 3: Chicago Police Department Area Boundaries Map<sup>128</sup>



<sup>128</sup> Police Area Boundaries, WTTW News, <https://news.wttw.com/sites/default/files/article/file-attachments/CPD-Area-Map.pdf>.

To place what was happening in Chicago into some context, we also reference a sampling of what was happening in other cities—particularly as events began to escalate. Again, this section is not a complete recounting of all events, but rather provides some touchpoints from across the country.

## MONDAY, MAY 25, 2020 (12:00 AM TO 11:59 PM)

### Minneapolis, Minnesota

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George Floyd was murdered in police custody soon after 8:00 PM on Monday, May 25, 2020. Several bystanders filmed the murder with their cell phones, and some observers begged for Floyd’s life as he repeated, “I can’t breathe.” Then-officer Derek Chauvin pinned Floyd on the ground with his knees for over nine minutes, killing him.<sup>129</sup> George Floyd’s murder was preceded by other high-profile killings of Black people in 2020, including Ahmaud Arbery in Georgia and Breonna Taylor in Kentucky.<sup>130</sup>

### Chicago

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Nearing the end of May, much of the City’s and the CPD’s efforts were focused on the upcoming Memorial Day holiday and the potential for summer violence. The City, the CPD, and other City entities were also opening the Summer Operations Center at the OEMC, which aimed to coordinate responses to summer violence across City entities.<sup>131</sup>

Likewise, as reflected below, while the City anticipated potentially beginning to reopen, the City and the CPD continued to enforce COVID-19 restrictions, including social distancing and limiting gatherings.

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<sup>129</sup> See Evan Hill et al., *How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (May 31, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html>. Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, *Prosecutor in Derek Chauvin trial makes closing argument: ‘This wasn’t policing, this was murder.’*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (April 19, 2021), <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/19/us/prosecution-closing-argument-derek-chauvin-trial.html#:~:text=Chauvin%20knelt%20on%20Mr.,Schleicher%20said>.

<sup>130</sup> See, e.g., Richard Fausset, Michael Levenson, and Sarah Mervosh, *Ahmaud Arbery Shooting: A Timeline of the Case*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (April 29, 2021), <https://www.nytimes.com/article/ahmaud-arbery-timeline.html?searchResultPosition=10>; *Breonna Taylor: What Happened on the Night of her Death?*, BBC NEWS (October 8, 2020), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-54210448>.




<sup>131</sup> See Mayor’s Press Office, *City Launches All-Hands-On-Deck Strategy to Ensure Safe and Healthy Celebrations for Memorial Day Weekend*, CITY OF CHICAGO OFFICE OF THE MAYOR (May 22, 2020), [https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/mayor/press\\_room/press\\_releases/2020/may/MemorialDayWeekendSafety.html](https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/mayor/press_room/press_releases/2020/may/MemorialDayWeekendSafety.html).

### Review Figure 4. Chicago Mayor Tweets (May 25, 2020)






 **Mayor Lori Lightfoot**  @chicagosmayor · May 25, 2020 




Regarding today's large unpermitted gathering at Millennium Park: while we respect 1st amendment rights, this gathering posed an unacceptable health risk and was dispersed. No matter where in the city you live, no one is exempt from @GovPritzker's stay-at-home order.

 737  539  3.5K  






 **Mayor Lori Lightfoot**  @chicagosmayor · May 25, 2020 

Dispersing crowds and enforcing social distancing is not what we want to use @Chicago\_police time or resources on, but for the greater good, when absolutely necessary, we will—no matter which neighborhood large crowds are gathering in.

 7  7  107  

 **Mayor Lori Lightfoot**  @chicagosmayor · May 25, 2020 

I know folks are getting restless, and the weather is beautiful. But no matter your race, age, or zip code, when you throw a party or congregate, as some did this weekend, you put yourself, your loved ones, and our first responders and healthcare professionals in serious danger.

 39  63  360  

 **Mayor Lori Lightfoot**  @chicagosmayor · May 25, 2020 

I have seen a widely shared video of an incident in the 007th District. We will continue to investigate the incident to ensure proper tactics were used—ensuring constitutional rights are protected—and that CPD officers are wearing face coverings to maintain public health.

 142  87  625  

 **Mayor Lori E. Lightfoot**  @chicagosmayor · May 25, 2020 




We can continue to flatten the curve and fully reopen our city ONLY when we work together.

 55  32  327 

 **Mayor Lori Lightfoot**  @chicagosmayor · May 25, 2020 






It is always my hope you will continue to follow @GovPritzker's stay at home order for your safety and the safety of your loved ones—and by and large the vast majority of you do.




 16  7  114  

 **Mayor Lori Lightfoot**  @chicagosmayor · May 25, 2020 






Let me directly address them.

Police enforcement is and should be the last resort. We want our officers focused on fighting crime—not on having to stop fully grown adults of all racial, ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds from partying.

 20  18  141  

 **Mayor Lori Lightfoot**  @chicagosmayor · May 25, 2020 

It is my number one priority to ensure the safety and health of all of our residents—and we must do it in a way that centers our commitment to racial equity and social justice. I've seen some questions about how @Chicago\_Police is enforcing social distancing across the city.

 12  12  106  

 **Mayor Lori Lightfoot**  @chicagosmayor · May 25, 2020 

And let me emphasize: no matter which neighborhood.

Last night alone, police responded to dozens of reports of social distancing violations in every part of Chicago: everywhere from Lincoln Park to Humboldt Park to Andersonville to Auburn Gresham.

 8  20  116  

TUESDAY, MAY 26, 2020 (12:00 AM TO 11:59 PM)

## Minneapolis, Minnesota

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Protests began in Minneapolis, and crowds clashed with Minneapolis Police Department officers.<sup>132</sup> Some people damaged police vehicles and focused on the precinct where the four officers involved with George Floyd's death were assigned.<sup>133</sup> The Minneapolis Chief of Police fired the four officers involved and called for the Federal Bureau of Investigation to open an investigation.<sup>134</sup>

### Review Figure 5. Minnesota Mayor Tweet (May 26, 2020)



## Chicago

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The day after George Floyd's murder, there was a previously planned protest at CPD Headquarters in the evening.<sup>135</sup> The demonstration was originally planned to protest the City and the CPD's alleged disparate enforcement of COVID-19 precautions and included participation by local celebrities. The protest remained peaceful, and some protesters expressed "solidarity with the people in Minneapolis that are grieving."<sup>136</sup>

The City did not mention George Floyd's murder in any official tweets, but rather remained focused on the COVID-19 pandemic and Memorial Day holiday safety. As Chicago prepared to reopen in early June, with the specific date yet to be an-

<sup>132</sup> See MPR News Staff, *Tear gas, chaos, rain: Protests rage after man dies in Mpls. Police custody*, MPR NEWS (May 26, 2020), <https://www.mprnews.org/story/2020/05/26/protesters-rally-to-call-for-justice-for-man-who-died-in-mpls-police-incident>.

<sup>133</sup> See Derrick Bryson Taylor, *George Floyd Protests: A Timeline*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (March 28, 2021), <https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd-protests-timeline.html>.

<sup>134</sup> See Matt Furber, John Eligon, and Audra D.S. Burch, *Minneapolis Police, Long Accused of Racism, Face Wrath of Wounded City*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (May 27, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/27/us/minneapolis-police.html>.

<sup>135</sup> See *Protest Held In Chicago After Death of George Floyd During Arrest By Minneapolis Police*, CBS CHICAGO (May 26, 2020), <https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2020/05/26/protest-held-in-chicago-after-death-of-george-floyd-during-arrest-by-minneapolis-police/>.

<sup>136</sup> *Id.*

nounced, the City released industry-specific guidelines for certain industry businesses, employees, and customers.<sup>137</sup> The City expected more than 130,000 Chicagoans to return to work, as industries included childcare, food service, hotel and accommodations, retail, and transportation, among others.<sup>138</sup>

Review Figure 6. Chicago Mayor Tweet (Tuesday, May 26, 2020)



## WEDNESDAY, MAY 27, 2020 (12:00 AM TO 11:59 PM)

### Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Other Cities

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In Minneapolis, Protests continued and escalated into incidents of unrest, with escalating unrest, looting, and one person shot to death.<sup>139</sup> One person was shot and

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<sup>137</sup> See, e.g., *Mayor Lightfoot and Local Industry Working Groups Release Industry Guidelines for Phase Three Reopening in Chicago*, CITY OF CHICAGO OFFICE OF THE MAYOR (May 26, 2020), <https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/mayor/Press%20Room/Press%20Releases/2020/May/Mayor%20Lightfoot%20and%20Local%20Industry%20Working%20Groups%20Release%20Industry%20Guidelines%20for%20Phase%20Three%20Reopening%20in%20Chicago.pdf>.

<sup>138</sup> *Id.*

<sup>139</sup> See MPR News Staff, *'Unbelievable devastation': 1 dead as Floyd protests boil over again*, MPR NEWS (May 28, 2020), <https://www.mprnews.org/story/2020/05/27/violence-near-south-minneapolis-police-precinct-continues-a-second-day>.



killed by a store owner amid the unrest.<sup>140</sup> There were also various fires, including burning cars and buildings, which continued into morning, as fire crews worked to put out the fires.<sup>141</sup> Protesters also gathered outside Derek Chauvin's home in suburban Minneapolis.<sup>142</sup>

Protests began to occur around the country. In Memphis, for example, people rallied outside a police station.<sup>143</sup> In Los Angeles, there were large protests that escalated, with some protesters blocking a major freeway.<sup>144</sup> In New York City, there were demonstrations and marches to protest the killing of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud Arbery.<sup>145</sup>

## Chicago

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As protests began to occur in cities throughout the country, CPD supervisors took varying approaches to prepare their teams. At least one supervisor emailed their officers as early as Wednesday or Thursday to make sure that the officers knew about potential crowd formations and were prepared with their equipment if they needed to respond. Many other supervisors, however, said that they did not prepare for any unusual levels of protest or the potential for unrest.

COPA representatives reported beginning to hear about and prepare for potential unrest in Chicago.

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<sup>140</sup> See Associated Press, *At least 11 killed during U.S. protests seeking justice for George Floyd, many of them African Americans*, KTLA5 (June 2, 2020), <https://ktla.com/news/nation-world/at-least-11-killed-during-u-s-protests-seeking-justice-for-george-floyd-many-of-them-african-americans/>.

<sup>141</sup> See *Crews respond to roughly 30 fires overnight in Minneapolis*, KSTP 5 EYEWITNESS NEWS (May 28, 2020), <https://kstp.com/news/multiple-fires-burn-overnight-following-violence-and-looting-in-minneapolis/5743398>.

<sup>142</sup> See, e.g., Mary Divine, *Six George Floyd protesters arrested at fired Minneapolis police officer's Oakdale home*, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS (May 28, 2020), <https://www.twincities.com/2020/05/28/george-floyd-protesters-arrested-at-oakdale-home-belonging-to-minneapolis-police-officer/>.

<sup>143</sup> See *Protests Continue to Rage After Death of George Floyd*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (May 28, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/us/george-floyd-national-guard.html>.

<sup>144</sup> See Matthew Ormseth, Richard Winton, and Jessica Perez, *Protesters, law enforcement clash in downtown L.A. during protest over George Floyd's death*, LOS ANGELES TIMES (May 27, 2020), <https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-05-27/protesters-block-the-101-freeway>.

<sup>145</sup> See Giulia McDonnell Nieto del Rio, John Eligon, and Adeel Hassan, *A Timeline of What Has Happened in the Year Since George Floyd's Death*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (May 25, 2021), <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/25/us/george-floyd-protests-unrest-events-timeline.html>.

## Review Figure 7. Chicago Mayor Tweet (Wednesday, May 27, 2020)



**Mayor Lori Lightfoot**  @chicagosmayor · May 27, 2020

...

Deeply troubled and saddened by the death of George Floyd. I'm praying for his family during this time of sorrow.

 93

 175

 2.2K





## THURSDAY, MAY 28, 2020 (12:00 AM TO 11:59 PM)

## Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Other Cities

Protests continued to grow and unrest continued to escalate in Minneapolis.<sup>146</sup> People overran the Minneapolis Police Department's Third Precinct and set it on fire.<sup>147</sup> A nearby pawn shop was also burned down.<sup>148</sup> A few months later, in July 2020, a body was found in the wreckage, and the medical examiner's report said that the cause of death was "probable inhalation of products of combustion and thermal injury from an intentional building fire" and was being considered a homicide.<sup>149</sup>

The Minnesota Governor declared a state of emergency and called in the National Guard.<sup>150</sup> The Minnesota Governor said, "The situation in Minneapolis is no longer,

<sup>146</sup> See, e.g., *Self-Described Member of "Boogaloo Bois" Charged with Riot*, THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA (October 23, 2020), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/pr/self-described-member-boogaloo-bois-charged-riot>; *Four Indicted In Minneapolis Police Third Precinct Arson*, THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA (August 25, 2020), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/pr/four-indicted-minneapolis-police-third-precinct-arson>.

<sup>147</sup> See, e.g., Azi Paybarah, *Burning of Police Station After George Floyd's Death Draws 4-Year Sentence*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (April 28, 2021), <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/28/us/minneapolis-police-fire-dylan-shakespeare-robinson.html>; *St. Paul Man Sentenced to Prison, \$12 Million In Restitution For Minneapolis Police Third Precinct Arson*, THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA (May 13, 2021) (noting that two co-conspirators had yet to be sentenced after pleaded guilty to one count each of conspiracy to commit arson), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/pr/st-paul-man-sentenced-prison-12-million-restitution-minneapolis-police-third-precinct-0>.

<sup>148</sup> See *Rochester Man Charged with Arson of Minneapolis Pawn Shop*, THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA (June 15, 2020), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/pr/rochester-man-charged-arson-minneapolis-pawn-shop>.

<sup>149</sup> See *Medical examiner identifies body found in burned pawn shop in Minneapolis*, KSTP 5 EYEWITNESS NEWS (October 20, 2020), <https://kstp.com/news/hennepin-county-medical-examiner-identifies-body-found-in-burned-pawn-shop-in-minneapolis/5900493/>.

<sup>150</sup> See *Governor Walz Signs Executive Order Activating National Guard to Protect the People of Minnesota, Order will help maintain safety in wake of George Floyd's death*, OFFICE OF GOVERNOR TIM WALZ AND LT. GOVERNOR PEGGY FLANAGAN (May 28, 2020), <https://mn.gov/governor/news/?id=1055-433799>. See also *Emergency Executive Order 20-64, Activating the Minnesota National Guard and Declaring a Peacetime Emergency to Provide Safety and Protection*

in any way, about the murder of George Floyd. It is about attacking civil society, instilling fear and disrupting our great cities.”<sup>151</sup>

Protests began or continued throughout many cities and escalated into unrest in others. In Louisville, Kentucky, seven people were shot amid protests related to the no-knock warrant police killing of Breonna Taylor.<sup>152</sup> The protest, like others around the country, began with a peaceful march, but escalated into unrest after dark.<sup>153</sup> Many vehicles, buildings, and other property sustained damage, and police released tear gas and fired paintballs at crowds.<sup>154</sup>

## Chicago

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On Thursday, May 28, 2020, the Mayor and the Chicago Department of Public Health announced a plan to reopen on Wednesday, June 3, 2020, by moving into phase three of the city’s reopening plan.<sup>155</sup> Specifically, the plan called for “cautiously” reopening Chicago and included various limitations, including physical distancing, face coverings, and limiting non-business gatherings to 10 or fewer people. Other City services, such as parks and libraries, were to begin reopening on Monday, June 8.

There was also an anticipated protest that occurred in the Englewood neighborhood (the CPD’s 7th District) in the late afternoon. The flyer distributed on social media featured a photo of George Floyd and the text “Justice for George Floyd Protest Today @4pm 68th & Halsted #Revolution Nothing Less Minneapolis, LA, Chicago, IL CHICAGO PLEASE SHARE!!!” Some people in the crowd wore “BA Speaks: Revolution Nothing Else” t-shirts. The protest appeared relatively uneventful with protesters primarily staying on the sidewalks until the CPD arrested one person. During the arrest, the crowd chanted “Let him go” and began crowding the area where the arrest was taking place. After removing the arrestee, the scene

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*to the People of Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Surrounding Communities*, STATE OF MINNESOTA EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT (May 28, 2020), <https://www.leg.mn.gov/archive/execorders/20-64.pdf>.

<sup>151</sup> See Giulia McDonnell Nieto del Rio, John Eligon, and Adeel Hassan, *A Timeline of What Has Happened in the Year Since George Floyd’s Death*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (May 25, 2021).

<sup>152</sup> See Brakkton Booker, *7 Shot at Louisville Protest Calling For Justice for Breonna Taylor*, NPR WBEZ CHICAGO (May 29, 2020), <https://www.npr.org/2020/05/29/864775688/7-shot-at-louisville-protests-calling-for-justice-for-breonna-taylor>.

<sup>153</sup> *Id.*


<sup>154</sup> See Mandy McLaren et al., *‘No justice, no peace’: 7 people shot amid downtown Louisville protests for Breonna Taylor*, LOUISVILLE COURIER JOURNAL (May 28, 2020), <https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/2020/05/28/breonna-taylor-shooting-protesters-rally-downtown-louisville/5280279002/>.

<sup>155</sup> See Mayor Lightfoot and CDPH Announce Chicago Ready to Begin Reopening Cautiously on Wednesday, June 3, 2020, Chicago to move to Phase three of “Protecting Chicago” reopening framework, CITY OF CHICAGO OFFICE OF THE MAYOR (May 28, 2020), <https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/mayor/Press%20Room/Press%20Releases/2020/May/ReopeningJune3.pdf>.

appeared to remain somewhat tense, though officers and community members eventually separated.

The same day, the City and the CPD began looking into an online threat to a CPD building, the sixth district station:

[Review Figure 8. Social Media Threat to Burn Down the CPD's 6th District Station \(May 28, 2020\)](#)



There was a meeting, entitled “Weekend Pre-Planning Meeting,” scheduled for 2:30 PM with high-ranking personnel of the CPD regarding concerns about what could happen in Chicago given what was occurring in Minneapolis.

According to some representatives, CPD leadership considered whether to add additional officer support and cancel officers’ regularly scheduled day off. The CPD also released a required training for all sworn officers, meant to remind officers about the dangers of positional asphyxia, in light of George Floyd’s death.<sup>156</sup> A similar required training had been issued in January 2020.<sup>157</sup> The CPD updated it in May and sent it out again via the CPD’s eLearning system on May 29.

### Body Worn Camera and Radio Review: May 28, 2020

Videos from May 28, 2020, depicted many interactions between police officers and people in the crowd. One officer, in the middle of a crowd and a scuffle, tells people to “get back.” The officer then touches a person who had a skateboard on the chest. The person with the skateboard tells the officer not to touch them, and the officer responds, “Yeah, yeah, whatever.”

<sup>156</sup> Chicago Police Department Education and Training Division. “A Knowledge Resource for Members of the Chicago Police Department, Positional Asphyxia” (Release Date: January 2020; Revised Date: May 2020). The CPD’s “Knowledge Resource” required training defines positional asphyxia as “Positional asphyxia is a death that occurs when a person’s body position interferes with their ability to breathe. It can occur when the person’s chest is restricted from expanding properly or the position of the person’s head obstructs their airway. In all cases, the person is unable to correct the lethal position, whether they are placed or inadvertently place themselves in that position.”

<sup>157</sup> Chicago Police Department Education and Training Division. “A Knowledge Resource for Members of the Chicago Police Department, Positional Asphyxia” (Release Date: January 2020).


In the same video, a different person tells an officer “Don’t touch me.” We saw an example of officers disengaging from a person as well. At one point, an officer went into the crowd alone and tried to grab a person by their backpack straps but was unsuccessful. Other officers said, “It’s not worth it,” as the officer started to chase the person who got away. The officer eventually stops the chase. Later in the video, a person with a megaphone says to the crowd, “We need to calm down.” The video depicts members of the crowd moving through the streets and blocking traffic with car horns honking.

## FRIDAY, MAY 29, 2020 (12:00 AM TO 11:59 PM)

### Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Other Cities

On Friday, protests and unrest continued to escalate across the country. The Minneapolis Governor called for an end of looting and arson, and former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin was arrested and charged with murder.<sup>158</sup>

#### Review Figure 9. Minnesota Governor Tweet (May 29, 2020)



In Atlanta, Georgia hundreds of protesters took to the streets, marching and chanting “Quit your jobs” at police. People set a police car on fire, broke into the CNN headquarters building, and interrupted traffic on the interstate highway running through downtown Atlanta.<sup>159</sup>

<sup>158</sup> See *Former MPD Officer Derek Chauvin In Custody, Charged With Murder In George Floyd’s Death*, CBS MINNESOTA (May 29, 2020), <https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2020/05/29/derek-chauvin-arrested-george-floyd-death-minneapolis-police-officer/>.

<sup>159</sup> See Associated Press, *Protests over George Floyd’s death break out in NYC, all over country*, NJ.COM (May 29, 2020), <https://www.nj.com/crime/2020/05/protests-over-george-floyds-death-break-out-in-nyc-all-over-country.html>.

In Oakland, California, a federal officer who was providing security at a federal courthouse during a protest was shot and killed in a drive-by shooting.<sup>160</sup>

The same day, President Donald Trump tweeted, “[W]hen the looting starts, the shooting starts.”

#### Review Figure 10. President Tweet (Friday, May 29, 2020)



## Chicago

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Friday morning, the CPD met internally to prepare for potential protests and then met with personnel from the Mayor’s Office. The Crime Prevention and Information Center (CPIC) sent out a notice regarding the potential looting of Target stores and the Water Tower Place in downtown Chicago.

Separately, because some commanders had only been in their positions for a few months, some commanders intended to use Saturday’s protest as a learning opportunity, placing all Area 3 Commanders (Districts 001, 012, 018, 019, 020, and 024) on the response team. As would become important, some of these commanders responded to protests and unrest on Friday night, as well as on Saturday.

The CPD also made plans to conduct roll-call trainings over the weekend—starting Friday night—to address the potential for unanticipated protests, the importance of de-escalation, and officer safety. The CPD again released the May 2020 updated version of the required training for all sworn officers, as a reminder to officers about the dangers of positional asphyxia, in light of George Floyd’s death.<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> See Associated Press, *At least 11 killed during U.S. protests seeking justice for George Floyd, many of them African Americans*, KTLA 5 NEWS (June 2, 2020), <https://ktla.com/news/nation-world/at-least-11-killed-during-u-s-protests-seeking-justice-for-george-floyd-many-of-them-african-americans/>.

<sup>161</sup> Chicago Police Department Education and Training Division. “A Knowledge Resource for Members of the Chicago Police Department, Positional Asphyxia” (Release Date: January 2020; Revised Date: May 2020).

Review Figure 11 below summarizes the anticipated demonstrations that the CPD anticipated for the day.<sup>162</sup>

Review Figure 11: CPIC Anticipated Demonstrations for May 29, 2020

Police District	Cause(s)
7th	"#JusticeforGeorgeFloyd"
1st	"Justice for George Floyd"
1st	"We Deserve to Live: We Need Revolution #GeorgeFloyd"

On Friday night, protests occurred in the downtown area—in the 1st and 18th Districts, as anticipated. The CPD had not received much information about the protests in advance. According to CPD personnel, they did not have information to expect a large turnout, and the CPD did not have a specific plan in place to respond to the protest, relying instead on a standard protest response.

Around 5:00 PM, a small group of about 30 protesters marched on Michigan Avenue. According to CPD personnel who responded to the protest, an unexpected number of people began to join the protest and promote the event online. The CPD deployed a bike team, as well as its different Area teams in response to the growing crowd.

About an hour into the protest, a group of about 50 protesters began marching toward the Eisenhower Expressway, before being blocked by a CPD bike-line.

Around 7:30 PM, a group of about 100 protesters were near the intersection of State and Ohio in front of a line of CPD officers. Some people in the group were able to break through the CPD police line, and officers kept those people separated from those who remained on the initial side.

Around 8:30 PM, some protesters convened outside the Metropolitan Correctional Center (71 W. Van Buren St., Chicago, IL 60605). Around 10:00 PM, social media posts claimed that the CPD was "holding [them] downtown" and were "threatening to beat unarmed protestors with clubs." Near midnight, protesters marched near and around Trump Tower (401 N. Wabash Ave., Chicago, IL 60601), as officers blocked access to the building with a heavy police car presence. According to some footage, some people appear to have attempted to rush the building and were cut off by officers.

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<sup>162</sup> According to CPD representatives, before the City stopped granting permits for protests, the CPD gathered its lists of anticipated protests or events through permits and monitoring social media.

Also, near midnight, some people began shoving and clashing with police near the intersection of Michigan Avenue and Monroe Street. At one point, some people in the crowd broke windows at several businesses.

Recognizing that unrest may continue on Saturday, the CPD canceled regular days off for Area teams and instructed them to report to McCormick Place by 2:00 PM for deployment into the 1st and 18th Districts.

Some officers estimated that there were about two hundred people participated in a protest in the 1st District on Friday night. The protest began peacefully, but some officers remarked that the tenor of the crowd changed over the course of the evening. They said that it appeared to them that peaceful protesters began to leave and the people who stayed appeared more likely to throw projectiles, damage property, break building windows, slash police vehicle tires, and in some cases injure officers. These officers added that they also believed additional groups of people arrived who were not attempting to protest, but came to attack police and damage and steal property.

On Friday night, some CPD areas were asked to send officers downtown to assist with the CPD's response to the protests and unrest. According to some CPD personnel, these officers were sent in teams and instructed to report to specific intersections and to announce their arrival on the radio. Some CPD command staff said that they self-deployed downtown that night, along with some officers on their special teams.

The CPD made arrests on Friday night into the early hours of Saturday morning. Some officers and command staff members we spoke to said that there was consistent confusion throughout the night about who was "in charge" or acting as the "incident commander."

Some CPD command staff had the sense the events of Friday night were an exception and that Saturday would be back to "normal." Other CPD command staff thought that the CPD had responded to Friday's protests and unrest in an organized manner. Several officers commented that they felt lucky to have escaped Friday night without more issues than they experienced, that they were close to losing control, and that they had a bad feeling about what was to come on Saturday, May 30.

### Body Worn Camera and Radio Review – May 29, 2020

Our review of body-worn-camera video revealed a variety of interactions between CPD officers and the public. In some videos, officers ignore the protesters completely. In one video, for example, officers walk alongside protesters who were staying on the sidewalk. The officers keep to themselves and did not respond to the protesters. In another video, protesters yell, "Let us through," as officers form



a bike line. The officers do not respond or engage, and the protesters later walk in a different direction. Several additional videos depicted little or no communication with the protesters, with CPD officers largely ignoring protesters as protesters shout at them.

We also observed instances when officers offered helpful communication. This included one video in which an officer points protesters in a direction they are allowed to continue marching. There is another video in which police are walking behind a group of people marching, encouraging them to disperse without additional incident.

There were also many examples of officers communicating disrespectfully and using force. In one video, for example, a group of protesters who seem frustrated approach a group of officers. At the same time, a CPD officer in a white shirt is engaging in an argument with a protester. Shortly thereafter, a crowd of people gathers around the officers. People in the crowd and officers begin pushing and shoving each other, and some items are thrown at the officers. The incident grows and the crowd gets larger. The pushing and shoving intensifies with officers having batons in their hands. Officers try to arrest one person as officers push and shove the person with their batons.

In another video, people attempt to shove past officers holding a bike line, shouting at them. Officers and the people in the crowd begin to shove each other. About two minutes later, a group of officers can be seen charging at the people as the crowd disperses. In that incident, while pushing and shoving is occurring, one officer can be seen pushing and nearly tackling a person who appears to be standing by observing the incident. About two minutes later, officers are seen making an arrest.

Another video depicts officers pushing and shoving people after a commotion breaks out and then throwing and tossing bikes, and another video depicts officers tackling some people amidst a commotion of pushing and shoving between people in the crowd and officers.

### City Data from May 29, 2020

The figures below reflect data that the IMT received from the City regarding May 29, 2020. It is important to note that much of this data reflects citywide information that is not necessarily tied to protest or unrest. Given various challenges regarding reporting and data collection and management, some of the information appears to be internally inconsistent and contrary to consistent video, audio, and interview evidence.

Review Figure 12. Police Computer Aided Dispatch System (May 29, 2020)

<b>Total Protests</b>	2
<b>Total Districts</b>	1 (001)
<b>Total "Riot"/Looting</b>	0
<b>Total Districts</b>	0
<b>Total</b>	2
<b>Total Districts</b>	1

Review Figure 13.

Daily City-Wide Statistics from the City and the CPD (Friday, May 29, 2020)

<b>Arrests for Disorderly Conduct</b>	0
<b>Arrests for Civil Unrest</b>	0
<b>Arrests for Looting</b>	0
<b>Arrest for firearms</b>	0
<b>Total</b>	0
<b>Complaints Filed Against Officers<sup>163</sup></b>	15
<b>Call for Service</b>	12,338
<b>Homicides</b>	4
<b>Shooting Incidents</b>	14
<b>Guns Recovered</b>	46
<b>Officers Injured on Duty (claims)</b>	0
<b>Destroyed Vehicles</b>	0
<b>Lost/Stolen Police Equipment</b>	0

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<sup>163</sup> This number reflects the number of complaints that were filed against officers on May 29, 2020, rather than the number of complaints regarding an incident on May 29, 2020. *Compare All Complaint Intake, May 29, 2020 – June 11, 2020*, CIVILIAN OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY (COPA) (June 17, 2020), <http://www.chicagocopa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/All-Complaints-Report-5-29-to-6-11-v4.pdf>.

## SATURDAY, MAY 30, 2020 (12:00 AM TO 11:59 PM)

### Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Other Cities

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On Saturday, May 30, protests and unrest continued in cities across the country.<sup>164</sup> Officials imposed curfews in Los Angeles, California; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Miami, Florida; and Washington, DC; among others, and the governors of eight states activated National Guard troops, with mixed success in quelling unrest and violence.<sup>165</sup> In Washington, DC, when a crowd of protesters gathered outside the White House, the Secret Service locked down the building and moved President Trump to a safe location.<sup>166</sup>

### Chicago

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#### Review Figure 14. CPIC Anticipated Demonstrations (May 30, 2020)

Police District	Cause(s)
1st	“MMAMV (Millions March Against mandatory Vaccines)”
1st	“National Day of Protest”
1st & 3rd	Various, including “Juste 4 George Floyd – Stop Police Crimes – Free Them All Caravan” (Car Caravan)
2nd	“Call to Action to Stop the Gun Violence”

On May 30, protests, unrest, and arrests continued to occur downtown from Friday night into early Saturday morning. Many officers reported not having the resources

<sup>164</sup> See e.g., *Fiery Clashes Erupt Between Police and Protesters Over George Floyd Death*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (May 30, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/us/minneapolis-floyd-protests.html>; Riya Bhattacharjee et al., *Cities impose curfews, National Guard mobilizes as U.S. faces another night of unrest after George Floyd killing*, CNBC (June 1, 2020), <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/30/protests-and-rioting-erupt-in-cities-across-the-us-as-anger-boils-after-the-killing-of-george-floyd.html>; Suzanne Nuyen and Jason Slotkin, *Grief, Outrage Over George Floyd Spread Further*, NPR (May 31, 2020), <https://www.npr.org/2020/05/31/866279321/la-county-under-state-of-emergency-amid-saturdays-george-floyd-protests>; Tim Sullivan and Stephen Groves, *Protests over police killings rage in dozens of US cities*, PBS WTTW (May 31, 2020), <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/protests-over-police-killings-rage-in-dozens-of-us-cities>; Nicole Chavez, Jason Hanna, Dakin Andone, and Madeline Holcombe, *Protesters break curfew on another night of fury and frustrations over George Floyd’s killing*, CNN (May 31, 2020), <https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/30/us/george-floyd-protests-saturday/index.html>; Jemima McEvoy, *14 Days of Protests, 19 Dead*, FORBES (June 8, 2020), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/jemimamcevoy/2020/06/08/14-days-of-protests-19-dead/?sh=5aabdedf4de4>.

<sup>165</sup> See footnote above.

<sup>166</sup> See Peter Baker and Maggie Haberman, *As Protests and Violence Spill Over, Trump Shrinks Back*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (May 31, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/politics/trump-protests-george-floyd.html>.

that they needed to respond to the crowds, lacking shields and helmets as violence and unrest continued throughout the night.

At about 3:00 AM, the CPD called for mass-arrest procedures to be implemented downtown and repeated that call around 4:00 AM. During these mass arrests, many CPD officers did not report uses of force on Tactical Response Reports or mass arrest cards. Officers simply handed over arrestees to transport drivers without completing the required paperwork. One officer reported that he visited three different lockup locations to find the person he arrested to complete the corresponding paperwork.

According to some CPD personnel, sufficient mass-arrest kits were not readily available. Other CPD personnel sought out mass-arrest kits that were in storage, left over from NATO in 2012, and drove around downtown, distributing mass-arrest kits and shields to any officers they could find. Some officers told us that some of these mass-arrest kits contained materials that no longer worked, such as expired zip ties and pens. CPD personnel reported that personnel went to stores to buy the equipment with their own money.

Some CPD officers also said that they received implicit and sometimes explicit directions from their supervisors to not make arrests—to avoid taking needed officers off the line to process arrestees or evidence. Other CPD officers said that they were instructed or instructed others to go to the detention facility to follow up on their arrests.

Reflecting on the early morning hours of May 30, some CPD officers said that it would have helped to have more officers and expressed frustration that additional officers were not made available downtown. According to some CPD personnel, the CPD did not have enough appropriate vehicles at the time to transport enough officers to where they needed. The CPD utilized Chicago Transit Authority vehicles and rented vehicles from outside of Chicago, eventually renting about 130 vehicles between May 30 and June 30. In some cases, officers told us they had to drive out of state to pick up equipment or rental vans.

Officers told us that the protesters in the early morning hours of May 30 were particularly confrontational, showing no interest in working with police to move the crowds safely and close down traffic safely. They reported widespread destruction of property, which some officers attributed to “anarchists” and others attributed to “opportunists.” Some officers we spoke with also noted that some people on the streets that night seemed to be people who lived nearby and came out to observe what was happening. Some officers also noted that they had interactions with people who they believed were intoxicated.

As the early morning hours approached, CPD attempted to prepare for the day by, in part, adding resources to the originally scheduled protest response for Districts

1 and 18, including adding foot and tactical officers, videographers, legal officers, prisoner vans, and juvenile-arrest processing teams.

A “CPD Update” meeting took place on Saturday, May 30, 2020, from about 12:15 PM to 12:45 PM with representatives from the City and the CPD to “discuss and strategize re: protests for the weekend.”

Many officers told us that they were unclear about who was “in charge” of the CPD’s responses to the protests and unrest. Later that day, the City began converting the Summer Operations Center at OEMC into an Emergency Operations Center to track, manage, and direct City, CPD, and local, state, and federal resources. The Emergency Operations Center would include representatives from the Mayor’s Office, the Illinois State Police, the Illinois National Guard, the Office of the Emergency Management and Communications, the Chicago Fire Department, and Streets and Sanitation. The CPD began to staff the Summer Operations Center with some personnel who had experience with crowd management from NATO in 2012.

Before the Emergency Operations Center coming online, however, many officers were deployed without a plan or direction. Many City and CPD personnel told us that, once they received word of what was occurring downtown, they rushed to work and many officers self-deployed.

On Saturday, the City and the CPD did not, however, have mechanisms in place to sufficiently track or direct deployments, personnel, or resources. We heard from CPD personnel across levels that there was a lack of direction throughout the day on Saturday, May 30. Some CPD leadership told us that they were sent to a location downtown, but there was no one there to provide further instruction when they arrived.

In response, some supervisors and officers who responded downtown pushed crowds in various directions, and unsuccessfully, chased people who were looting from store to store. Others said that, without direction, they directed officers with them to not engage with crowds to avoid risking injuries to people in the crowd and themselves. As a result, they had their teams pull away from conflicts.

The CPD’s Incident Action Plan indicated a potential protest start time of 2:00 PM or 6:00 PM. Some CPD personnel said that there were already protesters in Federal Plaza by mid-morning, and other CPD personnel said that, by noon, there were already “10-1s” calls over the radio—which are calls for officer down or in need of immediate assistance. We heard that, by 1:30 PM, there were already hundreds of people at Federal Plaza, and before the CPD could fully deploy and prepare, there were thousands.

Because this was a planned protest, the CPD had deployed a Special Munitions Team, a Cut Team,<sup>167</sup> a legal officer, and other resources that the CPD typically has available for planned protests. While some officers were caught off guard without equipment on Friday, many had equipment on Saturday, such as helmets, because they were aware of what happened on Friday night.

In short, people showed up in large numbers hours earlier than expected, well in advance of the planned 2:00 PM start time. There was also a car caravan on the streets nearby. The crowd grew quickly and appeared to have been well over a thousand people. While the CPD appears to have initially been allowing protesters to march, with officers walking in the crowds with the protesters, scuffles between the CPD and people in the crowd began occurring very early on. Multiple videos depicting the clashes downtown were posted to social media, such as physical confrontations near 55 W. Monroe.

In addition to the protest and unrest downtown on Saturday, protests and unrest also occurred in many districts, including the 1st, 6th, 7th, 12th, and 18th Districts. As early as Saturday morning, for example, there were reports of wide-scale looting of retail locations in the 6th District, which continued throughout much of Saturday.

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<sup>167</sup> A “cut team” is a group of officers who have equipment to cut through chains when protesters chain. See, e.g., Brady Slater, *Pipeline protesters shut down Duluth bank by locking themselves to entrances*, FORUM NEWS SERVICE (January 13, 2018), <https://www.twincities.com/2018/01/13/pipeline-protesters-shut-down-duluth-bank-by-locking-themselves-to-entrances/>.

Review Figure 15. "For Floyd" Graffiti (May 31, 2020)



Shortly after the downtown protest began, officers and crowds were engaged in violent clashes, which became chaotic. People on bicycles and in vehicles used those bicycles and vehicles to block traffic. Officers repeatedly called for help over the radio. As officers called for help, other officers and command staff self-deployed to provide additional support downtown.

Separately, chaos was occurring in the 18th District. Trump Tower, which was and is a frequent target of protest activity, was surrounded by people. Mounted police were also stationed near Trump Tower. At about 3:00 PM, all previously un-deployed SWAT personnel were asked to deploy to the downtown area. Those SWAT personnel were told that use of oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray (also known as "pepper spray") had been authorized by the Superintendent, although there was confusion from some officers about whether that authorization was for general use of OC spray or whether each discrete incident required its own authorization for OC spray. OC spray was ultimately deployed in the 1st and 18th Districts on Saturday.

Large crowds also arrived at Trump Tower from the 1st District, on the south side of the river, with protesters also congregating on the north side of the Wabash Bridge next to Trump Tower. According to officers, members of the crowd became

violent, with some people jumping on, smashing the windows out of, and spray painting police vehicles. CPD officers began pushing the entire crowd back, away from Trump Tower, forcing people south onto and across the Wabash Bridge onto East Wacker. We heard from people on the bridge that they did not hear any dispersal orders from the police, that they were surrounded by people and officers with nowhere to go, and that it appeared to them that officers callously used excessive force with their batons and fists.

The Illinois State Police also deployed officers to assist the CPD at Trump Tower and at the Wrigley Building.

At the Wacker and Wabash intersection, officers reported that people pushed a CPD police van, rocking it back and forth, with officers in the vehicle. The vehicle was surrounded by people on all sides. According to some CPD personnel, a non-sworn CPD employee went through the crowd, coordinated with the Chicago Fire Department, and helped the officers get out of the crowd.

According to some CPD officers, the CPD issued a dispersal order on the Wabash Bridge. Many protesters, however, said that they did not hear a dispersal order. Likewise, some officers on the radio could be heard asking why the CPD did not use a long-range acoustic device (LRAD) to give the dispersal order. As officers attempted to disperse the crowd, some people in the crowd threw objects, and some officers used their batons on people in the crowd. After about 30 minutes, the CPD cleared the Wabash Bridge of people.

The CPD began to conduct mass arrests. As we noted above, many officers did not have mass arrest kits with them for use, nor had they been trained on the mass-arrest procedure. This resulted in a number of people being arrested without documentation of the charge or the arresting officer.

Downtown, confrontations between CPD officers and people in the crowd continued. At one point, people in the crowd appeared to drag a CPD officer on the ground, as others threw objects at officers and officers shoved people back. Separately, another officer was dragged on the ground as others hit the officer in the head. About an hour later, someone in the crowd set a CPD squad car on fire at State and Lake. In another instance, a CPD vehicle drove away from a crowd with someone on the hood of the vehicle.

After discussions with the Mayor's Office and the CPD, the Chicago Transit Authority suspended bus service in the loop after two buses got stuck in the crowds, which the CPD helped get out. Some protesters said that shutting down transit trapped them downtown.



The CPD's radios were also interrupted by hackers.<sup>168</sup> Throughout the weekend and into Monday, hackers intermittently interrupted radios, such as with music or false reports, hindering effective communication among public safety telecommunicators and officers.

By 6:00 PM, Chicago Transit Authority suspended all stops to the downtown area. At about 7:00 PM, looting began to occur in the 1st and 18th Districts, which continued well into Sunday morning. Officers described a pattern in which people in the crowd would attack businesses and begin looting and when officers intervened, the crowd would begin to attack the police.

In our conversations with representatives from multiple City entities, City personnel told us that the Mayor decided to raise certain downtown bridges, which proved to be a challenge. Due to COVID-19 shutdowns, the Chicago Department of Transportation had not been raising bridges on its usual summer schedule (*e.g.*, to allow boats to pass). Chicago also recently had high rates of rainfall and flooding, which had damaged some bridge mechanics.<sup>169</sup> City representatives worked to coordinate with the Chicago Transit Authority to reroute public transportation. Around 7:45 PM, some people began posting online that they were unable to get out of downtown.

Many officers said that they did not know that the bridges were going to be raised, and some teams of officers were split up as some were caught on each side. WE heard that the 18th District tactical teams were stuck south of the river, unable to easily return to Trump Tower, where unrest was occurring. Some officers reported that a warning was given when the bridges were raised, but the officers were in the process of holding demonstrators back from the bridge at that point and could not leave the line. We also heard that one police wagon was damaged because it was stuck on a bridge when that bridge raised.

At about 8:15 PM, via a press conference and social media, the Mayor's Office announced that a curfew would be enacted for 9:00 PM. At 8:40 PM, Mayor Lightfoot's Twitter account (@chicagosmayor) announced the curfew. Some community members said that they did not find out about the curfew until after 9:00 PM. Around 8:50 PM, officers began to be placed into police lines, and at around 9:10 PM, officers began to enforce the curfew and advance the line toward the crowd, attempting to push crowds away.

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<sup>168</sup> See Frank Main, *Chicago police officers' radios crackled with rogue messages during weekend of chaos*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (June 2, 2020), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/2020/6/1/21277567/chicago-officers-radios-rogue-messages-anti-cop-music-pro-cop-slogans-during-george-floyd-protests>.

<sup>169</sup> See Mike Janssen et al., *Flooding spreads across Chicagoland as storms bring twice May's average in a few days*, WGN9 (May 17, 2020), <https://wgntv.com/weather/flash-flood-warning-issued-for-large-part-of-chicago-area-cook-county/>.

Review Figure 16. Mayor Tweet regarding Curfew (May 30, 2020)



Looting was reported at several stores in the Loop and Michigan Avenue. Some online posts referred to the scene as “a chaotic mess,” and that CPD officers were “pursuing an aggressive strategy across the city.” Looting and destruction of property continued downtown into the night.

As before, some officers described chasing crowds around the City all night. This caused the officers to repeatedly clear people who were destroying or looting property out of the same buildings: as officers left a secured building to protect another building, people would return to the now unsecured building. Some officers said that they did not believe that it would have been safe to leave some officers at the secured buildings. Many members of the CPD said that they would have been better off securing one area, rather than chasing the crowds in an attempt to save all of the buildings.

In the evening hours of Saturday into the early morning hours of Sunday, the civil unrest continued and evolved into widespread looting. Some officers reported that, by Saturday evening, many officers on the street appeared demoralized and anguished. Many officers we spoke to told us that they were exhausted, dehydrated and had not eaten much for close to 18 hours. Many remarked that the downtown area looked like a battlefield and compared it to war scenes. After Saturday night, some remarked that it “could have been worse” if officers had not shown the level of restraint that they did. Some officers described Saturday as the worst day in decades for the CPD.

Some officers who were downtown expressed frustration that officers in other districts were told that they needed to stay in their districts and that they could not deploy downtown. Some said that they knew of officers who wanted to help, but were told that they could not leave their districts.

Some CPD personnel reported that the CPD decided to indefinitely move all officers to 12-hour shifts, canceling regular days off, effective May 31. This would eventually increase the number of resources that were available to respond to protests and civil unrest, but the additional personnel took time to roll out.

### Community Experiences and Reflections from May 30, 2021

The quotes and summaries below are samples of experiences from community members regarding events on Monday, May 30, 2020.

. . . . THE PEACEFULNESS WAS DISRUPTED WHEN CPD SHOWED UP, READY TO VIOLENTLY FIGHT US. IT FELT LIKE WE WERE ENEMIES AND THEY WERE A MILITARY FORCE SENT TO ELIMINATE US. AT AROUND 4:30 PM, I MADE MY WAY TO STATE AND MADISON, WHERE THERE WAS A HEAVY POLICE PRESENCE AT THE INTERSECTION. THEY ALL, IN RIOT GEAR, CIRCLED AROUND A CPD VEHICLE USED TO TRANSPORT ARRESTEES, FACING PROTESTERS WITH THEIR BATONS IN HAND. I WAS WALKING EAST ON MADISON, WHERE I CAME TO SEE TWO OFFICERS WHO DID NOT HAVE THEIR BADGE NUMBERS OR NAME TAGS ON. THEY ALSO DID NOT HAVE THEIR BODY CAMERAS UNDER UNIFORM. I APPROACHED AND ASKED IF THEY COULD IDENTIFY THEIR BADGE NUMBER OR WHICH PRECINCT THEY WERE FROM. ONE LAUGHED AT ME, WHILE THE OTHER RAISED HIS BATON AT ME TO BACK UP. ONE TOLD ME TO "F" OFF AND ANOTHER SPIT IN MY DIRECTION. . . . AT 6:18 PM, I MADE MY WAY NORTH ON STATE STREET AND RANDOLPH AFTER WHAT SEEMED TO BE 100 OFFICERS BEGAN TO MOVE NORTH BEHIND ME WITH THEIR BATONS OUT. WHEN I MADE IT SLIGHTLY NORTH OF THE INTERSECTION, THEY RAN TOWARDS US AND BEGAN HITTING AND ARRESTING EVERYONE IN SIGHT. I RECORDED AS A WOMAN WAS ARRESTED BY TWO OFFICERS FROM BEHIND, ONE BEING A WHITE-SHIRT POLICE OFFICER. SHE WAS NOT FACING THEM, SHE WAS LOOKING DOWN ON HER PHONE WHEN THEY PULLED HER TO THE GROUND BY HER PONYTAIL FROM BEHIND. THEN THEY FLIPPED HER OVER ONTO THE GROUND FACING HER DOWN BY THE PONYTAIL ONCE AGAIN. THREE MORE OFFICERS RAN OVER. ONE KICKED HER ON THE RIGHT HIP. THROUGHOUT THE SUMMER, I EXPERIENCED MUCH MORE DISRESPECT AND ABUSE FROM CPD OFFICERS AT OTHER PROTESTS, INCLUDING BEING TOLD -- INCLUDING BEING SEXUALLY HARASSED AND SAYING, QUOTE, "NICE SHORT-SHORTS, [HOMOPHOBIC SLUR]," QUOTE, BY AN OFFICER IN A PASSING CPD VEHICLE WHILE I WAS ON THE SIDEWALK. AS A LEGAL PROFESSIONAL, I CANNOT SEE HOW THE CITY IS PROUD OF THE SUPPOSED PROFESSIONALISM OF CPD. CPD ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY THESE RESPONSES BY MENTIONING THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVATE PARTY. BUT WHAT I REMEMBER FROM MY FIRST YEAR OF LAW SCHOOL IS THAT THE LAW VALUES PERSONAL RIGHTS OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS. THESE DEADLY AND VIOLENT RESPONSES FROM OFFICERS ARE UNJUSTIFIED. . . . <sup>170</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> Listening Session, August 19, 2020, at 79–80.

. . . . HE PINNED ME UP AGAINST THE PROTESTERS BEHIND ME UNTIL I COULDN'T TALK. AND THEN AT THAT POINT I COULDN'T BREATH[E] ANYMORE, AND I COULDN'T KEEP MY FEET UNDERNEATH ME, THE CROWD WAS MOVING SO MUCH, AND MY KNEES GAVE OUT. SO HE WAS PRESSING THE BATON AGAINST MY NECK SO HARD THAT I COULDN'T FALL TO MY KNEES. I WAS HANGING BY HIS BATON. WHEN I STARTED TO GO COMPLETELY LIMP, ANOTHER PROTESTER CALLED HIM OFF, SAID, SHE IS CHOKING, SHE CAN'T BREATHE, SHE CAN'T BREATHE, TAKE OFF YOUR BATON. I THINK THAT PROTESTER SAVED MY LIFE THAT DAY. . . .<sup>171</sup>

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AS THE SITUATION STARTED TO ESCALATE, WE WATCHED THEM PUSH THE LINE BACK. AND THEY SINGLED OUT A WOMAN WHO HAD BEEN YELLING QUITE LOUDLY ON MY RIGHT. AND AS THEY WERE PUSHING US BACK, PUSHING US BACK, WE CLIMBED UP ON THE CEMENT PLANTERS THAT WERE THERE IN THE PLAZA THAT GROUPS OF PEOPLE WERE STANDING ON. AND THEY SINGLED HER OUT SPECIFICALLY, AND THEY KIND OF MANHANDLED HER, PHYSICALLY. [W]RAPPED THEIR ARMS AROUND HER. AND I WATCHED HER, REALLY, BE THROWN TO THE GROUND. AND WHEN SHE ROSE HER HANDS WERE BLOODIED AND DIRTIED, AS WELL AS HER KNEES.<sup>172</sup>

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AT THIS POINT, THE POLICE REACHED US, AND I WAS BEATEN WITH A BATON ON MY BACK. I ESTIMATE THE OFFICER BEAT ME FOR 15 TO 30 SECONDS. I CAN'T SAY FOR SURE BECAUSE I WAS FOCUSED ON BLOCKING THE YOUNG WOMAN WHO WAS COVERING HER HEAD AS AN OFFICER REACHED AROUND ME TO BEAT HER. I ALSO FOCUSED ON THE UNIQUENESS OF MY SCREAMS. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME I HEARD MYSELF MAKE A SOUND I COULD ONLY DESCRIBE AS A COMBINATION OF SHOCK, FEAR, AND GURGLING PAIN. WHEN THE OFFICERS STOPPED BEATING ME, HE SAID: GET THE "F" OUT OF HERE. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME AN OFFICER TOLD ME I COULDN'T BE IN THAT LOCATION. I FROZE FOR A MOMENT AND SAID "NO" BECAUSE I WAS HELPING THE YOUNG WOMAN LOOK FOR HER PHONE THAT FELL OUT OF HER HAND AS SHE COVERED HER HEAD FROM THE BEATING. THE OFFICER WHO BEAT ME, AND ANOTHER, BEGAN SHOUTING AT THE TWO OF US. SO I SAID: OKAY, BUT TELL US WHERE TO GO SO WE DON'T GET BEATEN AGAIN. THERE IS NOWHERE TO GO.<sup>173</sup>

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AT THIS POINT, POLICE OFFICERS BEGAN CHARGING US FROM ALL SIDES, SHOVING US WITH THEIR BATONS. A YOUNG WOMAN FELL TO THE GROUND AND WAS GETTING TRAMPLED BY THE GROUP. I STOPPED TO HELP HER BEFORE I WAS ABLE TO PULL HER — AND BEFORE I WAS ABLE TO PULL HER UP, I FELT A PUSH FROM A POLICE OFFICER. THIS OFFICER REPEATEDLY SHOVED ME EXTREMELY FORCEFULLY WITH HIS BATON, WHICH HE WAS HOLDING HORIZONTALLY WITH BOTH HIS HANDS, HITTING ME IN THE FACE AND CHEST. HE PUSHED ME ABOUT 20 FEET DOWN STATE STREET UNTIL HE CAUSED ME TO FALL TO THE GROUND, KNOCKING MY GLASSES OFF AND BREAKING MY CAMERA, WHICH I WAS HOLDING IN MY HAND. THIS INTERACTION LEFT A LARGE, DARK PURPLE BRUISE ON MY RIGHT ARM THAT LASTED FOR WEEKS AFTER THE PROTEST. AFTER GETTING HELPED UP BY OTHER PROTESTERS, I COULDN'T SEE WHERE MY WIFE WAS. DISTRAUGHT, I WENT TO TRY AND FIND HER. I WAS CONFRONTED BY THE SAME OFFICER THAT SLAMMED ME TO THE GROUND AND SAID TO HIM: PLEASE, MY WIFE IS OVER THERE, POINTING

<sup>171</sup> Listening Session, August 20, 2020, at 159.

<sup>172</sup> Listening Session, August 19, 2020, at 30.

<sup>173</sup> Listening Session, August 20, 2020, at 125.

TO THE CORNER OF STATE AND KINZIE. THIS OFFICER THEN SHOVED ME AGAIN, STRIKING ME IN THE FACE THREE TIMES WITH HIS BATON AND SAID: I DON'T CARE, YOU SHOULDN'T HAVE COME HERE, YOU "F-ER," BUT SAID THE WORD.<sup>174</sup>

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WHILE I WITNESSED SEVERAL ACTS OF MINOR CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, THERE WAS NOTHING I WITNESSED IN THE CROWD AROUND ME THAT COULD HAVE JUSTIFIED WHAT CAME NEXT. AFTER MARCHING IN THE STREETS FOR SEVERAL BLOCKS, WITHOUT INCIDENT, NEAR THE INTERSECTION OF JACKSON AND DEARBORN, A BATTALION OF 20 TO 40 CPD OFFICERS IN FULL RIOT GEAR MARCHED THROUGH THE GROUP OF PROTESTERS TO ENGAGE IN WHAT I NOW KNOW IS CALLED KETTLING. AFTER SECTIONING US OFF FROM THE LARGER MARCH AHEAD OF US, THEY BLOCKED THE INTERSECTION AND FORMED A CIRCLE. THIS IS WHEN TENSIONS ESCALATED.<sup>175</sup>

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THE POLICE WERE ANTAGONIZING US AND BEATING US WITH THEIR BATONS AND GRABBING PEOPLE AND SHOVING THEM TO THE GROUND AND ALSO BEATING THEM UNTIL THEY WERE BLEEDING. I HAD TO WATCH AS MY PARTNER, WHO WAS TRYING TO PROTECT ME, HAD A BATON SHOVED IN THEIR FACE BY A POLICE OFFICER WHO WOULD NOT LET UP. AND FROM THERE, I HAD TO PUT MY BODY IN FRONT OF THE POLICE AND MY PARTNER SO THAT THEY WERE OKAY. AFTER THAT INCIDENT, WE HAD TO RUN AND GET AWAY BECAUSE THEY KEPT HITTING US, SHOOTING FLARES INTO THE AIR AND THROWING SMOKE BOMBS AND TEAR GAS INTO THE CROWD WHEN THE NATIONAL GUARD CAME. AND WE HAD TO RUN AWAY AND FIND AN AREA TO ESCAPE BECAUSE ALL THE BRIDGES WERE LIFTED WHEN THE CURFEW WAS ENACTED AT LEAST 20 MINUTES BEFORE POLICE STARTED ATTACKING US.<sup>176</sup>

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SO ON MAY 30<sup>TH</sup> I WENT TO PEACEFULLY PROTEST THE MURDER OF GEORGE FLOYD, AND TO PUT MYSELF BETWEEN BLACK PEOPLE AND THE POLICE BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT BLACK LIVES MATTER. IN THE AFTERNOON, I ENDED UP ON THE WABASH BRIDGE. THE POLICE FORMED A LINE AND HAD HORSES BEHIND THEM. AND THEY DID NOT CALL TO DISPERSE AT THAT TIME. I WAS BETWEEN THE POLICE AND SOME BLACK PEOPLE THAT I DIDN'T KNOW. AND THE POLICE — THERE WAS AN OFFICER PUSHING INTO MY CHEST HORIZONTALLY WITH A BATON LIKE THIS, AND HE WAS PUSHING ME VERY, VERY HARD. AND I WAS AFRAID OF STUMBLING. I WAS TRYING TO HOLD MY GROUND, BUT I WASN'T FIGHTING. I NEVER RAISED MY VOICE. AND I WAS AFRAID THAT I WAS GOING TO FALL ON THE GROUND AND GET TRAMPLED BECAUSE THE POLICE WERE ADVANCING, BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF HOW MUCH IT HURT TO HAVE THE BATON PUSHED INTO MY RIBCAGE AND MY CHEST. I ASKED HIM TO STOP AND HE WOULDN'T. HE KEPT SHOVED ME. SO I PUT MY HANDS UP. I THOUGHT HE WOULD STOP IF I WAS PROTECTING MYSELF, BUT HE SHOVED THE BATON INTO THE FINGERS OF MY BONE AND WAS PUSHING WITH HIS BODY WEIGHT. AND SO I SCREAMED AND I SAID, "STOP. PLEASE STOP." SO HE GAVE ME A LOOK, AND HE JUMPED TO A PERSON NEXT TO ME, WHICH WAS A BLACK PERSON AND STARTED SHOIVING HIM EVEN HARDER. AND I SAID, "STOP. STOP. PLEASE STOP." AND THE POLICE OFFICER NEXT TO HIM LOOKED AT ME AND SAID, "YOU WANT TO BE IN IT. NOW YOU'RE IN IT." AND HE GRABBED ME BY MY NECK AND HE LIFTED ME UP, AND I FLEW. I WENT AIRBORNE BY MY NECK.

<sup>174</sup> *Id.* at 168–69.

<sup>175</sup> Listening Session, August 19, 2020, at 81.

<sup>176</sup> Listening Session, August 20, 2020, at 116–117.

HE DRAGGED ME BACKWARDS SO QUICKLY THAT MY SHOE FLEW OFF AND MY HAT FLEW OFF. HE DRAGGED ME DOWN THE STREET THROUGH HORSE POOP SO HARD THAT MY BACK WAS SCRAPED UP AND BLEEDING. AND THEN TWO OTHER OFFICERS JUMPED ON ME AND I WAS SCREAMING, "STOP. YOU GOT ME. YOU GOT ME. YOU WON." THEY PUT ME IN ZIP TIES. I SAT ON THE CURB OF THE TRUMP TOWER FOR THREE HOURS. THEY — THIS IS WHEN THE BRIDGE WENT UP. I SAT ON A SHERIFF'S BUS FOR THREE HOURS. THEY TOOK US TO BELMONT AND WESTERN, DIDN'T LET US IN, HAD NO FEMALES. DIDN'T TELL THE FEMALES THAT WE WERE THERE, TO PROCESS US. I WAS IN ZIP TIES FOR SIX HOURS, VERY TIGHT. THEY TOLD US IF WE DIDN'T WANT TO BE ARRESTED, WE SHOULDN'T HAVE BURNED THE CITY DOWN. NONE OF US HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN ANY BURNING OR LOOTING OR ANYTHING. THEN I WAS IN JAIL FOR THE NIGHT. MY NAME CLEARED AT 3:00, I HAD NO WARRANTS, AT 3:00 IN THE MORNING. THEY WOULDN'T LET ME OUT UNTIL 8:00. TO THIS DAY I HAVE NO IDEA IF I HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH ANYTHING. THEY SAID IT WOULD BE DISORDERLY[] CONDUCT. IT WAS TERRIFYING. IT WAS BRUTAL. IT WAS TRAUMATIC. AND IT WAS UNCALLED FOR.<sup>177</sup>

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THE FIRST WAS ON THE BIG PROTEST TO PROTEST GEORGE FLOYD'S MURDER ON MAY 30TH DOWNTOWN. I WAS WORKING AS A MARSHAL, AND I WAS GOING TO HELP SOMEBODY WHO HAD HAD THEIR PANTS RIPPED OPEN BY CPD, WHO WERE SURROUNDED BY SIX OR SEVEN COPS. AND I WENT TO GO HELP THIS PERSON PUT THEIR PANTS ON AND I WAS SHOVED IN THE CHEST WITH A BATON, SHOVED TO THE GROUND AND I HIT MY NECK AND BACK, AMONG OTHER THINGS, AMONG BEING SCREAMED AT AND NOT REALLY GIVEN ANY ORDERS OR DIRECTIONS, JUST BEING SCREAMED AT.<sup>178</sup>

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ON MAY 30TH, POLICE IN RIOT GEAR CHASED PROTESTORS THROUGH THE STREETS IN MULTIPLE LOCATIONS AND TIMES, GRABBING AND BEATING PEOPLE AT RANDOM WITH FISTS AND BATONS. A YOUNG TEENAGER WAS SEIZED AND BEATEN BY POLICE FOR NO REASON ON THE WABASH BRIDGE. [LEGAL OBSERVERS (LOs)] SAW POLICE DRIVE CARS THROUGH CROWDS. AND ONE OF THE LOs WAS BEATEN. AND ARRESTED.<sup>179</sup>

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ON MAY 30TH I ATTENDED PROTESTS AS A LEGAL OBSERVER WITH THE NLG. ON THAT DAY, I WITNESSED CPD OFFICERS ATTACK PROTESTERS WITH A VICIOUSNESS AND A DISREGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE THAT I HAVE NOT SEEN SINCE WITNESSING AFGHAN POLICE OFFICERS ATTACK SUSPECTED TALIBAN MEMBERS. I WAS AT TRUMP TOWER WHEN CPD ATTEMPTED TO PUSH PROTESTERS OFF OF THE WABASH BRIDGE. I WAS IN THE VERY FRONT OF THE PROTESTERS, WEARING A LEGAL OBSERVER HAT. OFFICERS ARE PUSHING US BACK WITH BATONS AND PROTESTERS BEHIND US WERE PUSHING US FORWARD. TO MY LEFT, CPD DRAGGED A YOUNG WOMAN TO THE GROUND AND BEGAN KICKING HER AND BEATING HER WITH A BATON. ANOTHER PROTESTER ATTEMPTED TO SHIELD HER AND GOT THE SAME TREATMENT.<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>177</sup> Listening Session, August 19, 2020, at 39–41.

<sup>178</sup> *Id.* at 51.

<sup>179</sup> *Id.* at 68.

<sup>180</sup> Listening Session, August 20, 2020, at 142.

I ATTEMPTED TO GET THEIR NAMES TO SEND TO THE MASS DEFENSE COMMITTEE, WHICH PROVIDES FREE LEGAL REPRESENTATION TO ARRESTED PROTESTERS. WHILE TRYING TO GET THE NAMES OF THE PEOPLE BEING ASSAULTED BY THE CPD, AN OFFICER HIT ME IN THE THROAT WITH HIS BATON. AS HE ATTEMPTED TO DO SO AGAIN, I PUT MY ARM UP TO BLOCK IT. AFTER THAT, A NUMBER OF OFFICERS BEGAN HITTING ME IN THE HEAD WITH A BATON. OTHER OFFICERS GRABBED ME FROM BEHIND, RIPPED ME OVER A CONCRETE BARRIER, WHERE THEY CONTINUED TO BEAT ME. TWO OTHER PROTESTERS ATTEMPTED TO STOP THE CPD FROM BEATING ME AND WAS BEATEN AS WELL. I'M UNSURE OF HOW LONG I WAS KICKED, PUNCHED AND HIT WITH BATONS. AFTER THE BEATING, I WAS UNABLE TO SIT OR MOVE FOR A WEEK WITHOUT EXTREME PAIN.<sup>181</sup>

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AND, THEN, ULTIMATELY, I WOULD JUST LIKE TO SAY THAT THE DECISION ON THE PART OF THE MAYOR TO SHUT DOWN THE TRAINS THAT DAY -- THIS WAS A PROTEST THAT WAS SET TO GO FROM 2:00 TIL 5:00. IT TRAPPED A LOT PEOPLE, MYSELF INCLUDED, IN THE DOWNTOWN AREA. SO I SAW, AS I TRIED TO FIGURE OUT HOW I WAS GOING TO GET HOME, PEOPLE WANDERING AIMLESSLY, RUNNING INTO GROUPS OF POLICE OFFICERS THAT WERE ALSO SEEMING TO BE LOOKING FOR PROTESTERS. IT WAS A VERY UNSAFE FEELING AS THE POLICE WERE THERE. ANYTIME I TURNED ON A STREET AND SAW POLICE, I WENT THE OTHER WAY, BECAUSE I HAD A SIGN. I WAS OBVIOUSLY PART OF THE PROTEST. THE ONLY PEOPLE I SAW WERE EITHER PART OF THE PROTEST OR POLICE.<sup>182</sup>

## Body Worn Camera and Radio Review – May 30, 2020

Videos from Saturday, May 30, depict a wide range of verbal and physical interactions between people in the crowd and officers. One body-worn-camera video from the early morning hours depict protesters yelling, “Fuck y’all,” at CPD officers, and officers responding with, “Be safe.” Several other videos depict officers ignoring protesters and not verbally responding at all to the questions they ask.

Other videos depicted physical confrontations between people and officers. Many videos depict a crowd of officers and people who are pushing and shoving. In one video, an officer’s body-worn camera falls off, as officers continue to push and shove people amidst commotion. In another video, an officer aggressively pushes, tackles, and fights with people on the ground and makes arrests.

At around 3:00 AM, a video shows officers running toward a commotion between people and officers. The officers push, shove, and pull people, using batons to push them back. One officer makes an arrest. In another video, an officer can be seen grabbing something from someone, and officers and people then begin pushing and shoving.

In one interaction that occurred in the early morning hours, officers are seen pushing back against people using bikes, people in the crowd disperse, and the officers

<sup>181</sup> *Id.* at 142–43.

<sup>182</sup> *Id.* at 185.

draw their batons. Later, officers can be seen throwing bikes, pushing and shoving individuals, and dragging one individual. As one officer tries to restrain a woman on the ground, other officers yell, "Pick her up." The officer continues to drag the woman a couple of feet before trying to pick her up.

Another body-worn-camera video depicts an interaction in which officers are seen carrying a woman who is saying she needs some water. It sounds like she tells officers that she is pregnant. Officers don't respond to her pleas for water and push her into a large CPD vehicle ("wagon") before shutting the door on her. Officers place the handcuffed woman into the wagon with two other men, who do not appear to be handcuffed. Officers also don't offer masks to any individuals placed into the wagon. Later in the video, the officer later mocks the woman. A few minutes later, the officer brings another man to the wagon. As the wagon door opens, the woman continues to say that she can't breathe, that she needs water, and that she is pregnant. An officer says, "Why are you here then?" And officers tell her that she has to wait. The woman then says, "Get me some water, bitch." The officer steps into the wagon, and grabs the woman and moves her to the back. His complete actions are unclear from the video, but the others in the wagon respond with shock and ask the officer if his camera is on. Outside the wagon, officers continue to mock the woman who says she's pregnant and needs water. Throughout this video, officers continue to bring people to the wagon. All of the people in wagon appear to be people of color, primarily Black people. Many minutes later, a different officer eventually brings water to the woman and allows her to drink.

The same video shows an officer walking with a young White male, who is handcuffed. A different officer asks whether he is going to put him in the wagon. The officer with the young White male says, "I'm just separating him from his group. . . . He says that he's going to leave." The officer walks him down the street away from the CPD wagon.

Another video provides an example of the types of verbal interactions between officers, people in the crowd, and arrestees. As the CPD officer is seen cuffing the individual, he says the following:

**Officer:** "Where the fuck are you from?"

**Arrestee:** "Aurora. I want justice. I have the right to freedom to protest and assembly."

**Officer:** "Give me your hands and shut the fuck up. All night you've been fucking things up."

**Arrestee:** "I want justice."



**Officer:** “You’re going to get it. All of it. Tonight.”

**Arrestee:** “That’s really tight.” [Presumably referring to the handcuffs]

**Officer:** “Shut the fuck up, asshole.”

### City Data from May 30, 2020

The figures below reflect data that the IMT received from the City for May 30, 2020. It is important to note that much of this data reflects citywide information that is not necessarily tied to protest or unrest. Given various challenges regarding reporting and data collection and management, some of the information appears to be internally inconsistent and contrary to consistent video, audio, and interview evidence. Nonetheless, the tables demonstrate that the City and the CPD’s challenges were significant and widespread.

#### Review Figure 17. Police Computer Aided Dispatch System (May 30, 2020)

<b>Total Protests</b>	17
<b>Total Districts</b>	11 (001, 006, 007, 009, 010, 011, 014, 016, 018, 019, 022)
<b>Total “Riot”/Looting</b>	14 (1+13)
<b>Total Districts</b>	(001, 008, 012, 014, 018, 019, 024)
<b>Total</b>	31
<b>Total Districts</b>	14

#### Review Figure 18.

#### Daily City-Wide Statistics from the City and the CPD (Saturday, May 30, 2020)

<b>Arrests for Disorderly Conduct</b>	377
<b>Arrests for Civil Unrest</b>	0
<b>Arrests for Looting</b>	0
<b>Arrest for firearms</b>	16
<b>Other</b>	101
<b>Total</b>	494
<b>Complaints Filed Against Officers<sup>183</sup></b>	9
<b>Call for Service</b>	21,471
<b>Homicides</b>	9

<sup>183</sup> This number reflects the number of complaints that were filed against officers on May 30, 2020, rather than the number of complaints regarding an incident on May 30, 2020. Compare *All Complaint Intake, May 29, 2020 – June 11, 2020*, COPA (June 17, 2020), <http://www.chicagocopa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/All-Complaints-Report-5-29-to-6-11-v4.pdf>.

<b>Shooting Incidents</b>	18
<b>Guns Recovered</b>	34
<b>Officers Injured on Duty (claims)</b>	85
<b>Destroyed Vehicles</b>	0
<b>Lost/Stolen Police Equipment</b>	0
<b>Looted/Damaged Buildings</b>	86

## SUNDAY, MAY 31, 2020 (12:00 AM TO 11:59 PM)

### Other Cities

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Large-scale protests and incidents of unrest continued on Sunday, May 31, throughout the US.<sup>184</sup> In Washington, DC, for example, some people attacked cars, breaking car windows and turning cars over.<sup>185</sup>

Demonstrations also occurred in cities outside of the U.S., such as Vancouver, British Columbia, where thousands gathered in support of George Floyd.<sup>186</sup>

### Chicago

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The unrest, looting, and arrests that began on Saturday, May 30, continued downtown until well after sunrise. Some officers said that they continued to chase people who were looting past 6:00 AM.

There were also anticipated protests for Sunday, May 31.

### Review Figure 19. CPIC Anticipated Demonstrations (May 31, 2021)

<b>Police District</b>	<b>Cause</b>
1st	"Pritzkerville – Protest Against Mass Eviction"
1st	"Chicago Solidarity with George Floyd and Breonna Taylor"
1st	"Black Lives matter – Chicago Protest"
1st	"Chicago Solidarity with George Floyd and Breonna Taylor"

The Emergency Operations Center continued to take shape throughout Sunday. Once activated, the Emergency Operations Center would operate 24-hours during

<sup>184</sup> See Giulia McDonnell Nieto del Rio, John Eligon, and Adeel Haasan, *A Timeline of What Has Happened in the Year Since George Floyd's Death*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (May 25, 2021).

<sup>185</sup> See, e.g., *Looking back at fiery George Floyd protests*, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (April 25, 2021), <https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2021/apr/25/looking-back-at-fiery-george-floyd-protests/>.

<sup>186</sup> *Id.*

the continued response. The Emergency Operations Center determined large resources allocations.

Mayor Lightfoot had requested the assistance of the Illinois National Guard and the curfew from the previous day remained in effect. We heard that there were challenges determining how the City and the CPD could and should use the National Guard, and what the rules of engagement should be. Ultimately, the National Guard to set up perimeters around downtown to free up more CPD officers to deploy to the neighborhoods.

Reeling from two days of unrest, by Sunday the CPD still did not have a clear system for how to organize platoons or how to distribute and track resources, including radios. There was continued widespread confusion about deployments.

Officers from each district—mostly third-watch officers and officers returning from their days off—were sent to Guaranteed Rate Field and deployed to respond to areas that needed additional resources. There was some confusion and disagreement regarding whether all districts should deploy officers to Guaranteed Rate Field, rather than staying in their districts. Ultimately, certain districts were permitted to keep their officers—such as “Tier 1” designated districts, which have the highest levels of violent crime (the 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th, 11th, and 15th Districts). Nonetheless, on Sunday and a few days after, some of these districts continued to send officers to Guaranteed Rate Field, only to have officers return to each district.

Some officers were taken from the north side and redeployed to the south side, and vice versa. Often, officers were redeployed to districts with which they were not familiar, even when their own districts had requested additional resources. Many remarked that the redeployment strategy caused unnecessary delays and resulted in longer days for officers.

The National Guard and other non-CPD resources limited access to the downtown area by blocking roads. Some CPD personnel speculated that the downtown area received less attention on Sunday because most stores were looted already—as opposed to any response by the City, the CPD, or outside partners.

Unrest began spread to Chicago’s neighborhoods. By 10:00 AM, looting began to occur across several districts in Chicago’s neighborhoods. For instance, looting occurred at a number of stores on 47th Street (between Michigan Ave. and Martin Luther King Dr.).

One community member noted that officers were just “standing there” as people looted a liquor store, a clothing store, and other businesses. The same community member also commented on a protest near 53rd and Lake Park. The person re-

ported officers and community members began assaulting each other, with officers using batons and community members using bottles, skateboards, and other improvised weapons.

Protests also continued in other areas of the City, including in the 1st and 18th Districts and near the Mayor's home in the 14th District. Significant protest activity continued to occur in the downtown area. For instance, protesters held a die-in during the late afternoon at Daley Plaza while another protest occurred peacefully at Trump Tower.

On Sunday afternoon, Metra commuter rail suspended access to downtown. The bridges remained raised and at about 6:30 PM, the Chicago Transit Authority suspended its service on all bus routes and rail lines in and out of the Loop. The City's Department of Streets and Sanitation, Department of Water Management, and Chicago Police Department issued a joint statement about the limited access to the loop, noting that "only employees whose businesses are located within the designated boundaries, individuals who reside in the surrounding area and residents engaged in essential activities as defined in the Municipal Code" would be allowed inside the boundaries of Division Street from Lake Shore Drive and North Halsted Street; North Halsted from Division Street to Milwaukee Avenue and Grand Avenue; Milwaukee Avenue from Grand Avenue to Kinzie Street; Canal Street from Kinzie Street to 26th Street; and 26th Street from Canal Street to Lake Shore Drive.<sup>187</sup>

We heard that many Chicago neighborhoods did not experience protests on Sunday and only experienced unrest, including property destruction, looting, and arson. According to many CPD personnel, the CPD focused on protecting the retail corridors in each district. There were also reports of vigilantes and escalating gang conflicts.<sup>188</sup> We heard from CPD supervisors that officers were responding to these incidents, having vigilantes stand down, and having community contacts de-escalate tensions. We also heard, however, that, during some attempts, there were shots fired at police during attempted interventions.

Many commanders described requesting more resources, which were either slow to arrive or unavailable as many districts were in the same position. Personnel in

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<sup>187</sup> See Chicago Tribune Staff, *George Floyd fallout: Here's what happened May 31 in the Chicago area*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (May 31, 2020), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-george-floyd-chicago-protests-20200531-qghf4l7ysjgl3etxqu3jv6oq6a-story.html>.

<sup>188</sup> See, e.g., Elvia Malagón and Sam Charles, *Trouble follows some residents' plan to guard their neighborhoods after unrest*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (June 2, 2020), <https://chicago.sun-times.com/2020/6/2/21278543/little-village-pilsen-trouble-follows-residents-plan-neighborhoods-unrest-protest-floyd>; Bob Chiarito, *Bridgeporters Say Bat-Wielding Vigilantes Are Terrorizing Peaceful Protesters*, *Neighbors*, BLOCK CLUB CHICAGO (June 4, 2020), <https://blockclub-chicago.org/2020/06/04/bridgeporters-say-bat-wielding-vigilantes-are-terrorizing-peaceful-protesters-neighbors/>.

the Emergency Operations Center consistently confirmed that the demand for resources outpaced the supply.

### Community Experiences and Reflections from May 31, 2021

The quotes and summaries below are samples of experiences from community members regarding events on Sunday, May 31, 2020.

*ON MAY 31ST, WE OBSERVED A TEAM OF SWAT OFFICERS EXIT THEIR VEHICLE, PEPPER SPRAY [LEGAL OBSERVERS (LOs)] AND ABOUT SEVEN DEMONSTRATORS WITHOUT SAYING A WORD, AND THEN RETURN TO THE VEHICLE AND DRIVE AWAY. IN GRANT PARK, DOZENS OF OFFICERS IN RIOT GEAR ATTACKED A CROWD OF PROTESTERS CAUSING MANY INJURIES AND STOLE BIKES FROM PROTESTERS. CPD TARGETED THE LOs WITH PEPPER SPRAY AS LOs GATHERED TO GET ARRESTEE INFORMATION, AND INTENTIONALLY KNOCKED AN LO'S NOTEBOOK FROM THEIR HANDS AND BLOCKED THEM FROM RETRIEVING IT.<sup>189</sup>*

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*AT THE PROTEST ON MAY 31ST, I WITNESSED AN OFFICER DELIBERATELY HIT A TEENAGE GIRL IN THE FACE WITH HIS BATON, VISIBLY SHATTERING THE BRIDGE OF HER NOSE.<sup>190</sup>*

### Body Worn Camera and Radio Review – May 31, 2020

The videos we reviewed from May 31 depicted interactions between officers and the public, and also between officers who noted confusion regarding the City and the CPD's plan or lack of plans in the response.

One video, for example, shows a long interaction in an intersection, in which CPD officers are lined up and holding a line. There is looting happening nearby, but the officers hold the line. About 45 minutes into the video, one officer says "[Lightfoot] should have deployed National Guard earlier. She just deployed them. But they aren't going to come out now with a command plan." Shortly after that statement, the officers move to the other side of the street.

In another video, an officer in a white shirt approaches a group of officers and says, "Don't [inaudible] and then lead us back here so there needs to some fucking leadership here and there's zero... It's a safety issue... We need to go. So be ready to go and be ready to walk backwards."

Many other videos depict officers using disrespectful and foul language toward community members. For example, as a car drives past a group of officers, one says, "Get the fuck outta here, man."

<sup>189</sup> Listening Session, August 19, 2020, at 69.

<sup>190</sup> Listening Session, August 20, 2020, at 140.

In another video, as an officer makes an arrest, the following interaction occurs:

**Officer:** “You were crying back there. I got it on body cam. We can go back to the station and watch it. I’ll put that shit on YouTube.”

**Arrestee:** “It’s easy to talk shit when I’m in cuffs.”

**Officer:** “You weren’t in cuffs back there. I threw your ass to the ground, and you cried. You one pussy ass bitch. Big ass bitch.”

One video shows a retail store being looted as three officers and one supervisor watch from the nearby intersection. A community member approaches them and says, “It is sick.” An officer responds, “It’s embarrassing, but... destroy your own community.” Another community member, who may be the owner of the store, approaches the officers, and an officer says, “You’ve got insurance right? I hate that this is happening to you and everything, but they destroying their own community. This is what they think is tough. It’s embarrassing.” A bit later in the video, an officer says, “There’s more people coming. They think they’re something. They all need they ass whooped. It’s embarrassing. Talk to your people.”

**City Data from May 31, 2020**

The figures below reflect data that the IMT received from the City. It is important to note that much of this data reflects citywide information that is not necessarily tied to protest or unrest. Given various challenges regarding reporting and data collection and management, some of the information appears to be internally inconsistent and contrary to consistent video, audio, and interview evidence. Nonetheless, the tables demonstrate that the City and the CPD’s challenges continued to be significant and widespread.

**Review Figure 20. Police Computer Aided Dispatch System (May 31, 2020)**

<b>Total Protests</b>	20
<b>Total Districts</b>	10 (001, 002, 005, 009, 012, 016, 017, 018, 019, 020)
<b>Total “Riot”/Looting</b>	1,439 (10 + 1,429)
<b>Total Districts</b>	23 (001, 002, 003, 004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 009, 010, 011, 012, 014, 015, 016, 017, 018, 019, 020, 022, 024, 025)
<b>Total</b>	1,463
<b>Total Districts</b>	23

Review Figure 21.

Daily City-Wide Statistics from the City and the CPD (Sunday, May 31, 2020)

<b>Arrests for Disorderly Conduct</b>	465
<b>Arrests for Civil Unrest</b>	0
<b>Arrests for Looting</b>	0
<b>Arrest for firearms</b>	48
<b>Other</b>	201
<b>Total</b>	<b>714</b>
<b>Complaints Filed Against Officers<sup>191</sup></b>	<b>21</b>
<b>Call for Service</b>	65,256
<b>Homicides</b>	18
<b>Shooting Incidents</b>	52
<b>Guns Recovered</b>	68
<b>Officers Injured on Duty (claims)</b>	83

## MONDAY, JUNE 1, 2020 (12:00 AM TO 11:59 PM)

### Other Cities

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Tensions remained high in many cities into Monday, June 1. Demonstrators who gathered near the White House were cleared out of Lafayette Square by officers and National Guard who used tear gas and flash-bang explosions.<sup>192</sup>

Looting continued in New York City, where a nightly curfew was put in place,<sup>193</sup> and in Philadelphia, demonstrators marched onto a highway and were trapped by police at the front and back of the march, resulting in violent clashes involving pepper spray and tear gas.<sup>194</sup>

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<sup>191</sup> This number reflects the number of complaints that were filed against officers on May 31, 2020, rather than the number of complaints regarding an incident on May 31, 2020. *Compare All Complaint Intake, May 29, 2020 – June 11, 2020*, COPA (June 17, 2020), <http://www.chicagocopa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/All-Complaints-Report-5-29-to-6-11-v4.pdf>.

<sup>192</sup> See Katie Rogers, *Protesters Dispersed With Tear Gas So Trump Could Pose at Church*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (June 1, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/us/politics/trump-st-johns-church-bible.html>.

<sup>193</sup> *Id.*

<sup>194</sup> See Christoph Koettl et al., *How the Philadelphia Police Tear-Gassed a Group of Trapped Protesters*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (June 25, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/10000007174941/philadelphia-tear-gas-george-floyd-protests.html>.

## Chicago

As some protests and looting persisted during the early hours of Monday, June 1, 13 CPD officers lounged in the burglarized office of U.S. Congressman Bobby Rush, located on the south side. Starting at around 1:00 AM, security camera video shows the officers sleeping and eating popcorn.<sup>195</sup>

On Monday, the Governor issued a “Gubernatorial Disaster Proclamation” for nine counties, including Cook County.<sup>196</sup>

By Monday, June 1, 2020, the CPD began to establish a forward command post for each Area. These forward command posts tracked available and deployed officers and resources. The forward command posts also communicated on the radio between district commanders and central command.

### Review Figure 22. Chicago Mayor Tweet



On Monday, protests continued across several neighborhoods.<sup>197</sup>

## Community Experiences and Reflections from June 1, 2021

The quotes and summaries below are samples of experiences from community members regarding events on Monday, June 1, 2020.

*AS I THOUGHT ABOUT HOW TO FILL THIS TIME, I CONSIDERED WHAT I MIGHT SAY THAT COULD MAKE YOU UNDERSTAND. I COULD TALK ABOUT HOW THEY BEAT MY KNEES AS I TRIED TO RUN TOWARDS SOMEONE WHO WAS BEING BEATEN WORSE THAN ME, CAUSING ME TO FALL AND TAKING MY CANE FROM ME. I COULD TELL YOU HOW THREE OF THEM DUG THEIR BOOTS INTO MY SHOULDERS AND KNEE AND SCREAMED THREATS MASKLESSLY IN MY FACE. I COULD TALK ABOUT HOW OFFICERS HELD MY PARTNER DOWN IN A FETAL POSITION AND BEAT HIS GENITALS AND HIS LEG UNTIL HIS PHONE IN HIS POCKET BENT AND HIS SHIN SPLIT OPEN. I COULD TELL*

<sup>195</sup> Grace Hauck, *During George Floyd protests, 13 Chicago cops lounged in a congressman’s office and ate his popcorn*, USA TODAY (June 11, 2020), <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/06/11/chicago-police-lounged-bobby-rushs-burglarized-office-amid-looting/5343896002/>.

<sup>196</sup> *Gubernatorial Disaster Proclamation*, STATE OF ILLINOIS EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT (June 1, 2020), <https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/gov/Documents/DisasterProc-6-1-2020.pdf>.

<sup>197</sup> See, e.g., WGN Web Desk, *Chicago George Floyd protests: WGN updates from June 1*, WGN9 (June 1, 2020), <https://wgntv.com/news/george-floyd/chicago-unrest-george-floyd-june-1/>.



*YOU ABOUT HOW I WAS CLUBBED ON THE HEAD FROM BEHIND, GLASSES SHATTERING INTO MY SKULL BONE, AND AN OFFICER IN FRONT OF ME YELLED: THAT'S WHAT YOU GET. HAVE YOU EVER WONDERED WHAT IT FEELS LIKE TO PULL GLASS SHARDS OUT OF YOUR OWN HEAD, TO SEE YOUR BEST FRIEND SCREAMING AND SOBBING AND KNOW THERE IS NOTHING YOU COULD DO TO MAKE HER SAFE? HAVE YOU EVER THOUGHT YOUR PARTNER MIGHT BE DEAD? BECAUSE I COULD TELL YOU ABOUT THAT.<sup>198</sup>*

*\*\*\**

*I WAS CAUGHT AT THE UPTOWN AT THE WILSON RED LINE STOP. I WAS ONE OF ABOUT SEVEN OR EIGHT WHITE PEOPLE. THERE WERE ABOUT 40 OR 50 BLACK PEOPLE. THERE WERE ABOUT 150 RIOT COPS. WHEN THE CLOCK STRUCK 9:00, THE RIOT COPS. CHARGED US. THERE WAS NO ORDER OF DISPERSAL. THERE WAS JUST MAYHEM. INSTANTLY. I REMEMBER CROUCHING OVER A 60-YEAR-OLD BLACK MAN WHO THEY WERE KICKING AND BEATING WITH A BATON, MAYBE FOUR OR FIVE COPS AT A TIME BEATING THIS MAN. AND WHEN I WENT OVER BY HIM, THEY HIT ME ON THE BACK OF MY NECK, MY BACK AND MY LEGS, AND THERE WAS ANOTHER BLACK MAN NEXT TO HIM WHO KEPT SAYING, "I DIDN'T DO ANYTHING WRONG. I DIDN'T DO ANYTHING WRONG," OVER AND OVER AGAIN.<sup>199</sup>*

*\*\*\**

*ALSO ON THE 1ST OF JUNE IN HYDE PARK -- I THINK IT WAS THE 1ST OF JUNE -- I ATTENDED A VERY PEACEFUL PROTEST, ORGANIZED BY SOME YOUNG PEOPLE, I AM NOT SURE WHO THEY ACTUALLY WERE. AS THE PROTEST DISPERSED, POLICE BEGAN PUSHING PEOPLE TOWARDS THE LAKE, AND MOST FOLKS HAD THEIR CARS WEST. AND PEOPLE COULDN'T GET BACK TO THEIR CARS. THERE WAS A VERY TENSE STAND OFF WHEN AN OFFICER BRANDISHED A RIFLE AT THE CROWD. EVENTUALLY WE WERE ABLE TO GET THROUGH AND GET TO WHERE OUR CARS WERE PARKED, WHERE SOME PEOPLE WERE COMING OUT LOOTING AN ULTA, WE STOPPED TO GET THEIR NAME AND INFORMATION, YOU KNOW, TO PASS ON TO THEIR FAMILY. AND POLICE BEGAN PUSHING ME, MY FRIENDS AND MY FAMILY AGAINST THE WALL WITH BATONS. AND THEN HITTING US WITH THE BATONS, WHICH RESULTED IN MY FRIENDS COMING IN TO STAND BETWEEN ME AND THE OFFICERS AND MY FAMILY, PARTICULARLY, CHILDREN. THEY WERE BEATEN REPEATEDLY WITH BATONS, LAID ON THE GROUND, JUST COVERING THEMSELVES BEING HIT BY BATONS REPEATEDLY. AT SOME POINT AN OFFICER PUT HIS KNEE ON MY FRIEND'S NECK, THE SAME WAY THAT GEORGE FLOYD WAS KILLED. ANOTHER FRIEND, SHE PROTECTED HIM, SEEING THAT, JUST DOVE ONTO HIS BODY AND TOOK A LOT OF THOSE BATON HITS FOR HIM. AT LEAST FIVE OF MY FRIENDS WERE BADLY BRUISED WITH BATON MARKS AND THEN THROWN IN JAIL FOR THAT THAT DAY. . . . I -- THE HARDEST WAS DURING THE PROTEST IN HYDE PARK. I WAS THROWN TO THE GROUND. MY RIBS WERE CRACKED AND I STOOD IN FRONT OF AN OFFICER WHOSE SLEEVE WAS COVERED IN MY FRIEND'S BLOOD. THIS OFFICER WAS SAYING HOW HE WANTED TO PROTECT ME. HE WANTED TO PROTECT US. WHO STOOD THERE WHILE OTHER OFFICERS BEAT AND BRUTALIZED FOLKS.<sup>200</sup>*

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<sup>198</sup> Listening Session, August 20, 2020, 100.

<sup>199</sup> Listening Session, August 19, 2020, at 51–52.

<sup>200</sup> Listening Session, August 20, 2020, at 180–2.

## City Data from June 1, 2020

The figures below reflect data that the IMT received from the City regarding June 1, 2020. It is important to note that much of this data reflects citywide information that is not necessarily tied to protest or unrest. Given various challenges regarding reporting and data collection and management, some of the information appears to be internally inconsistent and contrary to consistent video, audio, and interview evidence. Nonetheless, the tables demonstrate that the City and the CPD's challenges continued to be significant and widespread.

### Review Figure 23. Police Computer Aided Dispatch System (June 1, 2020)

<b>Total Protests</b>	14
<b>Total Districts</b>	8 (002, 003, 008, 011, 018, 019, 020, 024)
<b>Total "Riot"/Looting</b>	1,027 (3+1,024)
<b>Total Districts</b>	(001, 002, 003, 004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 009, 010, 011, 012, 014, 015, 016, 017, 018, 019, 020, 022, 024, 025, 031)
<b>Total</b>	1,041
<b>Total Districts</b>	23

### Review Figure 24.

#### Daily City-Wide Statistics from the City and the CPD (Monday, June 1, 2020)

<b>Arrests for Disorderly Conduct</b>	200
<b>Arrests for Civil Unrest</b>	0
<b>Arrests for Looting</b>	0
<b>Arrest for firearms</b>	51
<b>Other</b>	162
<b>Total</b>	413
<b>Complaints Filed Against Officers<sup>201</sup></b>	69
<b>Homicides</b>	4
<b>Shooting Incidents</b>	25
<b>Guns Recovered</b>	77
<b>Officers Injured on Duty (claims)</b>	25

<sup>201</sup> This number reflects the number of complaints that were filed against officers on June 1, 2020, rather than the number of complaints regarding an incident on June 1, 2020. *Compare All Complaint Intake, May 29, 2020 – June 11, 2020, COPA (June 17, 2020)*, <http://www.chicagocopa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/All-Complaints-Report-5-29-to-6-11-v4.pdf>.

## JUNE AND EARLY JULY 2020

In June, Chicago remained on alert, but overall, protests continued, and unrest subsided.<sup>202</sup> The CPD revised its Incident Action Plan on June 2. Some public transportation resumed in the Loop on June 3.<sup>203</sup> Also on June 3, the CPD issued a message to all officers reminding them to enforce the curfew that was still in effect. The Commissioner of Health's Second Amended and Reissued Order (No. 2020-3), which reiterated facets of the Governor's stay-at-home order, expired on June 3.<sup>204</sup> On June 4, the CPD issued two department-wide reminders regarding mass arrest procedures. On June 6, the City announced that it had hired three private security firms for \$1.2 million to protect "local retail shops, grocery stores and pharmacies that community members rely on every single day."<sup>205</sup> The citywide curfew was lifted on June 7, 2020. Later that day, Chicago Transit Authority rail and bus service resumed to the downtown area and Lake Shore Drive, I-90/94 and I-290 were open, and all bridges in the Loop were lowered.

Throughout early June, the Mayor's Twitter feed included the City's recovery from the looting and violence, highlighting examples of neighborhood residents cleaning up and encouraging people to support their local businesses as Chicago continued to remove COVID-19 restrictions.

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<sup>202</sup> See, e.g., Mauricio Peña, *Police Order Little Village Businesses To Close Tuesday*, BLOCK CLUB CHICAGO (June 2, 2020), <https://blockclubchicago.org/2020/06/02/police-order-little-village-businesses-to-close-their-doors-tuesday/>.

<sup>203</sup> See Sun-Times Wire, *CTA Service resumes, bypassing stops in the Loop*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (June 3, 2020), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/2020/6/3/21278975/cta-service-resumes-bypassing-stops-in-the-loop>.

<sup>204</sup> *Order of the Commissioner of Health of the City of Chicago No. 2020-3 – Second Amended and Reissued (Applying Governor's Stay-at-Home Executive Order)*, CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH (May 29, 2020), <https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/cdph/HealthProtectionandResponse/CDPH%20Order%202020-3%20-%20Lakefront%20closure%20SEC-OND%20AMENDED%20AND%20RE-ISSUED%20v3.pdf>.

<sup>205</sup> Gregory Pratt, *In wake of looting, Chicago to spend \$1.2 million on private security firms to help protect businesses*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (June 6, 2020), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-chicago-hires-private-security-firms-20200606-6d75fp7srzaz3hiltDNAqrko6u-story.html>.

Review Figure 25. Mayor Tweets (June 2, 2020)



**Mayor Lori E. Lightfoot** @chicagosmayor · Jun 2, 2020

...

The men and women of the Dept. of Streets and Sanitation are working around the clock to clean up damage in communities around Chicago, like right here in East Garfield Park. Thanks to the City workers and many volunteers who continue to step up to serve our neighborhoods.



**Mayor Lori Lightfoot** @chicagosmayor · Jun 2, 2020

...

I'm seeing the power of neighborly love across our city. This Roseland group who helped pick up debris in their neighborhood is the embodiment of these values.



103 106 830



**Mayor Lori Lightfoot** @chicagosmayor · Jun 2, 2020

...

After meeting with small businesses and community leaders hardest hit, it's more clear than ever that we must continue as planned the cautious reopening of our city tomorrow.

Later in June, the CPD spent time reviewing what happened in May. On June 16, 2020, the CPD held an “After Action Review” meeting at McCormick Place, near entry Gate 41, from 8:00 AM to 12:30 PM. The email invitation read, “Tomorrow, we will conduct our civil unrest after action review for exempt staff.” The CPD also prepared for meetings with the Mayor, holding an internal meeting entitled “Prep for Mayor’s Meeting” on June 22, 2020, from 4:30 PM to 5:30 PM. Some CPD leadership also attended an “FBI Briefing” on June 30, 2020, addressing “Cases being worked which resulted from recent civil unrest and progress, IE Arsons, pharmacy, burglaries, bank burglaries, felons in possession, etc.”

As reflected in [Appendix C](#) below, many protests continued throughout June 2020.

### Community Experiences and Reflections from June 2020

The quotes and summaries below are samples of experiences from community members regarding unspecified dates in June 2020.

*I WAS ALSO REALLY SURPRISED AT THE RELATIVELY FEW POLICE WHO WORE MASKS, ESPECIALLY GIVEN JUST THE DEGREE TO WHICH WE, OUR CITY AND OUR STATE, ARE SUFFERING FROM THE PANDEMIC. I WAS PLEASANTLY SURPRISED THAT I ALMOST NEVER SAW PROTESTERS WITHOUT MASKS. I WAS VERY DISAPPOINTED THAT I, IN THE FIRST WEEK OR SO OF THE PROTESTS, I ALMOST NEVER SAW POLICE MASKS. AS THEY CONTINUED, I DID SEE SOME WITH MASKS, BUT I WOULD ESTIMATE MAYBE 10 PERCENT OF POLICE WHO WERE WEARING MASKS. AND THESE ARE FROM PEOPLE WHO ARE SUPPOSED TO BE KEEPING US SAFE AND THEY WERE PUTTING OUR HEALTH AT RISK.<sup>206</sup>*

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*. . . MOST OF THE TIME THAT I WAS INVOLVED IN THE PROTESTS, I PERSONALLY DID NOT FEEL UNSAFE. THE TIMES THAT I FELT MOST UNSAFE WERE THE TIMES I WAS AROUND THE POLICE. WHEN I WAS AROUND POLICE WEARING RIOT GEAR, WHEN I WAS AROUND POLICE WHO HAD HELMETS ON, FACE SHIELDS DOWN, THAT WAS WHEN, TO ME PERSONALLY, THE PROTESTS FELT MOST UNSAFE. I NEVER FELT UNSAFE AROUND ANY OF THE OTHER PROTESTERS, BUT WHEN THERE WAS THIS MILITARIZED RESPONSE FROM THE POLICE, I FELT LIKE ANYTHING BAD COULD HAPPEN AT ANY PARTICULAR MOMENT AND IT WAS REALLY NERVE WRACKING.<sup>207</sup>*

### City Data from June 2020

The figures below reflect data that the IMT received from the City for June 2 and June 3. It is important to note that much of this data reflects citywide information that is not necessarily tied to protest or unrest. Given various challenges regarding reporting and data collection and management, some of the information appears to be internally inconsistent and contrary to consistent video, audio, and interview

<sup>206</sup> Listening Sessions, August 19, 2020, at 33.

<sup>207</sup> *Id.* at 33–34.

evidence. Nonetheless, the tables demonstrate that the City and the CPD's challenges continued to be significant and widespread.

Review Figure 26. Police Computer Aided Dispatch System (June 2, 2020)

<b>Total Protests</b>	0
<b>Total Districts</b>	0
<b>Total "Riot"/Looting</b>	262
<b>Total Districts</b>	22 (001, 002, 003, 004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 009, 010, 011, 012, 014, 015, 016, 017, 018, 019, 020, 022, 024, 025)
<b>Total</b>	262
<b>Total Districts</b>	22

Review Figure 27.

Daily City-Wide Statistics from the City and the CPD  
(Tuesday, June 2, 2020, and Wednesday, June 3, 2020)

	<b>Tuesday, June 2, 2020</b>	<b>Wednesday, June 3, 2020</b>
<b>Arrests for Disorderly Conduct</b>	67	11
<b>Arrests for Civil Unrest</b>	0	0
<b>Arrests for Looting</b>	0	0
<b>Arrest for firearms</b>	53	40
<b>Other</b>	123	104
<b>Total</b>	<b>253</b>	<b>155</b>
<b>Complaints Filed Against Officers<sup>208</sup></b>	69	67
<b>Homicides</b>	2	2
<b>Shooting Incidents</b>	24	13
<b>Guns Recovered</b>	85	48
<b>Officers Injured on Duty (claims)</b>	12	10

<sup>208</sup> This number reflects the number of complaints that were filed against officers on June 2 and 3, 2020, rather than the number of complaints regarding an incident on June 2 and 3, 2020. Compare *All Complaint Intake, May 29, 2020 – June 11, 2020, COPA* (June 17, 2020), <http://www.chicagocopa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/All-Complaints-Report-5-29-to-6-11-v4.pdf>.

## FRIDAY, JULY 17, 2020 (12:00 AM TO 11:59 PM)

Protests continued in Chicago in July 2020.<sup>209</sup> Notably, on July 17, 2020, the CPIC anticipated a protest at 5:00 PM at Buckingham Fountain (301 S Columbus Drive, Chicago, IL 60605).

A large group of protesters began gathering at Buckingham Fountain around 4:00 PM, although social-media posts indicate that the protest was supposed to begin at 5:00 PM. While at Buckingham Fountain, there were dance performances, musical performances, and speeches. At about 6:15 PM, protesters began to move south toward Grant Park and the Columbus Statue. It appeared as though different groups met up at the Columbus statue, combining into one large group. One social media post indicated that police were already positioned at the statue, though at some point, people surrounded the statue without CPD intervention.

People continued to surround the statue. Some people in the crowd began spray painting the statue and attempting to pull the statue down using ropes. Officers began their push toward the statue and used OC spray on people in the crowd, causing the people to retreat and allowing CPD officers to gain control over the statue. While around the statue and officers, some people began chanting at police, and others threw water bottles, fireworks, and other projectiles at officers. Additional officers arrived and grabbed people's bikes. Some officers used additional uses of force, including OC spray and baton impact strikes. People in the crowd began to disperse. Multiple social-media posts indicated that some officers taunted people as they dispersed. One social-media post, for example, commented on officers spitting on community members as they left. At about 8:30 PM, social-media posts indicated that things had calmed down.

The skirmish at the Columbus statue in Grant Park resulted in about a dozen arrests and serious injuries to both people in the crowd and CPD officers. By the end of the evening, about 18 officers were injured, many protesters were injured, and five people were treated at area hospitals.<sup>210</sup>

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<sup>209</sup> See Chris Hush, *Marches, Protests Take Place Throughout Chicago on Fourth of July*, NBC CHICAGO (July 4, 2020), <https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/hundreds-take-to-streets-of-chicago-for-protests-on-fourth-of-july/2299873/>.

<sup>210</sup> Alice Yin, *Grant Park prompts standoff with police, arrests and rebuke of mayor*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (July 18, 2020), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-chicago-police-christopher-columbus-protest-20200718-ea62bmy6ujgh7cbeofrpwbakse-story.html>. See also Mitchell Armentrout, *Activists, officials slam Chicago police for alleged brutality in Columbus statue standoff*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (July 18, 2020), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/2020/7/18/21329669/chicago-columbus-statue-protest-miracle-boyd-police-officer-punch-activist>.

The following day, hundreds of people gathered near Mayor Lightfoot's home to protest how the police handled the demonstration in Grant Park.<sup>211</sup>

### Community Experiences and Reflections from July 17, 2020

The quotes and summaries below are samples of experiences from community members regarding events on Sunday, May 31, 2020.

*AND ON JULY 17TH DURING THE COLUMBUS STATUE PROTEST, I WAS ESPECIALLY SURPRISED WHEN I WAS BEATEN BY THE CHICAGO POLICE WITHOUT ORDERS TO DISPERSE, WITHOUT A WARNING, AND WITHOUT A ROUTE TO DISPERSE INTO. I WAS STANDING WITH OTHER BIKE SECURITY VOLUNTEERS FORMING A BARRIER BETWEEN A PIECE OF PROPERTY AND THE PEOPLE THEY ARE SWORN TO. PROTECT.<sup>212</sup>*

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*THEN THE COP WHO HAD JUST SHOVED ME TO THE GROUND FORCIBLY PULLED ME UP. HE GRABBED MY LEFT BICEP AND FORCEFULLY PULLED ME TO MY FEET. I TURNED TO GET MY BEARINGS AND PUT MY HANDS IN THE AIR. WHEN ANOTHER OFFICER IN A DARK UNIFORM ABOUT 20 FEET FROM ME SPRAYED A RUST-COLORED LIQUID AT THE RIGHT SIDE OF MY FACE, BURNING BOTH MY EYES, MY CHEEK, AND MOST NOTABLY THE INSIDE OF MY EAR, WHICH WAS VERY, VERY PAINFUL. I TURNED AWAY AND STARTED WALKING UP THE HILL WITH A WET MASK COVERING MY MOUTH AND MY NOSE AND PEPPER SPRAY IN MY EYES. I WAS DISORIENTED AND TRYING TO FEND OFF THE PANIC, TRYING TO BREATHE. I WAS HEADED TO THE STREET AWAY FROM THE STATUE WHEN I REALIZED I WAS ABOUT 10 FEET AWAY FROM ANOTHER POLICE OFFICER. AND HE WAS STANDING AT THE TOP OF A HILL YELLING RIGHT AT ME. MOSTLY BLINDED, PARTIALLY DEAF, AND STRUGGLING TO BREATHE, IT WAS TOO LATE WHEN I REALIZED THE COP WAS TELLING ME TO BACK UP, AND HE PUSHED ME HARD IN THE CHEST. I WAS VERY CONFUSED BECAUSE WASN'T THE POINT OF MACING ME TO GET ME TO LEAVE?<sup>213</sup>*

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*ON THAT DAY, CPD DID WHAT IT DOES BEST. THEY PROTECTED PROPERTY OVER PEOPLE. CPD BEAT AND BRUTALIZED BLACK, BROWN, AND INDIGENOUS BODIES IN ORDER TO PROTECT A STATUE OF A RAPIST, A TYRANT, A MASS MURDERER. THAT'S WHAT CPD PROTECTED. CPD DOES NOT AND DO NOT PROTECT THE PEOPLE OF CHICAGO. THE PEOPLE OF CHICAGO HAVE TO PROTECT THEMSELVES FROM CPD. CPD ALREADY HAD RECLAIMED GROUND BY THE STATUE WHEN THEY FURTHER TERRORIZED PROTESTERS. I WAS FORCED TO WATCH A FELLOW PROTESTER, A FRIEND, BE BEATEN RIGHT IN FRONT OF ME. HIS HANDS WERE IN THE AIR. HE WASN'T RESISTING. CPD STILL BEAT HIM. THEY LEFT BRUISES ON HIS BACK. HIS KNEE WAS SO BLOODY, THE BLOOD SOAKED THROUGH HIS PANT LEG. THEN THEY ADVANCED. AN OFFICER DUG HIS BATON INTO MY CHEST, IGNORING MY CRIES THAT HE WAS TOUCHING MY CHEST, HE WAS TOUCHING MY BREAST. HIS SOLUTION FOR THAT WAS TO SHOVE HIS BATON AGAINST MY GUT BEFORE PROCEEDING TO SHOVE IT INTO MY CHEST ONCE AGAIN. I FELT HIS FIST PUSH INTO MY BREASTS; I FELT HIS BATON PRESS INTO MY BREASTS. THEN THEY HOSED US DOWN WITH PEPPER SPRAY AS IF WE WERE RABID DOGS, WHEN IN FACT THEY WERE. CPD PEPPER SPRAYED*

<sup>211</sup> *Id.*

<sup>212</sup> Listening Session, August 19, 2020, at 57.

<sup>213</sup> *Id.* at 61.



PROTESTERS, MEDICS, LEGAL OBSERVERS DURING A PANDEMIC THAT TARGETS (INAUDIBLE). OFFICERS WEREN'T EVEN WEARING MASKS. I AM 22 YEARS OLD AND I NOW KNOW THE SHAPE AND COLOR OF A POLICE CAN OF PEPPER SPRAY. AN OFFICER SPRAYED US FROM 3 FEET IN FRONT OF US. WE WERE CHOKING ON THE POISON IN THE AIR. PEOPLE WERE WRITHING IN THE PAIN. I COULDN'T HELP THEM. CPD REFUSED TO LET US HELP THEM. WE WERE TRIPPING OVER EACH OTHER AND OURSELVES. TRYING TO GET AWAY FROM THEM.<sup>214</sup>

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WHILE WATCHING POLICE FLOOD THE GREEN LEADING UP TO THE STATUE, WITH NO AUDIBLE CALL FOR DISPERSAL, AND NO OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO, UNPROTECTED CHICAGOANS WERE MET WITH A SEA OF SWINGING BATONS. SCREAMS OF HELP CAME FROM THE CROWD. PEOPLE WERE CLIMBING ON TOP OF EACH OTHER TRYING TO FIND A WAY OUT. SOMEONE, PULLED OUT BY PROTESTERS, BLEEDING FROM THEIR HEAD SO BADLY THAT THEY COULD NOT STAND. THEY WERE COVERED IN BLOOD. I SAW ORANGE MACE STREAMING UP FROM THE CROWD LIKE FOUNTAINS. MY HUSBAND AND I RAN TO THE CONCRETE BARRIER ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE STATUE. WE WERE ASSISTING INJURED PEOPLE TRYING TO DISPERSE. MY HUSBAND ATTENDED TO ONE PERSON WHO WAS MACED SO BADLY THEY COULD NOT WALK OR SEE. HE PUT HIM ON HIS BACK AND CARRIED HIM TO SAFETY AWAY FROM POLICE. THERE WAS AN OFFICER APPROXIMATELY TWO FEET IN FRONT OF ME WEARING NO PROTECTIVE MASK. I SAID: I AM JUST TRYING TO GET PEOPLE OUT OF HERE SAFELY. HE SAID NOTHING AND MACED ME DIRECTLY IN MY FACE. I COULD FEEL THE MACE SOAKING THE FRONT OF MY BODY COMPLETELY. HE THEN BEAT ME REPEATEDLY WITH HIS BATON, HITTING IT ON MY LEFT ARM AND BACK MULTIPLE TIMES WITH ENOUGH FORCE TO DRAW BLOOD. THE OFFICER THEN MACED ME AGAIN ON THE LEFT SIDE OF MY FACE, SOAKING THE SIDE OF MY BODY.<sup>215</sup>

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I WAS AT THE PROTEST IN GRANT PARK ON JULY 17TH, WHERE I SAW CPD'S BRUTALITY FIRSTHAND. LIKE MANY OTHERS HAVE SAID, I SAW THEM HIT A PROTESTER IN THE HEAD, AND I SAW THE BLOOD RUNNING DOWN HIS FACE FROM HIS TEMPLE. I SAW THEM SPRAYING PROTESTERS WITHOUT WARNING WITH AN UNKNOWN SUBSTANCE FROM HOSES, AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER, EVERYONE IN THE VICINITY WAS COUGHING AND CRYING AND THROWING UP. AND THIS IS ALL DURING AN AIRBORNE RESPIRATORY PANDEMIC. I SAW THEM PUSH DOWN INDIVIDUAL PROTESTERS AND RIP THEIR BIKES OUT OF THEIR HANDS. I SAW THEM BEAT PEOPLE WHO WERE TRYING TO RUN AWAY FROM THEM. EVEN WHEN THEY WERE LOOKING RIGHT AT PEOPLE IN CLEAR NEED OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE, CPD OFFERED NONE.<sup>216</sup>

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ON JULY 17TH, I WITNESSED CPD PEPPER SPRAY AN ADULT EDUCATOR CONTINUOUSLY UNTIL SHE BEGAN TO GO INTO SHOCK. MOMENTS LATER, OFFICERS LAUGHED AS THEY PEPPER SPRAYED ME AT ONE-FOOT RANGE, STOLE MY BIKE, BEAT ME TO THE GROUND AND HIT ME REPEATEDLY IN THE FACE AND BODY.<sup>217</sup>

<sup>214</sup> *Id.* at 65–66.

<sup>215</sup> Listening Session, August 20, 2020, at 132.

<sup>216</sup> *Id.* at 137–38.

<sup>217</sup> *Id.* at 140.

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I WAS ALSO THERE ON THE 17TH, WHERE MY SON WAS PEPPER SPRAYED BADLY. MY NEPHEW HAD HIS TOOTH BROKEN BY COP WITH A BATON. THERE WAS NO OPPORTUNITY FOR FOLKS TO DISPERSE. THE ORDERS TO DISPERSE OVER THESE PAST TWO PROTESTS, I'VE WITNESSED OFFICERS DOING NOTHING TO PROTECT AND SERVE, BUT TO BRUTALIZE, AND WHO SEEMED TO, AS I HEARD ANOTHER PERSON TESTIFY TODAY, TO SMILE, SEEMED TO ENJOY BRUTALIZING CHICAGOANS.<sup>218</sup>

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AT GRANT PARK, POLICE BRUTALIZED OUR CROWD OF PROTESTERS. I WAS PERSONALLY PEPPER SPRAYED AND TEAR GASSED. THE BURNING CONTINUED FOR HOURS ALL OVER MY BODY. OVER AND OVER I COULD SEE CHICAGOANS WHO COULD NOT SEE, WHO COULD NOT BREATHE. I COULDN'T SPRAY WATER INTO PEOPLE'S EYES FAST ENOUGH TO SOOTHE THE BURNING, AND EVERYWHERE I LOOKED, PEOPLE WERE CALLING FOR MEDICS. AT THE FRONT OF MY LINE WERE PEOPLE WITH BIKES. COPS STOLE THE BIKES AND THREW THESE BIKES TO THE GROUND AND WERE PURPOSELY BREAKING THEM. AS I LEFT, I SAW PILES OF BIKES TWISTED AND STOLEN, WHICH TOOK AWAY PEOPLE'S PRIMARY FORM OF TRANSPORTATION, ONLY BECAUSE THEY WERE USED TO PROTECT US FROM THE VIOLENCE WE KNEW THE POLICE WERE ABOUT TO BRING UPON US IF THEY GOT THROUGH THE LINE OF BIKES. AND WE WERE CORRECT. THE POLICE PEPPER SPRAYED US, TEAR GASSED US, AND BEAT US WITH BATONS. THEY POINTED TO PEOPLE IN THE CROWD. I SAW OUR PROTECTIVE LINE, AND THEY WERE MARKING THEIR PERCEIVED LEADERS TO LATER TARGET FOR VIOLENCE OR ARREST. I SAW ONE MEDIC -- AND AT EVERY PROTEST MEDICS ARE CLEARLY MARKED AS SUCH -- WITH BLOOD STREAMING FROM THEIR HEAD DUE TO A BATON STRIKE. I ALSO SAW AT LEAST ONE OTHER INDIVIDUAL WITH BLOOD STREAMING FROM THEIR HEAD. . . . THEY BEAT PEOPLE WHO TRIPPED AS THEY WERE WALKING UP THE HILL. THEY BEAT PEOPLE AS THEY WERE TRYING TO STEP BACKWARD OVER A STONE WALL. AND, AGAIN, WE WERE RETREATING. WE WERE LEAVING THE PARK AND THIS WAS NOT ENOUGH FOR THE POLICE. THEY WERE INFLECTING PURPOSEFUL, UNNECESSARY VIOLENCE AGAINST INJURED PROTESTERS. THIS WAS NOT IN THE INTEREST OF ANYONE'S SAFETY. THIS WAS IN THE INTEREST OF A STATUE ON PUBLIC LAND, IN FACT ON UNCEDED NATIVE AMERICAN LAND, WHICH WE HAD EVERY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PROTEST.<sup>219</sup>

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EVEN AS PROTESTERS TRIED TO DISPERSE, CPD KEPT ON HITTING WITH BATONS. THE MAJORITY OF THE FACES I SAW WITH BLOODY HEADS WERE BLACK. AS WE RAN AWAY, WE WERE GASSED, WHICH MADE IT HARD TO BREATHE. I CHOKED ON THICK CHEMICALS THAT WERE BURNING IN MY EYES. MOMENTS LATER THEY BEGAN TO AGGRESSIVELY SPRAY EVERYONE IN THE FACE WITH MACE IN FRONT OF ME, INCLUDING ONE OF MY CLOSE FRIENDS. A MIXTURE OF MACE AND TEAR GAS MADE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO BREATHE AND SEE, AND I WITNESSED THEM STEAL PROTEST MARSHALS' BIKES AND THROW THEM AT YOUTH ACTIVISTS.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> *Id.* at 181–82.

<sup>219</sup> Listening Session, August 19, 2020, at 20–22.

<sup>220</sup> *Id.* at 28.

*I WON'T FORGET THE FRENZIED STARE-DOWN AS A WHITE SHIRT PULLED A KNIFE OUT TO SLASH BIKE TIRES AND HIS CLEAR FRUSTRATION THAT PROTESTERS WERE THE ONES WHO HAD TO DE-ESCALATE THE SITUATION. I WON'T FORGET THE TINGE OF REGRET IN THEIR EYES AS THEY REALIZED HOW MUCH SPRAY THEY DEPLOYED, CHOKING ON SPRAY ONLY TO LOOK AND SEE HOW MUCH THEY MADE US SUFFER, AND BANNED BY THE GENEVA CONVENTION. WE WEREN'T PREPARED. LAUGHING THROUGH THEIR COUGHS. . . . I HAVE A HARD TIME SLEEPING. I HAVE A HARD TIME WORKING AND FOCUSING. I KEEP THINKING BACK TO THEIR LOOKS OF ABSOLUTE VITRIOL, THE SEARING GAS ON MY SKIN. THEY DON'T SEE AS HUMAN MUCH LESS AS SOMEONE TO PROTECT. OR SERVE. MY MOUTH AND THROAT WERE FULL OF ULCERS, WORRYING THAT THEY WILL KILL AND LIE THE SAME WAY THEY DID FROM FRED HAMPTON TO LAQUAN MCDONALD. AT LEAST RAHM COULD ACKNOWLEDGE, AFTER YEARS OF PUSHING, HOW RACIST CPD IS.<sup>221</sup>*

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*THESE GUYS WANTED VIOLENCE AND THEY WANTED BLOOD AND THEY GOT THAT PRETTY SOON. YOU CAN SEE THE SCAR ON MY HEAD. THIS IS THE SCAR THAT I GOT FROM A BATON TO THE HEAD FROM THE CPD. IT WAS THE SAME GUY WHO GRABBED ME BY THE NECK. AND I GUESS HE HAD SOMETHING TO PROVE. WHEN I GOT HIT BY THE BATON. IN THE HEAD, I COULDN'T SEE ANYTHING. BLOOD COVERED MY EYES AND FACE. I WAS RUSHED BACK BY UNKNOWN PEOPLE, HELPED BY STRANGERS, AND MY HEAD GOT WRAPPED. I THEN GOT BACK TO MY TRUCK AND DROVE ALL OF THE WAY TO WISCONSIN. THIS KIND OF VIOLENCE IS INSANE BECAUSE IT IS HAPPENING TO GOOD CITIZENS.<sup>222</sup>*

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*AS THEY JUMPED OVER THE BARRICADE, THEY JUST STARTED INDISCRIMINATELY BEATING PEOPLE. MY EIGHT-YEAR-OLD NIECE GOT PEPPER SPRAYED. THEY WATCHED POLICE JUST START PUNCHING PEOPLE IN THE FACE. WE ALL WATCHED THEM JUST PUNCHING PEOPLE IN THE FACE FOR NO REASON, JUST FOR BEING THERE, FOR PRACTICING THEIR RIGHTS. WE STAYED JUST A LITTLE WHILE LONGER BECAUSE WE COULDN'T GET OUT BECAUSE THE POLICE WERE FORCING US BACK AND PEPPER SPRAYING PEOPLE AS THEY WERE TRYING TO ESCAPE. MY NIECE HAS HAD A HARD TIME SLEEPING. THEY ARE SEVERELY TRAUMATIZED. THEY CRY EVERY TIME THEY SEE A COP NOW. I DIDN'T THINK THAT OUR -- IT WAS A NICE RALLY. IT WAS A GOOD TIME AND THEN THE POLICE VIOLENCE JUST REALLY MADE THAT A HARD THING.<sup>223</sup>*

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*[W]HILE IN THE FRONT LINES, I GOT HIT IN THE HEAD WITH A BATON WHEN I WAS TRYING TO GET A POLICE OFFICER TO STOP HITTING SOMEBODY ON THE GROUND. A NUMBER OF POLICE OFFICERS WERE DRAGGING ANOTHER PERSON BY THEIR HAIR. THEIR HAIR WAS GETTING RIPPED OUT.<sup>224</sup>*

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<sup>221</sup> *Id.* at 35.

<sup>222</sup> *Id.* at 38.

<sup>223</sup> *Id.* at 42.

<sup>224</sup> *Id.* at 54–55.

AND IN THE MIDDLE OF THIS CHAOS CAUSED BY THE POLICE I SAW THAT, DESPITE ME GETTING INJURIES AND FEELING ALMOST, LIKE, ALMOST BREAKING DOWN AFTER ALL THE STRAIN OF, I DON'T KNOW WHAT, THERE WERE MOMENTS WHERE THE POLICE DIDN'T EVEN TRY TO ATTACK ME BECAUSE THEY SAW ME AS A SMALL WHITE WOMAN. THEY ATTACKED MEN. THEY ATTACKED MEN OF COLOR. THEY ATTACKED BLACK MEN. THEY ATTACKED WHITE PEOPLE TOO, BUT YOU COULD SEE THE BIAS IN ACTION WHEN I WAS THERE IN THE FRONT LINES AND I WAS SELECTIVELY SEEN.<sup>225</sup>

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DURING A BLACK INDIGENOUS SOLIDARITY RALLY, I WITNESSED A CPD OFFICER GRAB A WOMAN'S BIKE AND PULL IT AWAY FROM HER. AS HE PULLED IT, SHE FELL TO THE GROUND, AND HE STARTED PEPPER SPRAYING HER AS SHE LAID ON THE GROUND. I RAN OVER TO HELP HER -- HELP PULL HER UP AND PULL HER AWAY FROM THE ATTACK, AND WHEN I GOT TO HER, HE STARTED SPRAYING ME TOO. I TURNED TO RUN, AND AS I WAS RUNNING AWAY FROM HIM, I FELT HIS BATON CRACK DOWN ON MY HEAD. SO TO BE CLEAR, AFTER HE FINISHED PEPPER SPRAYING THE WOMAN WHO WAS LAYING ON THE GROUND, HE HIT ME OVER THE HEAD AS I WAS RUNNING AWAY FROM HIM. RIGHT AWAY I LOST THE ABILITY TO HEAR ANYTHING. I LOST MY BALANCE. MY HEAD STARTED BLEEDING PROFUSELY. MY CLOTHES WERE IMMEDIATELY SOAKED IN BLOOD. . . . EVENTUALLY I WAS TOLD THAT I HAD BEEN WRONGFULLY DETAINED, AND I WAS FREE TO GO. AND I IMMEDIATELY WENT TO THE HOSPITAL TO GET STAPLES IN MY HEAD FROM THE BATON INJURY.<sup>226</sup>

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THINGS BROKE INTO CHAOS AS SOON AS THE PEOPLE IN BROWN UNIFORMS CAME. I HEARD NO ORDER OF DISPERSAL, AND THERE WAS NO WARNING OF GAS. THEY SPRAYED A BROWN CHEMICAL AGENT IN THE AIR AND OUR LINE BROKE. PEOPLE STARTED RUNNING, (UNINTELLIGIBLE) ASSISTING THEM. THE POLICE GAVE NO EXIT PLAN. INSTEAD, THEY CAUSED CHAOS. I WATCHED OFFICERS BEAT PEOPLE WITH BATONS UNTIL THEY LET GO OF THEIR BIKES AND THE POLICE TOOK THEM AWAY. NONE OF THE BIKES WERE ABANDONED WILLINGLY. . . . NOTHING THE POLICE ENDURED MATCHED WHAT THEY UNLEASHED. IT WAS WILDLY UNJUST, AND I HOPE THE COURT TAKES THAT INTO ACCOUNT.<sup>227</sup>

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WHEN THE PROTESTERS ATTEMPTED TO PASS THE STATUE, CPD TOOK BATONS AND BEGAN BEATING DOZENS OF PROTESTERS ATTEMPTING TO PASS THE STATUE. THEY THEN BEGAN TO THROW BICYCLES AT PROTESTERS AND STEAL THE BICYCLES OF SAFETY MARSHALS. I SAW DOZENS OF PROTESTERS, MAINLY BLACK, WITH BLOODY FACE INJURIES FLEEING FROM THE STATUE. AS THIS HAPPENED, CHEMICALS BEGAN TO FILL THE AIR, MAKING MY EYES WATER AND MY LUNGS IRRITATED. WE WERE FORCED TO RUN BACKWARDS UP THE HILL AND THEN BACK DOWN TO THE MAIN STREET. AS WE STARTED WALKING BACK TO THE FOUNTAIN, CPD WAS LINED ON EITHER SIDE OF THE ROAD. I WAS ALSO INFORMED THAT MY FRIEND, WHO ALSO ATTENDED THE PROTEST, WAS SEVERELY MACED AFTER HAVING A BICYCLE THROWN AT HER FACE.<sup>228</sup>

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<sup>225</sup> *Id.* at 104.

<sup>226</sup> *Id.* at 105–06.

<sup>227</sup> Listening Session, August 20, 2020, at 109–10.

<sup>228</sup> *Id.* at 111–12.

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THE POLICE -- YOU COULD TELL HE WAS HIGH ON ADRENALINE, SO I KNEW THAT IF I TOUCHED HIS HANDS, THAT WOULD BE, FOR SOME WAY IT WOULD BE AN ACT OF VIOLENCE ON MY END. SO TO STOP THE PUNCHING, I THREW MY BODY OVER HIS FACE -- WELL, OVER THE PERSON ON THE FLOOR'S FACE. I EXPECTED THE BLOWS ON MY BACK, BUT THEN THE POLICE OFFICER'S PARTNER CAME FROM THE OTHER SIDE AND WHACKED ME IN THE HEAD WITH A -- I WISH IT WAS A BATON, IT WAS A POLE HE FOUND ON THE FLOOR. AND THEN I LOOKED UP AND THAT SAME POLICE OFFICER WAS WHACKING PEOPLE JUST WITH THAT POLE HE FOUND ON THE FLOOR. IT WAS LIKE FROM -- IT WAS FROM A SIGN.<sup>229</sup>

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AGAIN, LIKE I MENTIONED, I HAVE MY CAMERA ON ME WHENEVER I GO TO PROTESTS, AND I WAS ABLE TO DOCUMENT ALL OF THESE THINGS THAT OCCURRED. I WAS ABLE TO SEE THAT THE POLICE WERE ATTACKING OTHER PEOPLE. THEY WERE ATTACKING MY FRIENDS. I SAW POLICE TEARGASSING OTHER PEOPLE IN THEIR FACE, NOT EVEN TWO FEET AWAY FROM THEM. AS I WAS DOCUMENTING, I HAD POLICE COME AND KETTLE AROUND US. THERE WAS A POLICE OFFICER THAT WHIPPED OUT THEIR BATON AND STARTED YELLING, "GET BACK BEFORE I BEAT THE FUCK OUT OF YOU."<sup>230</sup>

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WITHOUT WARNING, A POLICE OFFICER SHOVED ME TO THE GROUND AND BEAT ME REPEATEDLY ON MY BACK AND RIBS WITH A BATON. I TUCKED MY HEAD BENEATH MY ARMS AND DIDN'T FIGHT BACK. I DON'T REMEMBER MUCH FROM THIS MOMENT BECAUSE ALL I COULD FEEL WAS BLINDING PAIN FROM BEING HIT OVER AND OVER WITH A BATON. AFTER SOME TIME, OTHERS HELPED SEPARATE ME FROM THE OFFICERS. POLICE CONTINUED TO BEAT AND GAS OTHER PEOPLE. MANY PEOPLE, INCLUDING MANY YOUNG PEOPLE, WERE SCREAMING OUT FOR MEDICAL ATTENTION, BUT POLICE DID NOTHING TO HELP THEM.<sup>231</sup>

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IT WAS REPORTED BY CPD AND MEDIA THAT CIVILIANS WERE USING BROKEN-OFF PARTS OF BANNERS AS WEAPONS. THE ONLY PEOPLE I SAW DO THIS WERE POLICE OFFICERS. I SAW AN OFFICER PICK UP A PIECE OF PVC PIPE AND SWING IT AT A LINE OF PEOPLE WITH INTERLINKED ARMS, WHILE THESE PEOPLE BACKED AWAY FROM THE THREATENING OFFICER. THE OFFICER THEN THREW THE PIPE AT THE LEGS OF THESE RETREATING PEOPLE.<sup>232</sup>

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I WITNESSED PEOPLE SCREAMING AND CRYING WITH SWOLLEN APPENDAGES, CRACKED SKULLS, BLOOD STREAMING DOWN THEIR FACES AND ACCUMULATING ALL THEIR CLOTHES. THERE WAS

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<sup>229</sup> *Id.* at 114.

<sup>230</sup> *Id.* at 117.

<sup>231</sup> *Id.* at 122.

<sup>232</sup> *Id.* at 127-28.

COUGHING AND VOMITING FROM THE CHEMICALS RELEASED IN THE AREA, AND I WAS DUMB-FOUNDED BY THE LEVEL OF FORCE EXHIBITED AGAINST THE PEOPLE THE POLICE CLAIM TO SERVE AND PROTECT.<sup>233</sup>

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IMMEDIATELY I HEARD SCREAMING AND CALLS FOR HELP AS POLICE IN RIOT GEAR WITH BATONS SURGED TOWARDS THE STATUE. I WALKED MY BIKE TO A LINE OF BIKE MARSHALS STANDING, UNMOVING, NOT GIVEN OFFICIAL CALLS TO DISPERSE. WE WERE TRYING TO SLOW A GROUP OF POLICE ABOUT TO BEAT PROTESTERS. I WAS TARGETED BY A WHITE-SHIRT OFFICER ABOUT TWICE MY SIZE. HE WAS UN-GLOVED, UNMASKED, AND HE PICKED ME UP BY THE THROAT, LIFTED ME OFF THE GROUND AND THREW ME. I WAS CHOKE-SLAMMED BY A POLICE OFFICER ACTING LOOK A PROFESSIONAL WRESTLER FIGHTING TO THE AUDIENCE.<sup>234</sup>

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I WATCHED MULTIPLE INDIVIDUALS GET BEAT WITH BATONS DIRECTLY TO THEIR HEAD, FACE, CHEST, ARMS, NEARLY EVERYWHERE ON THEIR BODY FOR NEARLY STANDING IN THE MIDDLE OF THE COMMOTION. I WATCHED PEOPLE I LOVE GET THAT, HAPPEN TO THEM TOO. NONE OF THE PROTESTERS I SAW WERE FIGHTING THE OFFICERS, EVEN WHILE THEY WERE BEING BEATEN AND PROVOKED. I COULD NOT COUNT THE NUMBER OF PROTESTERS AFFECTED BY THE CHEMICAL WEAPON SPRAYED THAT EVENING. I ALSO WAS AFFECTED BY THE SPRAYS THEY WERE USING. IT FELT LIKE SHARP AND STINGING OBJECTS WERE STUCK IN MY THROAT, AND I COUGHED SO HARD I ALMOST VOMITED. THIS HAPPENED TO ME MULTIPLE TIMES THAT NIGHT. I SAW PROTESTERS HAVING ASTHMA AND PANIC ATTACKS FROM THE SPRAY, IN ADDITION TO THE DEBILITATING INJURIES FROM BEING BEATEN WITH BATONS, BIKES, AND EVEN PVC PIPES.<sup>235</sup>

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AFTER ABOUT 20 MINUTES, SUDDENLY MULTIPLE VANS PULLED UP RIGHT BEHIND THE OFFICERS. DOZENS MORE COPS IN FULL RIOT GEAR CAME OUT, INCLUDING A COUPLE IN WHITE SHIRTS. WITHIN A MINUTE OF ARRIVING, THEY BEGAN DISTRIBUTING CANS OF PEPPER SPRAY. SOME OF THEM (UNINTELLIGIBLE) ALL THE CANNISTERS AND YELLED OUT A WARNING. WE STARTED CHANTING: DON'T DO IT. DON'T DO IT. THOSE WERE THE LAST WORDS OUT OF MY MOUTH BEFORE MY FRIENDS AND I WERE ASSAULTED BY CPD. THEY GAVE US NO WARNING WHATSOEVER. THEY DIDN'T ASK US TO MOVE. THEY DIDN'T ASK US TO LEAVE. THEY DIDN'T TELL US THAT WE NEEDED TO DISPERSE OR ELSE THEY'D ATTACK. THERE WAS NO OPPORTUNITY FOR COMPLIANCE. THEY DIDN'T CARE ABOUT OUR SAFETY, OUR HEALTH, OR OUR WELL-BEING. THEY DIDN'T WANT US TO DISPERSE, OR THEY WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN BLOCKING THE EXIT. THEY WANTED TO HURT US.<sup>236</sup>

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AT NO POINT DID I PROVOKE OR PROVIDE PRETEXT FOR SUCH FORCE TO BE APPLIED AGAINST MYSELF BEYOND THE THIN PRETEXT OF DISOBEYED ORDER. (INAUDIBLE). ANY ONE OF THE

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<sup>233</sup> *Id.* at 147.

<sup>234</sup> *Id.* at 149.

<sup>235</sup> *Id.* at 155–56.

<sup>236</sup> *Id.* at 163–64.

METHODS APPLIED AGAINST ME COULD HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE ALONE. HAVING SPRAYED CHEMICALS -- ILLEGAL ON A BATTLEFIELD -- INTO MY EYES, I VERY REASONABLY COULD HAVE ALREADY BEEN CONSIDERED NEUTRALIZED. HURLING ME TO THE GROUND WAS, SHALL WE SAY, REDUNDANT, AND THE BATONING SPITEFUL. MY INTERACTION ILLUSTRATES THE EAGERNESS ON THE PART OF POLICE TO USE FORCE NOT ONLY AS A METHOD OF DETAINING THOSE SUSPECTED OF COMMITTING A CRIME, BUT AS A PUNITIVE MEASURE ALONE.<sup>237</sup>

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SHORTLY AFTER, I WITNESSED A DIFFERENT OFFICER STANDING WITH A FEW COPS TO THE RIGHT OF MY ASSAILANT, SPRAYING A RED CAN OVER AND INTO THE CROWD I WAS A PART OF. I WAS VERY SUDDENLY OVERCOME WITH A BURNING SENSATION IN MY EYES, WHICH QUICKLY SPREAD TO MY NOSE, THROAT, AND THE REST OF MY BODY. WITHIN MINUTES THE PAIN FROM GETTING STRUCK IN MY WRISTS WAS NOW SECONDARY TO THE BURNING SENSATION CONSUMING MY BODY. THE BURNING IN MY NOSE AND THROAT CAUSED ME TO TAKE OFF MY MASK, AND BEING THAT WE ARE IN THE MIDST OF A PANDEMIC, THIS WAS A TREMENDOUS RISK FOR THOSE AROUND ME, BUT THE POLICE GAVE ME NO CHOICE. I WAILED FOR HELP FOR A MEDIC I HAD NO WAY OF GETTING TO. BUT THE ONLY ONES IN EYESHOT WERE SURROUNDED BY POLICE OFFICERS THAT HAD PROVEN DISTRUSTFUL TO ME.<sup>238</sup>

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AND SO I WAS RECORDING A GUY BEING ARRESTED BY THE POLICE, AND THE POLICE WERE DRAGGING HIM AWAY AND I WAS WALKING TOWARDS HIM, LIKE, TRYING TO GET HIM TO SAY HIS LAST NAME SO THAT HE COULD GET LEGAL HELP, AND TWO POLICE OFFICERS WALKED UP TO ME AND ONE OF THEM PUNCHED ME. AND MY PHONE HIT ME IN THE MOUTH AND MY TOOTH WAS KNOCKED OUT. I HAD TO GET A ROOT CANAL AND STILL TODAY -- JUST YESTERDAY, I FINALLY RECEIVED MY FINAL DENTAL WORK.<sup>239</sup>

## Body Worn Camera and Radio Review – July 17, 2020

The videos we reviewed of the events at the Columbus statue depicted a confusing and volatile scene.

Other videos depict respectful interactions between officers and reporters, in which officers direct reporters where to go. In another instance, a community member, who appears to be a reporter, is on the pathway. An officer told her to move, and she asked why. The officer said, "Because you're going to get hurt." A supervisor then said to the officer, "Push her the fuck back."

One video shows the following interaction between an officer and a person who says they are a reporter:

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<sup>237</sup> *Id.* at 173–74.

<sup>238</sup> *Id.* at 10–20.

<sup>239</sup> *Id.* at 18–25.

**Officer:** *“Hey you with maroon pants. Get out of here. You were part of that bullshit, get out of here.”*

**Person:** *“I’m a reporter.”*

**Officer:** *“Let’s go, get out of here.”*

We reviewed videos in which officers seem to be strategizing about how to handle the rapidly unfolding situation. For example, in one video we saw CPD supervisors in white shirts gather together to clarify what to do. One supervisor said, “Everybody’s gotta have their body camera on. Anybody who has an arrest, probably going to have to break off [inaudible], make sure they articulate proper language and proper charges... Later on, we can talk about that TRR shit ‘cause there’s going to be a whole bunch of them, it’s not going to be a mass TRR.” In another video, an officer says, “Need some police officers to walk along with that crowd so that they don’t cause any problems.” Later in the same video, we heard an officer say, “No plan. We have no plan right now squad,” and another officer reply, “No, this is the plan right here.” In videos later that evening, we heard an officer say “10-1 Columbus and Roosevelt. We need all officers.” As some in the crowd began to attempt to take down the Columbus statue, there is an audible radio transmission of someone saying: “Body cams on. Make sure you have your body cams on.”

Some people in the crowd said things like: “Who do you protect? Who do you serve?” “Pigs go home,” “Quit your job,” and “Fuck 12.”

At one point, an officer said, “Hey watch out, they’re throwing rocks.” Officers nearby formed a line with their bikes. Another officer said, “Fall back, we’re going to get the guys with the helmets.” Among the skirmish that began to break out, one officer said, “I want to hit this mother fucker right here.” Soon after, an officer said, “Get your helmets on. Get your fucking helmets on.” In another video, an officer says, “You want to grab that mother fucker?”

The videos we reviewed also depicted many instances of officers using force, including baton strikes and punches. For example, one video shows an officer jogging into the crowd. He then appears to turn toward someone, then grabs and starts punching the person. In another instance, an officer gets into a tug-of-war with someone over a bike, and then appears to throw the bike at the person. The person gets upset, begins walking towards the officer and stops. Then the officer walks toward the person, further closing the gap between them, and shoves the person. There was also footage of an officer swinging his baton like a baseball bat. We also saw officers using OC spray against people in the crowd, and we also saw officers getting sprayed with OC spray, either by fellow officers or by members of the crowd.



## Review Figure 28. Police Computer Aided Dispatch System (July 17, 2020)

<b>Total Protests</b>	5
<b>Total Districts</b>	4 (001, 002, 008, 024)
<b>Total “Riot”/Looting</b>	0
<b>Total Districts</b>	0
<b>Total</b>	5
<b>Total Districts</b>	4

## JULY AND AUGUST 2020

Throughout the remainder of July and early August, Chicago continued to have protests in various locations in Chicago, and CPD officers received several reminders about the requirements to wear masks due to the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the CPD sent out one “Masking Requirement” message on July 24, 2020, at about 2:02 PM, that read as follows:

*The health of our members, their families, and their co-workers is of the utmost importance to the Department. In order to help minimize the spread of Covid-19, the Department requires that all members wear a surgical mask or cloth face covering in any area or under conditions in which the member cannot maintain 6 feet of social distancing from other persons. The requirement to wear a mask/cloth covering applies to interactions with both the public and other Department members. The requirement to wear a mask/cloth covering extends to all locations including Department vehicles, all City of Chicago facilities, residential buildings, commercial buildings, public areas, and private property. The Department recognizes the difficulties of wearing mask/cloth covering under certain conditions, including high temperatures and physical exertion, but continues to stress the masking requirements for the well-being of our members. Be advised that additional items of PPE (surgical masks, gloves) are available at the Equipment and Supply Section. Department members should request additional PPE items from their immediate supervisor. Stay Safe, Stay Healthy, and Take Care of One Another.*

The CPD sent another, similar General Message to remind officers of the “Masking Requirement,” on August 4, 2020, at 3:16 PM.

## SUNDAY, AUGUST 9, 2020 (12:00 AM TO 11:59 PM)

On August 9th, an officer-involved shooting occurred around the 5700 block of South Racine Avenue, in the Englewood neighborhood, at about 2:30 PM. Following a pursuit by the CPD Community Safety Team, 20-year-old Latrell Allen was shot by police.<sup>240</sup> After the officer-involved shooting, there appears to have been two primary drivers of community members' subsequent looting in the downtown area. First, on-scene rumors and social media posts included a number of incorrect statements: that the individual shot by CPD officers was 15 years old, that the individual was shot 15 times, and that the individual had died as a result of the officer involved shooting. None of these statements were true, as evidenced by the records released by COPA from its investigation.<sup>241</sup>

Second, officers and community members clashed at the scene of the shooting. Social media posts showing video of the scene reveal a large contingent of police officers. Officers allegedly took a cell phone away from someone who had recorded the shooting.<sup>242</sup> Later, the commander for the 7th District ordered officers to clear the block.

As a result of the officer-involved shooting and neighborhood clashes, social media posts appeared online instructing people that looting would occur that evening. One such post read:

*ATTENTION ATTENTION LOTTING START AT 12am tonight...WE WILL NOT BE \*\*\*\* UP THE SOUTH SIDE EAST SIDE OR WEST SIDE DOWNTOWN AREA AND UP NORTH AREA ONLY BRING YA TOOLS SKI MASK AND GLOVES.*<sup>243</sup>

<sup>240</sup> See Paige Fry et al., *Police shooting of Englewood man reignites political debate and looting as Mag Mile trashed, 13 cops injured, 2 people shot*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (August 10, 2020), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-chicago-downtown-looting-20200810-3zwa3b7zzrc5vdyb4qjqywrjvu-story.html>; Tom Schuba and Sam Charles, *Man shot by police in Englewood charged with attempted murder*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (August 10, 2020), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/crime/2020/8/10/21362712/cpd-police-shooting-englewood-downtown-looting-latrell-allen>.

<sup>241</sup> See *Case Portal Log # 2020-3647*, CIVILIAN OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY (August 9, 2020), <https://www.chicagocopa.org/case/2020-3647/>.

<sup>242</sup> See Mark Guarino, Tim Elfrink, and Teo Armus, *Looters smash business windows along Chicago's Magnificent Mile after police-involved shooting*, THE WASHINGTON POST (August 10, 2020), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/08/10/chicago-looters-riot-magnificent-mile/>.

<sup>243</sup> Jessica D'Onofrio et al., *Chicago looting devastates Michigan Avenue, Loop, Gold Coast; More than 100 arrested, police say*, ABC7 EYEWITNESS NEWS (August 10, 2020), <https://abc7chicago.com/chicago-looting-michigan-avenue-gold-coast-violence/6363471/>. See also Jon Siedel, *'Lets get ready to steal': Feds charge Chicago man with inciting a riot in August*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (March 2, 2021), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/2021/3/2/22309825/chicago-man-charged-inciting-riot-august-2020>.

At 11:07 PM, the OEMC notified the CPD that that looting would occur at 87th and the Dan Ryan, the location of a shopping center. Shortly thereafter, a caravan of cars headed downtown where looting began near midnight.

### City Data from August 9, 2020

The figures below reflect data that the IMT received from the City for August 9, 2020. It is important to note that much of this data reflects citywide information that is not necessarily tied to protest or unrest. Given various challenges regarding reporting and data collection and management, some of the information appears to be internally inconsistent and contrary to consistent video, audio, and interview evidence.

#### Review Figure 29. Police Computer Aided Dispatch System (August 9, 2020)

<b>Total Protests</b>	2
<b>Total Districts</b>	2 (004, 019)
<b>Total "Riot"/Looting</b>	2
<b>Total Districts</b>	(001, 006)
<b>Total</b>	4
<b>Total Districts</b>	4

### MONDAY, AUGUST 10, 2020 (12:00 AM TO 11:59 PM)

After midnight, people began looting in the downtown area, near North Michigan Avenue. Looting spread out and included other locations along Michigan Avenue and surrounding blocks. Some people threw rocks and other projectiles at police officers and squad cars. Chicago police officers also exchanged gunfire with people in the crowd.<sup>244</sup>

As a result, the City raised bridges into the downtown area and about 100 people were arrested throughout the night and morning.<sup>245</sup>

Mayor Lightfoot put out a statement:

<sup>244</sup> See Bob Chiarito and Kelly Bauer, *Widespread Looting And Gunfire Rock Downtown After Police Shoot Man: 'We Are Waking Up In Shock'*, BLOCK CLUB CHICAGO (August 10, 2020), <https://blockclubchicago.org/2020/08/10/widespread-looting-shootings-on-mag-mile-downtown/>.

<sup>245</sup> See Julie Bosman, Christine Hauser, and Johnny Diaz, *Chicago Police Arrest More Than 100 People After Looting Batters Downtown*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (August 10, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/10/us/shooting-chicago-looting.html>.

*Access to the downtown area will be temporarily restricted . . . from 8 p.m. – 6 a.m. The restricted access to the downtown area is NOT a curfew. All residents, essential workers and employees whose businesses are located downtown will have access at all times.*

#### Review Figure 30. Mayor Tweets (August 10, 2020)



While there did not appear to be city-wide looting that evening, looting was reported in Streeterville, North Michigan Avenue, State Street in the Loop, and Old Town.<sup>246</sup> There were also protests later that day.<sup>247</sup> Protests continued in Chicago

<sup>246</sup> See CBS 2 Chicago Staff, *Ronald McDonald House Near Lurie Children's Hospital Was Among Looters' Targets*, CBS CHICAGO (August 11, 2020), <https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2020/08/11/ronald-mcdonald-house-near-lurie-childrens-hospital-was-among-looters-targets/>.

<sup>247</sup> See, e.g., Paige Fry, *Black Lives Matter protest: 'We don't need police. We need care.'*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (August 10, 2020), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-chicago->

throughout the week, including at the University of Chicago Hospital in connection with the officer-involved shooting.<sup>248</sup>

### Body Worn Camera and Radio Review – August 10, 2020

The videos we reviewed depict interactions between people and officers downtown and on Magnificent Mile, as some people are looting stores shortly after midnight. In one video, officers are arriving as looting occurs at Saks Fifth Avenue. As officers arrest a woman, she says, “I ain’t stole nothing. Y’all can check my bank accounts.” The arresting officer says, “She’s got a shitload of money on her” while checking arrestee’s pockets. The arrestee says, “Check my bank accounts,” and indicates she has \$1,500 cash on her and says, “That’s my money.” The arresting officer responds, “Yeah, I know—you’re going to get it back.”

In another video, two officers stop a car and approach the stopped car. All occupants in the car appeared to be Black. After a passenger repeatedly asked why they have been detained, Officer 1 shouts, “Let me talk!” The passenger asks if the officer’s body-worn camera is on, and the officer says, “Yes.” The passenger says, “One second,” and pulls out a cell phone. Officer 2 grabs the cell phone away. The passenger asks, “Can we get a white shirt?” Officer 1 continues shouting and says, “Tell your boy to stop talking over me. I’m explaining it.” The passenger asks, “Am I being racially profiled?” Officer 2 says, “No you’re not!” After officers gather and examine identification, Officer 1 hands the IDs back and tells them they can leave. A passenger says, “Thank you, have a wonderful night.”

Another video shows the following interaction:

**John Doe:** *“Can I ask you a question, though?”*

**Officer:** *“No.” [Walks in the other direction.]*

\*John Doe gets attention of an officer in a white shirt [supervisor] who walks over.\*

**John Doe:** *“Can I ask you a question?” “What’s going on?” [Holding up cell phone.]*

\*Supervisor throws up hands in a shrug and starts walking away.\*

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[downtown-looting-black-lives-matter-protest-20200811-lvejnsxhbgjfixcgioih7dn4-story.html](#).

<sup>248</sup> See, e.g., Manny Ramos, *Activists want charges dropped against man shot by police*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (August 14, 2020), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/2020/8/14/21369740/latrell-allen-police-shooting-chicago-looting-hyde-park-defund-rally-march>; *Residents and protestors clash at rally in Englewood*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (August 11, 2020), <https://www.chicago-tribune.com/news/ct-viz-englewood-police-shooting-protest-20200812-al3sgjfyzyxi6x6t2fk4qesy-photogallery.html>.

**John Doe:** *"I'm just asking a question, though."*

**Supervisor:** *"Trying to answer."*

**John Doe:** *"I'm just wondering why everyone's so disgusted with the cops."*

**Supervisor:** *"You've seen the same as me."*

**John Doe:** *"You don't have to be so rude, though."*

\*Supervisor, holding a baton in front and across his body, walks toward person, says something inaudible.\*

**John Doe:** *"What's your name, bro? My name's [John Doe]."*

\*Supervisor and John Doe. shake hands.\*

**John Doe (still holding up phone):** *"No need for attitude because I'm not one of these people"*

**Supervisor [gestures]:** *"I can have an attitude if I want! It's a free country!"*

**John Doe:** *"There's no need to be so mean. You don't know how to talk to people."*

**Supervisor:** *"Come to me when there ain't a bunch of savages out here lootin.' Right now, I'm obviously agitated. Stop calling me bro. We're not bros. I don't even know you. Come to me on a normal day and I'll talk to you like a person."*

**John Doe:** *"It is a normal day—you're a sergeant. It's a part of the job, bro."*

**Supervisor:** *"No it's not, stop calling me bro. Dealing with savages ain't a part of my job."*

**John Doe:** *"I'm a grammar schoolteacher."*

**A different officer speaking to John Doe:** *"Just get out of here, you're obviously part of the problem."*

The radio traffic also demonstrated the chaotic nature of events:

- *"More resources to address a crowd on State Street"*
- *"Every available unit to go to Wabash & Grand for a 10-1"*
- *"Report of gun inside Bloomingdale over radio at Wabash and Ontario"*
- *"Subject shot at Wabash and Ontario"*

- *“Huge crowd at Walton and Rush”*
- *“Looting at Walgreens on Ontario”*
- *“Need a car at Gucci”*
- *“A lot of cars pulling up at the Apple Store; they’re going in and out of the Apple store”*

In another video, an officer’s reacts to all that was happening:

*“I’ve never seen anything like this. It’s embarrassing. We need the National Guard.”*

### City Data from August 10, 2020

The figure below reflects data that the IMT received from the City regarding August 10, 2020. It is important to note that much of this data reflects citywide information that is not necessarily tied to protest or unrest. Given various challenges regarding reporting and data collection and management, some of the information appears to be internally inconsistent and contrary to consistent video, audio, and interview evidence. Nonetheless, the table demonstrate that the City and the CPD’s challenges were significant and widespread.

#### Review Figure 31. Police Computer Aided Dispatch System (August 10, 2020)

<b>Total Protests</b>	2
<b>Total Districts</b>	1 (001)
<b>Total “Riot”/Looting</b>	358 (1+357)
<b>Total Districts</b>	18 (001, 002, 003, 004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 009, 010, 011, 012, 014, 015, 018)
<b>Total</b>	360
<b>Total Districts</b>	18

### SATURDAY, AUGUST 15, 2020 (12:00 AM TO 11:59 PM)

On August 15, 2020, two separate protests occurred in Chicago. One protest was anticipated to occur on the Dan Ryan Expressway. The Illinois State Police was aware of this protest, and while the Illinois State Police would not allow protesters onto the Expressway, they ensured the organizer of the protest that they would try to ensure the safety of any protesters who made it onto the Expressway. The

CPD put in place a contingency plan that would allow protesters to march on the streets of Chicago, ending up downtown at Grant Park. Ultimately, protestors did not make it onto the Expressway, and the protest proceeded on the route that the CPD had secured. Protestors marched through Chicago, arrived at Grant Park, and disbanded without major incident.

Another planned protest began at the Cloud Gate Sculpture (also known as “the Bean”) in Millennium Park around 4:00 PM. Social media posts indicate that the protesters were demanding that CPD be taken out of Chicago Public Schools, that the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Citizens Academy be cancelled, that funds be reallocated toward learning and community centers, and that universities cut ties with ICE. Police were present at the beginning of the protest but appeared to remain at a distance from the protesters without intervention. Officers who had been assigned to the first protest responded to the second protest. Eventually, protesters left Millennium Park and began marching toward Wacker and Michigan.

The Wabash Bridge was raised, and the CPD stationed officers on the east side of the Wacker and Michigan intersection, and at Trump Tower on Wabash Avenue. Police were staged to block access to Lake Shore Drive from Wacker, though protesters appear to have faced off against officers, demanding access and creating their own line of bikes.

Ultimately, some officers and some people in the crowd clashed, including fights over umbrellas and bikes. Some people threw projectiles, and members of the crowd traveled eastbound. CPD officers prevented people from accessing Lake Shore Drive, at which point additional violent encounters occurred between some people and the CPD, and the CPD made some arrests. People then traveled southward to Randolph, then westbound. According to some CPD personnel, as members of the crowd moved westbound, the CPD gave dispersal orders and the crowd dispersed. According to early estimates, about 17 people were arrested by the end of the day, and about 17 officers were injured.<sup>249</sup>

### Community Experiences and Reflections from August 15, 2020

The quotes and summaries below are samples experiences from community members regarding events on Saturday, August 15, 2020.

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<sup>249</sup> See, e.g., Chris Sweda, *Protests turn violent in downtown Chicago*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (August 15, 2020), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-viz-violent-protests-chicago-police-photos-20200816-zu6mpcrtqjgwlluvk7ek662yba-photogallery.html>; John Garcia and Cate Cauquiran, *Chicago police, protesters clash in Loop, dozens arrested and several hurt*, ABC7 EYEWITNESS NEWS (August 16, 2020), <https://abc7chicago.com/chicago-protest-dan-ryan-expressway-protests-today/6371985/>.



ON AUGUST 15TH, I WAS AN [LEGAL OBSERVER (LO)] AT A PROTEST DOWNTOWN. CPD RESPONDED WITH HUNDREDS OF POLICE IN RIOT GEAR TO A RELATIVELY SMALL MARCH, COMPOSED MAINLY OF BLACK AND LATIN YOUNG PEOPLE. POLICE USED PEPPER SPRAY ON PROTESTERS, LOS, AND MEDICS. CPD WAS YELLING "FORWARD MARCH," AS THEY REPEATEDLY ADVANCED ON THE GROUP FROM MICHIGAN AND WACKER TO LASALLE AND ADAMS. CPD RUSHED THE CROWD REPEATEDLY AND ATTACKED THE MEDICS. AFTER DRIVING THE PEOPLE ONTO LASALLE, CPD BLOCKED ADAMS AND MONROE AND BEGAN BEATING AND ARRESTING PEOPLE WHO HAD NOT OUTFRAN THE RUSHING LINE OF RIOT POLICE. I NEVER HEARD ANY DISPERSAL ORDERS ISSUED, AND CPD DID NOT LET ME AND TWO OTHER ATTORNEY LOS LEAVE UPON OUR REQUEST. WE WERE DETAINED FOR 10 TO 15 MINUTES IN THE KETTLE. CPD INSISTED THAT WE EMPTY OUR BAGS AND LEAVE OUR PROPERTY BEHIND BEFORE THEY PERMITTED US TO LEAVE. AND THEY SEIZED A GREEN HAT THAT A LEGAL OBSERVER HAD. LOS OBSERVED THAT SUPERINTENDENT BROWN WAS PRESENT ON LASALLE WHILE THE KETTLE WAS IN EFFECT.<sup>250</sup>

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AND ON AUGUST 15TH, NEARLY A MONTH AFTER THE DISPLAY OF POLICE OFFICER BRUTALITY, POLICE IN RIOT GEAR ONCE AGAIN GASSED AND SEVERELY INJURED CIVILIANS. IS THIS WHO YOU WANT IN YOUR SCHOOLS? YOU CANNOT REFORM YOUR WAY OUT OF THIS. BLACK LIVES MATTER. DEFUND CPD. DECOLONIZE CHICAGO.<sup>251</sup>

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ON SATURDAY, AUGUST 15TH, A FEW DAYS AGO, WHILE I WAS RIDING MY BIKE ALONGSIDE A YOUTH-LED PROTEST IN THE LOOP WHO WERE SPEAKING OUT AGAINST POLICE BRUTALITY, I WAS SURPRISED AND ATTACKED FROM BEHIND, BEATEN OFF MY BIKE AND TO THE GROUND BY SEVERAL GROWN MEN IN RIOT GEAR WITH BATONS AND VIOLENTLY ARRESTED. VERY FEW WORE MASKS. MY BIKE WAS STOLEN AND MY BACKPACK WAS DESTROYED. RATHER THAN BEING READ MY RIGHTS, SEVERAL COPS SHOUTED IN MY FACE WITHOUT MASKS, "YOU LOST." I SPENT THE NIGHT LOCKED UP ENDURING FURTHER TERROR, DEHUMANIZATION, AND THE DENIAL OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS. DURING THE 14 HOURS I WAS DETAINED -- 12 OF WHICH WERE DOCUMENTED BY THE POLICE -- I WAS CAGED BY -- WITH SEVERAL WONDERFUL PEOPLE WHO HAD EXPERIENCED SIMILAR SYSTEMATIC TERROR AND VIOLENCE BY THE CPD, INCLUDING NURSES, JOURNALISTS, AND VERY YOUNG ORGANIZERS.<sup>252</sup>

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ON AUGUST 15, 2020, I ATTENDED A PROTEST DOWNTOWN IN THE LOOP. WHILE WE WERE MARCHING, I OVERHEARD SOMEBODY SAY THAT THE POLICE WERE GOING TO START TEARGASSING FOLKS, SO WE ALL STARTED RUNNING, BUT TO NO AVAIL. WE ENDED UP BEING KETTLED IN AS THE POLICE STARTED TEARGASSING THE CROWD AND STARTED BEATING PEOPLE WITH THEIR BATONS AND STICKS, AND STUFF. AND I WAS HIT IN MY BACK WITH A BATON, LIKE, FOUR TIMES. AND I WAS TEARGASSED. LUCKILY THE TEAR GAS DIDN'T MAKE IT INTO MY EYES, BUT I HAVE PERMANENT MARKS AND DISCOLORATION ON MY ARM AND MY LEGS FROM THE TEAR GAS TOUCHING MY SKIN. AS I WAS TRYING TO RUN, I SAW THE POLICE RAM A MAN SO HARD DOWN ON THE CONCRETE THAT HIS FOREHEAD STARTED GASHING BLOOD. AND I WAS HOPING

<sup>250</sup> Listening Session, August 19, 2020, at 69–70.

<sup>251</sup> *Id.* at 67.

<sup>252</sup> *Id.* at 71–72.

THAT SEEING HIM BLEEDING WOULD BE ENOUGH TO MAKE THEM STOP ATTACKING THIS MAN, BUT THEY PROCEEDED TO HAUL HIM UP AND STARTING HITTING HIM SOME MORE WITH HIS BATONS BEFORE THEY ARRESTED HIM. SO WE WERE EVENTUALLY ALL KETTLED IN UNTIL THE POLICE STARTED GOING "BAG CHECK" AND LETTING PEOPLE OUT. AND THEY DIDN'T REALLY LET EVERYBODY OUT BECAUSE THEY WERE SPECIFICALLY LOOKING FOR PEOPLE TO ARREST. I WAS ONE OF THE LUCKY ONES THAT GOT OUT. BUT AS I WAS PUSHED OUT OF THE SCENE, THEY CLOSED IT OFF, AND, LIKE, I WATCHED HELPLESSLY AS FIVE OF MY FRIENDS WERE WRONGLY BEATEN AND DETAINED.<sup>253</sup>

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ALL THAT PALES IN COMPARISON TO WHAT I SAW LAST SATURDAY, AUGUST 15TH. IN THE MOST HEINOUS ACT OF (UNINTELLIGIBLE) VIOLENCE THAT I'VE WITNESSED IN 29 YEARS OF LIFE, I WATCHED CPD OFFICERS CLEAR OUT MEDIA BEFORE ATTACKING INJURED PEOPLE BEING TREATED BY MEDICS ON THE SIDEWALK. THE CPD KICKED PEOPLE AND MEDICS, HIT THEM WITH BATONS AND DESTROYED MEDICAL SUPPLIES. CPD OFFICERS HIT ME, SHOVED ME AND CALLED ME A PUSSY FOR POINTING OUT THE PEOPLE WHO THEY WERE ASSAULTING WERE INJURED. I WAS WEARING A NLG LEGAL OBSERVER HAT THAT DAY AS WELL.<sup>254</sup>

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SOON AFTER I WITNESSED PEPPER SPRAY DEPLOYED WITHIN INCHES OF PROTESTERS' FACES. IT'S DIFFICULT TO DESCRIBE THE FEELING OF SEEING PROTESTERS BEING PEPPER SPRAYED BY CPD, BUT I BECAME EXTREMELY FEARFUL FOR MY SAFETY. NOT AT THE HANDS OF THE PROTESTERS, BUT AT THE HANDS OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT. I WITNESSED YOUNG PEOPLE STUMBLE INTO THE MIDDLE OF THE INTERACTION, BLINDED BY PEPPER SPRAY, WRITHING IN PAIN, PANIC AND CONFUSION, RIPPING THEIR MASKS OFF TO BREATHE AND SCREAMING IN AGONY. THE USE OF PEPPER SPRAY IN THE MIDST OF A RESPIRATORY PANDEMIC SEEMS LIKE AN EXTREMELY CRUEL AND CALLOUS RESPONSE TO A GROUP OF YOUNG PEOPLE JUST TRYING TO MAKE THEIR VOICES HEARD. WITH THE SMELL OF PEPPER SPRAY FRESH IN MY NOSTRILS, I LEFT THE AREA. I'D LIKE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE VIOLENT POLICE RESPONSE TO THIS PEACEFUL PROTEST WAS COMPLETELY UNWARRANTED. THE PROTESTERS WERE SIMPLY EXERCISING THEIR FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY. THE POLICE VIOLATED THAT RIGHT BY BEATING AND PEPPER SPRAYING US. CPD CLEARLY DID NOT HAVE SAFETY OF ANYONE IN MIND.<sup>255</sup>

## Body Worn Camera and Radio Review – August 15, 2020

Videos from this date show peaceful protests without incident, as well as violent confrontations. In one video, police form a bike line as protesters gather in the streets. Officers follow protesters down the streets as they march, and the protest carries on without disturbance.

Another video shows people approaching a police line. Officers yell, "Get back," as they grab and throw the people's umbrellas. One person gets into a shoving and

<sup>253</sup> Listening Session, August 20, 2020, at 119–20.

<sup>254</sup> *Id.* at 143–44.

<sup>255</sup> *Id.* at 161–62.

tugging match with an officer over the umbrellas. Another person continues to approach the bike line and gets into a shoving match with the police involving bikes. An officer yells, “Hold the line,” while protesters put their hands up and say, “Hands up don’t shoot.”

One video depicts a protester with a skateboard; he is holding the skateboard to his chest and an officer knocks him down. Later in the same video, we see a woman pick up her bike and swing it toward an officer. There is a tug-of-war with the bike, and eventually the officer takes it away.

In another video, the crowd appears to be standing around and waiting. There is no communication as to why the officers are not letting the protesters walk. There is no talking between officers and protesters, as everyone appears to just be waiting. One officer says, “That black dude on the skateboard. He’s been swinging that thing all day.” One person in the crowd says, “If you’re under 18, go to the front.” Another voice says, “Black and Brown Units to the Front.” A few minutes later, someone begins yelling loudly, and others in the crowd say, “Be peaceful.”

**City Data from August 15 and 16, 2020**

The figure below reflects data that the IMT received from the City. It is important to note that much of this data reflects citywide information that is not necessarily tied to protest or unrest. Given various challenges regarding reporting and data collection and management, some of the information appears to be internally inconsistent and contrary to consistent video, audio, and interview evidence.

**Review Figure 32. Police Computer Aided Dispatch System (Saturday, August 15, 2020, and Sunday, August 16, 2020)**

	<b>Saturday, August 15, 2020</b>	<b>Sunday, August 16, 2020</b>
<b>Total Protests</b>	7	4
<b>Total Districts</b>	5 (001, 002, 010, 011, 019)	2 (001, 011)
<b>Total “Riot”/Looting</b>	1 (0+1)	1 (0+1)
<b>Total Districts</b>	(006)	(006)
<b>Total</b>	7	5
<b>Total Districts</b>	6	3

## THE REST OF AUGUST, SEPTEMBER, AND OCTOBER 2020

Throughout August, September, and October, the City and the CPD reflected on what took place between May and July, holding meetings and conducting preparedness drills. CPD leadership also continued to remind their officers to wear masks.

On August 27, the City and CPD held a “Public Safety Hearing Prep” meeting from 5:00 PM to 6:00 PM. On August 28, 2020, the CPD issued an Updated Operational Plan/Mobilization Plan. On September 8, some CPD leadership participated in a “Thursday Drill – Prep” meeting in the Superintendent’s Conference room from 1:00 PM to 2:00 PM.

Throughout September and October, the CPD issued four reminders about its “Masking Requirement” (on September 4, 11, and 23 and October 2). The October 2 reminder added additional supervisor requirements (reflected in bold below):

General Message: “Masking Requirement” (October 2, 2020): 16:59

*The Department requires that all members wear a surgical mask or cloth face covering in any area or under conditions in which the member cannot maintain 6 feet of social distancing from other persons. The requirement to wear a mask/cloth covering applies to all interactions with the public. The requirement extends to and includes wearing in public areas, private property, buildings and vehicles. Department members can request addition[al] PPE items (Surgical Masks and gloves) from their immediate supervisor. **Supervisors will take the necessary corrective action to ensure that this requirement is strictly adhered to.** Help minimize the spread of COVID-19. Stay safe and be well. TO BE READ AT ROLL CALL FOR SEVEN (7) CONSECUTIVE DAYS.*

(Emphasis added).

## NOVEMBER 2020

Anticipating protests and preparing for unrest ahead of the November 3, 2020 Presidential election, the CPD implemented roll-call training regarding First Amendment activity and proper use of batons for each shift in all of its 22 Districts. The CPD prepared roll-call training as part of the ongoing discussions it had with the Coalition, the OAG, and the IMT since May. The IMT attended and observed roll-call training sessions on a variety of shifts in 15 Districts. The roll-call training was originally delivered in person, but due to inconsistencies in messaging, the CPD quickly produced a training video addressing First Amendment issues and proper baton use to be shown at roll call instead.

On November 4, the day after the election, hundreds of demonstrators gathered downtown to encourage election officials to “count every vote.”<sup>256</sup> The large crowd marched on Michigan Avenue, but did not reach Trump Tower because the Wabash Avenue bridge was raised.<sup>257</sup>

On November 7, as the vote counting dragged on and the nation waited for the election results, several news outlets projected that Joseph Biden, Jr. would ultimately be the winner. Crowds again converged downtown, resulting in street closures, re-routed Chicago Transit Authority buses, and a large police presence. Crowds also gathered at Union Park, Wrigley Field, and on North Halsted Street.<sup>258</sup> The crowds were largely celebratory and dissipated without major incident.

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<sup>256</sup> See Ben Pope, *Chicago protest: Hundreds gather downtown urging that every vote be counted*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (November 4, 2020), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/2020/11/4/21550300/chicago-protest-election-day-trump-biden-hundreds-gather-downtown-urging-that-every-vote-be-counted>.

<sup>257</sup> *Id.*

<sup>258</sup> See WGN Web Desk and Associated Press, *Live Blog: Crowds gather in Chicago's streets as Biden wins race for president*, WGN9 (November 7, 2020), <https://wgntv.com/news/politics/live-blog-count-drags-on-as-biden-nears-victory/>.

## Analysis

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This section provides the Independent Monitoring Team's (IMT's) analysis of the City and the CPD's responses to the protests and unrest from May 2020 through November 2020. We have broken our assessment into four topics of assessment and corresponding recommendations:

1. [PLANNING AND PREPARATION](#);
2. [POLICIES](#);
3. [TRAINING](#); and
4. [ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY](#).

Like the sections of the Consent Decree, these topics are interrelated and include various subsections.

In general, the quality of the City's and the CPD's planning and preparation had a direct impact on the state of existing resource allocation and command and control, in the short term, and existing resources, policies, training, and overall crowd-management competence in the long term. And the effectiveness of all of those actions directly impact the pressures on the City's accountability mechanisms. As a result of this interdependence, the City's and the CPD's successes and failures within each topic will have positive and negative effects across the City's and CPD's entire response.

Overall, the City and the CPD did not anticipate the level of protests and unrest in 2020, and even if they had anticipated large-scale protests and unrest after George Floyd's death on May 25, 2021, they would not have been able to adequately prepare for what transpired. The City and the CPD must continue to work to improve their ability to respond to protests and unrest.

## Planning and Preparation

### IMT's Recommendations: Planning and Preparation

- Expand planning operations cross all internal and external entities and partners by, among others, (1) establishing a multi-facet planning team, (2) modifying current planning template, and (3) conducting tabletop exercises for command personnel (¶704)
  - Enhance intelligence gathering and dissemination capabilities by, among other things, (1) tracking national and international events that may impact Chicago, (2) improving social-media engagement, (3) conducting formal meetings with protest organizers and community stakeholders, and (4) engaging with Chicago's communities, stakeholders, and experts regarding the City's and the CPD's policing efforts and strategies (¶46)
  - Continue New Forms of Community Engagement by, among other things, (1) clearly communicating time, place and manner restrictions; (2) conducting community-sentiment assessments; (3) engaging with community review of and comment on policies and training; (4) creating and maintaining community and business safety plans; (5) improving victim services (¶¶10, 49, 52, 115, 160, 511, 546)
  - Create, train, and equip specialized Mobile Field Force Teams, with certified members, across all CPD areas
  - Better prepare for department-wide officer wellness and support, including providing and tracking protective equipment, transportation, hydration, food, facilities, and relief (¶¶381–86)
  - Conduct a feasibility study regarding the acquisition, prioritization, allocation, and tracking of resources for officer wellness and responding to protests and unrest (¶¶377, 379)
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The importance of planning and preparing for large events cannot be overstated. Careful planning helps identify resources, needs, risks, options, and contingencies. Without adequate planning or preparation, personnel are placed in situations they are untrained for. As a result, existing training is inapplicable, policies can be forgotten, reporting can falter, and many of the efforts, progress, and reforms from efforts by the City and CPD personnel and communities can be undermined.

According to records provided by the City and the CPD, the City and the CPD did not create an operations plan for the vast majority of even the known protests in 2020 and, at the beginning of May 2020, did not have an effective plan for responding to unplanned protests. To the extent unwritten plans existed within each district or area, the CPD mainly relied on a boilerplate template for capturing very generic information and did not train its supervisors or officers—or City partners—

on how to effectuate those plans. Without planning or training, the City and the CPD—and their personnel—were forced to make up the plan as they went along through trial and error. As a result, there were inconsistencies across supervisors and districts, and the risk that many of the lessons learned were the wrong ones.

As detailed below, we believe that increased planning and preparation across and throughout City entities would allow the City and the CPD to more effectively and efficiently respond to protests and prevent the existence or spread of unrest. This would, in turn, better protect Chicagoans, personnel, essential services, businesses, and resources—reducing the need for as large and extended deployments of City personnel as occurred in 2020.

As reflected in [Analysis Figure 1](#) below, the CPD has acknowledged that the weaknesses in their planning and preparedness outweighed their strengths.

[Analysis Figure 1. CPD After Action Report \(May 20, 2020, through June 12, 2020\)](#)

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**CPD After Action Report: “Planning and Preparedness”**

Strengths	(1) Individual and collective experience (2) Unified command center (3) Open-minded leaders
Weaknesses	(1) Outdated, inflexible, and inefficient mass-mobilization plans (2) Uncoordinated approach to securing the city’s retail corridors (3) Reactive, ad hoc approach to emergency mobilization without training (4) Too few body-worn cameras and antiquated protective equipment (5) Equipment-related barriers to communication and transportation (6) Department members were exhausted, stressed, and over-burdened <sup>259</sup>

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This lack of planning and preparation was reflected across our interviews with representatives from the City and the CPD. We also heard CPD officers express such concerns in several of the body-worn-camera videos, such as the following quotes:

*Don’t [inaudible] and then lead us back here so there needs to be some fucking leadership here and there’s zero... It’s a safety issue... We need to go. So be ready to go and be ready to walk backwards.*

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*... Should have deployed the National Guard earlier. She just deployed them. But they aren’t going to come out now with a command plan.*

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<sup>259</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department’s Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 5 (citing Major Cities Chiefs Association at 27, note 1).



*This whole city is on fire again. The department doesn't know what they are doing. Why didn't they raise the bridges earlier? This has been going on for hours.*

As a result of the lack of sufficient planning and preparation, the City and the CPD could not avoid the emergency circumstances that led them to believe deploying all officers was necessary. As a result, personnel in the Bureau of Internal Affairs, the Force Review Division, and Reform Management were deployed, leaving their critical duties understaffed and under-resourced—walking back or delaying much of what the City and the CPD have worked to create under the Consent Decree.

Over the course of the summer, the City and the CPD made significant efforts to improve their planning and preparation for protests—planned and unplanned—and unrest. As reflected in other sections, this planning continued to be largely reactive, as policies, training, and tracking continued to present issues as the City and the CPD responded to events.

This was demonstrated in the City's and the CPD's preparations for potential unrest during the 2020 election, which never occurred.

## (1) PLANNING WITHIN AND ACROSS CITY ENTITIES AND PARTNERS

### IMT's Recommendation

- Expand planning operations cross all internal and external entities and partners by, among others, (1) establishing a multi-facet planning team, (2) modifying current planning template, and (3) conduct tabletop exercises for command personnel (¶704)<sup>260</sup>

As reflected above, the City and the CPD did not sufficiently plan or prepare for the size, scope, and sustained level of protests and unrest. After the murder of

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<sup>260</sup> See also Jonathan Links et al., *Recommendations for Enhancing Baltimore City's Preparedness and Response to Mass Demonstration Events, Based on a Review and Analysis of the Events of April 2015*, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, (December 4, 2015) at 27, 49; *May 30 Civil Unrest After-Action Review*, CITY OF CLEVELAND, OH (December 2020) 30–31; Reneé Hail, *Dallas Police Department After Action Report George Floyd Protest May 29, 2020 Thru June 1, 2020*, DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT (August 14, 2020) at 21–22, 36; Gerald Chaleff, *An Independent Examination Of The Los Angeles Police Department 2020 Protest Response* (March 10, 2021), at 74; *After Action Report - George Floyd Protests and Response May 30, 2020 - June 7, 2020*, RALEIGH POLICE DEPARTMENT CHIEF'S OFFICE - OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS INSPECTIONS UNIT (September 15, 2020) at 33–34, Nicholas Mitchell, *The Police Response to the 2020 George Floyd Protests in Denver, and Independent Review*, DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR, at 54–55; Benjamin Carleton et al., *Philadelphia Police Department's Response to Demonstrations and Civil Unrest May 30-June 15, 2020*, CNA AND MONTGOMERY McCracken (December 2020) at 79–81, 83.

George Floyd, there were a few City and CPD preparation meetings regarding the potential for large protests and the potential for unrest.<sup>261</sup> Everyone that we spoke to who was in those meetings, however, said that they ultimately did not believe that unrest would occur in Chicago. The opinion of many people was that, historically, Chicago has not experienced unrest from events that occurred outside of Chicago, so it was unlikely to occur here.

As a result, the City and the CPD ultimately prepared for Saturday's large downtown protest as they would for other large downtown protests.<sup>262</sup> We also heard from some CPD personnel that the CPD has done well over the last few decades in managing large peaceful protests without major incident or unrest. Some of the officers we interviewed said that their supervisors expressed confidence, or overconfidence, believing that the CPD is "good at" crowd control because Chicago experiences many large protests without issue.

According to the CPD's After Action Report, the CPD usually prepares for weeks for a planned large-scale event:

*In advance of these gatherings, the Department typically spends weeks planning and preparing alongside its local, state, and federal partners, to best ensure public safety and the protection of Constitutional rights. Previous to the 2020 Events, this often involved working directly with event organizers to ensure their safety and that of attendees by, for example, organizing routes and providing crowd control.*<sup>263</sup>

This plan was clearly insufficient, but was also limited to one protest and in one location. The plan also did not have an effective and flexible plan for rapidly increasing responses to unrest.<sup>264</sup> We heard from many supervisors that they received the plan Saturday, May 30, 2020, after the protest and unrest was well under way, that plan was over a hundred pages long, and that it was unhelpful.

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<sup>261</sup> This was unclear until relatively far into our review. Originally, in response to a request for records of such meetings, ("List of all preparatory meetings for CPD members responding to lawful demonstrations or unrest from May 1, 2020, through June 30, 2020"), the CPD's Office of Operations responded that they did not have responsive records. These meetings were ultimately identified from individual interviews and emails that the City provided in January 2021.

<sup>262</sup> The only deviation we heard was from some CPD command staff who, due to their inexperience with protest response, requested additional resources and participation to learn from experience of how to respond to a "typical protest."

<sup>263</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department's Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021).

<sup>264</sup> "For example, the Department's response to large-scale emergencies has long been based on two plans: "Plan Red" (using available on-duty personnel in phases) and "Plan Blue" (requiring, among other things, the recall of off-duty personnel). In the event the Department activated a "Plan Blue," off-duty personnel would be notified via radio and television announcements.

We also heard from many CPD representatives—from line officers to executives—that the CPD does not have a plan for responding to unrest—and further, that such plans do not exist. This perspective misses, however, how effective proper planning and preparation can be at preventing unlawful activity and unrest in the first place. It is always challenging to prove negatives—such as all of the crime and unrest that does not occur when a city and a department are prepared. But we heard from many members of the community that they joined protests after witnessing or hearing about what they believed to be excessive force from officers against protesters. We also witnessed and heard from many people that much of the unrest was from opportunists who decided to participate in looting or destruction of property once it appeared that the City and the CPD were not prepared to stop them.

While the chaos inherent in unrest is decidedly different from typical protests, the City's existing response was to have officers respond to "10-1s," or "officer needs assistance" calls. But given the volume of "10-1s"—along with many other confounding challenges, such as the radio issues described further below—officers responded without direction or in an organized manner. Teams were formed and deployed without coordinated training, which led to more officers engaging in individualized decision-making and responses, outside of best practices and engaging crowds individually, which then required another uncoordinated response to rescue them.

The City and the CPD did not have specific plans that were tailored for the unique circumstances of 2020—COVID-19 and stressed resources; no City-issued permits; unprecedented turnout; car caravans; fluid protests often influenced in real time by social media; and no centralized location. Unlike what was expected, the large protests and unrest began Friday night, May 29, 2020, continued early on Saturday morning, and continued for days. We heard from City personnel and many CPD officers—some with decades of experience—that they had never seen the level of unrest in their careers, with many adding that there was nothing the City or the CPD could have done to fully prepare. However, without those plans, the City and the CPD had to divert other preparations—namely the Summer Operations Center—and appeared to resort to old plans, based on the experiences of a few supervisors—that were designed to respond to one location, such as the plans for the 2012 NATO Summit.

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But with a modern, 'leveled' response, Department members can better anticipate whether their days off might be cancelled, hours extended, or areas of deployment shifted. Similarly, consistent 'levels' will enable the Department to scale an otherwise-consistent emergency response (whether localized or citywide) to any given incident." *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department's Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 11 (citing *Special Response Plans*, General Order G05-02 § II (December 7, 2017)).

Most notably, the City and the CPD created a single, unrehearsed central mobilization center that pulled officers from across the City—without their usual radios or body-worn cameras—to one location. Officers were then deployed in various places, sometimes with new officers and supervisors and to unfamiliar locations or to locations that they passed to get to the deployment center. These logistics were the most chaotic in the early days of the protests and unrest—when an organized and efficient response was needed the most. In those early days, resources such as radios, shields, and OC spray were handed out without tracking; officers were paired without familiarity; and there were limited resources for transportation, food, hydration, or bathroom facilities.

Moreover, in addition to potentially dangerous logistical issues and inefficiencies, by using the mobilization center to deploy officers throughout Chicago, officers were often placed in communities that they were unfamiliar with, both geographically and personally. This can create various issues, but also loses the benefit of having officers deploy to locations where they know the area, including potential vulnerabilities, and the people, allowing officers to potential gain valuable information or even better de-escalate tensions with known community members. We recognize that the City and the CPD were facing an unprecedented challenge, but it is under such circumstances that community policing principles and foundations become more—not less—important.

To be clear, we understand that there may have been disagreements regarding the central mobilization center at the time, but a decision needed to be made—and without better planning and preparation, there was no decision that could have been made in the moment without significant tradeoffs. As days went on, centralizing resources became more efficient, and the CPD learned how to make the best of the mobilization center, including allowing officers from districts with high needs to stay within their districts. The City and the CPD also made deliberate efforts to improve tracking and documentation.

In the CPD's After Action Report, the CPD referenced the recent work with City entities to provide for a more coordinated, City-wide response:

*To this end, the Department collaborated in the aftermath of the Events with public safety, infrastructure, transportation, regulatory, and other city agencies to develop a 'leveled' response plan. The levels and related responses are as follows:*

**Level 0:** Daily Business - a steady state

**Level 1:** Partial Response - a localized response

**Level 2:** Full Response - a citywide response

**Level 3:** Sustained Response - a continuing response

**Level 4:** Mutual Aid/State Resource - a collaborative response<sup>265</sup>

This leveled response plan reflects a vast improvement and accounts for the potential need to scale responses up or down. As reflected above, the City and the CPD developed this plan after facing Chicago-specific challenges May 20, 2020, through June 12, 2020. These plans were not developed with input from the IMT, and the IMT strongly recommends that the City and the CPD continue to review and improve this leveled plan with input from experts on the NIMS ICS model, if the City and the CPD have not done so already.

Given the differences in general and crowd-specific responsibilities, internal structures, and many other variables, the City entities were better able to respond. Representatives from the Chicago Fire Department, for example, said that, given the typical shift schedule, it was able to ramp up deployments and respond to fires and provide medical needs throughout Chicago. In fact, they said that, given the lack of typical traffic due to COVID-19 precautions, personnel were able to move around the City more easily than usual. These representatives acknowledged, however, that unlike the CPD, crowds were not openly hostile to their presence or intentionally obstructing their ability to put out fires or provide medical services. The City should consider such institutional differences, regularly share information

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<sup>265</sup> "These levels were designed to be 'activated' in advance of planned events and as unanticipated emergencies unfold. The Department will continue to collaborate with local, state, and federal partners to implement the necessary collaborative response that large planned gatherings demand. But the city's response to any forthcoming, unanticipated emergency situation requiring a large-scale response will rest largely on the Department and OEMC, as both operate each second of every day. The Department has since shared a video outlining and explaining this 'leveled' plan with its members." *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department's Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 11–12.

across entities, and clarify or revise roles accordingly, particularly as the City experiences high turnover.

On the other hand, with the lack of planning, the widespread nature of protests, and the lack of permits or advance notice, City personnel frequently were not asked to have emergency management services on standby for many protests—nor is it clear that such services would have been available for all crowds at the height of the protests. This was also true for several other key units and personnel, such as the CPD’s limited pool of Legal Officers.

Over time, the City was able to better utilize City resources to, for example, navigate traffic, protect businesses, and free up CPD officers and other CPD personnel to more efficiently respond to needs. These decisions, however, will always have costs, not only on potential freedoms, but on, among other things, essential services, livelihoods, and commuters. As a result, we recommend that, as the City and the CPD, continue to evaluate these plans, they incorporate community feedback, concerns, recommendations, and general input.

The CPD’s After Action Report acknowledged the need to include the City’s “business and retail partners in conversations as unplanned, emergency incidents of civil unrest unfold—particularly regarding asset allocation, short-term infrastructure changes, and post-incident investigative collaboration.”<sup>266</sup>

*To ensure our city’s retail corridors are protected in the event of future unplanned, large-scale incidents of civil unrest, the Department worked with the Chicago Department of Transportation (“CDOT”), the Department of Water management (“DWM”), and the Department of Streets and Sanitation (“DSS”) to formalize its collaborative approach to allocating, deploying, and mobilizing resources to retail corridors as a means of securing them and thereby mitigating any adverse impact. CDOT, DWM, and DSS resources were strategically positioned in neighborhoods throughout the city to deter organized criminal activity while facilitating the city’s ability to rapidly and efficiently enact closures. Individuals from these agencies had direct access to the Command Post enabling them to monitor retail corridors and quickly report criminal activity.*

*Department leaders recognized that District Commanders have a unique, localized understanding of community concerns, neighborhood economic lifelines, and any businesses that may be vulnerable during incidents of civil unrest. As such, the Department tasked its District Commanders with obtaining input from their community partners and identifying those specific businesses and retailers in their districts. Our retail corridor protection plans now reflect this input. These plans*

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<sup>266</sup> See *id.* at 12.

*include information for operational purposes (e.g., how to enact closures) along with a detailed list of key points of interest (e.g., public transit, historical and cultural monuments, etc.) and contact information for businesses, local chambers of commerce, and other key community partners.*<sup>267</sup>

This outreach is important, and the IMT recommends that the City make such outreach a formalized part of its multi-facet planning team and template.

Finally, for any inter- and intra-entity plans, the City, the CPD, and local, state, and federal partners will need to conduct table-top exercises to ensure that personnel are capable of carrying out the plans.

Moreover, while we did hear of assistance from outside federal, state, and local partners, the City and the CPD did not provide substantial information regarding how those partners specifically fit into its plans. The original utilization of outside partners appeared to be nearly entirely ad hoc. There was limited, if any, knowledge of how to utilize the National Guard, including whether the National Guard could or should address criminal activity that occurred in their presence. In response to a request for applicable inter-agency agreements, the City and the CPD provided a series of specific agreements with agencies on tangential or unrelated issues. Moreover, some relevant agencies did not appear to have agreements at all. This explains, for example, why some representatives told us that there was a rush to develop rules of engagement for the Illinois National Guard on Saturday, May 30, 2020. These agreements can serve to formalize expectations and enable key personnel to focus on the emergencies at hand, rather than jurisdictions or responsibilities.

Even assuming that the City and the CPD could not have predicted or prepared for the level of unrest at the end of May and beginning of June, the City and the CPD continued to approach most known protests without detailed plans. The CPD did not, for example, have an operations plan for the Grant Park protest on July 17, 2020.<sup>268</sup> We heard from some officers that the CPD was able to deploy additional officers to the location because those officers were working other non-protest related assignments throughout Chicago.

In some ways this reflects the fact that the City and the CPD leadership must address multiple issues at once, and many officers were still placed nearby and could respond timelier than in May. Nonetheless, to the extent this was the “plan” for increasing the response, the CPD again placed itself in a position of having to deploy officers on an ad hoc basis.

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<sup>267</sup> See *id.* at 12–13.

<sup>268</sup> In response to a request for operations plans, the CPD responded, in part, that the CPD’s Special Events Unit did not create an operations plan for July 17, 2020.

It is true that if the CPD had more officers assigned to the protest that an unrelated incident could have arisen elsewhere in the City, which the CPD would have then been less capable of responding to. But this emphasizes the need for planning and preparation, as the City and the CPD will be better able to identify and address resource needs, including a qualified, well-trained, and equipped Mobile Field Force team, as discussed further below.

We also heard from some CPD personnel, for example, that different CPD areas and districts already had plans to secure specific locations and business corridors in the event of an emergency, but that those plans were not readily known or rehearsed. As a result, many officers said that they felt always behind and constantly responding to calls for service, rather than preventing or deterring crime.

The IMT understands that, since May 2020, the City and the CPD have conducted several practice drills throughout the City.<sup>269</sup> And we also witnessed improvements with planning and preparation for the 2020 national election, including with partners, such as the National Guard.

## (2) INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATION

### IMT's Recommendation

- Enhance intelligence gathering and dissemination capabilities by, among other things, (1) tracking national and international events that may impact Chicago, (2) improving social-media engagement, (3) conducting formal meetings with protest organizers and community stakeholders, and (4) engaging with Chicago's communities, stakeholders, and experts regarding the City's and the CPD's policing efforts and strategies (§46)<sup>270</sup>

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<sup>269</sup> "Officers relying upon in the Department's new citywide, 'leveled' response to civil unrest and revised Emergency Mobilization Plans ("EMP") need to know these plans, policies, and procedures in advance of any future spontaneous implementation. . . . The Department relies on its field supervisors and police officers alike to implement plans, policies, and procedures. Going forward, operational efficacy demands prompt training on changes to long-standing plans such as the new 'leveled' response and revised EMPs. As a result, Department leaders need to communicate to field supervisors and police officers the many considerations underlying the Department's response. Using the EMPs, the Department and intragovernmental partners conducted three practice drills, testing the Department's downtown and neighborhood-specific, and retail corridor responses. These drills offered Department leaders, field supervisors, and police officers alike a tangible view of the practical implications of EMP implementation. In addition, the drills assisted the Department in refining the already-revised EMPs." *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department's Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 19.

<sup>270</sup> See Jonathan Links et al., *Recommendations for Enhancing Baltimore City's Preparedness and Response to Mass Demonstration Events, Based on a Review and Analysis of the Events of April 2015*, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY (December 4, 2015) at 62; *Protest and Civil Disorder Incidents, After-Action Report, May 29-June 13, 2020*, LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, at 25,



To be effective, plans must be based on accurate information from reliable sources. That information must then be shared to and from the top. Some CPD officials indicated that they had intelligence that protests would take place in Chicago, but others said that Chicago protests came as a surprise. Some CPD officials indicated that they had heard about protests in other cities—like Minneapolis—and others said they had not. Ultimately, as with many other cities and police departments throughout the country, the City of Chicago and the CPD did not anticipate the level of protests or unrest that occurred after George Floyd’s death. As a result, many officers heard “10-1s” and self-deployed Friday and Saturday, May 30 and 31, 2020. The City and the CPD continued to struggle with receiving, vetting, and sharing information, as protests and unrest spread throughout Chicago. The City and the CPD personnel told us, however, that they began to adjust to the “new normal,” as some representatives described.

The CPD further summarized its strengths and weaknesses regarding communications as follows:

[Analysis Figure 2. CPD After Action Report \(May 20, 2020, through June 12, 2020\)](#)

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**CPD After Action Report: “Communications”**

Strengths	(1) Community Partnerships (2) Existing SDSCs [(Strategic Decision Support Centers)] and ATCs [(Area Technology Centers)]
Weaknesses	(1) Information held in silos was not disseminated to field supervisors (2) Business and retail community vulnerable to property crime (3) Investigation units overwhelmed by widespread criminal activity Department members were exhausted, stressed, and over-burdened <sup>271</sup>

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As we know from City and CPD emails, leading into the weekend at the end of May 2020, there were discussions regarding the weekend protests and the potential for unrest. In interviews, however, City and CPD personnel offered various explanations for why the City and CPD believed the existing intelligence did not warrant more resources, which included the following:

- Some CPD personnel believed that unrest was unlikely because Chicago does not frequently experience the extent of large-scale protests or unrest that was

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31; Gerald Chaleff, *An Independent Examination Of The Los Angeles Police Department 2020 Protest Response* (March 10, 2021), at 74; *A Crisis of Trust, a National Police Foundation Report to the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners on the Los Angeles Police Department Response to First Amendment Assemblies and Protests Occurring May 27-June 7, 2020*, NATIONAL POLICE FOUNDATION (April 2021), at 73, 79, 80, 83; *After Action Report - George Floyd Protests and Response May 30, 2020 - June 7, 2020*, RALEIGH POLICE DEPARTMENT CHIEF’S OFFICE - OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS INSPECTIONS UNIT (September 15, 2020), at 13, 49.

<sup>271</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department’s Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 22.

occurring in other cities in response to police actions that occur outside of Chicago.

- Some City and CPD personnel said that efforts were being focused on limiting the spread of COVID-19 from other large gatherings, helping businesses to safely reopen after extended shutdowns, and responding to and reducing rises in violent crime.
- Some City and CPD personnel said that there was a gap in intelligence regarding anticipated turnout and organization because the City was not issuing permits for large gatherings due to COVID-19.
- Some City and CPD personnel said that many of the protests either did not have the typical organizational structure as typical protests, had organizers that the City and the CPD did not know the new organizers to establish preliminary contacts and coordination, or the organizers were hostile or otherwise unwilling to communicate with the City or the CPD.
- Some City and CPD personnel said that the City and the CPD were not effectively monitoring social media, where many protests—or even unrest—appeared to have been communicated before and during protests.

Even after the unrest on Friday night and Saturday morning, however, some members of CPD command staff—perhaps hopeful—believed that the worst was over, and information regarding those challenges was not consistently shared across the CPD.

The CPD recently described its process and its struggles in May and June of 2020:

*The process of distilling and sharing information relevant to criminal and/or national security investigations is typically referred to as the “intelligence cycle.” It is widely understood as a six-phase process: (1) requirements, (2) planning and direction; (3) collection; (4) processing and exploitation; (5) analysis and production; and (6) dissemination. Like any other law enforcement agency, the Department receives a tremendous amount of incoming information from various sources. These sources include, but are not limited to, calls-for-service, community conversations, and information submitted to CPDTip.org.*

*Strategic Decision Support Centers (“SDSC”) within each police district use this and other information to provide real-time, tactical analytic support to Department members while assisting with the strategic analysis of broader crime trends. Area Technology Centers (“ATC”) similarly use this information to support long-term criminal investigations conducted by BOD.*

*But the Department recognizes that SDSCs and ATCs were largely underutilized during the Events. Each lacked a formal role within the overall Command Post structure, so personnel assigned to them—with specialized training in emerging technologies and live access to POD cameras—contributed only extemporaneous intelligence products to Department leaders.<sup>272</sup>*

Based on a review of City and CPD records, the City and the CPD had reliable information suggesting a high likelihood of wide-scale protests and potential unrest in Chicago. In fact, the CPD and CPIC shared various circumstances that suggested a high risk, and the City and CPD executives met to address this likelihood. While information gathering must be improved to better collect details regarding when, where, and how such protests will occur, the City and the CPD must also better utilize the information they have. For example, the City and the CPD knew that stores were shutting down in Chicago based on information that those businesses had regarding the potential for unrest. This information, however, did not appear to be utilized in the City or CPD’s planning for the events at the end of May 2020.

According to the CPD, it continues to make efforts to improve information gathering and communication. The CPD said, for example, that it started to “actively evaluate the process by which information is received, interpreted, processed, and disseminated,” which is an ongoing, “cross-programmatic effort involving various units” and “local, state, and federal partners.”<sup>273</sup> CPD representatives also indicated that it began to create a social media team, along with policies and procedures and trainings. We have not, however, seen any of these materials.

### (3) COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

#### IMT’s Recommendation

- Continue New Forms of Community Engagement by, among other things, (1) clearly communicating time, place and manner restrictions; (2) conducting community-sentiment assessments; (3) engaging with community review of and comment on policies and training; (4) creating and maintaining community and business safety plans; (5) victim services (¶¶10, 49, 52, 115, 160, 511, 546)<sup>274</sup>

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<sup>272</sup> See *id.* at 22.

<sup>273</sup> See *id.*

<sup>274</sup> See *Strengthening Charleston: Assessment of the Charleston Police Department Response to the May 30-31, 2020 Protests/Riots, Final Report*, CITY OF CHARLESTON, SC (February 2021) at 59; Reneé Hail, *Dallas Police Department After Action Report George Floyd Protest May 29, 2020 Thru June 1, 2020*, DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT (August 14, 2020) at 40; *Protest and Civil Disorder Incidents, After-Action Report, May 29-June 13, 2020*, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 53–54; *Safe LA Civil Unrest, 2020 After Action Report*, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (April 13, 2020) at 119–20; *A Crisis of Trust, a National Police Foundation Report to the Los*

As reflected in the many Consent Decree requirements, community engagement is critical to policing. In addition, the CPD must enhance intelligence and community engagement efforts. Various reports have indicated that many people participated in protests for the first time. As a result, the City and the CPD did not have existing relationships with many of the people who participated in or organized protests. Further, many of the people who were inspired to protest for the first time, did so because of frustration, anger, and pain regarding policing in the U.S. and resisted any actual or appearance of cooperation with police.

According to the CPD's After Action Report, the CPD attempted to reach out to community members after George Floyd's death on Monday, May 25, 2020, and before the protests and unrest at the end of May 2020:

*In the lead up to the first days of the Events and throughout, the Department reached out to event organizers but struggled to establish an on-going dialogue. Similarly, about 60 percent of major city law enforcement agencies reported to the MCCA that a lack of protest organizer cooperation was "the most significant challenge with respect to managing protest-related incidents."<sup>275</sup>*

Nonetheless, we also heard from many CPD personnel—particularly those responding in the districts—that some of the best intelligence regarding unrest came from community members, including protesters, who believed that violence was occurring or was about to occur at a location.

We heard from members of the CPD that it was and continues to be a challenge to respond to protests with protesters and protest organizers who refuse to work with any members of the City or the CPD. The CPD representative said, however, that the CPD must continue to try. While necessary, however, it is not sufficient.

Further, the CPD has acknowledged the need to improve on community interactions before and during protest activity:

*The Department must also better facilitate communication between Department leaders and law-abiding, peaceful individuals engaged in First Amendment-protected activities—even when event organizers cannot (or refuse to) be identified. This is integral to the on-going*

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*Angeles Board of Police Commissioners on the Los Angeles Police Department Response to First Amendment Assemblies and Protests Occurring May 27-June 7, 2020*, NATIONAL POLICE FOUNDATION (April 2021) at 83; *After Action Report - George Floyd Protests and Response May 30, 2020 - June 7, 2020*, RALEIGH POLICE DEPARTMENT CHIEF'S OFFICE - OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS INSPECTIONS UNIT (September 15, 2020) at 48; Benjamin Carleton et al., *Philadelphia Police Department's Response to Demonstrations and Civil Unrest May 30-June 15, 2020*, CNA AND MONTGOMERY McCracken (December 2020) at 84–85, 90.

<sup>275</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department's Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021).

*transparency the Department owes to the individuals whom they serve. . . . Similarly, the Department recognized in the aftermath of the Events the importance of facilitating direct communication between members assigned to the Bureau of Detectives (“BOD”) and partners in the business and retail community to most efficiently investigate felony looting, burglary, property damage, and other crimes when they are, in fact, committed during large-scale incidents of civil unrest.<sup>276</sup>*

While such outreach is necessary and important for each protest and event, it is in many respects, too late and too isolated. Even the most well-meaning, compassionate, and resilient members of the CPD’s community policing team will not be able to build sufficient community trust when preparing for or responding protests. Rather than select outreach for or during protest activity, community’s sentiments are more likely to be driven by the vast majority of the CPD’s daily interactions with Chicago’s communities. If these interactions are or appear to be significantly detached from the principles of procedural justice and community policing, then the CPD will continue to struggle.

In 2020, the CPD continued to track and encourage positive community interactions. Specifically, the Office of Community Policing developed a community engagement performance management system to measure, manage, and report on community-participation data. Specifically, the performance management process tracks police performance by district. The Office of Community Policing tracks foot patrols, crime trends, complaint data, positive community interactions, and community engagement activities. Each month, the CPD performance management group analyzes the data and reports its findings back to districts (two districts per meeting) to help inform district-level and City-wide decision making.

While this may be a step in the right direction, we have expressed concerns that there are issues and inherent limitations with self-reporting. The CPD will need to demonstrate a more overarching plan to incorporate community feedback on officer interactions across Chicago’s communities, especially those communities that have the most police interactions.

To this end, the City and the CPD began to use new community-sentiment-survey data (Elucd survey).<sup>277</sup> This Elucd survey marks a significant new effort by the City and the CPD to measure community sentiment.<sup>278</sup> We further understand that the

<sup>276</sup> See *id.* at 7.

<sup>277</sup> See ELUCD, <https://elucd.com/>. See *Chicago Police Sentiment Dashboard*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, <https://home.chicagopolice.org/statistics-data/data-dashboards/sentiment-dashboard/>.

<sup>278</sup> In our Independent Monitoring Report 3, we outlined reasons for why we believe additional measures are necessary to receive input from Chicago’s underrepresented communities that are most impacted by policing. In this context of gathering systematic data at the district level to measure CPD’s legitimacy and use of procedural justice, we have strongly encourage the City and the CPD to listen to community members who have had a *recent* police contact, which

sentiment analysis survey is only one piece of the CPD's broader effort to engage the community, and the CPD has expressed an openness to additional options. Over the next few years, we strongly encourage the City to collect better data on how CPD officers interact with Chicago residents. The data should include interactions with vulnerable or protected segments of the community and reflect whether procedural justice principles are guiding police actions in all police districts, shifts, and units.

The City and the CPD must also improve information sharing across entities. We heard from several City personnel from different entities that their level of anticipation of large protests and unrest differed from the CPD, based on their own community networks and intelligence. While there are reasons for some entities to communicate differently, there is a concern that, for example, COPA was preparing for a likelihood of increased police interactions and complaints, while the CPD was not.

The City and the CPD must also regain the trust of victims of crime. We heard from people, for example, who suffered or whose friends or family suffered serious injuries, but did not receive follow-up from the CPD.<sup>279</sup> The businesses, employees, and customers whose businesses, stores, and pharmacies were destroyed—some of which were attached to residences.<sup>280</sup> Over the course of the summer, the City

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is not the focus of the Elucd survey. (The sentiment analysis survey includes one question asking whether the survey respondent has had any contact with the CPD in the past year, but the nature of the contact is unknown, the time period is too long, and there are no details about how the CPD treated the subject.) The voices from this particular segment of the community are essential, as they are the ones with first-hand, lived experience with the CPD—specifically recent experience that is not distorted by historical events or memory decay. The vast majority of Chicago residents have not interacted with a CPD officer in the past year, and therefore, their knowledge of CPD actions and police services is indirect and potentially inaccurate.

<sup>279</sup> Cf., e.g., ¶129 (“Fair, unbiased, and respectful interactions between CPD members and victims of crime provide an opportunity to strengthen community trust and foster public confidence in CPD. CPD will continue to require that CPD members interact with victims of crime with courtesy, dignity, and respect. CPD will continue to require that CPD members inform victims of crime of the availability of victim assistance and resources, including providing written notices of victim’s rights, when applicable. CPD will also have such victim assistance information readily available on its public website and at all district stations.”). As we reported in Independent Monitoring Report 3, the CPD implemented a revised version of Special Order S02-01-03, *Crime Victim Assistance* (although additional community engagement was necessary) and the CPD (1) hired three Victim Assistance Coordinators, (2) trained certain members on crime victims’ rights and services and sexual misconduct investigations, (3) received a grant related to crime victim advocacy, and (4) created the Chicago Crime Victim Services Coordinating Council.

<sup>280</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department’s Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 6–7 (“To proactively support those same businesses and retailers, the Department must look to how it interfaces with those businesses and other city agencies and determine a better, more effective means of offering resources and information designed to withstand any future incidents of civil unrest.”).

and the CPD made deliberate efforts to increase communications with businesses regarding risks:

*To this end, the Department has created physical fliers, videos, and social media content as a means of disseminating essential information related to on-going patterns, investigations, and/or public safety threats to the community.*

*One such flier offered a few steps that businesses can take to proactively prepare for large-scale civil unrest. For example, the Department informed business owners how to sign up for “ChiBiz Alerts,” which is a text-based alert system created and operated by OEMC. ChiBiz Alerts sends out emergency communications citywide or to businesses located within a particular geographical area. To date, at least 9,059 businesses have signed-up to receive these alerts. Similarly, business owners were informed how to join Chicago’s Public and Private Partnership Initiative (“CP3”). CP3 partners have access to an array of resource documents regarding general security measures and emergency planning.<sup>281</sup>*

Given the amount of widespread unrest—along with, among other things, the unfamiliarity with mass-arrest procedures or effective body-worn-camera usage, tagging, or review—the CPD also heavily relied on community input to identify suspects from the unrest:

*In addition, the Department established a Looting Task Force to coordinate investigations related to burglary, looting, vandalism, and related property crimes that occur during civil unrest. This task force has released countless pictures and videos of potential suspects to the public through the local media. Community cooperation (including thousands of incoming tips) has enabled the team to arrest a substantial number of individuals, most of whom the United States Attorney’s Office (“USAO”) and CCSAO have since charged with various felony offenses.<sup>282</sup>*

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<sup>281</sup> See *id.* at 23–24.

<sup>282</sup> See *id.*

## (4) MOBILE FIELD FORCE TEAM

### IMT's Recommendations

- Create, train, and equip specialized Mobile Field Force Teams, with certified members, across CPD areas<sup>283</sup>

Perhaps most notable from the IMT's review of the CPD's response to protest and unrest was the lack of formalized and effectively trained Mobile Field Force teams across the CPD. While some CPD officers had received Mobile Field Force training for the 2012 NATO summit, many of those officers were in different roles, and there were no existing teams that were trained as a unit.

The CPD has experienced and continues to experience significant turnover, with retirements, transfers, promotions, and other reassignments. Many officers were not around for the 2012 NATO summit. Moreover, unlike the 2012 NATO summit, the protests and unrest in 2020 were spread throughout Chicago, rather than being in one centralized downtown location. And with the City not issuing permits during COVID-19, many of the protests were relatively unplanned and did not permit the CPD to train any officers on a specific event, with specific routes, security points, or contingencies. After NATO, the CPD's coordinated and trained Mobile Field Force efforts were not maintained, which hampered the CPD's ability to deploy a significant number of officers with sufficient training or equipment.

The CPD describes Mobile Field Force teams as follows:

*Mobile Field Force ("MFF") units are large contingents of police officers, field supervisors, and Department leaders assembled to provide rapid, organized, and disciplined response to civil unrest. They consist of formally-structured, modular 'platoons' and 'squads' trained to perform a variety of specialized policing functions (e.g., crowd control, perimeter maintenance, traffic control, facility security, custodial escort) in an effort to maintain order and preserve peace amid civil unrest.*

*Notably, the Department was lauded following the 2012 NATO Conference for the efficacy with which it employed MFF units as a means of protecting peaceful protestors from agitators, inciters, and wrongdoers. But the 2012 NATO Conference took place nearly a decade ago.*

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<sup>283</sup> See *Strengthening Charleston: Assessment of the Charleston Police Department Response to the May 30-31, 2020 Protests/Riots, Final Report*, CITY OF CHARLESTON, SC (February 2021) at 60; *May 30 Civil Unrest After-Action Review*, CITY OF CLEVELAND, OH (December 2020) at 26–27; Reneé Hail, *Dallas Police Department After Action Report George Floyd Protest May 29, 2020 Thru June 1, 2020*, DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT (August 14, 2020) at 38; *After Action Report - George Floyd Protests and Response May 30, 2020 - June 7, 2020*, RALEIGH POLICE DEPARTMENT CHIEF'S OFFICE - OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS INSPECTIONS UNIT (September 15, 2020) at 12.



*Many Department members upon whom the city relied during related demonstrations have since moved to different roles or retired.*

*As a result, the Department could not reliably rest on experience alone to guide police officers and field supervisors through this summer's civil unrest. Officers were either unfamiliar with or unprepared to employ MFF-specific tactics, techniques, and strategies. In addition, field supervisors could not immediately mobilize the coordinated, cross-functional response demanded by the many unique circumstances underlying the Events.<sup>284</sup>*

Further, as detailed above, the level of protest and unrest in 2020 was unprecedented. Most officers were not previously expected or trained to respond to such protests and unrest, much less do so for such extended periods. Because mobile field force teams typically include specialized skills and training, the CPD did not provide recruit training that adequately prepared officers for what they were asked to do during the protests and unrest. Many of the officers did not have crowd-management experience or training. Many of those who received relevant training for NATO in 2012 had not received ongoing or structured training, and much of their specialized equipment had been phased out over the years.

According to CPD leadership, the CPD provided mobile field force training to officers in the Critical Response Team in 2020. We heard from officers of the Critical Response Team, however, that they had not received Mobile Field Force training—adding that they did not believe that mobile field force training would have helped with the level of unrest that the CPD experienced in 2020.

As a result, officers with little familiarity with Mobile Field Force training and tactics were required to respond protests and unrest throughout 2020. Officers were repeatedly placed in positions without sufficient training or equipment. Many of the results were predictable, including a lack of effective and coordinated uses of force when appropriate and necessary and increases in individualized and ineffective uses of force by officers acting outside of their police line or alone. As such attempts proved to be ineffective or even escalatory, protests and unrest continued and spread throughout Chicago. In turn, the CPD was required to deploy additional officers without necessary training and with similar results. This was particularly in the beginning of the protests and unrest, before officers attempted to learn from trial, error, and correction.

This was reflected in many interviews of officers of all levels and experience and community members. Officers who had any experience with forming police lines attempted to teach or remind officers of how to work as a unit, squad or platoon in the actual engagements with protesters. One of the main factors of having a

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<sup>284</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department's Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 19–20.

well-trained and equipped Mobile Field Force Team is to show unity, coordination, and operational efficiency. This can deter crime in itself and allow officers to minimize the use of force necessary to make arrests, increasing the safety to the person arrested, the officers, and members of the crowd. Such efficiency can also deter others from engaging in unlawful activity. Mobile Field Force units would normally train as units knowing all facets of their training and knowing what tactics are effective in various situations. In addition, properly equipped officers on Mobile Field Force teams have a level of protection from various actions, such as from various projectiles. Mobile Field Force equipment prevents officers from having to always respond with force in order to protect themselves.

While Mobile Field Force units may be authorized and capable of using more force than an individual officer, properly trained, equipped, and certified Mobile Field Force units allow the CPD to use force in a more effective, organized, and targeted manner, which results in less use of force overall. We also watched video of officers leaving their police lines to chase people who they believed committed a crime, such as throwing projectiles. We heard from officers that this often resulted in other officers needing to rescue officers who left the line. To do so, officers needed to use force on people who were either intentionally or unintentionally interfering officers from getting to the officer or officers in need.

In our review of many videos, there did not seem to be a coherent plan about how to respond when officers were having projectiles thrown at them, leaving many officers in harm's way. In many of the videos, we saw people being physically aggressive with officers, throwing projectiles (including rocks, glass, bricks, fireworks, and other explosives, among other items), while others actively pushed back against clear directions from officers. One officer's body-worn-camera footage included repeated questioning about decision-making involving the use of officers to form a human barricade, as well as maintaining a position when taking projectiles with no plan to retreat from or advance on the people who were throwing or launching the projectiles. We also reviewed several videos where officers appeared to advance, narrowing the spatial gap between the officers and the crowd, but gave the crowd no prior or subsequent instruction that would justify the officers getting closer (*i.e.*, communicating the need for the crowd to move back).

In other instances, officer spacing gaps on police lines became so wide as to render the line moot. In one instance, officers faced one line of people while other people freely walked behind them, leading to officer safety issues. People in the crowd may have interpreted the officers' line formation as an authoritative posture rather than a tactical move with any practical application, thereby potentially escalating an already agitated crowd.

To adequately respond to protests and unrest, City and CPD personnel must be aware of and able to identify potential dangers and tactics. In several videos, we

observed people in crowds employing tactics to confront officers, such as steering crowds to certain locations, bringing weapons and devices to harm officers or people in the crowd, leaving weapons along march routes, using banners and umbrellas to hide criminal activity or deflect OC spray, and creating barriers or human chains to break police lines or prevent officers from breaking up the crowds. People also used bikes as barriers and, similar to umbrellas, these often became a flashpoint for officers who were seen attempting to remove the bikes. Several videos we reviewed contained incidents of officers engaged in a tug-of-war with a bike. In one video we observed from July 17, 2020, an officer removed bikes in and around the Columbus Statue. We also observed a few videos where people appeared to use bikes as weapons against police.

We also saw apparent sophisticated tactics being used by people in the crowd, including the use of flags, banners, hand signals, and verbal chains. For instance, as an example of the verbal chains, we observed members of the crowd giving direction to people who appeared to be assigned with specific tasks. In one video, people could be heard saying “If you’re under 18, go to the front” and “Black and Brown units to the front.” The directions were then repeated down the line of people in the crowd. These tactics were purposeful and indicated an organized element within the broader crowd.

In an effective response, however, the City and the CPD must be able to identify tactics of individuals in the crowd to incite violence or an excessive response from the police. The City and the CPD must also know how to respond to such tactics to protect officers, bystanders, and people exercising their First Amendment rights.

As part of that effective response, the City and the CPD must be able to differentiate between lawful protests, civil disobedience, violent conduct from individuals, and violent conduct from crowds. There were trends when the CPD appeared to take an all-or-nothing approach, having no officers prepared to respond to violence or unrest at or nearby a crowd or having all officers with batons in hand without being needed. During our review of video, there were times when officers had their batons in their hands even when the crowd was docile or, in several instances, when officers were not near a crowd at all. Officers would often walk toward crowds with them. While batons are understandably a first defense in crowd-management situations, there are strategies to ensure that officers’ preparations to protect themselves or others do not inadvertently—or advertently—escalate tensions with members of the crowds or act to intimidate people exercising their First Amendment rights.

As the protests continued over the summer, members of the IMT personally observed an increase in preparation for protests that allowed CPD personnel to cre-

ate and maintain distances and de-escalate—or at least avoid escalation—of tensions, while keeping officers and members of the crowd safe. This included, for example, having multiple teams readily available.

In short, when non-Mobile Field Force teams act as Mobile Field Force teams, more people are likely to get hurt, and officers are more likely to use or feel the need to use more serious uses of force. Under the Consent Decree, officers are required to report excessive uses of force (*see, e.g.*, ¶176), officers in a non-Mobile Field Force team are less likely to be able to determine in chaos whether force is excessive, particularly if they were unable to witness the events that immediately proceeded the use of force.<sup>285</sup> It is perhaps unsurprising then that we heard from officers that their platoons or squads chose not to engage with people around them and, instead, attempted to just get through the events safely.

According to the CPD's After Action Report, there were significant consequences to officers on the front lines:

*There were a number of individual incidents where field supervisors and police officers found themselves targeted by assailants wielding various projectiles (e.g., frozen water-bottles, aluminum cans, bricks, rocks). As a result, there were a number of officers seriously injured. These injuries included, but were not limited to, broken bones, lacerations, burns, and abrasions.*<sup>286</sup>

To address this issue, the CPD created the Critical Incident Response Team (CIRT) and Community Safety Teams:

*Members assigned to CIRT often respond first when a police presence becomes necessary at large-scale, lawful gatherings and demonstrations. As such, field supervisors and police officers assigned to those units primarily responsible for responding to large gatherings (e.g., 001st District, 018th District, [Critical Incident Response Team], [Community Safety Team], Tactical Teams, etc.) have since begun to attend eight-hour 'refresher' trainings on MFF policies and tactics. In addition,*

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<sup>285</sup> On December 31, 2020, the CPD issued revised Use of Force policies, in which G03-02, *De-Escalation, Response to Resistance, and Use of Force*, was revised in Section VII.A.1, based on the Working Group's recommendation:

*A department member who directly observes a use of force and identifies the force as excessive or otherwise in violation of this directive will, except in extraordinary circumstances, act to intervene on the person's behalf. Such action may include, but is not limited to, verbally or physically intervening to try to stop the violation. If the member is a supervisor, he or she will issue a direct order to stop the violation.*

<sup>286</sup> *See After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department's Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 14.

*the Education and Training Division started providing MFF-specific ‘refresher’ training department-wide on July 23, 2020. To date, over 1,300 Department members have received this refresher training.*<sup>287</sup>

As we referenced in Independent Monitoring Report 3, we received little information regarding the Critical Incident Response Team or the Community Safety Team at the time, including membership, qualifications, trainings, policies, or procedures. This continues to be true at the time of this report. Without clear policies, standard operating procedures, or goals—including those for the City’s future responses to protests or unrest—we continue to have concerns regarding the challenges that these types of teams present and Chicago’s troubling history with roving teams.<sup>288</sup>

Still, we support the creation of properly trained, equipped, and certified Mobile Field Force teams. On the other hand, while refresher training may have been a necessary stop-gap measure as the CPD continued to respond to protests and unrest, such refresher trainings are not sufficient. In comparison, the City and the CPD prepared extensively for the 2012 NATO Summit, going beyond refresher trainings, including in-person drills and exercises. We heard from officers who went through the training and responded to the NATO Summit that the training was more intense and demanding than the event. In comparison, we heard from a few Critical Incident Response Team officers that the training they received was provided after the fact, was not helpful, did not qualify as “Mobile Field Force” training, and that they would continue to respond to any unrest using the instincts and lessons that they learned after hours in the field.

The CPD has said that, by April 15, 2021, it will establish a Domestic Preparedness Unit within the Education and Training Division to develop and offer training specific to large-scale events, including First Amendment protected demonstrations and wide-spread criminal activity.<sup>289</sup>

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<sup>287</sup> See *id.* at 19–20.

<sup>288</sup> As we noted in Independent Monitoring Report 3, both teams have significant ramifications for the CPD’s compliance with various sections of the Consent Decree, including Community Policing; Impartial Policing; Crisis Intervention; Use of Force; Supervision; Accountability and Transparency; and Data Collection, Analysis, and Management. The IMT understands that the number of officers in these teams has grown significantly since their inception, which creates a challenge for the CPD to achieve compliance with various Consent Decree requirements, including establishing the requisite unity of command and span of control. We expect the CPD to consider how communities respond to such teams and how policing strategies affect relationships between officers and the communities they serve. The IMT has and will continue to raise these concerns until the CPD addresses the concerns with the IMT, the OAG, and Chicago’s communities, as required.

<sup>289</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department’s Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 19–20.

As of the date of this report, we have not received additional details regarding the start of the Domestic Preparedness Unit or its training materials. Best practices on this training, however, exist and have been shown to be effective. While the CPD should use the newly gained experience of its officers to inform its training and policies, we recommend that the CPD revisit this training and ensure that trainers undergo the Office of Domestic Preparedness Mobile Field Force Training Train the Training programs to ensure that new generations of Mobile Field Force teams are not trained based on potentially false lessons from isolated experiences. The Office of Domestic Preparedness Mobile Field Force standardized training should inform the CPD's leadership and supervision of Mobile Field Force officers and tactics, such as OC spray. This training is critical for maintaining control of Mobile Field Force units and providing safety to officers and the public.

Such training requires identifying and addressing resource limitations. To be effective, Mobile Field Force officers must be properly equipped. Furthermore, while it is important for the City and the CPD to be transparent about the Critical Incident Response Team and Community Safety Team with the IMT and the OAG, it is perhaps more urgent to be transparent with the public regarding the use of Mobile Field Force teams. Specifically, the CPD should educate members of the public, community organizers, and protesters regarding the existence of the Mobile Field Force team, its purpose, and the reason its members are equipped with such gear.

The Mobile Field Force gear, for example, protects officers from violent members of the crowd, such as certain projectiles. In addition to safety, this also allows officers to more easily maintain composure and effectively isolate and separate assailants. In comparison, officers who face a hostile crowd without being fully equipped may be more likely to risk attempting to use force or arrest a hostile person in the crowd after being hit with a projectile, triggering a fight or flight response. Mobile Field Force equipment—and training—enable officers to not overreact and, instead, take deliberate measures to target assailants and de-escalate—rather than escalate—tensions. Such awareness and training must occur before, during, and after unrest to best protect officers, protesters, and the public.

In short, the CPD must create a cadre of well-trained and equipped Mobile Field Force teams under appropriately trained leadership. Such teams should be predetermined and should train together under the Mobile Field Force structure of unity of action and command, ensuring that officers do not respond independently or employ force without command authorization. The City and the CPD must also do a realistic and meaningful cost-benefit analysis regarding the need to provide meaningful Mobile Field Force training to additional officers. If all officers will be required to deploy to crowds and unrest, then the City and the CPD should prepare them to do so. While it may be ideal to prepare and train officers as a unit, Mobile Field Force teams will still work better with officers who have been trained separately, than not at all.

## (5) OFFICER WELLNESS AND SUPPORT PROCEDURES

### IMT's Recommendation

- Better prepare for department-wide officer wellness and support, including providing and tracking protective equipment, transportation, hydration, food, facilities, and relief (¶¶381–86)<sup>290</sup>

As reflected above, the City and the CPD did not have a plan to deploy most sworn officers until it was necessary to do so. Once officers were deployed, they were put on 12 hour shifts with canceled days off for an indefinite period. Officers were put into circumstances, often dangerous, without sufficient training or guidance. On top of these challenges, the CPD struggled to provide sufficient breaks, food, water, and rest. While overworked and under-rested, officers faced passionate crowds, often openly critical of police, in general, and the CPD, in particular. The City and the CPD asked officers to preserve professionalism and serve and protect while often receiving slurs, threats, doxing, and physical attacks. In addition to response to crowds and unrest, other officers needed to address typical police responsibilities, including rises in violent crime, where they are required to make quick assessments and decisions. We heard from many officers that they believe officers' ability to make these decisions was negatively impacted by their lack of rest and physical and mental fatigue.

In August 2020, COPA also identified officer wellness issues as directly relating to officer conduct:

*Several COPA investigations have highlighted the excessive number of hours and shifts worked during the protests. While there was an overwhelming public safety interest in maintaining a law enforcement*

<sup>290</sup> See Jonathan Links, Katie O'Connor, and Lauren Sauer, *Recommendations for Enhancing Baltimore City's Preparedness and Response to Mass Demonstration Events, Based on a Review and Analysis of the Events of April 2015*, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY (December 4, 2015) at 64–67; *Strengthening Charleston: Assessment of the Charleston Police Department Response to the May 30-31, 2020 Protests/Riots, Final Report*, CITY OF CHARLESTON, SC (February 2021) at 59–60; *May 30 Civil Unrest After-Action Review*, CITY OF CLEVELAND, OH (December 2020) at 27, 32, 34, 36–38; Reneé Hail, *Dallas Police Department After Action Report George Floyd Protest May 29, 2020 Thru June 1, 2020*, DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT (August 14, 2020) at 42–44; *Safe LA Civil Unrest, 2020 After Action Report*, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (April 13, 2020) at 116; Gerald Chaleff, *An Independent Examination Of The Los Angeles Police Department 2020 Protest Response* (March 10, 2021), at 73; *A Crisis of Trust, a National Police Foundation Report to the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners on the Los Angeles Police Department Response to First Amendment Assemblies and Protests Occurring May 27-June 7, 2020*, NATIONAL POLICE FOUNDATION (April 2021) at 81; *After Action Report - George Floyd Protests and Response May 30, 2020 - June 7, 2020*, RALEIGH POLICE DEPARTMENT CHIEF'S OFFICE - OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS INSPECTIONS UNIT (September 15, 2020) at 23–25; Benjamin Carleton et al., *Philadelphia Police Department's Response to Demonstrations and Civil Unrest May 30-June 15, 2020*, CNA AND MONTGOMERY MCCracken (December 2020) at 83–84.

*presence on the street during the protests, in many instances, lack of sleep, stress, and other similar factors directly influenced member conduct.*

To date, some officers are still under investigation for varying levels of misconduct, and according to the CPD, a few have been relieved of police powers for protest related conduct. There also appears to be an increase in officer retirements, including many high-level positions.<sup>291</sup> And tragically, the CPD has struggled with officer suicides before 2020, which continued in 2020 and have continued into 2021.

In the CPD's After Action Report,

*Whether a Department member's days off may be cancelled, hours extended, or area of deployment shifted invariably impacts his or her mental, emotional, and physical well-being. The Department relies on its field supervisors and police officers to make instinctual, split-second decisions and going forward, it cannot allow things like exhaustion and stress to impact decision-making.*<sup>292</sup>

While the number of hours, shifts, and canceled days off continued throughout 2020—and into 2021—the CPD eventually adjusted deployment plans to ensure that officers had at least one day off a week. Nonetheless, such extended shifts and canceled days off put significant stresses on officers and their families. This may have been especially true during COVID-19, as we heard that many families with first responders, and other essential workers, struggled to address child and parental care and closed schools.

The CPD has committed to improving the amount of notice that officers receive before canceled days off and extended shifts.

*The Department intends to better communicate with its members as far in advance as possible when they should anticipate disruptions to their personal lives as a result of large-scale, planned events and key holidays (e.g., Memorial Day, Father's Day, Independent Day, and Labor Day). This is, of course, in addition to the Department's on-going commitment to better support members as they navigate the unique*

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<sup>291</sup> See, e.g., Frank Main and Fran Spielman, *Chicago police retirements this year already top all of 2018, could end up among highest ever*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (June 18, 2021), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/2021/1/15/22229584/police-retirements-backlash-chicago-new-york-minneapolis-john-catanzara-fop-michael-lappe>; Fran Spielman, *Midterm correction, COVID-19 fatigue or mass exodus? Lightfoot's revolving door keeps spinning*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (May 9, 2021), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/city-hall/2021/5/9/22425232/chicago-mayor-loriligh-foot-administration-turnover-mid-term-cabinet>.

<sup>292</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department's Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 16, [https://home.chicagopolice.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/AAR\\_FINAL\\_2-4-21.pdf](https://home.chicagopolice.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/AAR_FINAL_2-4-21.pdf).



*demands of policing and its impact on mental, emotional, and physical health and well-being.*<sup>293</sup>

We have heard from officers, however, that this issue pre-existed the protests and unrest in 2020 and has continued in 2021.

The CPD further acknowledged the need for plans and preparation for unplanned events or for scaling up the response to planned events:

*But with a modern, 'leveled' response, Department members can better anticipate whether their days off might be cancelled, hours extended, or areas of deployment shifted. Similarly, consistent 'levels' will enable the Department to scale an otherwise-consistent emergency response (whether localized or citywide) to any given incident.*<sup>294</sup>

Commanders told us that the CPD made Employee Assistance Program personnel available to officers. Many acknowledged the importance of the program, but added that more needed to be done—because more always needs to be done.

As reflected in the CPD's policies and training, most CPD officers are not typically assigned to handle large-scale protests or unrest. All officers, however, were called on to do so in 2020 and for extended periods, often for 12 hour days with no or limited days off.

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<sup>293</sup> *See id.*

<sup>294</sup> *See id.* at 11 (citing *Special Response Plans*, General Order G05-02 § II (December 7, 2017)).

## (6) RESOURCES

### IMT's Recommendations

- Conduct a feasibility study regarding the acquisition, prioritization, allocation, and tracking of resources for officer wellness and responding to protests and unrest (§§377, 379)<sup>295</sup>

The Consent Decree requires, among other things, equipping CPD officers “in a manner that enables them to do their jobs as safely as reasonably possible” (§379). CPD must also “ensure that the safety of its members is not jeopardized by equipment and technology that is outdated, broken, or in need of repair or replacement” (§379). The CPD must also conduct periodic “department-wide equipment and technology audit[s] to determine what equipment is outdated, broken, or otherwise in need of repair or replacement” (§415).

Inadequate resources and misallocation of existing resources severely hindered the City and the CPD’s ability to effectively respond to protests and unrest. Better planning would have better addressed the City and the CPD’s ability to allocate existing resources. For example, the CPD did not utilize its existing radios or body-worn cameras efficiently, often requiring officers to respond with neither.

But even with proper planning, the City and the CPD likely would have still struggled with the challenges caused by a lack of necessary resources, such as effective radios. And as with the need to do preparations and trainings weeks—if not months—in advance of George Floyd’s death, the City and the CPD would have

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<sup>295</sup> See Jonathan Links et al., *Recommendations for Enhancing Baltimore City’s Preparedness and Response to Mass Demonstration Events, Based on a Review and Analysis of the Events of April 2015*, Johns Hopkins University (December 4, 2015) at 14, 17, 31–32; *Strengthening Charleston: Assessment of the Charleston Police Department Response to the May 30-31, 2020 Protests/Riots, Final Report*, CITY OF CHARLESTON, SC (February 2021) at 58–60; *May 30 Civil Unrest After-Action Review*, CITY OF CLEVELAND, OH (December 2020), 27, 30–31; Reneé Hail, *Dallas Police Department After Action Report George Floyd Protest May 29, 2020 Thru June 1, 2020*, DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT (August 14, 2020), at 17–19, 22–23, 27, 32, 38; *Safe LA Civil Unrest, 2020 After Action Report*, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (April 13, 2020), at 104–108, 112, 116; Gerald Chaleff, *An Independent Examination Of The Los Angeles Police Department 2020 Protest Response* (March 10, 2021), at 73; *A Crisis of Trust, a National Police Foundation Report to the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners on the Los Angeles Police Department Response to First Amendment Assemblies and Protests Occurring May 27-June 7, 2020*, NATIONAL POLICE FOUNDATION (April 2021), at 78–79; *After Action Report - George Floyd Protests and Response May 30, 2020 - June 7, 2020*, RALEIGH POLICE DEPARTMENT CHIEF’S OFFICE - OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS INSPECTIONS UNIT (September 15, 2020), at 12–14, 25–26; Nicholas Mitchell, *The Police Response to the 2020 George Floyd Protests in Denver, and Independent Review*, DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR, at 55; Benjamin Carleton et al., *Philadelphia Police Department’s Response to Demonstrations and Civil Unrest May 30-June 15, 2020*, CNA AND MONTGOMERY McCracken (December 2020), at 80–85, 88.

needed to acquire resources before May 25, 2020. Many supply chains were impacted by COVID-19, and by the time the CPD realized its need, the demand for specialized police equipment had risen across the country.

For example, as referenced above, the CPD did not have a fully staffed and trained mobile-field-force team at the start of the 2020 protests and unrest. During the 2012 NATO Summit, in comparison, the CPD fully equipped thousands of officers with Mobile Field Force equipment. Since then, the CPD allowed its supply of Mobile Field Force equipment to dwindle over the years. The CPD did not employ a system to track or reassign equipment as officers retired or transferred out of patrol. As a result, many of the corresponding equipment was gone or deteriorated and existing supply was insufficient. Still, at the end of May 2020, the CPD had to rely on mass arrests kits left over from the NATO Summit, some of which included expired markers and zip ties. The CPD was fortunate that it had recently taken inventory and had a few personnel who knew where those materials were. Even if all of the equipment was in good condition, however, it would not have been enough for what was needed.

If the CPD did not have sufficient resources for specialized teams to conduct crowd management, it definitely did not have sufficient resources for the emergency deployment of all officers. As a result, the City and the CPD had to identify needs for such a large deployment after beginning the deployment.

This required a rush to purchase necessary materials. According to CPD responses to requests, for example, between May and June 30, 2020, the CPD also purchased about 400 water bottles, 10,000 gloves, 1,000 black markers, 250 face shields for helmets, 15 fire extinguishers, 12,500 flex cuffs, 30 helmets, 10 HydroStorm Backpacks, 4,000 hand wipes, 500 batons, 103 “riot shields,” and 12,000 surgical masks. Some costs are reflected in [Analysis Figure 3](#), below.

**Analysis Figure 3. CPD Purchases between May 25, 2020, and June 10, 2020**

Emergency Purchase of cable tie for flex cuffs	\$226.44
Heavy duty long black cable ties and cuff cutters	\$1,698.20
Gas masks and filters	\$23,119.28
OC Spray	\$16,308.00
OC Spray + Freight Charges	\$16,087.49
Tent Rentals	\$1,482.68
Rental of 140 Passenger Vans (seat 12 to 15 people)	\$286,124.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$345,046.09</b>

The CPD also relied on donations, including over 56,000 snacks, 68,000 bottles of hydration, over 360 bags of ice, nearly 2,000 hand wipes and gloves, coolers, tents, generators, and fans. In the CPD's After Action Report, the CPD notes that it has also received additional donations:

*In addition, the Chicago Police Memorial Foundation ("CPMF") generously acquired and donated 1,650 ballistic helmets to front-line field supervisors and police officers, upgraded to include Kevlar protection and laser beam reflectors across the affixed face shield as part of its 'Helmets for Heroes' initiative. These helmets will undoubtedly protect field supervisors and police officers from blunt trauma, allowing them to stand confidently between law-abiding, peaceful demonstrators and those few hostile assailants willing to do harm to others.*<sup>296</sup>

## Body Worn Cameras

The Consent Decree specifies many requirements regarding the CPD's use of body-worn cameras. See, e.g., ¶¶237 and 239. Body-worn cameras are a critical tool for securing public trust, securing evidence, and increasing accountability. As the CPD acknowledged in their After Action Report, body-worn cameras "allow for increased transparency, create digital evidence, protect Department members from false complaints, and offer a fair and impartial documentation of events for all of the parties involved."<sup>297</sup> In the initial and ongoing response to protests and unrest, the CPD had several challenges with body-worn cameras.

In the initial response to unrest at the end of May 2020, with very minimal exceptions, the CPD deployed all sworn officers, including officers in Reform management, Force Review Division, and the Bureau of Internal Affairs. Because these officers are not typically in patrol, they are not equipped with body-worn cameras. In the CPD's After Action Report, the CPD acknowledged its challenges with equipping officers with body-worn cameras.

*[At] the time of the Events, BWCs were largely assigned to field units (i.e., patrol) and not to each of roughly 13,000 sworn officers in various roles throughout the Department due to cost. Thus, as this was a department-wide response, many field supervisors and police officers witnessed criminal activity and made arrests for which no BWC video exists.*<sup>298</sup>

<sup>296</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department's Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 14 ("The helmets previously purchased by police officers during the academy needed to be upgraded."), [https://home.chicagopolice.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/AAR\\_FINAL\\_2-4-21.pdf](https://home.chicagopolice.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/AAR_FINAL_2-4-21.pdf).

<sup>297</sup> See *id.*

<sup>298</sup> See *id.*

Moreover, by creating an ad hoc central mobilization location, officers who deployed from that location did not have access to their typical body-worn cameras from their districts. The CPD continued to have issues with body-worn cameras after creating the Critical Incident Response Team and the Community Engagement Team. Some of the officers assigned to these teams came from specialized units without body-worn cameras, and began working on the teams without receiving body-worn cameras. This issue became known after the officer-involved shooting in District 7 on August 9, 2020, because the officers involved were not wearing body-worn cameras.<sup>299</sup> According to CPD, there were at least 5,676 officers who responded to protests and unrest between May 1, 2020, and August 12, 2020, without body-worn cameras. We also heard from some officers with body-worn cameras that supervisors instructed them to not have the cameras on the entire time while responding to crowds during 12-hour shifts to preserve battery life—which was often limited from having been insufficiently charged.

These challenges, however, continued after the central mobilization center. As referenced above, the CPD created the Critical Incident Response Team and the Community Safety Team to respond to any ongoing protests and unrest over the summer of 2020. Some of these officers, however, did not have body-worn cameras. In fact, it wasn't until after the officer-involved shooting on August 9, 2020, when members of the Critical Incident Response Team did not have body-worn cameras, which led to another round of unrest, that the CPD addressed the issue.

On November 20, 2020, the CPD notified the IMT that “the Strategic Initiatives Division has provided the Community Safety Teams (CST) and the Critical Incident Response Team (CIRT) with Body Worn Cameras.” In the CPD’s After Action Report, the CPD asserted that everyone “assigned to patrol duties—including those on the Critical Incident Response Team (“CIRT”) and Community Safety Teams (“CST”)-has been assigned a BWC” and officers “mass transit and traffic sections have also recently been assigned BWCs.”<sup>300</sup>

Without sufficient body-worn cameras in place, there is less evidence of criminal activity or officer misconduct and the City and the CPD is unable to evaluate officer performances. It is paramount to provide officers who perform patrol functions. Officers who do not have body-worn cameras should only be deployed to assignments which do not require enforcement actions. The CPD has not yet provided the IMT with sufficient proof that all officers with patrol duties have been assigned

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<sup>299</sup> See Samah Assad and Christopher Hacker, *City Promises All Officers Will Wear Body Cameras By 2021 After Officers Without Cameras Shoot Man in Englewood*, CBS CHICAGO (August 11, 2020), <https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2020/08/11/city-promises-all-officers-will-wear-body-cameras-by-2021-after-officers-without-cameras-shoot-man-in-englewood/>. See also *Case Portal Log# 2020-3647*, CIVILIAN OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY (Posted September 29, 2020), <https://www.chicagocopa.org/case/2020-3647/>.

<sup>300</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department’s Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 14.

a body-worn camera. Moving forward in additional reporting periods, we look forward to receiving records of and reporting on equipment developments and corresponding existing audits and plans moving forward.

## Radios and Other Communication Devices

The CPD also had significant challenges with radios that were interrupted and a lack of equipment to effectively communicate with crowds. In the CPD's After Action Report, the CPD addressed the significance of the CPD's inability to use effective radio communication:

*A radio is, debatably, one of the most essential pieces of equipment that a police officer carries on a day-to-day basis. It is the primary means by which police officers are dispatched to calls and—perhaps more importantly—how they make emergency pleas for help. Following the civil unrest, Department leaders acknowledged a few ways which radio communications could be improved. Department members do not own the radios that they carry.*

The CPD has indicated that they have and continue to work to resolve this problem:

*[T]he Department acquired additional Motorola 8000 series radios to make available at each of the five police areas and twenty-two districts when off-duty officers are deployed. Similarly, the Department began the process of upgrading to a secure, modernized radio system to ensure that the intensity of a given situation and/or rogue transmissions do not comprise a member's ability to communicate effectively.*

There were also significant challenges communicating with members of the crowd, which is imperative for successful crowd management and limiting uses of force.

*. . . Department leaders—many of whom watched the civil unrest unfold live from OEMC—could not effectively communicate their POD observations to field supervisors or officers because of radio communication challenges. Crowd noise alone precluded effective back-and-forth radio communication. Rogue transmissions over police radio frequencies interrupted on-going emergencies. At the same time, Department members unfortunately found themselves mobilized for so many consecutive hours that their radio batteries died in the field.*

*Similarly, field-deployed Department leaders and mid-level supervisors could not communicate effectively with the many law-abiding, peaceful individuals engaged in First Amendment-protected activities. It was simply too loud to open and facilitate an effective transparent dialogue*

*about individual incidents, arrests, and/or decisions being made by Department leaders.*<sup>301</sup>

In response to this challenge, the CPD acquired additional radios and bullhorns:

*In order to facilitate communication between Department leaders and the many law-abiding peaceful individuals engaged in First Amendment-protected activities, the Department recognized an urgent need to acquire megaphones (i.e., bullhorns). These hand-held devices allowed Department leaders and mid-level supervisors to communicate with residents and police officers alike about what exactly was happening at any given time.*<sup>302</sup>

We have some concerns that these methods of communication are still not effective for large scale events, and we recommend that the City and the CPD continue to assess whether additional resources are necessary.

### Mobile Field Force Equipment and OC Spray

While officers have some of the equipment needed to respond, including helmets and personal OC spray devices. During initial protests and unrest, many officers responded without sufficient protective equipment, including helmets. This was dangerous and likely resulted in otherwise avoidable officer injuries. Further, the CPD did not have additional equipment—such as shields or OC spray canisters—readily available for organized distribution. In the first weekend, we heard that this equipment was handed out after events already rose to a level of an emergency and without tracking. While we hear that additional OC spray canisters were only handed out to supervisors, there was no way to show this outside of the memories of a few people who were rushing around to deliver materials to any officers they could find.

There also does not appear to have been a tracking mechanism for renewing personal OC spray canisters. This is a particular concern since we heard that there was a lot of confusion regarding the use of personal OC spray. CPD leadership said that the OC spray is a liquid substance that can target one individual at a time and that officers need the Superintendent's approval before using OC spray on a crowd.<sup>303</sup>

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<sup>301</sup> See *id.* at 15.

<sup>302</sup> See *id.* at 15–16.

<sup>303</sup> See, e.g., ¶¶208 (“CPD officers may only use OC devices for crowd dispersal when such force is necessary, objectively reasonable, and proportional to the threat presented to public safety. CPD will continue to require that the Superintendent or his or her designee provides authorization before OC devices are used for noncompliant groups, crowds, or an individual taking part in a group or crowd.”) and 210 (“Each individual application of an OC device (e.g., each spray of an officer’s personal OC device) by a CPD officer must be objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances, and consistent with the objectives above.”).

Nonetheless, there appears to have been significant confusion regarding some officers' misconception that they could use their individual OC spray canisters on multiple individuals at a time—as opposed to larger OC spray canisters from munitions teams for the purpose of the use on crowds—without Superintendent approval. On October 28, 2020, for example, in response to a request for a “list of all officer requests for personal OC spray—and the corresponding dates of those requests—from May 25, 2020, through August 31, 2020,” the CPD responded that “there are no records responsive to this request.”

While officers may be justified in using individual OC spray on multiple assailants, the lack of tracking individual OC spray distribution and refills was a significant missed opportunity. If the CPD had done so, the CPD could compare officers reporting on the use of OC spray and their requests for renewals to ensure that OC spray was properly reported and potentially review the reports and corresponding body-worn-camera footage and evidence to determine whether OC spray was being used according to CPD policy.

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While the City and the CPD had yet to provide compliance records by the end of the last reporting period (December 31, 2020), the CPD reported that they have made progress on increasing the City and CPD's ability to better utilize existing equipment and obtain additional equipment to respond to protests, prevent unrest, and respond to unrest. This includes better Mobile Field Force equipment, improved radio communications, crowd communication devices, and upgraded helmets.

Specifically, the CPD has reported that it has improved the security of its radios and added body-worn cameras to transportation and special teams. For example, in the CPD's After Action Report, the CPD asserted that everyone “assigned to patrol duties—including those on the Critical Incident Response Team (“CIRT”) and Community Safety Teams (“CST”)-has been assigned a BWC” and officers “mass transit and traffic sections have also recently been assigned BWCs.”<sup>304</sup> Moving forward in additional reporting periods, we look forward to receiving records of and reporting on equipment developments and corresponding existing audits and plans moving forward.<sup>305</sup>

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<sup>304</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department's Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 14.

<sup>305</sup> See *id.* at 15–16 (“Even when Department members could receive information, various obstacles inhibited their ability to move around the central business district efficiently. Squad cars were destroyed (and often set ablaze) with an astounding, unanticipated frequency on the first few days and nights. This vandalism rendered the vehicles functionally useless. Similarly, when more Department members are working at a particular time (during, for example, twelve-hour



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shifts and/or cancelled days off) the Department simply lacked sufficient fleet capacity to provide all working officers with sufficient transportation. . . . Department leaders also recognized the urgent need to identify alternate means of transportation for officers when more officers are working than squad cars are available. As a result, the Department assessed and developed a plan ensuring that each officer could be transported by relying on rented passenger vans and Chicago Transit Authority ('CTA') buses. These alternate means of transportation mobilized small teams quickly and efficiently transported large platoons to pre-identified, 'fixed' foot posts.").

## Policies

### IMT's Recommendations: Policies

- Update and Develop Standard Operating Procedures for initiating Emergency Operations Center and Forward Command Posts, establishing clear roles and responsibilities for all levels of command (§§341–46, 354)
- Update and develop CPD policies, with an enhanced focus on (1) Use of Force, including mass arrests (§§153, 158–216, 218–19, 243–48, and 509), (2) First Amendment-related policies (§208), (3) core policing values regarding ethical policing practices and a commitment to fair, unbiased and respectful interactions (§§154, 152, and 163); and (4) accountability (§§626, *et al.*)

Effective policies should serve as the foundation for providing the City and the CPD, including command staff, supervisors, and officers, with their responsibilities and expectations. While this is always true, it is particularly important during crises. Policies should reflect the institutional knowledge and wisdom of past experiences, so that leaders and personnel do not need to reinvent known solutions or repeat mistakes. As reflected in [Analysis Figure 4](#) below, the CPD has acknowledged that there were gaps in its policies and procedures at the start of the 2020 protests and unrest. The City and the CPD now have the opportunity to capture the lessons learned into its policies and procedures to better address similar circumstances if they occur in 2021, in the next decade, or in the next generation. This process should include the lessons learned across all levels of City and the CPD personnel, as well as receive input from the Chicago's communities they serve.

### Analysis Figure 4. CPD After Action Report (May 20, 2020, through June 12, 2020)

#### CPD After Action Report: "Command and Control"

Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Existing Summer Operations Center ("SOC")</li> <li>(2) Intergovernmental relationships</li> <li>(3) Investment in technology</li> </ul>
Weaknesses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Outdated, ad hoc incident management policies and procedures</li> <li>(2) Inefficient method of tracking Department members and resources</li> <li>(3) Department leaders lacked recent training on NIMS/ICS<sup>306</sup></li> </ul>

<sup>306</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department's Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 17.

## (1) COMMAND POSTS, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

### IMT's Recommendations

- Update and Develop Standard Operating Procedures for initiating Emergency Operations Center and Forward Command Posts, establishing clear roles and responsibilities for all levels of command (¶¶341–46, 354)<sup>307</sup>

The success of the City and the CPD's policies start at the top. Based on the records we received—or rather lack thereof—the City and the CPD did not have sufficient policies delineating clear duties and responsibilities for personnel to respond to widespread protests and unrest.<sup>308</sup> The City and the CPD relied on the experience of its personnel, and while many personnel admirably worked to meet the moment, the City and the CPD must have processes that are not reliant on any one individual or set of individuals.

As referenced above, the Summer Operations Center was converted into the Emergency Operations Center to track, manage, and direct City, CPD, and local, state,

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<sup>307</sup> See Jonathan Links et al., *Recommendations for Enhancing Baltimore City's Preparedness and Response to Mass Demonstration Events, Based on a Review and Analysis of the Events of April 2015*, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY (December 4, 2015), 14, 17, 31–32; *Strengthening Charleston: Assessment of the Charleston Police Department Response to the May 30-31, 2020 Protests/Riots, Final Report*, CITY OF CHARLESTON, SC, 58–60 (February 2021); *May 30 Civil Unrest After-Action Review*, CITY OF CLEVELAND, OH, 27, 30–31 (December 2020); Reneé Hail, *Dallas Police Department After Action Report George Floyd Protest May 29, 2020 Thru June 1, 2020*, DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT, 17–19, 22–23, 27, 32, 38 (August 14, 2020); *Safe LA Civil Unrest, 2020 After Action Report*, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, 104–108, 112, 116 (April 13, 2020); Gerald Chaffeff, *An Independent Examination Of The Los Angeles Police Department 2020 Protest Response* (March 10, 2021), at 73; *A Crisis of Trust, a National Police Foundation Report to the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners on the Los Angeles Police Department Response to First Amendment Assemblies and Protests Occurring May 27-June 7, 2020*, NATIONAL POLICE FOUNDATION, 78–79 (April 2021); *After Action Report - George Floyd Protests and Response May 30, 2020 - June 7, 2020*, RALEIGH POLICE DEPARTMENT CHIEF'S OFFICE - OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS INSPECTIONS UNIT, 12–14, 25–26 (September 15, 2020); Nicholas Mitchell, *The Police Response to the 2020 George Floyd Protests in Denver, and Independent Review*, DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR, 55; Benjamin Carleton et al., *Philadelphia Police Department's Response to Demonstrations and Civil Unrest May 30-June 15, 2020*, CNA AND MONTGOMERY McCracken, 80–85, 88 (December 2020).

<sup>308</sup> The CPD has noted that some of the Emergency Operations Center practices are in CPD directives, such as Forward Command Post concepts in G05-05, *Critical Incident response Program* (December 7, 2017) and updated roles responsibilities in the recent revision to G02-02, *First Amendment Rights* (April 13, 2021). We agree that the CPD's policies do reference relevant aspects of its response to protests and unrest, and the City and the CPD have made and continue to make deliberate efforts to improve relevant policies, such as G02-02. Our recommendation, however, is for the City's entities, including the CPD, to better develop or update specific standard operating procedures for responding to protests and unrest and to enumerate the lessons learned in 2020, better reflect best practices, and maintain institutional knowledge.

and federal resources.<sup>309</sup> The Emergency Operations Center included representatives from the Chicago Police Department, Mayor’s Office, the Illinois State Police, the Illinois National Guard, the Office of the Emergency Management and Communications, the Chicago Fire Department, and Streets and Sanitation. The Operations Center also had the ability to monitor various Observation Device cameras.

Throughout the weekend at the end of May 2020 and until Monday, June 2, 2020, several locations were identified as incident command locations. This made it difficult for the CPD to establish and communicate incident command, as there was an overall lack of knowledge about who was acting as the incident commander and where the command center was that weekend. Specifically, in our interviews with officers, many supervisors were identified as possibly being in charge on Saturday, May 30, and Sunday, May 31, from commanders to deputy chiefs. Similarly, many officers referred to different locations as the “command center”: the Summer Operations Center (SOC) at OEMC, the Emergency Operations Center, CPD Public Safety Headquarters, and Guaranteed Rate Field.

The CPD acknowledged the importance of following the National Incident Management System and unified Incident Command System framework:

*[The] Department has long recognized the value of a systematic, proactive approach consistent with the National Incident Management System (“NIMS”), which follows a unified Incident Command System (“ICS”) framework. Under NIMS/ICS, the highest-ranking on-site Department member, responsible for the Department’s overall response, takes on the role of “Incident Commander.” This individual typically takes control at a Forward Command Post (“FCP”), a secure location established by the first field supervisor on-scene—typically located just outside the immediate vicinity of a critical incident. . . . However, the Department faced a unique challenge in that Department leaders and key members lacked recent, up-to-date training or practice on NIMS/ICS policies and procedures.*<sup>310</sup>

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<sup>309</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department’s Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 5–6 (“Department leaders manage the incident from a FCP until a full-scale Operations Center (‘OC’) is established at the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (‘OEMC’). But earlier this summer, the Department had, for the first time, established a Summer Operations Center (‘SOC’) at OEMC—which enabled a coordinated, proactive response to violent crime by the city’s public safety, regulatory, infrastructure, and other agencies. In turn, the Department was able to quickly transition the existing SOC to a full-scale OC at the onset of the large-scale, unprecedented civil unrest. As a result, Department leaders could more efficiently manage available resources (and resolve incoming resource requests) from the same centralized location where they were ultimately making command-level decisions.” (citing *Critical Incident Response Program*, General Order G05-03 § II-A-1 (December 7, 2017)).

<sup>310</sup> See *id.* (citing *Critical Incident Response Program*, General Order G05-03 § II-A-1 (December 7, 2017)).

## (2) CPD POLICIES

### IMT's Recommendation

- Update and develop CPD policies, with an enhanced focus on (1) Use of Force, including mass arrests (¶¶153, 158–216, 218–19, 243–48, and 509), (2) First Amendment-related policies (¶1208), (3) core policing values regarding ethical policing practices and a commitment to fair, unbiased and respectful interactions (¶¶154, 152, and 163); and (4) accountability (¶¶626, *et al.*)<sup>311</sup>

As an extension to the lack of planning and preparation for large scale protests and unrest, the CPD did not have sufficient policies on how to respond to large crowds, much less large and sustained protests or unrest. Policies should be developed or revised which address critical issues such as planning process, intelligence gathering and dissemination, roles and responsibilities, rules of engagement, mass arrest, uses of force, and other critical elements of managing protest and special events.

CPD Directives are available on the CPD's website: <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/>. The CPD also generally invites public comment via email:

*“General questions or suggestions about Department directives and the Department Directive System can be directed to the [CPD’s] Research and Development Division’s email address at [RandD@chicagopolice.org](mailto:RandD@chicagopolice.org).”*<sup>312</sup>

<sup>311</sup> See Jonathan Links et al., *Recommendations for Enhancing Baltimore City’s Preparedness and Response to Mass Demonstration Events, Based on a Review and Analysis of the Events of April 2015*, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, 60–61 (December 4, 2015); *May 30 Civil Unrest After-Action Review*, CITY OF CLEVELAND, OH, 27, 30, 36 (December 2020); Reneé Hail, *Dallas Police Department After Action Report George Floyd Protest May 29, 2020 Thru June 1, 2020*, DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT, 24, 26, 41–42, 45 (August 14, 2020); *Protest and Civil Disorder Incidents, After-Action Report, May 29-June 13, 2020*, LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, 43–48; *Safe LA Civil Unrest, 2020 After Action Report*, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, 111 (April 13, 2020); Gerald Chaleff, *An Independent Examination Of The Los Angeles Police Department 2020 Protest Response* (March 10, 2021), at 67–68; *A Crisis of Trust, a National Police Foundation Report to the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners on the Los Angeles Police Department Response to First Amendment Assemblies and Protests Occurring May 27-June 7, 2020*, NATIONAL POLICE FOUNDATION, 73–78 (April 2021); *After Action Report - George Floyd Protests and Response May 30, 2020 - June 7, 2020*, RALEIGH POLICE DEPARTMENT CHIEF’S OFFICE - OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS INSPECTIONS UNIT, 14–15, 21–22, 26, 35, 37–38 (September 15, 2020); Nicholas Mitchell, *The Police Response to the 2020 George Floyd Protests in Denver, and Independent Review*, DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR, 53–54; Benjamin Carleton et al., *Philadelphia Police Department’s Response to Demonstrations and Civil Unrest May 30-June 15, 2020*, CNA AND MONTGOMERY MCCrackEN, 81–82, 86–88, 90–91 (December 2020).

<sup>312</sup> *Department Directives System, General Order G01-03*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (May 5, 2020), <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12da4413-45c12-da48-e53050843037d784.pdf?ownapi=1>.

Because of the increased deployments, community contacts, and sporadic nature of events, many of the CPD's policies applied to the CPD's response to protests and unrest.<sup>313</sup> The City and the CPD have updated many of these policies through the Consent Decree review process, such as those related to Use of Force. This process includes input from the IMT, the Office of the Illinois Attorney General, and Chicago's communities. *See, e.g.*, ¶¶52, 160, and 627, *et al.* Many others are still undergoing the review process. The CPD also, however, amended some of these policies after identifying issues during the protests and unrest, after their after-action report, during requests for records and interviews with the IMT and the City of Chicago Inspector General, and from community feedback, including feedback from the Coalition.<sup>314</sup> [Analysis Figure 5](#), below, provides a non-comprehensive summary of the CPD's relevant policies in May 2020, recent changes, and ongoing development.

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<sup>313</sup> CPD policies include "**General Orders (GO)**" ("directives that establish critical policies directly related to the core values and functions of the Department or the broad organizational policies and key practices relating to those core values"), "**Special Orders (SO)**" ("directives that establish protocols and procedures concerning specific Department functions, operations, programs, or processes"), "**Employee Resources (ER)**" ("directives that pertain to administrative functions, employment requirements, operations, programs, or processes"), "**Uniform and Property (UP)**" ("Directives pertain to uniforms and equipment, both Department and personal, and Department facilities, property, and vehicles"), and "**Department Notices (DN)**" (directives that are anticipated to be reviewed or revised soon after publication or directives with a limited duration that: a. establish procedures and assign duties to Department personnel for a single event or circumstance; or b. introduce pilot programs or involve only a limited geographic scope or selected personnel; or c. provide listings, calendars, or other information of general interest." *Department Directives System, General Order G01-03*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (May 5, 2020). Although not reflected here, the CPD also has "**Unit-Level Directives**," which are "official written documents issued in the name of a command staff member or unit commanding officer establishing or communicating specific processes, functions, or information within the issuing unit and/or in units below the issuing unit as defined in the Department directive titled 'Department Organization for Command,'" "can only direct the activities of those units and members under the command of the issuing authority," and are superseded by "Department directives, regardless of classification." *Id.*

<sup>314</sup> On July 23, 2020, the Coalition filed a *Notice of the Coalition's Intent to Initiate Enforcement Proceedings* after which Judge Dow, the IMT, the Parties, and the Coalition began discussions about protest-related policies. *See* pages 6 and 20 of the Executive Summary for further information.

## Analysis Figure 5.

## CPD Policies Related to Crowd Response from May 2020 to Present

Policy in May 2020	Revised Policy or Policies	Major Changes	Under Policy Review
<b>CPD Policies Regarding Responding to Crowds, First Amendment Activity, and Unrest</b>			
<p><i>The First Amendment and Police Actions,</i> G02-02 (April 19, 2012)</p> <p><i>Other Police Action Which May Impact First Amendment Conduct,</i> G02-02-02 (April 19, 2012)</p>	<p><i>The First Amendment,</i> G02-02 (April 13, 2021)</p> <p><i>The First Amendment and Police Actions,</i> S02-02 (April 13, 2021)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defines First Amendment assembly</li> <li>• Describes crowd management techniques</li> <li>• Outlines requirements and responsibilities for issuing crowd dispersal orders, including reporting requirements</li> <li>• Added procedures and reporting requirements regarding dispersal orders</li> <li>• G02-02-02 discontinued and the material it covers incorporated into G02-02</li> </ul>	Ongoing review with the IMT, the OAG, and the Coalition
<p><i>Investigations Directed at First Amendment-Related Information,</i> G02-02-01 (April 19, 2012)</p>	Not revised	None	Not submitted for policy review
<p><i>Critical Incident Response Program,</i> G05-03 (December 7, 2017)</p>	Not revised	None	Not submitted for policy review
[Did not exist]	<p><i>Response to Crowds and Civil Disturbances,</i> S03-22 (August 27, 2020)</p> <p>ICS-11 Incident Check-In, CPD-11.301 form (August 2020), and</p> <p>Incident Response, CPD-11.302 form (August 2020)</p> <p>**</p> <p><i>Reporting the Response to Crowds, Protests, and Civil Disturbances,</i> D20-08 (November 2, 2020),</p> <p>ICS-211 Incident Check-In, CPD11.301 form (October 2020)</p>	<p>*NEW POLICY*</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Introduced two new forms for supervisors to complete when CPD deploys officers as squads or platoons: (1) the Incident Check-In must be filled out before deployment to track resources and personnel and (2) the Incident Response form must be completed when Department members formed into squads physically respond to a crowd's actions or inactions in response to verbal directions (e.g., with baton "port arms push" or "stunning").</li> </ul>	Under annual CPD review per ¶159 and subject to community input per ¶160

Policy in May 2020	Revised Policy or Policies	Major Changes	Under Policy Review
	ICS-211 Incident Response, CPD11.302 (Revised January 2021)  **	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Clarifies that Tactical Responses Reports are still required for individual uses of force</li> <li>Describes in Section IV.C.6 that supervisors are required to document “whether verbal warnings were given to the crowd, including the number of warnings and the content.”</li> </ul>	
<i>Department Response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), S04-09 (April 30, 2020)</i>	<i>Department Response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) - Revised 29 January 2021, S04-09 (January 29, 2021)</i>  <i>COVID-19 PPE Kit Replacement Report, CPD-21.251 (March 2020)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Specifies that CPD personnel (officers and other CPD personnel who perform a critical function) must go through prescreening, conduct regular self-monitoring, wear PPE, and social distance after being exposed to an individual with COVID-19 within 48 hours before that individual began to fell ill or exhibit symptoms</li> <li>Encourages CPD personnel to get tested for COVID-19 five to seven days after a known close contact exposure</li> <li>Adds the following language: “Department members are required to wear a surgical mask or face covering when a member cannot maintain 6 feet of social distancing from other persons. The surgical mask or face covering applies to all interactions with the public and other Department members and extends to all locations including Department vehicles, all City of Chicago facilities, private property, common or public areas, and residential and commercial buildings.”</li> </ul>	<i>Not submitted for policy review</i>



Policy in May 2020	Revised Policy or Policies	Major Changes	Under Policy Review
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Requires, “when practical and available” that “an arrestee claiming to have COVID-19” or an arrestee “contaminated with COVID-19 will be requested to wear a surgical mask, face cover, or PPE to contain the contamination”</li> <li>Adds additional reporting requirements for CPD personnel who come within 6 feet of someone with COVID-19 for 15 minutes or more within 24 hours, specifying that CPD personnel will “NOT identify the source individual”</li> <li>Specifies the use of benefit, medical, or unpaid status for officers who are exposed to COVID-19 and work-from-home options</li> </ul>	
<p><i>Emergency Action Plans for Department Facilities,</i> S05-07 (November 12, 2015)</p>	<p><i>Emergency Action Plans for Department Facilities,</i> S05-07 (August 26, 2020)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Updates CPD facility emergency action procedures and responsibilities. Specifically designates that, in the event of an evacuation, if the sector sergeant is absent, OEMC should assign a field sergeant and notify the district station supervisor to man traffic-control sites</li> <li>Updates the authority to implement and terminate a building evacuation under an emergency evacuation plan for a Department facility. The First Deputy Superintendent has the authority to order an evacuation of the Public Safety Headquarters Building. The Deputy Chief, Criminal Networks Group has the authority to order an evacuation of the Homan Square Police facility. The appropriate area</li> </ul>	<p><i>Not submitted for policy review</i></p>

Policy in May 2020	Revised Policy or Policies	Major Changes	Under Policy Review
		<p>deputy chief of Office Operations has authority to evacuate an area center or the South Loop Complex</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>For drills and training, the Inspection Division will complete a report to the inspected facility's responsible Bureau Chief or highest ranking member</li> </ul>	
<p><i>Emergency Action Plans</i>, S05-07 (November 12, 2015)</p>	<p><i>Emergency Action Plans</i>, S05-07 (August 26, 2020)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Updates emergency plans for Area Centers, District Facilities, and other CPD facilities (<i>non-public</i>)</li> </ul>	<p><i>Not submitted for policy review</i></p>
<p><i>Mass Arrest Procedures</i>, S06-06 (September 27, 2018)</p> <p><i>Mass Arrest Card</i>, CPD-11.433 (September 2018)</p>	<p><i>Not Revised</i></p>	<p><i>None</i></p>	<p><i>Coordinated Multiple Arrest Incident Procedures</i>, S06-06 (October 1, 2020)</p> <p><i>Multiple Arrest Card</i>, CPD-11.433 (August 2020)</p>
<p><i>Large Street Gatherings</i>, D19-03 (May 24, 2019)</p>	<p><i>Not revised</i></p>	<p><i>None</i></p>	<p><i>Not submitted for review</i></p>
<p><b>Other CPD Policies related to Responding to Crowds, First Amendment Activity, and Unrest</b></p>			
<p><i>Use of Force</i>, G03-02 (February 29, 2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establishes Department policies on response to resistance, and use of force</li> </ul>	<p><i>De-Escalation, Response to Resistance, and Use of Force</i>, G03-02 (April 15, 2021)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Changed the title of directive G03-02 from <i>Use of Force</i> to <i>De-Escalation, Response to Resistance, and Use of Force</i> to further emphasize the importance of de-escalation within the policy</li> <li>Replaces term "subject" with "person"</li> <li>Revised G03-02 language for when use of force is authorized and to further define "objectively reasonable" (Section III.B.1) to include these additional factors to be considered when determining reasonableness: whether de-escalation</li> </ul>	<p>Under annual CPD review per ¶159 and subject to community input per ¶160</p>

Policy in May 2020	Revised Policy or Policies	Major Changes	Under Policy Review
		<p>techniques can be employed or would be effective (d) and the availability of other resources (e).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Revised G03-02 language for when use of force is authorized and to remove ambiguity related to the definition of “necessary” (Section III.B.2) and defined it as “the minimum amount of force needed to provide for the safety of any person or Department member, stop an attack, make an arrest, bring a person or situation safety under control, or prevent escape.”</li> <li>• Made de-escalation an affirmative obligation of every CPD officer and reflected that obligation in every applicable directive in the policy suite. For example, in G03-02 the CPD revised Section III.C to <i>require</i> officers to de-escalate: “Department members are required to use de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force, unless doing so would place a person or a Department member in immediate risk of harm, or de-escalation techniques would be clearly ineffective under the circumstances at the time.”</li> <li>• Details the concept of the sanctity of human life</li> <li>• Establishes that Department members will use the minimum amount of force needed and continually assess the necessity of the use of force</li> <li>• Requires officers to use de-escalation tactics to prevent</li> </ul>	

Policy in May 2020	Revised Policy or Policies	Major Changes	Under Policy Review
		<p>or reduce the need for force, unless doing so places someone, including a Department officer, in immediate risk of harm, or de-escalation is clearly ineffective under the circumstances</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sets out expectations that officers will act in such a way that eliminates the need to use force. Force should only be used when required under the circumstances to serve a lawful purpose</li> <li>• Adds de-escalation techniques and other resources as factors to consider in determining whether force is objectively reasonable</li> <li>• Prohibits chokeholds, other maneuvers for applying direct pressure on a windpipe or airway, and carotid artery restraints with the sole exception being as an act of last resort when necessary to protect against an imminent threat to life</li> <li>• Requires officers to provide life-saving aid to injured persons for use of force incidents until medical professionals arrive on scene and prohibits interference with emergency medical personnel providing treatment</li> </ul>	
<p><i>Force Options</i>, G03-02-01 (February 29, 2020)</p>	<p><i>Response to Resistance and Force Options</i>, G03-02-01 (April 15, 2021)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Replaces term “subject” with “person”</li> <li>• Details the concept of the sanctity of human life</li> <li>• Requires officers to use de-escalation tactics to prevent or reduce the need for force, unless doing so places someone, including a</li> </ul>	<p>Under annual CPD review per ¶159 and subject to community input per ¶160</p>

Policy in May 2020	Revised Policy or Policies	Major Changes	Under Policy Review
		<p>CPD officer, in immediate risk of harm, or de-escalation is clearly ineffective under the circumstances</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requires officers to consider individualized factors in assessing situations, such as: age, disability, and physical condition (including known or suspected mental health conditions), the risk posed by the person, and whether the person is restrained, injured, or in crisis</li> <li>• Requires officers, when safe and feasible, to consider whether noncompliance with lawful verbal direction is due to age, limited English proficiency or other language barriers, a medical condition, disability, behavioral health crisis, or drug or alcohol use</li> <li>• “Consistent with Department policy that all uses of force must be objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional, Department members will refrain from using force against a person who is secured and restrained with handcuffs or other restraining devices (e.g., flexible restraining devices), unless the member:               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. must act to prevent injury to the Department member, the restrained person, or another person.”</li> </ol> </li> </ul>	
<p><i>Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report, G03-02-02 (February 20, 2020)</i></p>	<p><i>Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report, G03-02-02 (April 15, 2021)</i></p> <p>Tactical Response Report, CPD-11.377 (December 2020)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Details how Tactical Response Reports (TRRs) are used: to document, investigate, and evaluate reportable use of force incidents, as well as incidents where an officer was assaulted or battered and no response option was used; to regularly</li> </ul>	<p>Under annual CPD review per ¶159 and subject to community input per ¶160</p>

Policy in May 2020	Revised Policy or Policies	Major Changes	Under Policy Review
	<p><i>Tactical Response Report - Investigation form</i> CPD-11.377-I (December 2020)</p>	<p>review city and district-level data on reportable uses of force (including frequency and type of force used; patterns, trends, and emerging concerns)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Revised the TRR form to require that CPD officers “describe with specificity” (instead of “when applicable”) their responses, including force mitigation efforts and specific types and amounts of force used.</li> <li>Revised the Tactical Response Report – Review (TRR-R) form to document specific debriefing points for the officer and reviewing supervisor, including those related to the following: Communication, Not Articulated in Narrative, Positioning/Distance, Time, and Other</li> </ul>	
<p><i>Firearm Discharge Incidents- Authorized Use and Post-Discharge Administrative Procedures,</i> G03-02-03 (February 29, 2020)</p>	<p><i>Firearm Discharge Incidents- Authorized Use and Post-Discharge Administrative Procedures,</i> G03-02-03 (April 15, 2021)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Details the concept of the sanctity of human life</li> <li>Requires officers to use de-escalation tactics to prevent or reduce the need for force, unless doing so places someone, including a CPD officer, in immediate</li> </ul>	<p>Under annual CPD review per ¶159 and subject to community input per ¶160<sup>315</sup></p>

<sup>315</sup> In the third reporting period, the City and the CPD made progress toward, but remain under assessment for, Preliminary compliance with ¶183. To evaluate Preliminary compliance with ¶183, we focused our review on whether the City and the CPD received the requisite community input for General Order 03-02-03, *Firearm Discharge Incidents – Authorized Use and Post-Discharge Administrative Procedures*. The community and Use of Force Working Group recommended that officers issue verbal warnings prior to discharging a weapon and recommended that officers identify themselves as law enforcement unless doing so creates imminent risk of death. They also recommended that officers use hand signals or visual cues to provide warnings in event that a person is hearing impaired. The CPD did not incorporate these recommendations in the December 31, 2020 revised Use of Force policies. The CPD and the Working Group agreed to continue discussion about the Use of Force policies into 2021, which we will continue to monitor moving forward.

Policy in May 2020	Revised Policy or Policies	Major Changes	Under Policy Review
		<p>risk of harm, or de-escalation is clearly ineffective under the circumstances</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Specifies that the topics covered in post-firearm discharge training may include de-escalation, trauma-informed techniques, and implicit bias</li> </ul>	
<p><i>Taser Use Incidents,</i> G03-02-04 (February 29, 2020)</p>	<p><i>by Taser Use Incidents,</i> G03-02-04 (April 15, 2021)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Details the concept of the sanctity of human life Requires officers to use de-escalation tactics to prevent or reduce the need for force, unless doing so places someone, including a CPD officer, in immediate risk of harm, or de-escalation is clearly ineffective under the circumstances</li> <li>Requires officers to use de-escalation tactics to prevent or reduce the need for force, unless doing so places someone, including a CPD officer, in immediate risk of harm, or de-escalation is clearly ineffective under the circumstances</li> </ul>	<p>Under annual CPD review per ¶159 and subject to community input per ¶160</p>
<p><i>Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Devices And Other Chemical Agent Use Incidents,</i> G03-02-05 (February 29, 2020)</p>	<p><i>Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Devices And Other Chemical Agent Use Incidents,</i> G03-02-05 (April 15, 2021)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Details the concept of the sanctity of human life</li> <li>Requires officers to use de-escalation tactics to prevent or reduce the need for force, unless doing so places someone, including a CPD officers, in immediate risk of harm, or de-escalation is clearly ineffective under the circumstances</li> </ul>	<p>Under annual CPD review per ¶159 and subject to community input per ¶160</p>
<p><i>Canine Use Incidents,</i> G03-02-06 (February 29, 2020)</p>	<p><i>Canine Use Incidents,</i> G03-02-06 (April 15, 2021)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Details the concept of the sanctity of human life</li> <li>Requires officers to use de-escalation tactics to prevent or reduce the need for force, unless doing so places someone, including a</li> </ul>	<p>Under annual CPD review per ¶159 and subject to community input per ¶160</p>

Policy in May 2020	Revised Policy or Policies	Major Changes	Under Policy Review
		<p>CPD officers, in immediate risk of harm, or de-escalation is clearly ineffective under the circumstances</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Prohibits the use of CPD canine teams in response to crowds, protests, or civil disturbances</li> </ul>	
<p><i>Baton Use Incidents,</i> G03-02-07 (February 29, 2020)</p>	<p><i>Baton Use Incidents,</i> G03-02-07 (April 15, 2021)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Details the concept of the sanctity of human life Requires officers to use de-escalation tactics to prevent or reduce the need for force, unless doing so places someone, including a CPD officers, in immediate risk of harm, or de-escalation is clearly ineffective under the circumstances</li> </ul>	<p>Under annual CPD review per ¶159 and subject to community input per ¶160</p>
<p><i>Department Review of Use of Force,</i> G03-02-08 (February 29, 2020)</p>	<p><i>Department Review of Use of Force,</i> G03-02-08 (January 27, 2021)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>“[I]ntroduces the use of the CLEARNET: Tactical Response Report (TRR) application for units to document the required individual follow-up actions and finalize the TRR.”</li> <li>Specifies Force Review Board review “firearm discharge incidents or uses of force that cause the death of any person, contain an incident briefing of the facts and review of the incident by the Commander, Incident Response Team, or designee, and any other appropriate Department members designated by the Superintendent”</li> <li>Specifies Force Review Board review “for all other Level 3 reportable uses of force, contain an incident briefing of the facts and review of the incident by the Commander, Force Review Division, or designee, and</li> </ul>	<p>Under annual CPD review per ¶159 and subject to community input per ¶160</p>



Policy in May 2020	Revised Policy or Policies	Major Changes	Under Policy Review
		<p>any other appropriate Department members designated by the Superintendent”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Notes that a COPA representatives will be invited to the incident briefing</li> <li>Provides responsibilities for the Commander, Force Review Division, at the conclusion of a Force Review Board review of incident, including ensuring that recommended training for involved members is coordinated with the Training and Support Group, that Complaint and Disciplinary procedures are followed when an obvious policy violation requiring discipline has occurred and a Log Number has not been obtained at the district level, and that the review of the Force Review Board is documented within thirty days of the review incident.</li> <li>Provides responsibilities for the unit commanding officers who receive a unit-level or Department-wide recommendation from the Force Review Board</li> </ul>	
<i>[Did not exist]</i>	<i>Foot Pursuits, G03-07 (May 26, 2021 – Effective June 11, 2021)</i>	<i>*NEW POLICY*</i> <sup>316</sup>	Under ongoing review with the City, the CPD, the OAG, the IMT and ¶172 and subject to community input per ¶¶160 and 627, <i>et al.</i>
<i>Restraining Devices, G06-01-02 (December 8, 2017)</i>	<i>Not revised</i>	<i>None</i>	<i>Not submitted for review</i>

<sup>316</sup> See News Release - Chicago Police Department Announces New Foot Pursuit Policy, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (May 26, 2021), <https://home.chicagopolice.org/wp-content/uploads/26-May-21-Foot-Pursuit-Policy-1.pdf>.

Policy in May 2020	Revised Policy or Policies	Major Changes	Under Policy Review
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Outlines policy and procedures related to physical restraint of persons in custody</li> <li>• Authorizes use of flex cuffs, handcuffs, and leg irons</li> <li>• Provides general guidelines for use of restraining devices</li> <li>• Continues policy for use of leg irons during arrestee transfers</li> <li>• Outlines policy related to custodial and transport searches</li> </ul>			
<p><i>Canine Teams</i>, S03-04-01 (July 24, 2014)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Outlines procedures for canine team duties, responsibilities, and capabilities</li> <li>• Outlines responsibilities for requesting canine teams and for a canine handler after a canine bites or inflicts injury</li> </ul>	<p><i>Canine Teams</i>, S03-04-01 (November 3, 2020)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• States, "Department canine teams will not be used in response to crowds, protests, or civil disturbances."</li> </ul>	<p><i>Not submitted for policy review</i></p>
<p><i>Helicopter Support for Department Operations</i>, S03-04-02 (May 30, 2014)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides information on helicopter support capabilities for Department operations</li> <li>• Provides information on procedures for requesting CPD, CFD, or USCG helicopters</li> </ul>	<p><i>Not revised</i></p>	<p><i>Not Applicable</i></p>	<p><i>Not submitted for policy review</i></p>
<p><i>Crime Prevention and Information Center (CPIC)</i>, S03-04-04 (November 30, 2017)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Clarifies CPIC requirements to notify COPA</li> </ul>	<p><i>Not revised</i></p>	<p><i>Not Applicable</i></p>	<p><i>Not submitted for policy review</i></p>
<p><i>Fire and Arson Incidents</i>, S04-03-12 (September 19, 2014)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Clarifies Arson Section responsibilities</li> </ul>	<p><i>Not revised</i></p>	<p><i>Not Applicable</i></p>	<p><i>Not submitted for policy review</i></p>

Policy in May 2020	Revised Policy or Policies	Major Changes	Under Policy Review
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Clarifies reporting requirements</li> </ul>			
<p><i>Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System,</i> S05-10 (June 2, 2017)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Outlines procedures for requesting a response through ILEAS and responding to requests for services from ILEAS</li> <li>Establishes responsibilities, notifications, and approval for ILEAS requests and responses</li> </ul>	<i>Not revised</i>	<i>Not Applicable</i>	<i>Not submitted for policy review</i>
<p><i>Body Worn Cameras,</i> S03-14 (April 30, 2018)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Discontinues the use of Body Worn Camera Video Audit Report</li> <li>Introduces use of Body Worn Camera Video Review and Videos Viewed Report(s)</li> </ul>	<i>Not Revised</i>	<i>Not Applicable</i>	<p><i>Body Worn Cameras (Draft),</i> S03-14 (November 25, 2020)</p> <p><i>Body Worn Cameras (Draft),</i> S03-14 (April 28, 2021)</p>
<p><i>Potential Cost Recovery Incidents – City of Chicago,</i> S03-15 (November 20, 2015)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establishes procedures to identify any incident where the City or Department has incurred expenses and might recover its cost (for personnel and equipment use or damaged property)</li> </ul>	<i>Not revised</i>	<i>Not Applicable</i>	<i>Not submitted for policy review</i>
<p><i>Detention Facilities General Procedures and Responsibilities,</i> S06-01-02 (September 9, 2019)</p>	<p><i>Detention Facilities General Procedures and Responsibilities,</i> S06-01-02 (August 17, 2020)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Requires that the Annual Lockup Inspection Summary report (CPD-21.976) and Lockup Facility Weekly Inspection Reports (CPD-21.974) are submitted electronically to the Inspections Division by February 28 of each year</li> </ul>	<i>Not submitted for policy review</i>
<p><i>Processing Property Under Department Control,</i> S07-01 (October 15, 2015)</p>	<p><i>Processing Property Under Department Control,</i> April 27, 2021 (October 15, 2015)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Updates procedures for collecting and inventorying bomb or arson evidence, suspect incendiary devices, and flammable chemicals or liquids (such as gasoline)</li> </ul>	<i>Not submitted for policy review</i>

Policy in May 2020	Revised Policy or Policies	Major Changes	Under Policy Review
<i>Emergency Service Agencies,</i> S12-04 (July 1, 1989)	<i>Emergency Service Agencies,</i> S12-04 (August 19, 2020)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Updated list of agencies and services to “inform[] members of various agencies within the City of Chicago that provide services at the scene of major fires, natural and human-caused disasters, civil disorders, and similar emergencies”</li> </ul>	<i>Not submitted for policy review</i>
<i>Removal Process for D-2, D-2A, and D-3 Positions,</i> E05-06-01 (March 12, 2019)	<i>Removal Process for D-2, D-2A, and D-3 Positions,</i> E05-06-01 (September 11, 2020)  <i>Notice of Hearing Before the Review Board form,</i> CPD-12.151 (August 2020)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Updating process with the <i>Notice of Hearing Before the Review Board</i> form, CPD-12.151 (August 2020)</li> </ul>	<i>Not submitted for policy review</i>
<i>Application for Police Officer (Assigned As Special Weapons and Tactics Team Member),</i> E05-15 (December 24, 2019)	<i>Application for Police Officer (Assigned As Special Weapons and Tactics Team Member),</i> E05-15 (September 24, 2020)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Soliciting internet applications Police Officer (Assigned as Special Weapons and Tactics Team Member)</li> </ul>	<i>Not submitted for policy review</i>
<i>Application for Explosives Technician I, Title Code 9158,</i> E05-20 (February 11, 2015)	<i>Application for Explosives Technician I, Title Code 9158,</i> E05-20 (April 9, 2021)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Updates duties, eligibility, and training for Explosive Technician I position</li> </ul>	<i>Not submitted for policy review</i>
<i>Application for Sergeant (Assigned As Special Weapons and Tactics Team Member),</i> E05-25 (December 24, 2019)	<i>Application for Sergeant (Assigned As Special Weapons and Tactics Team Member),</i> E05-25 (September 24, 2020)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Soliciting internet applications for Sergeant are accepted until Friday</li> <li>Clarifies how to access the application on The Wire page</li> <li>Candidates will return the properly completed and signed original forms to the Employment Section of Human Resources</li> </ul>	<i>Not submitted for policy review</i>
<i>Application for Police Legal Officer II (Legal Affairs Division),</i> E05-30 (May 16, 2014)	<i>Application for Police Legal Officer II (Legal Affairs Division),</i> E05-30 (May 11, 2020)  <i>Application for Police Legal Officer II (Legal Affairs Division),</i> E05-30 (June 1, 2020)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Updates duties for the Legal Officer II, including the duty to “attend[] protests and demonstrations to provide legal advice to officers and exempt members”; “participate[] in meetings addressing compliance with consent decree requirements”;</li> </ul>	<i>Not submitted for policy review</i>

Policy in May 2020	Revised Policy or Policies	Major Changes	Under Policy Review
		<p>“prepare contracts, memoranda of understanding (MOUs), and inter-governmental agreements (IGAs)”; and “respond to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) appeals.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Updates the eligibility for the Legal Officer II position to include two years of active duty status as a Sergeant of Police</li> <li>• Identified updated application deadline</li> </ul>	
<p><i>Traumatic Incident Stress Management Program,</i> E06-03 (November 22, 2017)</p>	<p><i>Traumatic Incident Stress Management Program,</i> E06-03 (February 25, 2021)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Introduces the Traumatic Incident Stress Management Program CLEAR application, which includes a new referral process</li> <li>• Adds responsibility for the watch operations lieutenant</li> <li>• Discontinues the Traumatic Incident Stress Management Program CLEAR application</li> <li>• Recognizes that policing may introduce emotional or psychological impacts on officers that are unique to policing</li> <li>• Establishes the Traumatic Incident Stress Management as a way for officers to process traumatic events</li> <li>• Referral to the Program is only for on-duty incidents</li> <li>• The Program is part of the Professional Counseling Division and is overseen by a licensed mental health professional</li> </ul>	<p>Subject to compliance review under ¶627, <i>et al.</i></p>
<p><i>Department Approved Weapons and Ammunition,</i> U04-02 (February 29, 2020)</p>	<p><i>Department Approved Weapons and Ammunition,</i> U04-02 (May 7, 2021)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Added Executive Director, Office of Constitutional Policing and Reform</li> </ul>	<p>Subject to compliance review under ¶627, <i>et al.</i></p>

<b>Policy in May 2020</b>	<b>Revised Policy or Policies</b>	<b>Major Changes</b>	<b>Under Policy Review</b>
<i>Police Carbine Operator Program</i> , U04-02-05 (March 8, 2019)	<i>Police Carbine Operator Program</i> , U04-02-05 (January 1, 2021)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>For personally owned duty carbines, complete rifles must be manufactured by FN America, LLC (among others previously approved)</li> </ul>	<i>Not submitted for policy review</i>
<i>Respirator Program</i> , U04-03 (April 20, 2012)	<i>Respirator Program</i> , U04-03 (September 17, 2020)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provides responsibility to CPD's Training and Support Group</li> </ul>	<i>Not submitted for policy review</i>
<i>Department-Issued Restraining Devices</i> , U01-07 (February 29, 2012)	<i>Not revised</i>	<i>Not Applicable</i>	<i>Not submitted for policy review</i>
<i>Uniform and Appearance Standards</i> , U04-01 (March 11, 2020)	<i>Uniform and Appearance Standards</i> , U04-01 (April 27, 2021)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Updates Uniform and Personal Equipment Policy Committee membership to include Chief, Bureau Patrol, Deputy Chief, Office of Constitutional Policing and Reform, Deputy Chief, Special Operations Group, Deputy Chief, Training and Support Group, and Commander, Labor Relations Division</li> <li>The Chief of Bureau Patrol will serve as chairperson of the committee</li> </ul>	<i>Not submitted for policy review</i>
<i>Prescribed Uniform and Equipment Items</i> , U04-01-01 (July 15, 2019)	<i>Prescribed Uniform and Equipment Items</i> , U04-01-01 (May 7, 2021)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Executive Director of the Office of Constitutional Policing and Reform may authorize the use of additional weapons/ammunition by specialized Department units.</li> <li>The Executive Director of the Office of Constitutional Policing and Reform will designate district stations and any other police facilities to be equipped with a ballistic clearing station</li> </ul>	<i>Not submitted for policy review</i>
<i>Helmet - General Duty, Vehicular, and Riot</i> , U06-01-31 (August 26, 2019)	<i>Helmet - General Duty, Vehicular, and Riot</i> , U06-01-31 (November 4, 2020)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Requires all sworn personnel to own and maintain the appropriate prescribed helmets listed in the directive. These helmets are designed</li> </ul>	<i>Not submitted for policy review</i>

Policy in May 2020	Revised Policy or Policies	Major Changes	Under Policy Review
		to work with all body armor and gas masks	
<p><i>Riot Control Kit</i>, U06-03-05 (February 12, 2012)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Designates required items in riot control kit, as well as options items</li> <li>Describes the kit items, including materials and build</li> </ul>	<i>Not Applicable</i>	<i>Not Applicable</i>	<i>Not submitted for policy review</i>
<p><i>BDU, SWAT</i>, U06-03-07 (December 12, 2013)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Describes the design and accessories of BDU and SWAT uniforms</li> </ul>	<i>Not Applicable</i>	<i>Not Applicable</i>	<i>Not submitted for policy review</i>
<p><i>Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Police Department</i>, DEPARTMENT GUIDES AND MANUALS (April 16, 2015)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sets out the regulations for the governance of the Department</li> <li>Sets out regulations for establishing Department goals</li> <li>Sets out regulations for establishing Department members' goals</li> <li>Sets out regulations establishing member duties</li> <li>Sets out Department rules of conduct</li> <li>Sets out Department penalties</li> <li>Sets out Department medical separations</li> <li>Sets out Department suspension for legal inability to carry a firearm</li> <li>Sets out Department Rules of Procedures</li> </ul>	<i>Not Applicable</i>	<i>Not Applicable</i>	<i>Not submitted for policy review</i>

During the course of our review into the City's and the CPD's responses to the recent protests and unrest—including requests for records and various lines of interview questions—the CPD identified that there was insufficient reporting and documentation during the CPD's responses. The IMT provided technical assistance to the CPD to aid in the development of new required reporting forms to address this issue.

In fact, during the initial protests and unrest—with outdated policies and reporting requirements—one commander took it upon themselves to use the federal Incident Command System-204 Sector/Group Assignment List form to track

- Arrests
- Team posts, deployment, command, personnel assigned, and duties
- Control Operations
- Map of the District
- Personnel Injuries
- Uses of Force and associated injuries.<sup>317</sup> ¶

On August 27, 2020, the City and the CPD informally provided the IMT with a new temporary policy—*Response to Crowds and Civil Disturbances* (S03-22)—and corresponding forms—Incident Check-In (CPD-11.301) and Incident Response (CPD-11.302); Administrative Message Center (AMC) notice; and a training bulletin referenced in S03-22, dated August 2016. The City of Chicago (City) and the Chicago Police Department (CPD) issued Special Order 03-22, *Response to Crowds and Civil Disturbances* (S03-22), under ¶631 of the Consent Decree. Paragraph 631 permits the CPD to issue a temporary policy or procedure when “extraordinary circumstances demand an immediate revision or clarification.”

While the informal production referenced that the City would formally produce the records to the IMT and the OAG for review and comment, the IMT provided

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<sup>317</sup> The Federal Incident Command System is part of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which “guides all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to and recover from incidents.” *National Incident Management System*, FEDERAL INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM, <https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/nims>. NIMS is part of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The “204 Sector/Group Assignment List” is a tool within the Incident Command System that aids responding agencies in tracking their resources and activities when responding to a critical incident. See *Assignment List (ICS 204)*, FEDERAL INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM, <https://emilms.fema.gov/IS201/assets/ICS%20Forms%20204.pdf>



preliminary feedback.<sup>318</sup> We recognized that the City and the CPD were facing extraordinary circumstances, but reporting uses of force and other critical actions by the CPD are fundamental to compliance with the Consent Decree, accountability, and public trust. It was and is imperative that the CPD gets this right. The CPD must, among other things, ensure that officers “report and document” reportable uses of force, including when officers use force in concert, as required under ¶218.<sup>319</sup> The City, the CPD, the OAG, the Coalition, and the IMT met with Judge Dow in efforts to revise the policy as soon as possible.<sup>320</sup>

We appreciated that the CPD took many of the IMT’s suggestions into account (although not all) by making the following revisions:

- Creating a policy to provide guidance on the new Check-In and Incident Response forms.

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<sup>318</sup> According to the production, the CPD issued S03-22 on August 27, 2020, under ¶631 of the Consent Decree, which permits the CPD to issue a temporary policy or procedure when “extraordinary circumstances demand an immediate revision or clarification.” We note, however, that ¶631 requires the CPD to provide “prompt notice of the temporary policy or procedure” to the IMT and the Office of the Illinois Attorney General (OAG), and it is our understanding that the OAG did not receive notice on or before August 27, 2020. The IMT also did not have a chance to review the final policy before it was issued.

<sup>319</sup> Paragraph 218 of the Consent Decree defines “reportable uses of force” as follows: CPD members must report and document any reportable use of force. Beginning January 1, 2019, a reportable use of force will be defined as any use of force by a CPD member included in any of the following three levels: a. A level 1 reportable use of force is the use of any force by a CPD member to overcome the active resistance of a subject that does not rise to a level 2 or level 3 reportable use of force. This would include force that is reasonably expected to cause pain or an injury, but does not result in injury or complaint of injury. The following techniques are level 1 reportable uses of force when applied in response to active resistance: pressure point compliance techniques; joint manipulation techniques; wristlocks; armbars; and any leg sweep, weaponless defense techniques, or takedown that does not result in injury or complaint of injury. It is not a reportable use of force for a CPD member to escort, touch, or handcuff a person with no or minimal resistance. b. A level 2 reportable use of force is the use of any force by a CPD member that includes use of a less-lethal weapon or that causes an injury or results in a complaint of an injury, but that does not rise to a level 3 reportable use of force. Force options in this level include: discharge of an OC device; discharge of a Taser; impact weapon strikes to any part of the body other than the head or neck; use of impact munitions; any physical apprehension by a canine; any reportable use of force against a handcuffed subject; and any leg sweep, weaponless defense technique, or takedown resulting in an injury or complaint of injury. c. A level 3 reportable use of force is when a CPD member does any of the following: uses any force that constitutes deadly force, such as discharging a firearm or using an impact weapon to strike a person’s head or neck; uses a chokehold or other maneuver for intentionally putting pressure on a person’s airway or carotid artery; uses any force that causes the death of any person; or uses any force that causes injury to any person resulting in admission to a hospital.

<sup>320</sup> On July 23, 2020, the Coalition filed a *Notice of the Coalition’s Intent to Initiate Enforcement Proceedings* after which Judge Dow, the IMT, the Parties, and the Coalition began discussions about protest-related policies. See pages 6, 20, and 126 of this report for further information.

- Separating the Incident Check-In and Incident Response forms to allow the CPD to more clearly and accurately account for multiple events throughout the officers' shift.
- Adding definitions to terms, which are generally in line with FEMA's Center for Domestic Preparedness Field Force Operations Training (although some key terms still lack clarity).<sup>321</sup>
- Forwarding the Incident Check-In forms to the Incident Commander before deployment to better track and monitor deployments.

On Friday, August 28, 2020, during discussions between the City, the Coalition, and the IMT, the Coalition raised several concerns regarding S03-22, citing that the policy's wording was confusing. Still, the IMT and the OAG provided written comments on August 31, 2020, recommending additional changes.

Through ongoing discussions between the IMT and the Coalition and the IMT and the City, the CPD agreed to clarify the appropriate uses of batons during the Critical Incident Response Team roll call on Saturday, August 29, 2020—before responding to protests over Labor Day Weekend.<sup>322</sup> The IMT observed the roll-call training, which was for about 70 to 80 CPD officers, including supervisors. The CPD instructed officers that a baton strike to the head is considered deadly force and provided instructions on the appropriate use of the baton as a “controlled shove” with two hands on the baton, rather than a strike.

At the time, the City, the CPD, and the Coalition understood that they would need to continue to work through potential changes and clarifications to the CPD's responses to protests in policy, training, and practice. And we made several recommendations to the CPD to further improve the policy and forms.

About a month later, on October 2—in response to feedback from the IMT, the OAG, and the Coalition—the City and the CPD informally produced a second draft of S03-22 and a revised draft of Special Order 06-06, *Coordinated Multiple Arrest Incident Procedures* (S06-06), both dated October 1, 2020. The City and the CPD requested feedback by October 7, 2020, five days after the production. On October

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<sup>321</sup> See Federal Emergency Management Agency, Center for Domestic Preparedness, Field Force Operations training, which is a “three-day Field Force Operations (FFO) course provides law enforcement and security officers with instruction in protest types and actions, legal considerations, responsibilities of mobile field force teams, and crowd-control methods. The course culminates with a series of hands-on activities that allow responders to practice all of the learned skills (baton-holding positions, mass-arrest procedures, and riot-control formations) in a realistic context” (<https://cdp.dhs.gov/training/course/PER-200>).

<sup>322</sup> See, e.g., Steven Grave, *Downtown Protest Ends Peacefully After Police Block March From Shutting Down Magnificent Mile*, CBS CHICAGO (August 29, 2020), <https://chicago.cbslo-cal.com/2020/08/29/dueling-protests-planned-saturday-evening-on-magnificent-mile/>.

7, 2020, the IMT replied via email that the October 1, 2020 drafts of S03-22 and S06-06 did not address many of the comments from the IMT, the OAG, or the Coalition. In response, the CPD indicated that it would redo the policies.

About two weeks later, on Friday, October 22, the City and the CPD informally produced a third draft of S03-22, dated October 21, requesting feedback on Monday, October 26. The CPD also included written responses to comments from Judge Dow, the IMT, the OAG, and the Coalition. We did not—and still have not—received an updated draft of S06-06, *Coordinated Multiple Arrest Incident Procedures*.

Superintendent Brown acknowledged these efforts in response to the Inspector General's Office's report:

*These events occurred during a time when the Department was working to revise its use of force orders to comply with the Consent Decree. Often as a result of amending one order, other orders are affected, and such was the case here. The amendments made to the order on Tactical Response Reports were not reflected in the mass arrest order and vice versa, which caused ambiguity. Once such ambiguities were identified, the Department worked swiftly to mitigate. For example, in response to one such issue, as noted in the [Office of the Inspector General for the City of Chicago's] Report, the Department issued S03-22, in consultation with the Consent Decree's Independent Team (IMT). While this happened after the events in the Report, it is an example of the efforts taken by the Department.<sup>323</sup>*

We agree that the CPD's policies are interrelated—and consistently advocated for the City and the CPD to take a holistic approach to reform since the beginning of the Consent Decree process. We do not, however, believe that the mass-arrest procedure difficulties were a result of the TRR reforms. Neither the existing mass-arrest procedures nor the reformed TRR procedures were consistently followed for responses to protests and mass unrest in May and early June. We do, however, acknowledge that the CPD identified the issue during our review, interview questions, and records requests. The CPD also attempted to resolve the issues by creating emergency policy changes and then worked and continue to work with the IMT, the OAG, and the Coalition to improve those policies. We look forward to receiving a revised draft of the mass-arrest procedures for the Consent Decree review process.

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<sup>323</sup> CPD Superintendent David O. Brown, *Re: Report on Chicago's Response to George Floyd Protests and Unrest*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 11, 2021), <https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/CPD-Response-to-OIG-Report-on-Civil-Unrest.pdf>.

Likewise, the CPD recently recognized in its After Action Report that the mass-arrest procedures are not well-suited for large scale protests or unrest:

*At times, Department members found themselves making a relatively significant number of arrests while a continued police presence was necessary to ensure public safety. In those instances, the Incident Commander or highest-ranking, on-scene member of the Bureau of Patrol had the capability of declaring a “mass arrest” incident.*

*The Department has a substantial written procedure governing mass arrest incidents[] that works in theory but, during the Events, broke down in practice. This appeared attributable in part to the chaotic nature and unprecedented geographic scope of the Events. For example, Department members effecting arrests were required to complete “Mass Arrest Cards”—duplicate paper forms capturing limited information including, but not limited to, probable cause for arrest and the transporting unit’s information.*

*But many Department members lacked familiarity with formal mass arrest policies and processes as a result of limited (if any) involvement with actual, tangible applications of the procedure; not all incidents at which multiple arrests are effected are mass arrest incidents. Nor were many duplicate mass arrest forms immediately available during the Events where widespread criminal activity was occurring.*

*As a result, many of the individuals arrested during the Events were either released without charging (“RWOC”) or had charges filed against them dropped by prosecutors because the arresting officer or officers could not be identified. These individuals may have been involved in serious, criminal wrongdoing (e.g., looting, arson, violence, etc.) during the Events and may never be held accountable as a result.<sup>324</sup>*

Likewise, according to the Office of Inspector General for the City of Chicago: “Breakdowns in the mass arrest process resulted in CPD’s failure to arrest some offenders, the release of some arrestees without charges, and risks to officer and arrestee safety.”<sup>325</sup>

In anticipation of potential protests and unrest leading up to and after the federal election, the OAG, the Coalition, and the IMT provided comments to the updated

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<sup>324</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department’s Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 9–10.

<sup>325</sup> See *Report on Chicago’s Response to George Floyd Protests and Unrest*, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE CITY OF CHICAGO (February 18, 2021) at 8–9.

policy at the beginning of the following week, noting that additional discussions would need to occur after the election.<sup>326</sup>

Overall, we believed that the City and the CPD need to re-assess expectations for issuing a sound policy—and for sufficient training on that policy—before the election.<sup>327</sup> We were willing to meet, as soon as possible, with the CPD command personnel who are responsible for developing, implementing, and training on these policies. We further noted that our original understanding of S03-22, as reflected in the “Purpose” Section of the August 27, 2020 policy, was that the CPD created S03-22 to ensure that the CPD appropriately documented coordinated uses of force in response to demonstrations and civil disturbances. As a result, in the IMT’s feedback on August 31, 2020, we stated that we believed that S03-22 included either too much information, by going beyond the purpose of the special order, or not enough information, by not matching the title of the policy: *Response to Crowds and Civil Disturbances*. We note that the CPD chose to update S03-22 to match its name, rather than the original purpose. As a result, the October 1, 2020 draft of S03-22 is twice as long (from 5 to 10 pages), and the October 21, 2020 draft of S03-22 is even longer (13 pages).

We also noted that the City and the CPD have intended to expedite the process under ¶631, but we feared that circumventing the typical Consent Decree review process has caused, rather than prevented, delay. The IMT’s review would have benefited, for example, from additional information regarding the reasons behind the changes—or lack of changes—along with the policy task files and sources or external policies that the CPD considered when developing S03-22 and S06-06, if any. Likewise, the entire process would have benefited from community engagement. By either receiving community input—or at least considering that audience more deliberately—the CPD would have likely identified and avoided aspects of the policies that create confusion or unnecessary issues.

We agreed, however, that it was paramount that the City developed and revised policies, training, and practices regarding its responses to demonstrations and civil disturbances that align with best practices and the Consent Decree as soon as possible. But the revisions to the second and third drafts of S03-22, however, created new issues that we believed the City of Chicago and the CPD needed to address before implementing a new policy, even under ¶631.

Specifically, we were concerned that the City and the CPD were trying to both change too much and not enough before the election—which provided limited

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<sup>326</sup> While we did have a draft of S06-06 on October 7, 2020, we expected to receive a revised draft of S06-06 with the revised draft of S03-22.

<sup>327</sup> The IMT understands the CPD—along with many other police departments and entities—anticipated large demonstrations and unrest near the November election.

time to train officers on the changes. In fact, we believed that aspects of the October 21 version of S03-22 and the October 1, 2020 version of S06-06 **created** “extraordinary circumstances [that] demand an immediate revision or clarification,” rather than resolving extraordinary circumstances.

Ultimately, the City, the CPD, the OAG, the Coalition, and the IMT were able to identify agreements, discuss disagreements, and compromise on the latest version for S03-022. We continue, however, to have concerns regarding the CPD’s ability to comply with the reporting obligations in the Consent Decree. Paragraph 219 requires that officers complete a “TRR, or any similar form of documentation CPD may implement, prior to the end of his or her tour of duty.” While S03-22 adds two forms when responding to crowds and civil disturbances (CPD-11.301 and CPD-11.302), officers’ obligations to report and document all reportable uses of force continue. (The IMT would also appreciate further clarity regarding the intended data collection and review procedures for the new forms. *See, e.g.*, ¶¶571–72.

Further, to the extent that much of the crowd responsibilities are now within specialized teams—including the Critical Incident Response Team—the IMT continues to recommend that the City and the CPD develop public policies to clearly guide those practices and provide further procedures for transparency of requirements and expectations to its officers.

In addition to the many policies that continue to be developed, revised, and reviewed under the Consent Decree—which we will report on after the fourth reporting period in Independent Monitoring Report 4—the City and the CPD also amended several CPD policies under community pressures to address police practices:

There were also several policies that were related to the CPD’s response, some of which are reflected in [Analysis Figure 6](#) below, along with a non-comprehensive summary of recent changes and ongoing development.

Analysis Figure 6.  
 CPD Policies Related to Crowd Response from May 2020 to Present

Policy in May 2020	Revised Policy or Policies	Major Changes	Under Policy Review
<p><i>Emergency Vehicles Operations – Eluding and Pursuing</i>                      G03-03-01                      (April 9, 2019)</p>	<p><i>Emergency Vehicles Operations – Eluding and Pursuing</i>                      G03-03-01                      (August 15, 2020)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased restrictions on vehicle pursuits</li> <li>• Created CLEAR Eluding Vehicle Incident Report application</li> </ul>	<p>According to the City, G03-03-01 is not subject to ¶627 policy review, but provided the implemented policy and corresponding training to the IMT and the OAG under ¶631 (“extraordinary circumstances”). The IMT and the OAG provided comments and recommendations for both.</p>
<p><i>Search Warrants,</i>                      S04-19                      (January 3, 2020)</p>	<p><i>Search Warrants,</i>                      S04-19                      (May 28, 2021)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• States commitment to treat all persons with courtesy, dignity, and respect</li> <li>• References requirement to use de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force</li> <li>• Mandates that where forcible entry is required, officers use only the amount necessary to gain entry and make every effort to leave the premise in the same condition as originally found</li> <li>• Requires various heightened levels of supervisor review and approval for various classifications of search warrants</li> <li>• Requires the presence of a female officer during the service of the search warrant</li> <li>• Requires a critical incident after-action review for search warrants identified as wrong raids</li> <li>• Prohibits the use of “no-knock” search warrants except in certain circumstances, and mandates that only the SWAT Team will</li> </ul>	<p>The City disagrees with the OAG and the Coalition regarding whether the CPD’s <i>Search Warrant</i> policy falls under the Consent Decree. The City, the OAG, and the Coalition have filed briefs with Judge Dow on the issue.</p>

Policy in May 2020	Revised Policy or Policies	Major Changes	Under Policy Review
		<p>serve no-knock search warrants</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Introduces search warrant development requirements for affiants to verify and corroborate information via an independent investigation</li> <li>Introduces additional measures to protect or minimize trauma to potentially vulnerable persons who may be occupants of or present at the location, including children</li> </ul>	
<p><i>Responding to Incidents Involving Citizenship Status,</i> S06-14-03 (March 25, 2020)</p>	<p><i>Responding to Incidents Involving Citizenship Status,</i> S06-14-03 (February 23, 2021)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Updated in accordance with “Welcoming City Ordinance,” removing exception for when the CPD can transfer someone to federal custody for violating civil immigration law</li> </ul>	<p><i>Not submitted for policy review</i></p>
<p><i>Impoundment of Vehicles for Municipal Code Violations,</i> S07-03-05 (March 31, 2020)</p>	<p><i>Impoundment of Vehicles for Municipal Code Violations,</i> S07-03-05 (September 19, 2020)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Updates amendments to Municipal Code of Chicago</li> </ul>	<p><i>Not submitted for policy review</i></p>
<p><i>Information Systems Development Group,</i> S09-01-01 (November 28, 2018)</p>	<p><i>Information Systems Development Group,</i> S09-01-01 (February 23, 2021)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Updates membership and responsibilities for the Information Systems Development Group, including Public Safety Administration personnel to include: Bureau Chief of Crime Control Strategies or designee, General Counsel to the Superintendent, Managing Deputy Director of Information Technology, Public Safety Administration, Deputy Chief of Training and Support Group, the Director of Research Development (serving as the Secretary), and the Deputy Chief of the Bureau of Crime Control Strategies. The group will also include designees from:</li> </ul>	<p><i>Information Systems Development Group,</i> S09-01-01 (May 5, 2021 Draft)</p>



Policy in May 2020	Revised Policy or Policies	Major Changes	Under Policy Review
		<p>Office of the First Superintendent, Executive Director Office of Constitutional Policing Reform, Bureau Patrol Chief, Bureau of Detectives Chief, Bureau of Counterterrorism Chief, Bureau of Internal Affairs Chief, Office of Community Policing Commander, and Labor Relations Division Commander.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The ISDG will meet quarterly</li> <li>A quorum is the Chairperson or Vice-Chairperson and seven other members</li> </ul>	
<p><i>Medical Policy, E03-01 (April 1, 1998)</i></p>	<p><i>Medical Policy, E03-01 (February 11, 2021)</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Requires all sworn officers in Ambulatory Recuperation status to complete e-Learning training within the required timeframe</li> <li>All Department officers (sworn) in Ambulatory Recuperation status will complete an e-learning training. They may access this training online from home, or at the nearest Department facility.</li> </ul>	<p><i>Not submitted for policy review</i></p>
<p><i>Narcotics Arrest Diversion Program, D18-03 (January 24, 2020)</i></p>	<p><i>Narcotics Arrest Diversion Program, D18-03 (August 3, 2020)</i></p> <p><i>Narcotics Arrest Diversion Program, D18-03 (February 24, 2021)</i></p> <p><i>Narcotics Arrest Diversion Program, D18-03 (March 29, 2021)</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Expands Narcotics Arrest Diversion Program to the 001, 006, 007, 008, and 012 Districts</li> <li>Updates edibility factors for the narcotics Arrest Diversion Program</li> <li>Introduces the Narcotics Arrest Diversion Program to the 001<sup>st</sup> and 0012<sup>th</sup> Districts</li> <li>Continues the Narcotics Arrest Diversion Program for the 006<sup>th</sup>, 007<sup>th</sup>, and 008<sup>th</sup> Districts</li> </ul>	<p><i>Not submitted for policy review</i></p>

Policy in May 2020	Revised Policy or Policies	Major Changes	Under Policy Review
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An officer making an arrest for possession of a controlled substance of one gram or less, possession of hypodermic syringes and needles, or possession of drug-related items within the boundaries of the 001<sup>st</sup> and 012<sup>th</sup> Districts (among others), should screen the arrestee for eligibility into the Narcotics Arrest Diversion Program.</li> <li>• An arrestee will be eligible for participation in the Narcotics Arrest Diversion Program ONLY when the arrest occurred within the geographic boundaries of the 001<sup>st</sup> and 012<sup>th</sup> Districts (among others); when the arrestee is present in the 001<sup>st</sup> and 012<sup>th</sup> Districts (among others) while a counselor is available.</li> <li>• When arresting an offender that meets the criteria established in this directive, an arresting officer will transport the arrestee to the 001<sup>st</sup> and 012<sup>th</sup> Districts (among others) for processing</li> </ul>	

Overall, the City and the CPD must continue to improve and update these policies and procedures under the Consent Decree.<sup>328</sup> And there continues to be ongoing discussions with the City, the CPD, the OAG, the Coalition, the IMT, and federal court to improve these policies.

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<sup>328</sup> See, e.g., 725 ILCS 5/103-3 (effective July 1, 2021).

## Training

### IMT's Recommendations: Training

- Develop training programs for leadership, commanders, and supervisors as teams on Mobile Field Force operations and rules of engagement (¶¶265–68)
- Provide adequate training for all officers on new or revised policies, including use of force, de-escalation, batons, and personal OC spray (¶¶265–68)
- Provide refresher training on (1) the people's right to record officers (¶58), (2) uniform requirements (¶347, 351, 433), (3) respectful interactions (¶52, 54, 56), (4) providing and requesting medical aid (¶173), and (5) arrestee rights (¶¶30–31, 35, 71)

While reviewing and revising the City's and the CPD's policies is important and necessary, the City and the CPD must inform personnel of their policies and provide effective training to enable personnel to follow those policies.

As reflected in [Analysis Figure 7](#) below, the CPD acknowledged training concerns in its After Action Report. The CPD did have recruitment and in-service training that touched upon crowd management tactics, including guidance on appropriate uses of batons and prohibitions on improper baton use. This type of infrequent training is not sufficient to ensure personnel have the skills, knowledge, and abilities to respond effectively and efficiently. We heard several commanders say that they had to provide on-the-scene training to officers just before and even during deployments into critical situations.

### Analysis Figure 7. CPD After Action Report (May 20, 2020, through June 12, 2020)

#### CPD After Action Report: "Training"

Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) In-service training</li> <li>(2) Knowledgeable leaders</li> <li>(3) Decentralized training</li> </ul>
Weaknesses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Insufficient field force training and lack of regular practice drills</li> <li>(2) Officers inexperienced with civil unrest of this scale</li> <li>(3) Co-occurring lawful demonstrations and criminal activity<sup>329</sup></li> </ul>

<sup>329</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department's Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 19.

## (1) COMMAND AND SUPERVISOR TRAINING

### IMT's Recommendations

- Develop training programs for leadership, commanders, and supervisors as teams on Mobile Field Force operations and rules of engagement (¶¶265–68)<sup>330</sup>

The CPD acknowledged that CPD “leaders and key members lacked recent, up-to-date training or practice on NIMS/ICS policies and procedures,” which impacted the City and CPD’s ability to manage Emergency Operations Center as efficiently and effectively as possible.<sup>331</sup>

*The Department is committed to better equipping supervisors with the training, tools, and resources necessary to hold roll calls in which information is shared, standards are enforced, and the Department’s principles are proactively fostered. This starts with a deliberate effort to identify best practices and provide in-service training to Department leaders on how to hold effective roll calls.*<sup>332</sup>

The National Incident Management System defines the more comprehensive approach guiding the community, all levels of government, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. The primary focus is to create a seamless partnership to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the effects of incidents. We recommend that the City and the CPD provide National Incident Management System (NIMS) training, including Incident Command System Series 100-700 for leadership and Incident Command System Series 100-400 for supervisors.

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<sup>330</sup> See Jonathan Links et al., *Recommendations for Enhancing Baltimore City’s Preparedness and Response to Mass Demonstration Events, Based on a Review and Analysis of the Events of April 2015*, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, 61 (December 4, 2015); *May 30 Civil Unrest After-Action Review*, CITY OF CLEVELAND, OH, 27, 29 (December 2020); Reneé Hail, *Dallas Police Department After Action Report George Floyd Protest May 29, 2020 Thru June 1, 2020*, DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT, 17, 19, 32–33, 41–42 (August 14, 2020); *Protest and Civil Disorder Incidents, After-Action Report, May 29-June 13, 2020*, LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, 26; *Safe LA Civil Unrest, 2020 After Action Report*, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, 104 (April 13, 2020); Gerald Chaleff, *An Independent Examination Of The Los Angeles Police Department 2020 Protest Response* (March 10, 2021), at 72–74; *A Crisis of Trust, a National Police Foundation Report to the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners on the Los Angeles Police Department Response to First Amendment Assemblies and Protests Occurring May 27-June 7, 2020*, NATIONAL POLICE FOUNDATION, 74, 78–79 (April 2021).

<sup>331</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department’s Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 5–6 (citing *Critical Incident Response Program*, General Order G05-03 § II-A-1 (December 7, 2017)).

<sup>332</sup> See *id.* at 9.

In addition to specially equipped and trained Mobile Field Force teams, this training will help the City and the CPD ensure that leadership, commanders, and supervisors are trained on options during protests, uses of equipment, squad formations, mass-arrest procedures, and rules of engagement.

Many commanders were candid with the challenges they faced in 2020—particularly at the end of May. Overall, command personnel were proud of their officers and believed that many officers under their command responded admirably. Many command staff were also candid, however, about the fact that they felt unprepared to supervise the officers responding to the unrest. Many commanders, for example, were relatively new to their positions and did not have experience leading responses to large-scale protests, even fewer had experience with unrest, and none had any experience with the level of unrest that occurred.

We heard, for example, that several relatively new commanders intended to respond to the protest downtown on Saturday, May 30, as a training opportunity. But the lack of an established command and control operations plan, left many commanders having to fend for themselves without any clear operational guidance from the Emergency Operations Center or from their supervisors. As a result, there was no clear birds-eye view guidance for officers in the field or the ability to strategically move officers and resources. In fact, many responding command staff, supervisors, and officers described going from place to place downtown, trying to collect officers, form police lines, and respond to the nearest 10-1 all day and all night, until the unrest subsided—at least for a few hours until starting again.

With the lack of sufficient planning and training, the various communications challenges, and the repeated calls of officer assistance, many command staff and supervisors rushed into action without an organized plan or sufficient training. The choice to put some of the most experienced command staff in the field may have helped improve the CPD's responses in the specific areas where they were deployed. But as a city-wide operation, many officers said that they went without leadership, making many of their own judgment calls in the moment. Weeks and even months later, many members of command staff, supervisors, and officers gave different answers regarding who the incident commander was at various times when the protests and unrest started at the end of May, and others didn't know.

In a response to a request for the "schedule and whereabouts for all commanders and higher ranks from May 29, 2020, through June 1, 2020," the CPD responded that "there is no documentation that would be responsive to this request beyond any answers provided by the referenced individuals in interviews conducted by the IMT and Office of the Inspector General." In their interviews, however, many officers struggled to describe more than generalities about where they were deployed

and what their overall mission was—often describing the days as blending together and the most chaotic experiences of their careers.

The absence of this documentation is a clear indicator of a flawed Command and Control System. Without it, the CPD could not to fully command and control various operational incidents with a clear understanding of who, what, where, or how field decisions were to be made. Further, the lack of documentation complicated efforts to conduct an effective and comprehensive after action report.

The City's and the CPD's original response to the beginning of the protests and growing unrest was largely to react to events as they occurred. The City and the CPD's inability to effectively maintain control over any particular area allowed opportunists to continue attempts to destroy and loot property. Many CPD personnel from all levels of the organization expressed a sincere frustration with wanting to do better but not being able to do so that first weekend.

Eventually, days into the protests and unrest in May 2020, the CPD activated the Emergency Operations Center and Area Command Posts, which according to the CPD's After Action Report, "allowed Department leaders to more efficiently manage available resources and resolve incoming resource requests" and "prevented a duplication of effort among field supervisors and individuals at the OC who report to the Incident Commander."<sup>333</sup> These command post scribes, however, were filled by officers without training, who had to learn in the heat of the moment. Naturally, there was a learning curve, which meant that, for example, many decisions, deployments, and resources were not tracked. As protests continued throughout the summer, the City and the CPD made deliberate efforts to improve tracking of personnel, incident locations, posts, communications, and equipment by sharing databases and standardized spreadsheets across relevant City entities.

The supervision challenges continued, however, after the CPD activated the central mobilization center. Some officers said that, even after officers were placed into more organized squads and platoons, there were many challenges in moving officers to where they were needed and without further instruction. Several officers were not equipped with radios, body-worn cameras, or protective gear. Transportation was also limited, which led to some officers being dropped off at various locations. This system left many squads and platoons stranded and unable to be re-deployed to other critical areas in a timely fashion. In some instances, platoons were dropped off at certain locations with no directions regarding their mission or how to accomplish it. Without clear instruction otherwise, officers were then left to their discretion on the levels of force to use to, for example, secure their location.

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<sup>333</sup> See *id.* at 17.

While the City and the CPD made some improvements throughout the summer, there were also continued struggles. For example, on July 17, 2020, at the protest at Grant Park, there was a contingent of the crowd that was captured on City cameras appearing to prepare to attack the police by using umbrellas for coverage to change into matching clothes and masks and distribute projectiles. These members of the crowd then marched toward the statue to confront the officers.

Some supervisors and officers reported that they did not receive notice of a potential attack on officers or members of the crowd until after police started to call in for 10-1s. We also heard concerns from officers that they did not agree with leadership decisions throughout the City's and CPD's response to unrest.

While many City and CPD personnel admirably did their best to rise to challenges, often taking initiative as individuals, the City and the CPD must provide sufficient command and supervisor training to enable personnel to better respond to protests and unrest as coordinated teams.

## (2) CPD RECRUIT AND IN-SERVICE TRAINING

### IMT's Recommendations

- Provide adequate training for all officers on new or revised policies, including use of force, de-escalation, batons, and personal OC spray (¶¶265–68)<sup>334</sup>

As discussed in the Planning and Preparation section above—particularly in the Mobile Field Force subsection—the CPD did not have sufficient recruit or in-service training that would have allowed the CPD to effectively use all of the officers it used for Mobile Field Force.<sup>335</sup> Moreover, putting aside the recent and necessary revisions to relevant policies, the CPD did not have sufficient training on existing

<sup>334</sup> See Jonathan Links et al., *Recommendations for Enhancing Baltimore City's Preparedness and Response to Mass Demonstration Events, Based on a Review and Analysis of the Events of April 2015*, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, 65–66 (December 4, 2015); *A Crisis of Trust, a National Police Foundation Report to the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners on the Los Angeles Police Department Response to First Amendment Assemblies and Protests Occurring May 27-June 7, 2020*, NATIONAL POLICE FOUNDATION, 83 (April 2021); Benjamin Carleton et al., *Philadelphia Police Department's Response to Demonstrations and Civil Unrest May 30-June 15, 2020*, CNA AND MONTGOMERY McCracken, 84, 87, 89 (December 2020).

<sup>335</sup> ¶293 (“A solid foundation of recruit training is important for equipping new police officers with the skills, knowledge, and values to police fairly, safely, effectively, and in accordance with the law, CPD policy, best practices, and this Agreement.”). The IMT will assess the City and the CPD's compliance with ¶293 in Year Three of the Consent Decree. See also ¶317 (“Regular in-service training is critical to ensure that CPD officers continue to hone important policing skills and remain up-to-date on changes in the law, CPD policy, technology, community expectations, and developments in best practices. In-service training should, as appropriate, reinforce CPD's commitment to procedural justice, de-escalation, impartial policing, and community policing.”).

policies, such as the appropriate use of and prohibitions on certain uses of batons and OC spray. All officers—including those who are not part of Mobile Field Force teams—should continue to receive recruit and in-service training on the various concepts and policies for crowd management.

Officers were not, however, entirely without training, and the CPD did provide training before the protests and unrest, send modified trainings and reminders during the unrest, and have since provided additional trainings as the protests have continued.

In a response to requests for relevant training, the CPD provided the following:

*Recruit Training*

- Control tactics, including
  - Handcuffing Introduction,
  - Handcuffing Standing/Kneeling/Prone,
  - Impact Weapon Introduction,
  - Impact Weapon – Closed Mode Strikes, Open Mode Strikes, Open Mode Drills, Multiple Subjects, Disadvantage[] Positions, Review, Drills, and Test
  - OC Introduction, Drills, and Exposure
  - Half-Face Respiratory (April 13, 2020)

*In-Service Training*

- Crowd Control and Behavior Refresher 2019 (August/November/December)
- Crowd Control and Behavior Refresher 2019 (August/July)
- Crowd Control and Behavior supervisor in-service training presentation and lesson plan (dated June 2019)
- Crowd Control and Behavior recruit training lesson plan and training presentations (revised August 2017)
- Crowd Control Operations training bulletin
- Crowd Control and Behavior recruit training lesson plan and training presentations (revised February 2014)



Many of these trainings included critical information. For example, the CPD's recruit training regarding impact weapons provides the following guidance on baton use:

*Trainees ARE NEVER TRAINED TO USE THE BATON as a lethal force instrument. Striking areas of the head, neck and spine are prohibited.*

After updating these trainings based on new or revised policies, these trainings should continue to be provided to officers in recruit and in-service training.

Still, most recruit and in-service training is not hands on or scenario-based. Further, as referenced in the CPD's After Action Report, the CPD's recruit training exposed officers to Mobile Field Force and mass-arrest procedures, but "newer [CPD] members (including those brought on during a dramatic hiring push started in late 2016) did not experience the same tangible application of those tactics, policies, and procedures as . . . officers were deployed to, for example, the 2012 NATO Conference"—"before some of the [CPD] members working during this unprecedented, large-scale civil unrest were on the job or in the senior leadership positions."<sup>336</sup> As a result, the CPD agrees that it "is essential that the [CPD] commit to ensuring all necessary field units receive updated field force training moving forward."<sup>337</sup>

To compensate and address several emerging issues, the CPD sent out several messages to all officers throughout 2020. This included, for example, messages regarding the following:

- *Mandatory Review of Use of Force Policies* (Thursday, May 28, 2020):

*In light of recent developments in Minneapolis, Minnesota District Commanders will ensure their Watch Operations Lieutenants on all watches review CPD Use of Force policies and training materials during roll call. . . .*

- *Uniform and Appearance Standards* (Tuesday, June 2, 2020)

*Sworn members are reminded that the unit assignment designator and nameplate will be positioned so that it will be clearly visible. The combined nameplate/unit designator will be worn on the uniform outer garment[(except rainwear)]. The prescribed stars will be clearly*

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<sup>336</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department's Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 5–6 (citing *Critical Incident Response Program*, General Order G05-03 § II-A-1 (December 7, 2017)).

<sup>337</sup> See *id.* at 5–6 (citing *Critical Incident Response Program*, General Order G05-03 § II-A-1 (December 7, 2017)).

*visible and positioned on the left breast of the uniform outer garment. . . .*

- *Body Worn Camera Reminder (Wednesday, June 3, 2020)*

*Department members will activate the system to event mode at the beginning of an incident and will record the entire incident for all law enforcement related activities . . . [which] include but are not limited to: arrests, any encounter with the public that becomes adversarial after the initial contact, arrestee transport and any other instances when enforcing the law. . . .*

- *Uniform and Appearance Standards (Thursday, June 4, 2020)*

*All sworn members when attired in uniform will wear the prescribed star, name tag, unit designator, and rank insignia on their outer-most garment and in view to the public. . . . All supervisors have the responsibility and authority to ensure that uniform standards are strictly adhered to by both sworn and uniformed civilian members. Appropriate action will be taken when members fail to meet standards. . . .*

As reflected in the sample above, the CPD often repeated general messages with stronger verbiage and reference to supervisor authority and potential penalties.

In August 2020, COPA notified the CPD regarding several concerning patterns from complaints and its ongoing investigations. This included, for example, the following:

- *Excessive baton use was the most prevalent form of unnecessary use of force alleged in protest-related complaints. Members who COPA has interviewed regarding these complaints seemed to lack clarity regarding [CPD] directives on proper baton use.*

As reflected in the CPD Policies subsection above, the CPD also made specific efforts to train on new relevant policies or changes to policies. For example, between October 31 and November 9, 2020, the CPD provided a *First Amendment and Public Gatherings* roll-call training. The CPD ultimately transitioned this in-person training to a video to ensure consistency across roll calls. Among other things, this training included the First Amendment; relevant CPD policies, including the *Human Rights and Human Resources* policy; and explained the new CPD forms, ICS-211 Incident Check-In form (CPD-11.301) and Incident Response form (CPD-11.302) Forms; and clarified that Tactical Responses Reports (TRRs) are still required for individual reportable use of force incidents during a crowd, protest, or civil disturbance response.

The training also specified that CPD officers

- “will not use batons to intentionally strike a person in the head or neck except when deadly force is justified.”
- “ANY DEPLOYMENT OF OC SPRAY ONTO A CROWD AND NOT DIRECTLY AT AN ASSAILANT IS ONLY PERMITTED IF MEMBER HAS RECEIVED PERMISSION FROM THE SUPERINTENDENT”
- “Department Members will activate BWCs when taking law enforcement action such as issuing a dispersal order, using force, or making an arrest.”
- “Department members are prohibited from concealing identifying parts of the prescribed uniform or wearing unauthorized uniform items or equipment consistent with the Department directive titled ‘Uniform and Appearance Standards.’”
- “As required by Department protocols to prevent the spread of COVID-19, personnel will wear a mask, face covering, or face shield under any condition in which a member cannot maintain 6 feet of social distancing from other persons. The requirement to wear a mask, face covering, or face shield applies to all interactions with the public. The requirement extends to and includes wearing in public areas, private property, buildings, and vehicles.”

Analysis Figure 8.

Select Slides from *First Amendment and Public Gatherings – Roll Call Training* (October and November 2020)

**INTERACTING WITH THE PUBLIC DURING A RESPONSE TO CROWDS, PROTESTS, OR CIVIL DISTURBANCES**

- \* Act, speak, and conduct themselves in a professional manner, recognizing their obligation to safeguard life and property, and maintain a courteous, professional attitude in all contacts with the public consistent with the Department directive titled "Human Rights and Human Resources"
- \* Treat all persons with the courtesy and dignity which is inherently due every person as a human being
- \* When a dispersal order is given, provide adequate dispersal routes and clearly identify and announce the routes to disperse and the requirement to leave the area
- \* Not disrupt, interfere with, harass, or discriminate against any person engaged in First Amendment conduct for the purpose of punishing, retaliating, or preventing the person from exercising his or her First Amendment rights consistent with the Department directive titled "The First Amendment and Police Actions"



**INTERACTING WITH THE PUBLIC DURING A RESPONSE TO CROWDS, PROTESTS, OR CIVIL DISTURBANCES**

- \* Not prevent members of the public from recording Department members on the public way performing their duties in a public place consistent with the Department directive titled "Body Worn Cameras" and Illinois Compiled Statutes (720 ILCS 5/14-2(e)).
- \* Request the appropriate medical aid for any injured person and, when it is safe and feasible to do so, may provide the appropriate medical care consistent with the member's training, consistent with the Department directive titled "Preliminary Investigations"
- \* Deescalate to prevent or reduce the need for force when it is safe and feasible to do so based on the totality of the circumstances. When it is safe and feasible to do so, provide a warning prior to the use of any reportable force and allow individuals to voluntarily comply with lawful verbal direction.
- \* Act to intervene on the subject's behalf when the Department member directly observes a use of force and identifies the force as excessive or otherwise in violation of Department policy, consistent with the Department directive titled "Use of Force"



**REMINDERS**

- \* **The public can video record us.** They may record Department members on the public way performing their duties in a public place consistent with the Department directive titled "Body Worn Camera" and Illinois Compiled Statutes (720 ILCS 5/14-2(e))
- \* Department members made aware of a "doxing" incident or other threats against a Department member will notify a supervisor who, when necessary, will follow the procedures outlined in the Department directive titled "Protection of Department Members"
- \* **Constitutional policing is smart policing. It is respectful policing. It is policing that places at the forefront the dignity and rights of individuals but upholds the duties and obligations of the police to serve, protect and enforce the law.**
  - \* Police have a range of appropriate responses available for any given scenario
  - \* Any police action must be reasonable based upon the facts and circumstances
  - \* If in doubt, ask questions and seek guidance
- \* When appropriate and lawful, seize and inventory property consistent with the Department directive titled "Processing Property Under Department Control"



The CPD continues to roll out relevant training materials. In April 2021, for example, the CPD sent officers a “Pocket Guide to [Field Force Operations (FFO)] Formations” (dated March 2021) and a “Checklist for (FFO) Platoon Leaders.” Later that month, the CPD provided a video roll-call training on Mass Arrest Procedures for seven consecutive days.

In response to the Inspector General’s Office’s report, CPD Superintendent Brown wrote that “While the Department had not engaged in formal training on mass arrest procedures for some time before the events of 2020, several units, including those in BIA, took it upon themselves to do roll-call training for members as these events unfolded in order to reinforce the requirements of the mass arrest and use of force orders.”<sup>338</sup> We appreciate and heard from many CPD personnel who worked hard to mitigate the circumstances the City and the CPD found themselves in, but more deliberate district-wide training is necessary. Moreover, the IMT, the OAG, and the Coalition have shared with the CPD that there continue to be concerns with the CPD’s mass arrest policy, procedures, and forms, and we do not believe that training on the existing process will be sufficient to meet the requirement of the Consent Decree.

As reflected in the Independent Monitoring Report 3, the CPD faced significant challenges with providing adequate training during COVID-19. The CPD relied heavily on roll-call trainings for new policies or major changes. While roll-call trainings are helpful to widely distribute new information, the CPD needed and still needs thorough in person training and drills to effectively ensure relevant units and officers could effectively follow the CPD’s plans and policies for crowd management. The CPD noted concerns about over reliance on roll-call trainings in its After Action Report:

*Unfortunately, the chaotic nature of the Events often kept Department members from leading roll calls with Department members in advance of their deployments to a given area. Instead, these Department members geared up and responded to the Events as soon as practicable; a well-intentioned but ultimately ineffective decision. This precluded Department leaders from communicating specific plans (and their underlying rationales) with those field supervisors and/or Department members ultimately expected to execute them . . . . There is an overarching concern among Department leadership regarding how roll calls are conducted in each district and various specialized units. Roll call is the most direct opportunity for Department leaders—namely Sergeants, Lieutenants, Captains, and Commanders—to cultivate a specific culture within and among their chain of command.*

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<sup>338</sup> CPD Superintendent David O. Brown, *Re: Report on Chicago’s Response to George Floyd Protests and Unrest*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 11, 2021).

*However, roll calls often differ in length, breadth, and scope depending on the individual leading the briefing. As a result, the Department often sees rumors, speculation, and an insular distrust among its membership rather than a sincere understanding of its higher-level decision-making and strategy.*<sup>339</sup>

In Independent Monitoring Report 4, we will also provide updates on the CPD's relevant Use of Force training, which should incorporate the recent revisions to the Use of Force policies through a variety of delivery modes, including annual in-service training, eLearning, and roll call briefs, to address the requirements of the Consent Decree.<sup>340</sup>

- *De-escalation, Response to Resistance, and Use of Force*, General Order G03-02, which “sets forth Department policy regarding sworn members’ and detention aides’ de-escalation, response to resistance, and use of force.”
- *Response to Resistance and Force Options*, General Order G03-02-01
- *Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report*, General Order G03-02-02
- *Firearm Discharge Incidents – Authorized Use and Post-Discharge Administrative Procedures*, General Order G03-02-03
- *Taser Use Incidents*, General Order G03-02-04
- *Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Devices and Other Chemical Agent Use Incidents*, General Order G03-02-05
- *Canine Use Incidents*, General Order G03-02-06
- *Baton Use Incidents*, General Order G03-02-07
- *Department Review of Use of Force*, General Order G03-02-08
- *Firearm Discharge and Office-Involved Death Incident Response and Investigation*, General Order G03-06

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<sup>339</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department’s Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 8–9.

<sup>340</sup> As reflected in Independent Monitoring Report 3, as of December 31, 2020, 70% of CPD officers had completed the 2020 Use of Force in-service training. Further, the CPD plans to deliver an eLearning on the Use of Force policy changes reflected in the December 31, 2020-issued policies in February 2021. This eLearning will be in addition to the 40 hours of in-service training required for 2021.

These trainings should be prioritized to account for the various findings and concerns raised by the City, the CPD, COPA, the Inspector General's Office, the IMT, and members of Chicago's communities.

### (3) REFRESHER TRAINING

#### IMT's Recommendation

- Provide refresher training on (1) the people's right to record officers (¶58), (2) uniform requirements (¶347, 351, 433), (3) respectful interactions (¶52, 54, 56), (4) providing and requesting medical aid (¶173), and (5) arrestee rights (¶¶30–31, 35, 71)

As discussed above, the large protests and unrest occurred in Chicago about four days after the murder of George Floyd over 400 miles away. The CPD would not have been able to adequately train all officers who were ultimately required to respond to protests and crowds in that time. The most comparable training occurred about eight years earlier in preparation for the 2012 NATO Summit, which was, in comparison, in an isolated location. The City and the CPD cannot control or predict when the next national or local event will occur.

As a result, the City and the CPD must implement refresher training in case another event occurs eight years or a few months from now. Refresher training on these critical skills must occur in addition to regular in-service training, referenced above, that should be provided at regular intervals based on the likelihood of certain units and officers needing to respond to large crowds. Specifically, this refresher training should occur soon and reflect some of the policies and training that already exist, but that some officers appeared to continue to not follow during 2020 deployments. The City and the CPD should also, however, review, update, and revise these trainings to address any gaps in the previous trainings and maximize their long-term effectiveness.

#### The people's right to record officers (¶58)<sup>341</sup>

The importance of police department's acknowledgment *and protection* of people's right to safely record officers during their duties has had a long and important history in the United States and in Chicago. In fact, it was bystander video that led to the international awareness of George Floyd's murder.

<sup>341</sup> See, e.g., ¶58 ("Within 90 days of the Effective Date, CPD will clarify in policy that CPD officers will permit members of the public to photograph and record CPD officers in the performance of their law enforcement duties in a public place, or in circumstances in which the officer has no reasonable expectation of privacy. The policy will also provide that officers may take reasonable action to maintain safety and control, secure crime scenes and accident sites, protect the integrity and confidentiality of investigations, and protect the safety of officers or others.").

During our review of body-worn camera footage, we observed multiple officers take issue with being recorded. One officer, for example, appeared to strike the phone out of a community member's hand because the person was filming the interaction.

In the third reporting period, the CPD still needed to receive additional community input on its corresponding policy, *Human Rights and Human Resources*, General Order G02-01. As we said in Independent Monitoring Report 3, "The lack of community engagement regarding this paragraph's requirements is concerning considering various allegations that some officers took or destroyed community members' phones or cameras during protests and civil unrest in the summer of 2020."

Since then, the CPD has also submitted its related policy, *Body Worn Camera*, for Consent Decree review, which will also need to undergo significant community engagement to ensure that CPD's practices of recording and allowing others to record officer interactions with the community reflects the community's priorities and helps build and sustain trust.

### Uniform requirements

As referenced above, there were many issues with officers not complying with uniform requirements. This includes, for example, the dangers associated with not wearing helmets. But there were also many instances—including those demonstrated by images and videos of officers covering their badges and nametags during protests and unrest.<sup>342</sup>

In the CPD's After Action Report, the CPD acknowledged that there were policy violations by officers:

*[S]ome Department members were observed during the Events with their names and/or badges removed from their uniforms or otherwise obscured in violation of Department policy. This could have been avoided had supervisors, per that same Department policy, "inspect[ed] uniformed members at . . . roll call."<sup>343</sup>*

In addition to the damage caused to community trust by willful violations of policies, as discussed further the Accountability section below, the coverings negatively impacted investigations of officer misconduct.

<sup>342</sup> Compare, e.g., ¶433 ("CPD will require that officers provide their name and star number, or in the case of non-sworn members other employee-identifying number, to any member of the public, upon request.").

<sup>343</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department's Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 8 (citing *Uniform and Appearance Standards*, Uniform and Property U04-01 § II-A-3 (March 11, 2020)).



Furthermore, since the beginning of COVID-19, and corresponding mask and social distance requirements, many officers continued not wearing masks when interacting with colleagues and community members. In some circumstances, the lack of masks was somewhat understandable—as officers struggled to respond to large-scale unrest, immediate dangers, and serious communication challenges associated with unreliable radio communications and loud noises of the chaos around them. We also heard from officers who expressed frustration about having to respond to large crowds that were not following social distance guidelines and people in the crowds who were either not wearing masks, not wearing masks correctly, or intentionally not following social-distance protocols by getting into officers' faces.

Still, none of this justifies the increased risk of infection that officers who chose not to wear masks placed on colleagues, arrestees, essential workers who needed to be moving throughout Chicago, or other community members who were completely uninvolved but had interactions with exposed persons downstream. Furthermore, the CPD was largely responsible for enforcing COVID-19 precautions, including social distancing and mask wearing. For many, officers' refusal to wear masks themselves suggested that these officers believed that the rules that they enforce on others do not apply to them, and these choices by individual officers reflected on the entire CPD.

There were also officers who appeared to have chosen to cover their badges and nameplates and also not wear a mask. This suggests that the officers were less concerned about protecting their identity and safety from doxing—as many suggested—and more concerned about escalating tensions with members of the crowd and an implicit threat of impropriety regarding misconduct.

The CPD has sent several department-wide messages about masking and personal protective equipment throughout the pandemic, and we did view images of protest response where the rate of officers wearing masks appeared to increase. Still, there continued to be many officers who refused to wear masks, and as of the date of this report, we are only aware of one officer who was disciplined for this refusal to wear a body-worn camera and for covering a badge.<sup>344</sup> In addition to the accountability section below, we recommend that additional training regarding uniform rules, the reasons for the rules, and the penalties for violating the rules—including examples of such discipline—would be helpful and welcomed by officers who have followed and continue to follow those rules and by community members who witnessed officers ignore them.

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<sup>344</sup> Unlike other officers who covered both badges and name plates, the officer who received a reprimand was wearing a name plate.

## Respectful interactions (¶52, 54, 56)

During this review, we heard from many community members who witnessed CPD officers use aggressive, mocking, and inappropriate language toward protesters.<sup>345</sup> We also saw video of officers using such language toward people during various interactions. It appeared that many protesters and people engaging in unrest were being intentionally disrespectful and hostile toward officers (with chants and slogans like “fuck the police,” “fuck 12,” “kill the police,” and “ACAB,” meaning “all cops are bastards”). People do, however, have First Amendment rights to use, among other things, disrespectful language, and officers must maintain professionalism in response to all protected speech. To do this, the City and the CPD must acknowledge the challenges and establish expectations and fully equip, train, and prepare, and provide sufficient supports for officers to respond to all protected speech with professionalism. Such preparation can help ensure that officers are equipped to respond to protests in a way that may de-escalate tensions, build trust, and prevent officers from losing community trust—and in the least, does not escalate tensions.<sup>346</sup>

In evaluating the level of respect during communications, officers and community members often mirrored one another during the interaction. Many interactions from the body-worn-camera footage demonstrate respectful engagement between officers and community members—although some interactions would end abruptly with disrespectful language. Given the sometimes abrupt start or stop of footage, it was often difficult to determine whether the officers or community members were setting the tone of the interactions. Either way, when community members appeared to be disrespectful and confrontational, officers often replied in a disrespectful and confrontational way. Similarly, when community members appeared more willing to respectfully engage, officers appeared more willing to engage respectfully.

On the other hand, we also heard concerning language between officers that suggested some officers may be more willing to start disrespectful interactions with people in crowds—or worse. The review of body-worn-camera videos provided insight into how some CPD officers viewed community members who were taking part in the protests, rallies, or other events, particularly during “down times,”

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<sup>345</sup> ¶54 (“CPD will continue to require that all CPD members interact with all members of the public in an unbiased, fair, and respectful manner. . .”).

<sup>346</sup> *See, e.g.*, ¶163 (“CPD officers may only use force for a lawful purpose. CPD officers are prohibited from using force as punishment or retaliation, such as using force to punish or retaliate against a person for fleeing, resisting arrest, insulting an officer, or engaging in protected First Amendment activity (e.g., lawful demonstrations, protected speech, observing or filming police activity, or criticizing an officer or the officer’s conduct).”).

when the public was not within hearing range. In a number of instances, CPD officers made disparaging remarks about community members. For instance, officers said things such as the following:

*Somethin' gonna happen tonight.*

*I wanna hit this mother fucker right here.*

*There's more people coming. They think they're something. They all need they ass whooped. It's embarrassing.*

In other instances, we heard common references to community members as “animals” and “savages,” particularly when referencing people who were looting or participating in violence.

Although community members may not hear this language, the language is nonetheless concerning because it may reveal how some CPD officers view some members of the communities they serve. While we are unable to draw direct links from comments made about community members to actions taken against community members, it is nevertheless concerning that such language could reflect a culture that can have dangerous repercussions.

There was no shortage of disrespectful communication found within the videos we reviewed. Based on the aggregate of the videos, it appeared that many protesters were attempting to elicit emotional responses from officers, often through disrespectful chants and direct statements targeting specific officers. We saw some people call officers derogatory, racist, and sexist terms. Such statements were often made in officers' faces, as well as from a distance as protesters were walking by. We also saw some protesters identifying officers by name, looking the officer up online, and then making derogatory comments about the specific officer. It should be noted, however, these tactics have been used for years. Many departments train officers on how to endure and respond to these types of tactics through training and supervisory oversight, monitoring officers' behaviors during these encounters.

Some officers appeared willing to taunt community members, often with similarly derogatory language. At times, the taunts appeared to be in response to community member statements. In other occasions, some officers appeared to be taunting people without prompt. For instance, during one mass arrest for looting, officers were having a respectful interaction with the individuals being arrested. However, one officer then appeared to provoke one arrestee with the following exchange:

**Officer:** *“Look at that stare though. Why are you staring at me?”*

**Arrestee:** *“Stop talking to me.”*

**Officer:** *“Ok, so what’s going to happen after? I’m not gonna stop talking and then your ride’s going to come and you’re going to go to jail.”*

**Arrestee:** *“Then I’ll get back out.”*

*[Pause]*

**Officer:** *“You were crying back there. I got it on body cam. We can go back to the station and watch it. I’ll put that shit up on YouTube.”*

**Arrestee:** *“It’s easy to talk shit when I’m in cuffs.”*

**Officer:** *“You weren’t in cuffs back there. I threw your ass to the ground, and you cried . . . You one big pussy ass bitch. Big ass bitch.”*

Other exchanges contained similar disrespectful language. For instance, during one arrest, a woman yelled, “He did not hit you with a brick.” A supervisor assisting with the arrest yelled back at her, pointing with a baton, “Shut up, bitch,” to which the woman retorted, “Your mama’s a pig.” Later in that interaction, the woman walked alongside officers as they were escorting the arrestee and was told by another officer: “You want to get locked up? Get back! Get the fuck back you little shit.”

These types of exchanges do little to demonstrate the professionalism of the CPD. As noted above, there was relative parity between officers and the public in terms of respectful/disrespectful actions. It is therefore likely that the derogatory language was the result of the situation and may have been influenced by protester actions. However, officers should be expected to maintain their composure even when faced with contemptuous individuals or crowds. In addition to the planning for officer wellness and support, additional training and enhanced monitoring by supervisors is likely necessary to ensure officers understand expectations and benefits regarding respectful interactions—along with the long-term harms that can be caused by disrespectful interactions.

Moreover, it was clear from some body-worn-camera footage that some officers knew how to conduct respectful interactions, even when facing hostile crowds and potentially dangerous circumstances. In several videos, CPD officers spoke with community members and potential crowd organizers respectfully and productively. In many of these instances, the officers were supervisors, indicating that leadership was interested in hearing community voices. While such interactions had mixed results, we were encouraged to see officers attempting to do their part to de-escalate tensions and protect protesters and other community members.

We look forward to reviewing CPD training and attendance records that aim to ensure that such interactions become the norm.

### Providing and requesting medical aid (¶173)

According to CPD records and interviews of CPD personnel, there were instances when officers provided critical medical aid to people injured during protests and unrest, including shooting victims. However, the IMT reviewed many videos where CPD officers' responded to protests and unrest and did not render or request medical aid for injured protesters or people who had received uses of force.<sup>347</sup> As demonstrated in many of the same videos, it is likely that many people who received uses of force from officers did not want to or would have been unwilling to receive aid from the CPD.

Nonetheless, the CPD's *De-Escalation, Response to Resistance, and Use of Force* policy, G03-02, requires officers to immediately request medical aid for the injured person, including contacting emergency medical services (EMS) from the Chicago Fire Department via the OEMC. Likewise, the *Firearm Discharge and Officer-Involved Death Incident Response and Investigation* and *Immediate responsibilities for the involved member*, require officers to do the following:

1. *Immediately request medical request medical attention for the injured and as soon as it is safe and feasible to do so, provide lifesaving aid consistent with their department training, including the Law Enforcement Medical and Rescue Training (LE-MART), to persons injured by a Department member's use of force until medical professionals arrive on scene.*
  - a. *Department members may provide appropriate medical care consistent with their training to any individual who has visible injuries, complains of being injured, or requests medical attention. This may include providing first aid and/or arranging for transportation to an emergency medical facility.*

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<sup>347</sup> See, e.g., ¶¶173 ("Following a use of force, once the scene is safe and as soon as practicable, CPD officers must immediately request appropriate medical aid for injured persons or persons who claim they are injured.") and 211 ("CPD officers must assist subjects exposed to application of an OC device with decontamination and flushing when it is safe and feasible to do so. CPD officers must request the appropriate medical aid for a subject after the discharge of an OC device if the subject appears to be in any physical distress, or complains of injury or aggravation of a pre-existing medical condition (e.g., asthma, emphysema, bronchitis, or a heart ailment.").

*b. If the scene is safe and the person in custody is secure, Department members will not interfere with emergency medical personnel when providing treatment to injured persons.*

As reflected most recently in Independent Monitoring Report 3, we have yet to receive sufficient evidence of training compliance of officers on these policies.

### Arrestee rights (¶¶30–31, 35, 71)

As reflected above, the CPD had significant challenges with arrests, including mass arrests. As with many issues throughout this report, many of the challenges regarding arrestee rights were caused by a lack of sufficient planning. We heard, for example, that there were significant organizational challenges around mass arrests, including how to conduct and process arrests. We heard that in some circumstances, the CPD did not have all crucial personnel available, such as videographers to take pictures of injuries before and after stages of processing. According to the CPD, mass arrest issues, for example, were caused in large part by an unfamiliarity with existing policies—that is, a lack of training:

*The Department has a substantial written procedure governing mass arrest incidents[] that works in theory but, during the Events, broke down in practice. This appeared attributable in part to the chaotic nature and unprecedented geographic scope of the Events. For example, Department members effecting arrests were required to complete “Mass Arrest Cards”—duplicate paper forms capturing limited information including, but not limited to, probable cause for arrest and the transporting unit’s information.*

*But many Department members lacked familiarity with formal mass arrest policies and processes as a result of limited (if any) involvement with actual, tangible applications of the procedure; not all incidents at which multiple arrests are effected are mass arrest incidents. Nor were many duplicate mass arrest forms immediately available during the Events where widespread criminal activity was occurring.*

*As a result, many of the individuals arrested during the Events were either released without charging (“RWOC”) or had charges filed against them dropped by prosecutors because the arresting officer or officers could not be identified. These individuals may have been involved in serious, criminal wrongdoing (e.g., looting, arson, violence, etc.) during the Events and may never be held accountable as a result.<sup>348</sup>*

<sup>348</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department’s Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 9–10.

Similarly, constitutional, department, and local rules regarding arrestee rights were in place when the protests and unrest began.<sup>349</sup> However, we heard of challenges, for example, with arrestees receiving access to their attorneys or families.<sup>350</sup>

We also heard from the CPD that there were significant challenges with transporting and securing arrestees in May and June 2020. There were, for example, closures of certain CPD locations due to COVID-19 outbreaks, and additional logistical challenges with any attempts to follow COVID-19 precautions. CPD representatives said that people accused the CPD of intentionally punishing arrestees by moving them to different locations, lying about where arrestees were, and keeping arrestees from their attorneys. These representatives said, however, that the reality was that there were significant challenges handling the increase of arrestees that the CPD locations were unprepared for.

Illinois recently amended state law to guarantee people the right to a phone call no later than three hours after arrival at the first place of custody.<sup>351</sup> The IMT is

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<sup>349</sup> As reflected in Independent Monitoring Report 3, we believe additional improvements should be made to relevant CPD policies. For example, we believe that the *Arrestee and In-Custody Communications* policy, G06-01-04, should be more specific than “as soon as practicable” to ensure arrestees can reach their attorneys or families in a specified and timely manner. We have requested that the CPD track the times that arrestees are taken into custody and when arrestees are provided with their phone call. We will look forward to reviewing this data. Further, the CPD has implemented *Processing of Juveniles and Minors under Department Control* policy, S06-04, which codifies ¶135’s requirements. At the end of the third reporting period (December 31, 2020), however, we had not yet received sufficient records of the practices in place to supervise officers’ interactions with juveniles once in custody.

<sup>350</sup> Cf., e.g., ¶¶31 (“CPD will provide arrestees access to a phone and the ability to make a phone call as soon as practicable upon being taken into custody.”) and 35 (“If a juvenile has been arrested CPD will notify the juvenile’s parent or guardian as soon as possible. The notification may either be in person or by telephone and will be documented in any relevant reports, along with the identity of the parent or guardian who was notified. Officers will document in the arrest or incident report attempts to notify a parent or guardian. If a juvenile is subsequently interrogated, CPD policy will comply with state law and require, at a minimum, that: a. Juvenile Miranda Warning will be given to juveniles prior to any custodial interrogation; b. the public defender’s office may represent and have access to a juvenile during a custodial interrogation, regardless of parent or legal guardian permission; c. CPD officers will make reasonable efforts to ensure a parent or legal guardian is present for a custodial interrogation of a juvenile arrestee under 15 years of age in custody for any felony offense; and d. juveniles in custody for felony offenses and misdemeanor sex offenses under Article 11 of the Illinois Criminal Code will have their custodial interrogation electronically recorded.”).

<sup>351</sup> 725 ILCS 5/103-3 (effective July 1, 2021).

also aware of much local attention to this issue during this reporting period, including proposed City legislation,<sup>352</sup> a lawsuit filed by county officials against the City,<sup>353</sup> and a new state law.<sup>354</sup>

As the City and the CPD revise policies and procedures, they must also train officers and personnel to ensure the law and the corresponding policies are followed.

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<sup>352</sup> See Paris Schutz, *Alderman, Mayor at Odds Over Phone Calls in Police Custody*, WTTW News (December 21, 2020), <https://news.wttw.com/2020/12/21/aldermen-mayor-odds-over-phone-calls-police-custody#:~:text=The%20Chicago%20Police%20Department's%20deputy,arresting%20and%20booking%20a%20suspect.&text=Mayor%20Lori%20Light-foot's%20administration%20has,hours%20of%20being%20in%20custody>.

<sup>353</sup> See Matthew Hendrickson, *Arrestees denied phone calls, access to lawyers, lawsuit claims*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (June 23, 2020), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/2020/6/23/21300460/lawsuit-cook-county-public-defender-good-kids-mad-city-black-lives-matter-chicago-police>.

<sup>354</sup> See Public Act 101-0652 (February 22, 2021), <https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/101/PDF/101-0652.pdf>.



## Accountability and Transparency

### IMT's Recommendations – Accountability and Transparency

- Improve reporting and documentation on uses of force, arrest, deployments, dispersals, officer wellness and safety, all injuries, and use of OC spray (¶¶566–67, 438, 528, 567, 581–82)
- Increase transparency regarding discipline, including decisions to relieve or not relieve officers of police powers (¶¶567)
- Address personnel needs across accountability systems, including COPA investigators, CPD Force Review Division, BIA, and CPD supervisor ratios (¶¶343, 356, 521, 575, 700)
- Allocate sufficient City and CPD resources to review and analyze data, including tagging and auditing body-worn-camera video footage (¶¶352–53, 576, 700)
- Continue to review and increase methods of transparency with Chicago's communities, regarding crime-reduction strategies, officer-involved shootings, and other police activities (¶¶10, 12, 17, 54, 334)
- Create After Action procedures—including body-worn camera review and opportunities for community engagement—after each operations plan (¶¶8–10, 347–51)

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The importance of and need for accountability and transparency are reflected throughout this report, from the distrust of or anger toward national and local policing to the spike in allegations of violent crime and officer misconduct. As reflected in the Consent Decree: “Holding public servants accountable when they violate law or policy is essential to ensuring legitimacy and community confidence” (¶419). Without consistent and transparent incentives for personnel to follow policies and training, the City and the CPD will continue to struggle with community trust.

While the City's and the CPD's planning and preparation were insufficient, the City and the CPD did have some policies and training in place to respond to large crowds. Those policies—particularly policies that had been reinforced through training—needed and continue to need supervision and enforcement. This en-

forcement should include recognition of officers who followed policies and appropriate accountability for those who did not.<sup>355</sup> Further, the City and the CPD should make additional efforts to increase transparency and clarity regarding discipline.

In the CPD's After Action Report, the CPD acknowledged the challenges associated with accountability, particularly the issues regarding the efficient review of complaints.

#### Analysis Figure 9. CPD After Action Report (May 20, 2020, through June 12, 2020)

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#### CPD After Action Report: "Accountability"

Strengths	(1) Collaboration with the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (2) Bureau of Internal Affairs members detailed to field operations (3) Prompt review of objective, verifiable evidence
Weaknesses	(1) Reactive, rather than proactive, supervision and accountability (2) Inability to efficiently identify and analyze event-related complaints (3) Length of time for disposition of complaints <sup>356</sup>

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We have some concerns regarding the strengths the CPD identified above.

First, we agree that the CPD did collaborate with COPA, and CPD and COPA continue to work on addressing the logistical challenges of their jurisdictions. COPA did provide additional resources to attempt to address the spike in complaints, but were still limited by resource challenges and by the CPD's lack of planning, such as a lack of body-worn cameras in the field.

Second, the CPD responded with an all-hands-on deck approach, putting officers without body-worn cameras in the field, including members of the Bureau of Internal Affairs, the Force Review Division, and the Reform Management Group. In addition to delaying supervisor review and reform efforts, this also created separate issues. For example, some officers who are responsible for holding officers accountable for not wearing body-worn cameras during patrol duties were being required to engage in patrol duties without body-worn cameras. Further, while it may be advisable to send Bureau of Internal Affairs investigators to observe officer conduct, the CPD should not deploy Bureau of Internal Affairs Officers to conduct tasks unrelated to their position. In response to the Inspector General's Office's

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<sup>355</sup> See, e.g., ¶148 ("CPD will create opportunities to highlight, reward, and encourage officer, supervisory, and district performance on furthering community partnerships, engaging in problem-solving techniques, effective use of de-escalation, exemplary and effective supervision, and implementing community-oriented crime prevention strategies.").

<sup>356</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department's Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 8.

report, CPD Superintendent Brown wrote that the deployment of key accountability personnel did not lead to a breakdown in oversight.<sup>357</sup> Specifically, he wrote:

*While members of BIA and the Force Review Division (FRD) were deployed, they were deployed to assignments which were generally removed from the direct interactions between officers and members of the public. First, some members of BIA were assigned to transport vehicles which are typically parked away from the heart of the interactions between officers and the public, and the BIA Sergeants were required to stay with the transport vehicles. Second, members of BIA and FRD were deployed to secure Public Safety Headquarters (PSHQ) in response to threats by protestors and looters to enter and burn down the building. PSHQ has a large footprint, over one square block, and required significant manpower to secure. The Department took steps to keep these members back from the front line of interactions with the public. Moreover, even if members of BIA and FRD were later assigned to review an incident that they personally witnessed, there are steps that members can and must take to identify this conflict and recuse themselves from an investigation or review. Upon notification of a conflict the investigation or review would be immediately reassigned to another member.<sup>358</sup>*

While such measures may be necessary during emergency circumstances, it is more of a demonstration that the planning and preparation was insufficient than it is a strength to rely on in the future. To the extent that many City and CPD personnel deserve recognition for putting themselves in positions to help mitigate crises, we agree. But the City and the CPD should enable its personnel and officers to achieve success by better preparing them for roles and responsibilities that match their training, equipment, and specialties within the City and the CPD.

Third, while the CPD may have reviewed objective, verifiable evidence, the amount of objective, verifiable evidence was diminished by the challenges regarding data collection and management, as detailed in this report and below.

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<sup>357</sup> CPD Superintendent David O. Brown, *Re: Report on Chicago's Response to George Floyd Protests and Unrest*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 11, 2021).

<sup>358</sup> *Id.*

## (1) REPORTING

### IMT's Recommendation

- Improve reporting and documentation on uses of force, arrest, deployments, dispersals, officer wellness and safety, all injuries, and use of OC spray (§§566–67, 438, 528, 567, 581–82)<sup>359</sup>

According to the City and the CPD, there were significant delays in producing records for this review because information was not consistently captured, managed, or accessible.

The Consent Decree includes many reporting requirements.<sup>360</sup> This includes reporting requirements that the City and the CPD have created or improved since the Consent Decree began, such as the requirement to report the pointing of firearms and Tactical Response Reports.<sup>361</sup>

When an officer engages in a reportable use of force, the Consent Decree requires officers to “complete a [Tactical Response Report], or any similar form of documentation.” During our interviews, however, CPD officers said that when the protests and mass arrests began on Friday night and Saturday (May 29 and 30, 2020), officers were told that they did not have to report uses of force when responding to crowds and that all relevant information would be on a mass arrest card.<sup>362</sup>

<sup>359</sup> See Reneé Hail, *Dallas Police Department After Action Report George Floyd Protest May 29, 2020 Thru June 1, 2020*, DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT, 36–37, 40, 42 (August 14, 2020); *Safe LA Civil Unrest, 2020 After Action Report*, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, 108, 112 (April 13, 2020).

<sup>360</sup> See, e.g., §§218 (“CPD members must report and document any reportable use of force.”), 219 (“Whenever a CPD member engages in a reportable use of force, the member must complete a TRR, or any similar form of documentation CPD may implement, prior to the end of his or her tour of duty. In addition to completing the TRR, officers must also document the reason for the initial stop, arrest, or other enforcement action per CPD policy. . . .”), and 221 (“Any CPD member who engages in a reportable use of force must immediately report the incident to OEMC. OEMC is required to notify the involved member’s immediate supervisor and the Watch Operations Lieutenant of the district of occurrence.”).

<sup>361</sup> In the third reporting period, for example, the City and the CPD received the requisite community input for G03-02-02, *Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report*, and finalized the policy. In the second reporting period, the CPD changed (on February 29, 2020) the number of levels of force (from four to three), as required by the Consent Decree. On December 31, 2020, after extensive and ongoing dialogue between the CPD and the Working Group, the CPD issued revised Use of Force policies, including G03-02 *De-Escalation, Response to Resistance, and Use of Force*, that further addresses chokeholds, emphasizing that chokeholds are to only be used as last resort and elaborating on prohibitions.

<sup>362</sup> See *Report on Chicago’s Response to George Floyd Protests and Unrest*, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE CITY OF CHICAGO (February 18, 2021) at 8–9 (“During the events at issue, CPD did not fulfill its force reporting obligations and did not provide clear and consistent guidance to officers on reporting obligations.”).

This is not true, and likely occurred because of the unfamiliarity with the mass-arrest procedures, which according to the CPD, had not been used in years. What is more, even if the mass-arrest cards were sufficient, the CPD did not have enough mass-arrests cards distributed for all officers who engaged in a reportable use of force to fill out, and not all reportable uses of force led to an arrest or appeared to be unrelated to the force necessary to secure an arrest. We reviewed one video, for example, in which multiple officers appeared to have an individual under control, and as officers were bringing him out of the crowd, a supervisor was seen appearing to strike the individual near the head with a baton despite the individual putting his hands up in a protective manner. Still, in other instances, officers appeared to excessively push community members without consideration for objects or persons behind the community members which may have caused them to fall, potentially creating a situation in which the community may have been unnecessarily injured.<sup>363</sup>

Further, according to the CPD's After Action Report, "it was determined that the completion of mass arrest cards was not feasible, [CPD] leaders informed members to document similar information verbally on their Body Worn Cameras."<sup>364</sup> In response to the Inspector General's Office's report, CPD Superintendent Brown wrote that "as time went on there was a directive from the First Deputy Superintendent to the Area Deputy Chiefs that a Body Worn Camera (BWC)-equipped officer should partner with a BIA mass arrest Sergeant for all transports as a stop gap measure to ensure that necessary information to effectuate the arrest was received by the arresting officers."<sup>365</sup> But many officers did not have body-worn cameras and much of the video was not tagged for review. Further, even if it was tagged for review, in the CPD's After Action Report, the CPD acknowledges that "it remained tremendously burdensome for processing officers to review hours of BWC footage for the purposes of identifying, among other things, the complainant officer, appropriate charges, and/or the time and location of arrest."<sup>366</sup>

In response, the CPD "intends to thoroughly review its mass arrest procedures in light of the challenges faced during the Events," which "remains an on-going process involving multiple cross-functional working groups."<sup>367</sup> As reflected in the Policy section above, the CPD sent the IMT, the OAG, and the Coalition a draft of those

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<sup>363</sup> We note that the IMT cannot conduct an investigation into any particular event or interaction. Rather, for these instances (in addition to other concerning interactions described here), we have forwarded them on to COPA for their review and potential investigation.

<sup>364</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department's Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 10.

<sup>365</sup> CPD Superintendent David O. Brown, *Re: Report on Chicago's Response to George Floyd Protests and Unrest*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 11, 2021).

<sup>366</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department's Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 10.

<sup>367</sup> See *id.*

revisions, but after receiving feedback in October 2020, the CPD has yet to submit a revised version.

As a result, the CPD's Force Review Division could not review all reportable uses of force. Combined with the body-worn camera issues above, there simply is no reliable way to get a full accounting of all uses of force. The Force Review Division submitted a report dated November 30, 2020, indicating they had generated two complaint logs for officers who failed to report uses of force. Given resource limitations, the Force Review Division was still backlogged from officer conduct during the protests and unrest.<sup>368</sup> According to CPD representatives, the Force Review Division caught up on that backlog in 2021.

The challenges from reporting are reflected in many of the responses to requests. For example, the CPD could not account for where many officers were deployed, including commanders. Moreover, according to the CPD responses to requests, there were no arrests for unlawful assembly. The CPD also reported that between (May 1, 2020, and June 30, 2020) there were only four foot pursuits related to citywide demonstrations and unrest-related foot pursuits, two on May 31, 2020, and two on June 2, 2020. These were "determined based on identified demonstration and unrest related arrest RD numbers." Likewise, because the CPD's records of injured arrestees were based on completed Tactical Response Reports—which were not consistently completed—the CPD did not have record of any injured arrestees between the start of the protests and unrest at the end of May and June 10, 2020.<sup>369</sup>

Following George Floyd's murder, COPA anticipated potential unrest in Chicago. Specifically, COPA's public information unit tracked demonstrations and civil unrest that occurred in other parts of the country and, anticipating that this unrest would occur in Chicago, proactively contacted aldermen and other stakeholders to let

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<sup>368</sup> On September 9, 2020, in response to a request for "Records reflecting that CPD has or will analyze data regarding the number of arrests, uses of force, deployments, injuries, and resource needs from the protests and unrest between May 28, 2020, and June 2, 2020," the CPD's Force Review Division responded that, as of August 13, 2020, there "were 173 Tactical Response Reports (TRRs) generated city-wide between May 28, 2020, and June 2, 2020." Further, a "total of 138 of these TRRs, or 80%, were subject to review by the Force Review Division," "the Force Review Division has completed reviews on 107 of these TRRs," and "31 are in the process of being reviewed." The Force Review Division added that it "does not maintain or analyze data on all injuries," but reviews "reported uses of force which result in a subject injury or complaint of injury," which is "contained within the TRRs being reviewed by the Force Review Division for this time period."

<sup>369</sup> The City and the CPD provided records reflecting the amount of arrests, which were incomplete, as demonstrated by the Inspector General's Office's report and corresponding analysis. *See Report on Chicago's Response to George Floyd Protests and Unrest*, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE CITY OF CHICAGO (February 18, 2021) at 77, <https://igchicago.org/2021/02/18/report-on-chicagos-response-to-george-floyd-protests-and-unrest/>.

them know that COPA would be fully operational the weekend of May 30. Moreover, according to COPA personnel, in May 2020, most COPA personnel had transitioned to working remotely due to COVID-19. COPA's intelligence and preparation paid dividends and allowed COPA personnel to quickly and efficiently transition into a 24-hour response.

As Chicago began to experience unrest and demonstrations, COPA instituted daily leadership briefings. Each day, COPA's Complaint Intake Unit reviewed new complaints to determine which ones involved particularly egregious allegations that were likely to be supported by sufficient evidence to reach a conclusion. COPA formed a new investigations squad to lead the investigation of those cases, and COPA's Public Information Unit helped investigate complaints from incidents captured on social media.

COPA and the CPD's Bureau of Internal Affairs worked collaboratively on information-gathering for complaints that arose out of the protest activity and unrest at the end of May and early June. As detailed further below, however, it was difficult to identify some officers who were the subject of complaints or potential witnesses because, among other reasons, officers had been redeployed out of their assigned districts without access to their body-worn cameras. When footage was available, some officers and witnesses could not be readily identified because of the limitations of the footage, officers covering identifying information, or officers borrowing other officers' gear. In response, the Bureau of Internal Affairs helped COPA identify some officers by suggesting research methods and providing contact information of CPD personnel who could potentially assist with COPA's identification efforts.

On July 17, 2020, COPA implemented the same plan and process that it had used at the end of May. As complaints came in, COPA's Complaint Intake Unit triaged them, made notations in the Case Management System, and assigned complaints to a special investigations unit or to General Investigations. Because this was a smaller protest that resulted in fewer complaints than those at the end of May, COPA did not require as much assistance from the Bureau of Internal Affairs.

Despite these efforts, COPA, the Bureau of Internal Affairs, and the Force Review Division faced many challenges in investigation complaints. In August 2020, COPA reached out to the CPD Superintendent to raise several concerns that impeded their investigations, which included the following:

- *Tactical Responses Reports (TRRs) were not completed in the vast majority of use of force incidents. Not only does this present an accountability concern from COPA's perspective, it also creates a compliance concern for the [CPD]. The absence of such important documentation regarding the use of force renders the [CPD's] Force Review Unit unable to evaluate ongoing compliance with use of force directives. Furthermore,*

*the lack of TRRs leaves supervisory [CPD] members unable to evaluate the conduct of members under their command.*

- *Attendance and Assignment Sheets were used inconsistently. In many instances, handwritten [forms] provide the only documentation of members assigned to work a particular shift and/or area, creating challenges in identifying members involved in several use of force incidents as well as officer safety issues.*
- *There was often insufficient time for BWCs to be re-charged between shifts, leaving members with non-functional equipment during encounters with civilians that, according to [CPD] directives, should have been captured.*
- *Inconsistent recordkeeping relative to BWC footage uploaded to Evidence.com, exacerbated by already inadequate documentation . . . compounded challenges related to incident and member identification in the investigation of misconduct complaints.*
- *Obstruction of members' names and/or star numbers was prevalent and impeded identification of accused and involved members.*
- *Officers' sharing of equipment (such as riot helmets) impeded identification efforts by COPA and the [CPD].*
- *Identification of accused and involved members has presented the largest investigative challenge in protest - related cases. Although many of these incidents were captured on video and have been widely circulated in both social and traditional media, members have not come forward to identify themselves or their fellow members in any of these investigations.<sup>370</sup>*

Further, in its report, the Inspector General's Office identified four "critical challenges to the appropriate management of allegations of police misconduct" that were caused by "the way in which CPD responded to the protests and unrest":

- *First, breakdowns in mass arrest processing and documentation undermined any efforts to systematically identify relevant reports and BWC footage, and CPD failed to retain any copies of a significant volume of mass arrests records.*
- *Second, CPD's emergency deployment of all available members compromised the members responsible for reviewing uses of force and conducting internal investigations by risking the involvement of those members in the very events they would be responsible for examining. Meanwhile, deficits in training and policy clarity meant that some of those events were never processed for examination in the first place.*
- *Third, there was widespread non-compliance with CPD's policy requiring the use of BWCs; during much of the time at issue, CPD members who were working outside of their regular schedules deployed to the field directly from Guaranteed Rate Field, ra-*

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<sup>370</sup> (Emphasis added).



ther than from their stations, and BWCs were not available to them. As a result, countless interactions between CPD members and members of the public were not captured on BWCs.

- Finally, there were widespread complaints—and evidence—of CPD members obscuring their badge numbers and nameplates while deployed during the protests and unrest.<sup>371</sup>

In response to the Inspector General’s Office’s report, the CPD explained some short-term measures that were put in place to address some of the issues described by that report.<sup>372</sup> The CPD should continue to work and report on more permanent measures to address the Inspector General’s Office’s findings.

## (2) POLICY VIOLATIONS AND DISCIPLINE

### IMT’s Recommendation

- Increase transparency regarding discipline, including decisions to relieve or not relieve officers of police powers (¶1567)<sup>373</sup>

During the protests and unrest in 2020, there were many viral videos of apparent officer misconduct. Some of these videos were of CPD officers. In response to some of these videos and reports, the City and the CPD relieved some officers of their police powers, pending investigations. This included, for example, the following incidents:

- Officer who “flipped off” protesters, and
- Officer who used a homophobic slur.<sup>374</sup>

<sup>371</sup> See *Report on Chicago’s Response to George Floyd Protests and Unrest*, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE CITY OF CHICAGO (February 18, 2021) at 9–10.

<sup>372</sup> CPD Superintendent David O. Brown, *Re: Report on Chicago’s Response to George Floyd Protests and Unrest*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 11, 2021), <https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/CPD-Response-to-OIG-Report-on-Civil-Unrest.pdf>.

<sup>373</sup> See *Preliminary Report on the New York City Police Department’s Response to the Demonstrations Following the Death of George Floyd*, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (July 10, 2020) at 40–44.

<sup>374</sup> See, e.g., *Chicago Officer Who Flipped Off Protesters Relieved of Police Powers*, NBC CHICAGO (June 10, 2020), <https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/chicago-police-officer-who-flipped-off-protesters-relieved-of-police-powers/2287340/>; *Chicago Police Officer Stripped of Powers After Being Heard Using Homophobic Slur During Unrest Downtown*, CBS CHICAGO (June 10, 2020), <https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2020/06/10/chicago-police-officer-stripped-of-powers-after-being-heard-using-homophobic-slur-during-unrest-downtown/>.

Seventeen officers who were caught on video in U.S. Representative Bobby Rush's Office were also suspended.<sup>375</sup>

We heard from multiple officers and community members who were troubled by this discipline. While many people agreed that the officers should have been relieved of their police powers, some officers, for example, felt that relieving officers of police powers is usually reserved for the most serious and fireable offenses.<sup>376</sup> Some community members who agreed that these officers should have been relieved of their police powers also noted that they would rather have seen the CPD relieve the police powers of officers who committed more serious offenses, such as excessive uses of force against protesters.<sup>377</sup>

The Coalition has also repeatedly raised concerns that the existing standards for relieving police powers are insufficient. While there continues to be serious disagreement between the Coalition and the CPD on this issue, the IMT, the OAG, the City, the CPD, and the Coalition continue to meet with Judge Dow to resolve this dispute and ideally reach a resolution that best serves Chicago.

Regardless of relieving police powers, officers have due process rights and the City and its entities must follow the accountability procedures under the corresponding laws, bargaining agreements, and Consent Decree requirements.<sup>378</sup> COPA recently released various reports on protest-related complaints in 2020. See [Analysis Figure 10](#) and [Analysis Figure 11](#), below. COPA also clarified the methodology for considering whether a complaint was "protest related":

*Designation and location of a complaint as "protest" related is based upon contextual information provided by the complainant. The number of complaints may exceed the number of incidents of misconduct as some incidents may be the subject of a complaint by more than one party. Numbers are adjusted as COPA identifies duplicate complaints resulting from a single incident. Further information and questions*

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<sup>375</sup> See, e.g., Fran Spielman, *Union: CPD suspended 17 officers, supervisors who lounged in congressman's burglarized office*, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (January 14, 2021), <https://chicago.suntimes.com/city-hall/2021/1/14/22231310/bobby-rush-office-chicago-police-sleeping-pop-corn-riots-suspensions-fop-union>.

<sup>376</sup> See, e.g., Patrick Smith and Chip Mitchell, *Cops Say Condemnation After Chaos Is Unfair And Misplaces The Blame*, WBEZ CHICAGO (June 13, 2020), <https://www.wbez.org/stories/cops-say-condemnation-after-chaos-is-unfair-and-misplaces-the-blame/634b76cd-82c3-4f62-aa81-4be40bc045ef>.

<sup>377</sup> As referenced above, in August 2020, COPA sent a letter noting that "[i]dentification of accused and involved members has presented the largest investigative challenge in protest - related cases," and "[a]lthough many of these incidents were captured on video and have been widely circulated in both social and traditional media, members have not come forward to identify themselves or their fellow members in any of these investigations."


<sup>378</sup> See, e.g., ¶711.

may be directed to COPA Public Affairs at (312)746-0168 or COPA-PublicAffairs@chicagocopa.org.<sup>379</sup>

Analysis Figure 10. COPA Figure on All Protest Related Complaints by District of Incident from May 29, 2020 – December 31, 2020<sup>380</sup>

**ALL PROTEST RELATED COMPLAINTS BY DISTRICT OF INCIDENT  
MAY 29, 2020 - DECEMBER 31, 2020**

DISTRICT	# of Protest Related Complaints
1st - Central	96
18th - Near North	74
19th - Town Hall	23
2nd - Wentworth	17
9th - Deering	11
11th - Harrison	10
12th - Near West	10
14th - Shakespeare	10
10th - Ogden	9
8th - Chicago Lawn	8
25th - Grand Central	7
4th - South Chicago	5
15th - Austin	5
6th - Gresham	4
7th - Englewood	4
3rd - Grand Crossing	3
16th - Jefferson Park	3
22nd - Morgan Park	3
5th - Calumet	2
17th - Albany Park	2
24th - Rogers Park	2
20th - Lincoln	1



\* For further information regarding data depicted, please see Note on Protest Home Page.  
 \*\* District location numbers are represented by information given when the complaints is filed. Location data will be updated as determined.  
 Report date: 1/4/21


<sup>379</sup> Protest Related Information, COPA, <https://www.chicagocopa.org/data-cases/protest-related-information/>.

<sup>380</sup> All Protest related Complaints by District of Incident, COPA (January 4, 2021), <http://www.chicagocopa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Protest-Complaints-District-Heatmap-1.png>.

Analysis Figure 11. COPA – Protest Related Complaints  
(May 29, 2020 – December 31, 2020)<sup>381</sup>

**COPA** CHICAGO OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY  
INTEGRITY • TRANSPARENCY • INDEPENDENCE • COURAGE

**PROTEST RELATED COMPLAINTS**  
MAY 29, 2020 - DECEMBER 31, 2020



\* For further information regarding data depicted, please see Note on Protest Home Page.  
Report date: 1/4/21

<sup>381</sup> *Protest Related Complaints, May 29, 2020 – December 31, 2020*, COPA (January 4, 2021), <http://www.chicagocopa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Protest-Related-Complaints-Report-5-29-to-12-31.pdf>.

As reflected above, there are concerns that these complaints are both over and under-inclusive. As COPA references, some of these complaints may be duplicates of the same incident. Some percentage of the complaints may also be false or misleading. On the other hand, based on various activities we witnessed in videos, there may also have been instances where people chose not to file a complaint because they are actively against and would not want to participate in the City's institutions. There may have also been circumstances where people who were engaging in criminal activity when they may have been the victims of excessive force chose not to file a complaint, because they did not want to bring attention to their own conduct. Separately, we heard during the Listening Sessions, many people said that they did not file a formal complaint regarding excessive force, because they feared retaliation.

As discussed further in the sections below, these are additional reasons why it is important that the City and the CPD ensure officers have body-worn cameras and conduct proactive audits of footage of such events. This would allow the City and CPD to better ensure accountability for excessive force and work toward building trust in the City's institutions and would help reduce fears of retaliation.

Based on existing complaints, COPA provided made updated statistics public, as of January 4, 2021:

**PENDING INVESTIGATIONS**

- 144 Open protest related investigations

**CLOSED INVESTIGATIONS**

- 89 Administrative Closure Disposition
- 3 Investigation Closed at COPA

**REFERRALS**

- 290 CPD Bureau of Internal Affairs
- 5 Referred to the Office of the Inspector General
- 5 Referred to State/Federal Law Enforcement

**AFFIDAVIT OVERRIDE REQUEST**

- 5 Submitted to CPD Bureau of Internal Affairs – 5 Approved

**COPA RECOMMENDATIONS – MODIFIED DUTY OR RELIEF OF POLICE POWER**

- 8 Recommendations
  - 4 Requests have been granted – 8 Officers relieved of police power.
  - 4 Request pending review/Officer identifications.<sup>382</sup>

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<sup>382</sup> *Protest Investigation Information*, COPA (January 4, 2021), <https://www.chicagocopa.org/data-cases/protest-related-information/>.

Separately, in September 2020, the CPD provided data about discipline regarding officer misconduct through August 12, 2020. There were no sustained Compliant Registers in Case Final status for complaints that were filed or allegations occurred within May 1, 2020, and June 30, 2020. There were two cases with sustained findings, and there were eight Summary Punishment Action Reports: four noted violations without disciplinary action (including three for failure to provide police service or assistance during protests and one for crashing a rental vehicle in a crowded area during the unrest) and four reprimands (including one for failure to secure a radio during a foot pursuit of someone who had allegedly fired shots; one for leaving a post during protests without permission; one for hitting a fence, causing damage to the passenger-side of a CPD vehicle, during the unrest; and one for failing to wear a body-worn camera or star on an outer garment—although wore a nameplate).

These investigations and discipline, however, are not widely known. Many community members we hear from do not believe any officers have been disciplined for protest-related misconduct. While these community members may find that existing discipline is insufficient, it is in the CPD's best interest to share discipline information, not only for officer's awareness but also for building community trust. Chicago's police accountability systems are complex. To that end, the Office of Inspector General for the City of Chicago recently released flowcharts for the CPD's disciplinary process, which provides a helpful overall picture of police discipline in Chicago.<sup>383</sup>

The CPD's accountability mechanisms continue to be high priorities for all parties within and under the Consent Decree. And as reflected in Independent Monitoring Report 3, much work remains to be done. One major effort toward such transparency, however, has been COPA's efforts to increase community engagement—including through its policy development process—and the Bureau of Internal Affairs' efforts to create public-facing policies, which should provide additional transparency for officers and the public.

In our next report, we will report on the progress of the City and the CPD to meet compliance with Consent Decree requirements through June 30, 2021.

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<sup>383</sup> See *Chicago Police Department Disciplinary Process Overview*, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL CITY OF CHICAGO, <https://igchicago.org/about-the-office/our-office/public-safety-section/cpd-disciplinary-process-overview/>. See also *A Guide to the Disciplinary Process for Chicago Police Department Members*, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL CITY OF CHICAGO (last updated April 2021), [https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/5102-Final\\_Long-form-discipline-flowcharts.pdf](https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/5102-Final_Long-form-discipline-flowcharts.pdf).

### (3) PROVIDE SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL FOR ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS

#### IMT's Recommendation

- Address personnel needs across accountability systems, including COPA investigators, CPD Force Review Division, BIA, and CPD supervisor ratios (¶¶343, 356, 521, 575, 700)<sup>384</sup>

As we have detailed in each of our Independent Monitoring Reports, a consistent challenge for the City and the CPD—as is the case for many city governments—is having enough personnel for key functions.

When the CPD created the Force Review Division, for example, it was understaffed. The CPD needs to appropriately support the work of the Force Review Division, as well as make clear to all officers that Use of Force requirements of the Consent Decree are the responsibility of every CPD officer.<sup>385</sup> The IMT has appreciated the Force Review Division's work to establish clear policies, standard operating procedures, forms, and processes to hold officers accountable. We also commended the Force Review Division's work to identify patterns and trends related to Use of Force incidents and requirement of plans for either districts or units to address these issues in required debriefings. The City and the CPD then made deliberate efforts to add personnel to the Force Review Division.

Since then, however, the City and the CPD continue to add responsibilities to the Force Review Division, such as reviewing firearm pointing and foot pursuits. We agree that these reviews are important and should help the CPD become a better police department. On the other hand, this will only be true if the Force Review Unit has enough personnel to do meaningful, timely, and consistent reviews. Similarly, we have reported on the various personnel challenges for the CPD's supervisor-to-officer ratio and COPA, which continues to need additional investigators and other personnel.<sup>386</sup>

These staffing shortages were highlighted by the unprecedented protests, unrest, and misconduct complaints.

In theory, when a police department has sound policies, training, recruitment practices, and fair, reliable, and speedy accountability mechanisms, complaints, and findings will decrease per capita. But the City and the CPD will never have a

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<sup>384</sup> See e.g., *Safe LA Civil Unrest, 2020 After Action Report*, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, 119 (April 13, 2020).

<sup>385</sup> See, e.g., ¶153.

<sup>386</sup> See, e.g., ¶359.

sufficient accountability system if it does not have sufficient personnel to supervise, review, and investigate officer conduct.

## (4) REVIEW AND ANALYZE DATA

### IMT's Recommendation

- Allocate sufficient City and CPD resources to review and analyze data, including tagging and auditing body-worn-camera video footage (§§352–53, 576, 700)<sup>387</sup>

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As referenced above, a significant challenge for this review was the lack of collected, managed, and readily available information. Information regarding arrests, mass arrests, deployments, and complaints were difficult to track. When we did receive information, it was often difficult to process, such as in unsearchable lists of pdfs or buried within emails. In some cases, we never received the information, such as certain City or Police Observation Device camera video. According to the City, this information was too burdensome to review and provide. In response, the IMT said that we would still be interested in receiving video that the City or the CPD has already identified and reviewed for the purposes of, for example, gathering information or identifying suspects or conducting after-action reviews. We did not receive responsive records.

In some ways, not receiving information or data is just as, if not more concerning than, what the data may have shown. To best serve Chicago's communities, the City and the CPD must be efficient learning organizations. This requires that the City and the CPD to collect, manage, and analyze such information for themselves. Consent Decree oversight is not intended to create permanent oversight to replace the City and CPD's own self-assessments. In fact, the goal is for the City and the CPD to adopt policies and practices that put them in the best position to perpetually grow and adapt to the needs of their communities through constitutional and effective policing.

As with many gaps in policies and training, the City and the CPD's data issues could not have been solved within a week and, in many ways, addressing the data-collection issue may be more challenging than implementing policy or training changes to acquire the right systems and personnel that can use those systems. As the Consent Decree acknowledges, putting proper data collection and analysis systems in place will take time. Still, these efforts must be prioritized now if they are to be accomplished. Analyzing this data is critical to not only informing the City and the CPD on where its policies and training should be, but also on potentially informing and even leading national best practices for policing. As we have seen

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<sup>387</sup> See, e.g., Reneé Hail, *Dallas Police Department After Action Report George Floyd Protest May 29, 2020 Thru June 1, 2020*, DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT, 44 (August 14, 2020).



throughout 2020, without sufficient data and internal analysis, the City and the CPD are left to reforms that are “reactive” and based on external review and critique, rather than thoughtful internal analysis. Further, with limited data, such external analysis may consist of anecdotes rather than trends. When significant issues are raised to City and CPD leadership, they may seem like new issues, when an accurate accounting of data may have actually shown that the issue has existed for years, if not longer. To address, eventually get ahead of such issues, and reach full and effective compliance with the Consent Decree, the City and the CPD must improve its data collection, management, and analysis—and in many cases, do so transparently and with community engagement.

## (5) TRANSPARENCY

### IMT’s Recommendation

- Continue to review and increase methods of transparency with Chicago’s communities, regarding crime-reduction strategies, officer-involved shootings, and other police activities (¶¶10, 12, 17, 54, 334)<sup>388</sup>

The Consent Decree requires demanding reforms from the City and the CPD. Likewise, this report has identified several areas for improvement under those requirements. As reflected above, this includes, for example, revising policies and training materials; providing resources, such as body-worn cameras and data systems; and addressing officer wellness concerns and providing support, especially during critical events and incidents.

While progress has been slow—and prone to mistakes and powerful disagreements—the City and the CPD have increased transparency and community engagement around policies, training materials, and existing data. The Consent Decree requires that the City and the CPD go much further.

During the Consent Decree process, the CPD has appeared to resist some of the community engagement required by the Consent Decree. What is more, many of CPD-specific complaints during the protests and unrest related to crime reduction strategies before, during, and after George Floyd’s murder; officer-involved shootings; foot-pursuits; search warrants; and investigatory stops. Most of these incidents have involved special teams, including the new Critical Incident Response

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<sup>388</sup> See, e.g., Gerald Chaleff, *An Independent Examination Of The Los Angeles Police Department 2020 Protest Response* (March 10, 2021), at 67; *Preliminary Report on the New York City Police Department’s Response to the Demonstrations Following the Death of George Floyd*, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, 35–40 (July 10, 2020); Benjamin Carleton et al., *Philadelphia Police Department’s Response to Demonstrations and Civil Unrest May 30-June 15, 2020*, CNA AND MONTGOMERY McCracken, 89–90 (December 2020).

Team and Community Safety teams, which continue to grow and operate with limited transparency.

The City and the CPD have provided additional records regarding the Crisis Intervention Team and the Community Safety Teams, for which we will report on soon in Independent Monitoring Report 4. But there continue to be unanswered questions. And if we do not know the answer—the court appointed monitor of the Consent Decree—then members of Chicago’s communities are even farther in the dark about CPD’s most recent strategies, their costs or their benefits.

As reported in Independent Monitoring Report 3, there was still notable improvement in 2020 regarding community engagement—particularly for policies. It may be because some key personnel have been empowered to increase community engagement or because others have begun to see its inherent value.

In the beginning of the protests and unrest, there was a clear disconnect between the protests and unrest that many members of the community anticipated and what many members of the CPD anticipated. Much of that anger and frustration toward the CPD continued after the protests and unrest in many other cities dissipated.

Significant portions of Chicagoans felt significantly angry to destroy parts of their own communities. And in August 2020, many people looted and destroyed property again—this time likely in direct response to police activity in Chicago. Specifically, this round of unrest was likely in response to—at least in part—an officer-involved shooting and subsequent information that was spread across the internet, much of which was false. But even after the CPD worked to correct the record, suspicions continued because the officers involved did not have body-worn cameras.

During interviews, many members of leadership from the City and the CPD acknowledged that they needed to do better at building trust by communicating quick, accurate, and reliable information. We also witnessed, for example, a rise in social-media communications and regular public engagements. The CPD also began more consistently preparing and releasing video presentations of events and incidents, such as the Grant Park events on July 17, 2020. This transparency is important. The City and the CPD must guard their reputations, as any false or misleading statement can have a long-lasting impact on Chicagoan’s trust. And the City and the CPD must work even harder to win the trust back from those who lost it during the protests and unrest.

## (6) AFTER-ACTION PROCEDURES

### IMT's Recommendation

- Create After Action procedures—including body-worn camera review and opportunities for community engagement—after each operations plan (¶¶8–10, 347–51)<sup>389</sup>

In response to the Inspector General's Office's report, CPD Superintendent Brown noted that after-action reviews for city-wide protests and unrest should be of "all city agencies," and not just the CPD.<sup>390</sup> We agree that, for the City and the CPD to successfully respond to protests and unrest, City entities need to have a unified approach. Naturally, the CPD had and will have a central role in responding to protests and unrest. As the entities responsible, it is critical that the City and the CPD create the practice of developing city-wide after-action reviews and incorporating lessons across entities and partners. Unfortunately, until the City and the CPD improve on police reporting, data collection, and analysis, such reviews will be lacking.

That said, those data issues are unlikely to change without buy-in from the leadership of many City entities. To help determine the best allocation of resources and priorities, we recommend that the City and the CPD create policies to require operational plans for known protests, to conduct consistent after-action reviews after those events, and to make those after-action reviews public.

In the CPD's After Action Report, the CPD described the value of such reviews:

*Evidence-based decision-making can eliminate many of the inefficiencies, redundancies, and avoidable costs associated with a reactive, ad hoc approach to incidents of civil unrest.*<sup>391</sup>

We believe that, for the most part, the City and the CPD have demonstrated that they are more capable of responding to protests and unrest than they were in the beginning of 2020. As reflected by the Inspector General's Office's findings and our recommendations, there is more work to be done to address known weaknesses and challenges. But as the world learned with COVID-19, the City and the CPD must be able to learn from new and unforeseeable challenges. This is best

<sup>389</sup> See *After Action Report - George Floyd Protests and Response May 30, 2020 - June 7, 2020*, RALEIGH POLICE DEPARTMENT CHIEF'S OFFICE - OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS INSPECTIONS UNIT, 43–45, 47–48 (September 15, 2020).

<sup>390</sup> CPD Superintendent David O. Brown, *Re: Report on Chicago's Response to George Floyd Protests and Unrest*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 11, 2021).

<sup>391</sup> See *After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department's Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 2020*, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (February 2021) at 12–13.

achieved by deliberate efforts to learn and grow from the entities and personnel directly responding to those challenges.

## Conclusion and Looking Ahead

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Chicago was unable to predict the level of protests and unrest in the summer of 2020. Even if the City and the CPD had predicted the level of protests and unrest after the death of George Floyd on May 25, 2020, the City and the CPD did not have the policies, reporting practices, training, equipment, community engagement, or inter-agency coordination required to respond timely and efficiently. Police departments that do not have policies and trainings that follow best practices can put officers in positions that are less likely to lead to positive outcomes. Bad and even tragic outcomes should be avoided, in and of themselves, but as we have seen, they can also be a catalyst for protests and unrest locally, nationally, and even internationally.

The City of Chicago and the Chicago Police Department must comply with the U.S. Constitution; the State of Illinois Constitution; federal, state, and local laws; and the Consent Decree. The CPD must respond to protests and unrest in a content neutral way. While this report does not speak to the viewpoints or ideologies of those who participated in protests and unrest, we must note that the protests and unrest were largely regarding the CPD and policing in general. As a result, the City and the CPD would benefit from continued efforts to comply with the Consent Decree, putting itself in the best position to “deliver services in a manner that fully complies with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the State of Illinois, respects the rights of the people of Chicago, builds trust between officers and the communities they serve, and promotes community and officer safety” (¶12).

In other words, as the City and the CPD work toward reforms and improving accountability and trust under the Consent Decree, the City and the CPD will, in turn, lower the likelihood of unrest regarding policing. As Mayor Lori Lightfoot and Superintendent David Brown have repeatedly said, “While we remain committed to fulfilling the requirements outlined in the Consent Decree, we have been clear that the Consent Decree is merely a baseline, not the ceiling, when it comes to police reform.”<sup>392</sup> It is our hope that this report provides the City and the CPD with information and recommendations that they use to improve policing in Chicago and

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<sup>392</sup> *Joint Statement from Mayor Lori E. Lightfoot and CPD Superintendent David O. Brown on the Independent Monitoring Team’s Second Semiannual Report*, CITY OF CHICAGO OFFICE OF THE MAYOR (June 18, 2020), <https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/mayor/Press%20Room/Press%20Releases/2020/June/StatementLightfootBrownConsentDecree.pdf>. Nonetheless, the baselines set by the Consent Decree are substantial—and in many ways, themselves unprecedented. For example, many states, cities, and police departments responded to George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, Rayshard Brooks, Jacob Blake, and other high-profile incidents, with reformed policies and practices that were already in place in Chicago, which continue to be monitored under the Consent Decree. *See, e.g.*, Campaign Zero, *Compare Cities*, #8CANTWAIT (finding that Chicago meets 7 of the 8 reforms, with one reform under review, “restricts shooting at moving vehicles”), <https://8cantwait.org/compare/>.

better ensure the protection of the rights and safety of personnel, officers, protesters, and all community members.

While the City and the CPD have been behind in their reform efforts, and this report demonstrates many improvements are needed, we have seen tangible improvements in the City's policies, training, and practices regarding responding to protests during this review.<sup>393</sup> These improvements have occurred with the involvement and efforts of both police and community members working together. It is our hope that the City and its entities will continue the reforms they have made and make more expedient progress on the reforms they have yet to make.

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<sup>393</sup> See *Reports and Resources*, INDEPENDENT MONITORING TEAM, <https://cpdmonitoring-team.com/overview/reports-and-resources/>.

## Appendix A: The Independent Monitoring Team


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As the IMT, we (1) monitor the City's, the CPD's, and other relevant City entities' progress in meeting the Consent Decree's requirements and (2) offer assistance to the City, the CPD, and other relevant City entities to implement the changes that the Consent Decree requires.

Monitor Maggie Hickey and Deputy Monitor Chief Rodney Monroe, Ret., lead the IMT. The IMT's eight Associate Monitors, in turn, oversee the 10 topic areas of the Consent Decree. Our legal team, analysts, subject matter experts, Community Engagement Team, and community survey staff provide support in several ways: by reaching out to and engaging with Chicago communities; by providing general administrative support; and by collecting and analyzing policies, procedures, laws, and data, including conducting observations and interviews and writing reports.

Our full organizational chart is in [Appendix A, Figure 1](#) on the next page, and our team structure is in [Appendix A, Figure 2](#) on the following page.

Appendix A, Figure 1. Independent Monitoring Team Organizational Chart





## Appendix A, Figure 2. Independent Monitoring Team Members

Monitoring Team Leadership	Independent Monitor	Maggie Hickey
	Deputy Monitor	Rodney Monroe
Associate Monitors	Community Policing	Stephen Rickman
	Impartial Policing	Dennis Rosenbaum
	Crisis Intervention	Julie Solomon
	Use of Force	Paul Evans
	Recruitment, Hiring, and Promotion	Theron Bowman
	Training	Theron Bowman
	Supervision	Kathleen O'Toole
	Officer Wellness and Support	Kathleen O'Toole
	Accountability and Transparency	Harold Medlock
Data Collection, Analysis and Management	Scott Decker	
Community Engagement Team	Subject Matter Expert, Analyst, and Support Staff	Tom Christoff
	Member	Joe Hoereth
	Subject Matter Expert	Meghan Maury
	Member	Laura McElroy
	Member	Elena Quintana
	Member (and Associate Monitor for Community Policing)	Stephen Rickman
	Member	Sodiqa Williams
Community Surveys	Joe Hoereth & Other Experts	
Subject Matter Experts and Legal Team	Project Director	Laura Kunard
	Attorney	Mir Ali
	Attorney	Derek Barella
	Attorney	Kirstie Brenson
	Officer Wellness and Support	Brandi Burke
	Crisis Intervention and Data Collection, Analysis, and Management	Tom Christoff
	Attorney	Meredith DeCarlo
	Use of Force and Data Collection, Analysis, and Management	Terry Gainer
	Attorney	Ariel Hairston
	Community Policing and Crisis Intervention	Bruce Johnson
	Training	Blake McClelland
	Accountability and Transparency	Laura McElroy
	Analyst	Mariana Oliver
	Community Policing	Hildy Saizow
	Lead Attorney	Anthony-Ray Sepulveda
Attorney	Kylie Wood	
Supervision and Recruitment, Hiring, and Promotion	Tom Woodmansee	
Monitoring Team Support	Analyst for Solomon and Decker	Tom Christoff
	Project Manager, Analyst for Evans	Vivian Elliot
	Analyst for Rickman and O'Toole	Tammy Felix
	Analyst, Independent Monitoring Team Support	Mariana Oliver
	Deputy Project Manager, Analyst for Bowman	Keri Richardson
Analyst for Rosenbaum and Medlock	Christopher Sun	

## FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS FROM THE COMMUNITY

Throughout the first reporting period, the IMT received many questions from the community. We list the most frequently asked questions and our corresponding answers below.

### What is a Consent Decree?

A Consent Decree is a court-approved settlement that resolves a legal dispute between parties. This Consent Decree requires the CPD and the City to reform training, policies, and practices in many important areas, such as use of force, community policing, impartial policing, training, accountability, officer wellness, and data and information systems. The goal is to ensure that the CPD performs constitutional and effective policing that keeps both community members and officers safe and restores the community's trust in the CPD (¶12).<sup>394</sup> Federal judge Robert M. Dow, Jr. was appointed to oversee the Consent Decree. He chose the Independent Monitor and oversees the work of the Independent Monitoring Team. The Independent Monitoring Team will assess the CPD's and the City's compliance with the Consent Decree. The Consent Decree will be in effect for at least five years so that the CPD can develop, implement, and sustain the training, policies, and practices that the Consent Decree requires.<sup>395</sup>

### Why is Chicago under the Consent Decree?

In August 2017, the Office of the Attorney General for the State of Illinois (OAG) sued the City, alleging that the CPD had violated the U.S. Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, and federal and state laws. The OAG's complaint pointed to reviews of the CPD's policing practices over the last fifty years, including a 2017 report by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). According to the DOJ report, the CPD engaged in a repeated pattern and practice of using excessive force and racially discriminatory policing practices.<sup>396</sup> The City did not accept the OAG's allegations but agreed to enter a Consent Decree with the OAG.

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<sup>394</sup> The final Consent Decree is available on the Chicago Police Consent Decree Website. See *Consent Decree* (January 31, 2019), <http://chicagopoliceconsentdecree.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/FINAL-CONSENT-DECREE-SIGNED-BY-JUDGE-DOW.pdf>.

<sup>395</sup> To learn more about the Consent Decree, visit the Office of the Attorney General's Consent Decree website: <http://chicagopoliceconsentdecree.org/>.

<sup>396</sup> DOJ Civil Rights Division and United States Attorney's Office Northern District of Illinois, *Investigation of Chicago Police Department* (January 13, 2017), <http://chicagopoliceconsentdecree.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/DOJ-INVESTIGATION-OF-CHICAGO-POLICE-DEPT-REPORT.pdf>.

## Who is on the IMT?

We have assembled a team of recognized leaders and innovators in police reform from across the country. They have experience as police chiefs, academic scholars, and attorneys and have a wide range of expertise that covers every aspect of the Consent Decree from use of force and impartial policing to the training and supervision of police officers. We also have a Community Engagement Team that organizes meetings and serves as the outreach arm. Members of the Community Engagement Team meet with residents, stakeholders, and activists to ensure that the community has a voice in this process.

## What is the IMT doing?

The Independent Monitoring Team observes and assesses how the CPD is making progress and complying with the Consent Decree's requirements. Throughout the process, the IMT collects and analyzes data to measure the City's and the CPD's progress. The Independent Monitoring Team's Community Engagement Team also gathers community input and feedback about the CPD's and the City's progress from a broad range of people and organizations. The Independent Monitoring Team will also develop and release public reports on its monitoring activities, such as this report. We will make all reports available on the Reports section of our website (<https://cpdmonitoringteam.com/>).

## How can I get involved?

The Community Engagement Team works hard to connect with neighborhoods, community groups, religious organizations, activists, and residents across the city. The Community Engagement Team encourages community members to participate in meetings and to promote these sessions through their networks. We regularly update the Community Involvement section of the IMT website with details on upcoming community meetings and events. If your neighborhood or community group would like to invite a Community Engagement Team member to a meeting, please email us at [contact@cpdmonitoringteam.com](mailto:contact@cpdmonitoringteam.com) or fill out a feedback form on our website (<https://cpdmonitoringteam.com/feedback-form/>).

Community members can provide input on CPD policy. When the CPD modifies or creates applicable policies, it will post them on its website so that community members can provide input: <https://home.chicagopolice.org/>.

Community members can also do the following:

- ❖ Attend any of our public meetings listed on our website;
- ❖ Complete an input form on our website; and
- ❖ Reach out to the IMT or members of our Community Engagement Team (see below).

## How can I contact the IMT?

Community members can reach out to the entire IMT via email ([contact@cpdmonitoringteam.com](mailto:contact@cpdmonitoringteam.com)) and also contact individual members of our Community Engagement Team:

- ❖ Sodiqa Williams ([Sodiqa.Williams@cpdmonitoringteam.com](mailto:Sodiqa.Williams@cpdmonitoringteam.com)),
- ❖ Joe Hoereth ([Joe.Hoereth@cpdmonitoringteam.com](mailto:Joe.Hoereth@cpdmonitoringteam.com)), and
- ❖ Elena Quintana ([Elena.Quitana@cpdmonitoringteam.com](mailto:Elena.Quitana@cpdmonitoringteam.com)).

Learn more at the Contact Us page on our website (<https://cpdmonitoringteam.com/contact-us/>).

Community members can also use the Feedback Form on our website to provide input (<https://cpdmonitoringteam.com/feedback-form/>).

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## Appendix C: The Crime Prevention and Information Center Anticipated Demonstrations (June 2020)

<b>Date</b>	<b>District(s)</b>	<b>Cause(s)</b>
Monday, June 1	001	"ICE / BLM Protest"
Monday, June 1	001	"I Can't Breath"
Monday, June 1	002	"Free Malcolm Now"
Monday, June 1	001	"We Demand for the Release of All Protestors, We Demand Justice"
Monday, June 1	018	"We Demand for the Release of All Protestors, We Demand Justice"
Monday, June 1	019	"Peaceful Protest for George Floyd – North Side"
Tuesday, June 2	001, 002	"The Faith Community Cannot Be Silent"
Tuesday, June 2	002	"Police Accountability in Minneapolis and Chicago"
Tuesday, June 2	011	"Peaceful Solidarity March"
Tuesday, June 2	012	"Honk for Justice - West Town"
Tuesday, June 2	019	"Free Erica Kadel"
Tuesday, June 2	019	"We Demand Justice, We Demand Accountability"
Wednesday, June 3	002	"Chicago: Justice for George Floyd Car Caravan Day of Action (Part 2) "
Wednesday, June 3	010	"Latinx Community in Solidarity for Black Lives"
Wednesday, June 3	014	"Chicago: Justice for George Floyd Car Caravan Day of Action (Part 1) "
Thursday, June 4	001	"Re-Open Illinois"
Thursday, June 4	002	"CPD Out of CPS Rally and March"
Thursday, June 4	006	"Let's work to heal our community; as a community"
Thursday, June 4	006	"The Faces of Pain"
Thursday, June 4	008	"Midway for Black Lives Matter"
Thursday, June 4	012	"Powerful Message of No More Against Systemic Racism"
Thursday, June 4	018	"CPS Community Protest: Defund CPD Now"
Thursday, June 4	020	"Honk for Justice Chicago in Uptown"
Thursday, June 4	022	"Their Fight is our Fight"
Thursday, June 4	025	"No Means No! Sexual Harassment Brought to You By Target"
Friday, June 5	002, 003, 007, 008, 009, 010, 011	"Black and Brown Unity: Car Parade"
Friday, June 5	004	"Community Altar Memorial Wall - Brown and Black Unity"

Friday, June 5	004	"SE Youth For Black Lives Matter"
Friday, June 5	008	"Southwest Side Peace March"
Friday, June 5	010	"Unity March on 26th Street"
Friday, June 5	012	"FOP New Leadership Will Not Change 'Racist'"
Friday, June 5	012	"Black Jews for Black Lives: Shabbat Gathering with Kol Or"
Friday, June 5	012	"Defund CPD: Fund Black Lives"
Friday, June 5	012, 015	"Why We!! Black Lives Matter"
Friday, June 5	019	"Say Her Name: Breonna Taylor"
Friday, June 5	024	"Honk for Justice Chicago in West Ridge"
Friday, June 5	001, 002, 011, 018, 026	"El Grito Unido For Black Lives Matter"
Saturday, June 6	007	"United Against Racism & Public Violence"
Saturday, June 6	008	"Ashburn for Black Lives Matter & Justice Reform"
Saturday, June 6	009	"Youth Led Black and Brown Unity March: Justice for George Floyd"
Saturday, June 6	012	"Justice for George Floyd, Trump/Pence Out Now"
Saturday, June 6	012	"Chicago March of Justice"
Saturday, June 6	012	"Union Contingent for #JusticeForGeorgeFloyd"
Saturday, June 6	012	"Census Drive-By Parade"
Saturday, June 6	014	"Solidarity Vigil for Black Lives"
Saturday, June 6	014	"Humboldt Park Unity for BLM"
Saturday, June 6	015	"Westside March for Peace, Equity, and Justice"
Saturday, June 6	016	"Walk to Recognize Racism"
Saturday, June 6	018	"Storm Ohio Street Beach"
Saturday, June 6	022	"Prayer Service for Racial Justice"
Saturday, June 6	025	"Peaceful Protest March in Hermosa"
Sunday, June 7	001	"March for Justice"
Sunday, June 7	002	"Protest for George Floyd and against UCPD"
Sunday, June 7	004	"Candlelight Vigil 4 George Floyd"
Sunday, June 7	006	"Chatham Peace Walk & Food Giveaway"
Sunday, June 7	012	"Kids for Change"
Sunday, June 7	012	"Campaign against owner of Nini's Deli"
Sunday, June 7	014	"Interfaith Gathering for Black Lives"
Sunday, June 7	014	"Faith Community Walk in Prayer"
Sunday, June 7	015, 025	"Peaceful Protest for Justice in the Wrongful Death of George Floyd"
Sunday, June 7	019	"Honk for Justice Chicago - Lincoln Square"
Sunday, June 7	019	"Lincoln Square Standing with Black Lives Matter - Safe Protest"
Sunday, June 7	022	"Peaceful Protest Through Mt. Greenwood/Beverly/Morgan Park #BLM"
Sunday, June 7	025	"Black Lives Matter"
Monday, June 8	001	"Press Conference and Front-Line Worker Speak Out"
Monday, June 8	010	"Public Defenders March for Black Lives"



Monday, June 8	010	"Together We Rise - Black and Brown Unity Rally"
Monday, June 8	024	"In Remembrance of George Floyd and Many Other African Americans"
Tuesday, June 9	001, 019	"Car Caravan For Essential Workers"
Tuesday, June 9	006	"Blackout Townhall Meeting"
Friday, June 12	001	"Chicago Mothers Speak!"
Friday, June 12	001	"Hospitality Worker Car Caravan for Black Lives"
Friday, June 12	001	"Stop the Murder, Stop the Torture: Free Them All - CPAC Now!"
Friday, June 12	002	"Muslims for Abolition Rally"
Friday, June 12	002	"March Against UCPD, Stand with our Community"
Friday, June 12	010, 011	"In the Spirit of King"
Friday, June 12	012, 018	"The March for America's Future"
Friday, June 12	016	"Portgagge and Jefferson Parks Unite for Black Lives"
Friday, June 12	019	"End Northside Racism: Demand Tunney & Alderpeople Support CPAC"
Saturday, June 13	001	"Peaceful Protest Matters"
Saturday, June 13	001	"End Institutional Racism & Murder by Police - Nothing Less"
Saturday, June 13	001	"Defund CPD Now March for Black lives and direct action against CPD"
Saturday, June 13	002	"Kids Non-Violent Protest Against Racism"
Saturday, June 13	003	"Defund UCPD Breakfast Rally"
Saturday, June 13	004	"One Voice Black Love Rally"
Saturday, June 13	010	"Support Survivors: Defund the Carceral System"
Saturday, June 13	010, 011, 012	"Dog Peace Walk"
Saturday, June 13	011	"All Black Everything Pre-Juneteenth Community Celebration"
Saturday, June 13	011, 015	"Walk the Walk"
Saturday, June 13	016	"Justice for George Floyd + Breonna Taylor, Defund CPD: NW Side"
Saturday, June 13	016, 025	"Black Lives Matter"
Saturday, June 13	020	"Pride Is Protest: Andersonville #BLM Sidewalk Chalk Action"
Saturday, June 13	022	"Mount Greenwood Rally & March"
Saturday, June 13	025	"March for Black Lives"
Sunday, June 14	001	"March for Change"
Sunday, June 14	001, 005	"CPD Ran Over a 16 Y.O. Girl"
Sunday, June 14	002	"Take Back Bronzeville"
Sunday, June 14	003	"Graduates March #CopsOutCPS #DefundPolice"
Sunday, June 14	004	"East Side BLM Solidarity March"
Sunday, June 14	012	"Justice in June: Black and Brown Youth Led Unity March"
Sunday, June 14	014	"Chicago Coffee Community Stands with Black Lives Matter"
Sunday, June 14	019	"Boy Bye #BunkerBirthday for Trump"

Sunday, June 14	019	"Drag March for Change"
Sunday, June 14	020	"Unity Rally"
Monday, June 15	010	"Rabbi On Location: Free Them All"
Monday, June 15	017	"March: The 39th Ward demands Samantha Nugent support CPAC & BLM"
Monday, June 15	018	"Protest Against Repression in Ukraine"
Monday, June 15	020	"Honk for Justice - Uptown"
Wednesday, June 17	001	"Tell City Council - We Demand CPAC Now"
Wednesday, June 17	002	"#JUSTICEFORTOYIN"
Wednesday, June 17	014	"Honk for Justice - Logan Square"
Wednesday, June 17	019	"True Peace March"
Thursday, June 18	001	"F*@k That Colonizer"
Thursday, June 18	010	"Defund the Cook County Jail"
Thursday, June 18	017	"Honk for Justice - Lincoln Square"
Friday, June 19	001	"March For Us 2020"
Friday, June 19	001	"Rabbi DEMANDS Chicago PAINT Michigan Ave BLM"
Friday, June 19	001	"Juneteenth"
Friday, June 19	001	"Black Lives Matter"
Friday, June 19	001	"Chicago Peace and Equality Juneteenth March"
Friday, June 19	001, 002	"Black Unity March"
Friday, June 19	001, 002	"Juneteenth Drive for Justice"
Friday, June 19	002	"June 19"
Friday, June 19	002	"Juneteenth: A Call to Action, Holding Our Healthcare System Accountable"
Friday, June 19	002	"Juneteenth Celebration ReBuild Black WallStreet Car Parade"
Friday, June 19	002, 003	"Chicago Black Artists Union Juneteenth March"
Friday, June 19	003, 004, 006, 011, 018	"Juneteenth Car Parade"
Friday, June 19	004	"A.W.A.R.E. CommUNITY Rally"
Friday, June 19	005	"Juneteenth Celebration Car Parade"
Friday, June 19	005, 011	"Juneteenth Holiday Celebration & Black Culture Week Kick-Off"
Friday, June 19	007	"Juneteenth: In Defense of Black Lives"
Friday, June 19	007	"Defund Police and Defend Black Lives"
Friday, June 19	007	"Roll n Peace 5 - A Juneteenth Celebration"
Friday, June 19	011	"Juneteenth Celebration Car Parade"
Friday, June 19	012	"Juneteenth Downtown March"
Friday, June 19	012	"Trump/Pence #OutNOW"
Friday, June 19	016	"Juneteenth Caravan - NW Side"
Friday, June 19	018	"DePaul University Charwells Workers' March"
Friday, June 19	018	"Black Lives Matter"
Friday, June 19	018, 019	"Honk for Justice - Lincoln Park"

Saturday, June 20	001	"Shift Chicago March/Gathering"
Saturday, June 20	002, 003	"Nurses for Racial Justice-Chicago"
Saturday, June 20	001	"Close the Camps #BLM"
Saturday, June 20	001	"March For Reform"
Saturday, June 20	001	"Protest Trump's KKKampaign Rally"
Saturday, June 20	003	"Free-ish Fest - 2 till Auntie Lori Fine Us"
Saturday, June 20	008	"Rally Prayer, Action & Justice"
Saturday, June 20	011	"Juneteenth Car Parade"
Saturday, June 20	012	"Black Rides for Black Lives"
Saturday, June 20	018	"Father's Day Weekend Protest We Are Not Thugs"
Saturday, June 20	018	"End Chicago Nightlife Racism"
Saturday, June 20	019	"Montrose Beach Kick Back"
Saturday, June 20	020	"Express Yourself and Protest - Chalk up Lincoln Square"
Saturday, June 20	024	"Black Rides for Black Lives: A Solidarity Bike Ride"
Saturday, June 20	024	"Honk for Justice - Rogers Park"
Sunday, June 21	001, 002	"Men that Pray Prayer Walk"
Sunday, June 21	010	"Father's Day March for Cook County Inmates"
Sunday, June 21	014, 018, 019	"Chicago Musician March for Equality & Change"
Sunday, June 21	024	"Honk for Justice - West Ridge"
Monday, June 22	001	"Chicago Reparations Committee Demonstration at City Hall, Chicago 2020"
Monday, June 22	002	"Chase pull up and Shutdown"
Monday, June 22	015	"Justice for Mekhi & Amaria! Community Call to Action! "
Monday, June 22	020	"Honk for Justice – UpTown"
Wednesday, June 24	001	"Silent Protest in Honor of Oluwatoyin Salau"
Wednesday, June 24	001	"Black Lives Matter: Educational Equity or Else"
Wednesday, June 24	001	"Protest U.S. Immigration Enforcement"
Wednesday, June 24	001, 024	"West RP Car Caravan to BLM Rally: Educational Equity or Else"
Wednesday, June 24	014	"Honk for Justice - Logan Square"
Thursday, June 25	019	"Honk for Justice - Lincoln Square"
Thursday, June 25	019	"Uptown: 46th Ward March for Cappleman to Meet BLM's Demands"
Thursday, June 25	020	"Edgewater/Andersonville March for Osterman to Meet BLM's Demands"
Saturday, June 27	001	"Health Care Justice"
Saturday, June 27	002	"BLM Stop the violence - take back our streets from killers"
Saturday, June 27	004	"SE Chicago in solidarity with Black Lives Matter: March & Rally"
Saturday, June 27	012	"Protest in Motion"
Saturday, June 27	012	"Black Rides for Black Lives (Bike Ride)"
Saturday, June 27	012	"Honoring our Transcestors"
Saturday, June 27	018	"DePaul Student Abolitionists Campus Protest"

Saturday, June 27	022	"National Day of Action - End Child Detention Centers and Keep Families Together"
Saturday, June 27	024	"Protest Amazon and Whole Foods in Support of Workers Losing Hazard Pay"
Saturday, June 27	024	"Honk for Justice - Rogers Park"
Sunday, June 28	001	"Forgotten Victims of Drug Induced Homicide Peaceful Rally"
Sunday, June 28	001	"A Ride for Unity (Bike Ride)"
Sunday, June 28	001	"#REVOKEtheVOTE We Demand the Removal of CPD from CPS"
Sunday, June 28	009	"Asian American Christians for Black Lives and Dignity"
Sunday, June 28	015	"Austin Healing & Peace Circle"
Sunday, June 28	019	"Libertarians at Black Trans Lives Matter March"
Sunday, June 28	019	"Pride Without Prejudice Reclaiming Pride March"
Sunday, June 28	019	"No Hate Skate & Bike Pride Parade"
Sunday, June 28	024	"Honk for Justice - West Ridge"
Sunday, June 28	025	"Peace March LaFollette Park"
Monday, June 29	020	"Honk for Justice - Uptown"
Monday, June 29	024	"Honk for Justice - West Ridge"
Tuesday, June 30	002	"We Walk for Her March 2020: Missing Black & Brown Girls & Women"
Tuesday, June 30	012	"Honk for Justice - West Town"
Tuesday, June 30	018	"Pritzker: 24-Hour Tent City for Housing Justice in Illinois"
Tuesday, June 30	020, 024	"We Keep Us Safe: Protest Against Discrimination in Edgewater"
Wednesday, July 1	014	"Honk for Justice - Logan Square"
Wednesday, July 1	Citywide	"Chase Bank Citywide Boycott"
Thursday, July 2	001	"Shutdown Chicago BLC Protest"
Thursday, July 2	006	"Protest for All Black Lives - Demand Killings of All Black Lives to Stop!"
Thursday, July 2	019	"Honk for Justice - Lincoln Square"
Saturday, July 4	Undisclosed location	"No Brakes - #DefendBlackLives #DefundThePolice"

Appendix D:  
Listening Session Transcripts  
August 19, 2020

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS  
EASTERN DIVISION

STATE OF ILLINOIS,	)	Docket No. 17 CV 6260
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	Chicago, Illinois
	)	August 19, 2020
vs.	)	1:02 p.m.
	)	
CITY OF CHICAGO,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS - INDEPENDENT MONITOR LISTENING  
SESSIONS  
BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT M. DOW, JR.

APPEARANCES:

Independent Monitor:	MS. MAGGIE HICKEY
Deputy Monitor:	CHIEF (RET.) RODNEY MONROE
Inspector General City of Chicago:	MR. JOSEPH M. FERGUSON

Court Reporter:	KRISTIN M. ASHENHURST, CSR, RDR, CRR Official Court Reporter 219 S. Dearborn Street, Room 2304-A Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 818-6549 kristin_ashenhurst@ilnd.uscourts.gov
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1 (The following listening session proceedings were held via  
2 telephonic and videoconference.)

3 THE CLERK: Okay. This is 17 civil 6260. State of  
4 Illinois versus the City of Chicago.

5 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Carolyn.

6 Good afternoon, everybody. Welcome to this special  
7 session of court in case No. 17 Civil 6260, State of Illinois  
8 versus City of Chicago.

9 I am going to stop there for just one second to make  
10 sure that everything is -- everybody can hear and see this. So  
11 if there's anybody in the chat room right now who can't hear or  
12 see, please speak up and we'll be able to remedy that.

13 Okay. Sound good. So today and tomorrow are  
14 opportunities for members of the community to speak, and so I  
15 will keep my introductory remarks very short. We have tried  
16 our best to model these sessions on the fairness hearings that  
17 were held in 2018, but some modifications clearly have been  
18 necessary due to the pandemic, most obviously because this is a  
19 remote proceeding.

20 I want to first thank the monitoring team and the  
21 clerk's office team in this District Court for their expert  
22 help in making this possible with the technology, as well as  
23 the sign language service, the captioning service, and the  
24 court reporter.

25 I also want to take a quick moment to introduce the

1 people you see on your screens this afternoon. One is the  
2 Independent Monitor Maggie Hickey. Another is the Inspector  
3 General Joe Ferguson. And another is the Deputy Monitor Rodney  
4 Monroe. So in addition to myself, those are the faces you will  
5 see all day, and you will also see the sign language  
6 interpreter. And, again, we are very grateful for the  
7 assistance of our interpreter.

8           These listening sessions and the accompanying written  
9 comment period arise out of the Independent Monitor's  
10 invocation of her authority to prepare special reports on  
11 issues that are covered by the consent decree. The report she  
12 is currently preparing focuses on the response of the City of  
13 Chicago and the Chicago Police Department to the rise in First  
14 Amendment activity, civil unrest, and related law enforcement  
15 activity over the past few months.

16           As with the fairness hearings, it is important that  
17 all of those who wish to be heard have the opportunity. And  
18 because we cannot accommodate all of those who wish to speak,  
19 written comments are welcome and they're due by tomorrow at  
20 4:30 p.m. And the procedures for written comments are spelled  
21 out in some detail both on the court docket and also on the  
22 Monitor's website. And we certainly appreciate everyone's time  
23 and input on these important issues.

24           To be sure that everyone is clear on how we'll be  
25 proceeding today, I am going to ask the Monitor, Ms. Hickey, to



1 briefly summarize the ground rules for the platform that we are  
2 using.

3 So Maggie?

4 MS. HICKEY: Thank you, your Honor. I want to thank  
5 everybody for their participation, and a special thank you to  
6 Judge Dow, his team, the Inspector General Joe Ferguson and his  
7 team, and my team for working very hard to facilitate the  
8 virtual listening sessions that will take place today and  
9 tomorrow.

10 We had over 540 registrants sign up for these Zoom  
11 listening sessions, and the speakers for those listening  
12 sessions were randomly selected from that group. To maximize  
13 our connection and to increase efficiency, only the people who  
14 are scheduled to appear or to speak are on the Zoom meeting.  
15 The public may view each session live on YouTube and there will  
16 be a slight 20-second delay. The YouTube links for today and  
17 for tomorrow are available on the Independent Monitoring Team's  
18 website, [cpdmonitoringteam.com](http://cpdmonitoringteam.com).

19 Our website also includes a link to live transcription  
20 which is available during the session. The Court's listening  
21 session order is also available on our website, which provides  
22 instructions on how to file any written comments that anyone in  
23 Chicago would like to make.

24 For the speakers on today's meeting, you will not have  
25 the ability to turn on your microphone or camera until Judge

1 Dow calls your name and speaker number. And let me correct  
2 that. He is only going to call the speaker number. You should  
3 have received your speaker number via email last Friday, August  
4 17th.

5 When the Court calls your number, the meeting host  
6 will make you a Zoom panelist to begin speaking. For those of  
7 you on a computer, Zoom will automatically log you in and out.  
8 You may see a brief blank screen, and then you will be prompted  
9 to turn on your camera and microphone. You will have to turn  
10 those on yourself. For those of you via telephone, your line  
11 will be unmuted.

12 We have also provided visual cues for speakers that  
13 are on Zoom. There will be a list -- a timer box, and that is  
14 green to start, and then yellow means you have 30 seconds left,  
15 and red means you are out of time.

16 For people calling into the meeting telephonically, we  
17 will also provide a verbal 30-second warning. For those  
18 speakers, keep an eye on the chat function as the IMT might  
19 send messages through that service, too, if necessary. That's  
20 for the telephone participants.

21 If you are not available when the judge calls your  
22 number, you will be moved to the end of today's speaker list,  
23 and the Judge will then again call your number, if time  
24 permits. If you have any logistical questions during the  
25 session, please contact

1 listeningessions@CPDmonitoringteam.com. Let me repeat that  
2 again. Listeningessions, with an S, @CPDmonitoringteam.com,  
3 which is also listed on the IG's website.

4 Finally, these hearings are for the community to have  
5 a direct voice with the Court. The Independent Monitoring Team  
6 and the Inspector General's Office will continue to want to  
7 hear from the community on an ongoing basis. Thank you again  
8 for your patience and your understanding as we use a virtual  
9 platform during this very unprecedented time in history.

10 Thank you, your Honor.

11 THE COURT: Great. Thank you very much. And, again,  
12 thank you to your team. I know a tremendous amount of work has  
13 gone into making this possible, and I do appreciate it.

14 I also wanted to start at the outset by asking the  
15 Inspector General, Mr. Ferguson, if he had anything he would  
16 like to say at the outset of the proceeding.

17 MR. FERGUSON: Yes, Judge. Thank you. One quick note  
18 before turning to the important business of hearing from all of  
19 the people who are gathered for this purpose. These  
20 court-hosted listening sessions are just one of several avenues  
21 for community input and the expression of lived experience to  
22 inform this joint inquiry on which we'll be publicly reporting.

23 Today's listening sessions are by their nature both  
24 public and part of the official record of the court proceedings  
25 pursuant to the authority of the consent decree.

1           If for whatever reason anyone speaking, listening, or  
2 watching today wishes further opportunity to provide feedback,  
3 input or expression of experience, or wishes to provide it to  
4 the IMT or OIG in a less public setting or format, please be  
5 aware that there are opportunities to do so, including doing so  
6 anonymously, and we strongly encourage and hope that you do so.  
7 For those purposes, the ID information can be found at  
8 [www.cpdmonitoringteam.com](http://www.cpdmonitoringteam.com). And the Inspector General's  
9 information can be found at [www.igChicago.org](http://www.igChicago.org).

10           Thanks, Judge.

11           THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much as well. So  
12 just a couple more words about the order in which we'll proceed  
13 today. So we'll first hear today from counsel for the Attorney  
14 General and the City and the Coalition, and then we'll have 45  
15 individual speakers today. And each will have an opportunity  
16 to speak for three minutes.

17           Tomorrow the lawyers will not be speaking, so we'll  
18 move right into the members of the public and so we'll be able  
19 to accommodate 50 individuals tomorrow. I would ask that out  
20 of respect for all speakers, each speaker kindly finish their  
21 remarks at the three-minute time frame. And as I said before,  
22 it is my understanding that each speaker has been given a  
23 number and that there may have been some changes due to  
24 cancellations and substitutions.

25           And so I would ask that you all excuse the informality

1 of using numbers and not names. I am just afraid that I would  
2 get confused enough times with substitutions and the challenge  
3 of keeping this speaker list exactly current. So I am going to  
4 use numbers for the clarity of the record today. But I know we  
5 would appreciate it if each person can introduce themselves at  
6 the beginning of their remarks.

7 So thank you all again for your participation. It is  
8 my understanding that the first person on today's list is  
9 Ms. Pryor from the Office of the Attorney General. If that's  
10 correct, I will turn the floor over to Ms. Pryor.

11 MS. PRYOR: Good afternoon, your Honor. My name is  
12 Shareese Pryor and I am the Chief of the Civil Rights Bureau at  
13 the Illinois Attorney General's office. Our office represents  
14 the State of Illinois, the parties to this case, and the  
15 parties to the consent decree. On behalf of the two attorneys  
16 who worked to enforce the consent decree, thank you for the  
17 opportunity to speak briefly on the important topic of the  
18 Chicago Police Department's response to protesters.

19 The stories of police inflicting abuse on members of  
20 the community that they are supposed to serve and protect are  
21 not new in Chicago. Those abuses were the very impetus of the  
22 2019 consent decree invoked by the City and the Illinois  
23 Attorney General on behalf of the State, and the provisions of  
24 which the CPD is required to implement and follow.

25 In recent months, protesters in Chicago have taken to

1 the streets to express their righteous indignation over the  
2 horrific killings of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, as well  
3 as to make other calls for social justice reform.

4 Many of the demonstrators were at protests to speak  
5 out against systemic racism and abuses of force by members of  
6 the CPD, particularly against people living in the Chicago  
7 Black community.

8 We have been deeply disturbed by the reports from the  
9 coalition of community groups participating in the consent  
10 decree process and other community members about the brutal  
11 treatment of protesters by some CPD officers.

12 We are concerned by reports of CPD officers using  
13 excessive force, which in some cases resulted in serious  
14 injuries, confiscating or destroying protesters' personal  
15 property including cell phones and cameras, failing to or  
16 refusing to provide medical care, and denying protesters access  
17 to counsel.

18 If these accounts are accurate, these officers'  
19 actions in response to the protesters violate multiple  
20 provisions of the consent decree. These include requirements  
21 that prohibit officers from unjustifiably using impact weapons  
22 or other means of physical force, retaliating against First  
23 Amendment expression, speaking to civilians in a degrading and  
24 dehumanizing manner, and using race, gender, and sexual  
25 orientation as a basis for the law enforcement decision.

1           The consent decree also requires officers to allow  
2 civilians to record them in the course of their law enforcement  
3 duties, provide and arrange for medical care when a person has  
4 been injured by an officer, and allow arrestees to prompt  
5 access to counsel. The consent decree further requires CPD to  
6 adopt a community policing model for law enforcement and to  
7 ensure its crime reduction strategies are consistent with the  
8 principles of community policing.

9           The department's efforts to engage community members  
10 will mean little if it's simultaneously violating those same  
11 community members' rights. Police officers have a difficult  
12 job to do, which is more stressful during periods of civil  
13 unrest. We commend the CPD officers who have shown restraint  
14 even as they or their fellow officers have been assaulted.

15           We acknowledge that many CPD officers do this work  
16 honorably and consistent with the requirements of the consent  
17 decree. But for those who do not, CPD must not accept this  
18 conduct -- misconduct and the attorney general will not  
19 tolerate consent decree violations identified by the Monitor In  
20 the special report. Rather, our office is committed to  
21 enforcing the consent decree.

22           We thank the coalition for bringing these important  
23 issues forward, the Monitor for her special report, and your  
24 Honor for holding these hearings. We also appreciate those who  
25 will share their experiences today and tomorrow as we work

1 together to build a police department that has the trust of all  
2 the communities it serves.

3 THE COURT: Thank you very much. I appreciate it. My  
4 understanding is that the attorneys for the City will speak  
5 next. And I'm just not sure which one. So whoever it is,  
6 please step forward.

7 MS. BABBITT: Good afternoon, your Honor. It's  
8 Elizabeth Babbitt. I will be speaking on behalf of the City of  
9 Chicago this afternoon.

10 I would like to begin by saying we, the City,  
11 understand the frustration and the concerns about the current  
12 pace of implementing the reforms that are required by the  
13 consent decree. As we all know, the challenges of implementing  
14 these reforms has proven especially difficult in the landscape  
15 of the ongoing pandemic, which, as you know, has significantly  
16 impacted CPD.

17 The City and CPD acknowledge that we have fallen  
18 behind on meeting some of the established deadlines of the  
19 consent decree, but we are 100 percent committed to sustainable  
20 and lasting reform. We also understand there have been  
21 concerns related to the protests and looting in the aftermath  
22 of George Floyd's death.

23 We are also proud of our officers who maintain  
24 professionalism and calm under circumstances of high duress and  
25 conflict. The City and CPD are fully cooperating with the



1 Independent Monitor's investigation into those protests and the  
2 City and CPD's response to them.

3 We are keenly interested in hearing the commentary  
4 today and incorporating the feedback into our ongoing work to  
5 ensure consent decree compliance. And I would like to  
6 underscore, as officials with the CPD did last week at the city  
7 council hearing, that while we are behind on some deadlines on  
8 the consent decree, on others we are closer.

9 In the most recent report from the Monitor, for many  
10 of the paragraphs cited, we are just a step or two away from  
11 achieving a level of compliance. There is momentum, real  
12 momentum in the CPD to get policies, training, and community  
13 engagement in a timely manner.

14 While I don't have time to go over everything that has  
15 been done, let me name a few of the accomplishments. First,  
16 CPD has revised 12 of its use-of-force policies in February.  
17 One significant addition to that was that chokeholds are now  
18 clearly prohibited unless deadly force is authorized by  
19 officers.

20 At the direction of Mayor Lightfoot, the CPD has  
21 implemented safeguards for sworn and civilian personnel, whose  
22 primary responsibilities are focused on reform and consent  
23 decree compliance. From deployments to critical incidents,  
24 mass gatherings, or civil unrest, this is particularly  
25 relevant, I believe, to today's discussions.

1           We are also currently improving our process for  
2 community engagement through a new framework with the goal of  
3 educating members of the public on each policy within the  
4 consent decree and gaining feedback on those ideas.  
5 Eventually, this will evolve into a task force with a  
6 responsibility for ongoing community engagement.

7           We have also launched a force review division within  
8 CPD which is responsible for reviewing use-of-force incidents,  
9 including foot pursuits and the pointing of a firearm. We have  
10 also increased the amount of annual in-service training for all  
11 active sworn officers. We've launched public data dashboards  
12 and made significant progress toward the mayor's 90-day reform  
13 initiatives introduced in early June. So while we recognize  
14 that there is much work to be done, we are moving in the right  
15 direction.

16           The City and CPD's responses to the protests and  
17 looting are of great concern to us, and we appreciate the  
18 opportunity to participate in these listening sessions. We are  
19 here to listen and ultimately to act.

20           THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. I appreciate  
21 your comments.

22           My understanding is that there are maybe two lawyers  
23 from the coalition who are going to speak. So I invite the two  
24 of you to sort that out and go ahead and give your comments at  
25 this time. Thank you.

1 MS. BEDI: Good afternoon, your Honor. I am Sheila  
2 Bedi, one of the lawyers who represent the Campbell Coalition.  
3 And those organizations include Black Lives Matter Chicago, the  
4 Brighton Park Neighborhood Council, the Chicago Urban League,  
5 Justice for Families, the 411 movement for Pierre Loury,  
6 Network 49, the Chicago West Side Branch of the NAACP and the  
7 Women's All Points Bulletin.

8 Your Honor, Independent Monitor Hickey, Inspector  
9 General Ferguson, during this proceedings, assuming that the  
10 tech and the logistics cooperate, you're going to hear from  
11 Chicagoans who have been part of what has been called the  
12 largest social justice movement in the history of the world,  
13 and they were proud to play that role. People took to the  
14 street lifting up George Floyd's name to protest law  
15 enforcement brutality, violence, and racism. And they will  
16 describe how Chicago police officers responded to protesters  
17 with brutality, violence, and racism.

18 CPD's protest response revealed its propensity to  
19 engage in the exact behavior that inspired these global  
20 protests. People from all walks of life and backgrounds will  
21 be here as they were during the protest. And they will  
22 describe how CPD officers systematically abused their  
23 authority, used lethal force, sprayed them with chemical  
24 restraints that cause excruciating pain, unlawfully detained  
25 them, and mocked those who were bloody, crying out in pain, and

1 begging CPD to recognize their humanity.

2 Now, these violations have been widely publicized, and  
3 in their response, the City of Chicago shirks responsibility  
4 and issues blame. It has defended the use of lethal force by  
5 characterizing protesters as aggressors. But this blame game  
6 misses a fundamental point. This, and indeed the Constitution  
7 itself, protect the people against the power of the police.

8 It sets the standard for police response, standards  
9 which must be followed even when protesters are expressing  
10 disdain for the police, especially when the protesters are  
11 expressing disdain for the police. And instead of upholding  
12 the rule of law, the PD has subverted the requirements of this  
13 consent decree. The CPD mocks the requirements of this federal  
14 consent court order.

15 Now, the stories you will hear today, tomorrow, and  
16 through written testimony, represent just a small fraction of  
17 those brutalized by the Chicago Police Department during the  
18 2020 protests, and a smaller portion still of those who have  
19 been brutalized by CPD throughout history, and it is history  
20 just as surely as the present that we speak to today.

21 We know well that lawlessness, racism, violence, and  
22 corruption has a long history in our city. In 1919, there were  
23 uprisings on Chicago streets and CPD acted with brute force to  
24 quell them. In a report commissioned by city officials in  
25 1920, the City of Chicago admitted that in response to those

1 uprisings, police lashed out and targeted Black Chicagoans.

2           Because of the CPD's violent reaction to the 1919  
3 uprisings, the after-action report then called for, and I  
4 quote, "a house cleaning of the Chicago Police Department." 100  
5 years later, we have a different uprising, but the exact same  
6 Chicago Police Department in need of a housecleaning.

7           Spikes of CPD violence, racism, and lawlessness can be  
8 plotted along a timeline from 1919 until the present. This  
9 decree only exists because five years ago, Chicagoans took  
10 their demands for justice from the street to the city council  
11 in the names of Laquan McDonald, Rekia Boyd, and so many other  
12 Black and Brown people killed or brutalized by the Chicago  
13 Police Department in recent history.

14           This consent decree could be, and it should be, an  
15 antidote to the poison of police lawlessness that has infected  
16 Chicago for well over 100 years, but it has failed. CPD  
17 officers regularly flaunt its most basic. CPD officers refuse  
18 to wear body cameras. They use slurs and hate speech. They  
19 refuse to accurately report uses of force. And in the absence  
20 of decisive, immediate action, the summer of 2020 will be  
21 remembered as just one more spike, one more wave, one more peak  
22 on the deadly timeline of CPD's failure to make Black lives  
23 matter.

24           Or this summer could go down in history as a turning  
25 point and a time of transformation. The transformation will

1 require two things. One, meaningfully implementing the consent  
2 decree terms. And, two, consistent with the people's consent  
3 decree, amending the decree to include additional terms, terms  
4 that curb police power to arrest and harm, and that will  
5 include immediately removing from the streets Chicago Police.  
6 Department officers who brutalize protesters.

7 I want to thank each of you for your time, your  
8 attention, for reciting this critically important platform and  
9 all you have invested in this process.

10 THE COURT: Thank you very much for your comments.  
11 I'm sorry. Again, each time I have to mute -- unmute myself.  
12 But thank you. So it's my understanding, Ms. Sheley, are you  
13 next?

14 MS. SHELEY: Yes, Judge. Good afternoon. I am Karen  
15 Sheley from the ACLU in Illinois. Judge Dow, Ms. Hickey,  
16 Mr. Ferguson, thank you for arranging these hearings and  
17 allowing me to speak on behalf of my clients, Communities  
18 United, Community Renewal Society, One North Side, Next Steps  
19 and the ACLU of Illinois, all members of the coalition who have  
20 the right to enforce the consent decree.

21 The consent decree is a commitment that the police  
22 department will take community concerns into account when  
23 forming policies. Abandon the mentality, lift up the sanctity  
24 of life, hold officers accountable for misconduct, and actively  
25 work to eliminate harmful and unnecessary police contacts.

1           After nearly a year and a half, the City has missed 70  
2 percent of its deadlines to meet the promise of the consent  
3 decree, and has failed to provide any feasible plan for getting  
4 back on track. So this summer -- this summer, the fulfillment  
5 of the promise seems very, very far away. My clients are  
6 living with the consequences of that stalled start. The  
7 Monitor has found the City out of compliance with community  
8 outreach requirements and then making plans to address  
9 community safety concerns. We're seeing on the streets and on  
10 our phones officers who violate the decree's restrictions on  
11 use of force, and it's happening against protesters. You will  
12 hear many of those stories today.

13           In neighborhoods, people have been frightened and  
14 harmed by the militarized presence of officers who during a  
15 pandemic too often refuse to wear masks when interacting with  
16 the public. My clients look at the City's actions this year.  
17 They look at the excessive force, raising bridges, shutting  
18 down transportation, and they feel they're losing their rights,  
19 not gaining them, under the decree.

20           You rightly cautioned us as the decree was entered  
21 that it is not a panacea or a magic wand, but people are losing  
22 faith in the promise. My hope is that the monitor and  
23 inspector general's report will acknowledge the violations of  
24 the decree that we've all seen and identify remedies that the  
25 City will adopt, that we'll need more to instill confidence in

1 the decree.

2 We need a dialogue between the CPD, the City, the AG's  
3 office, and the coalition. We need answers from the City about  
4 how it will meet its deadlines, and we need accountability for  
5 the violations of the decree that are happening in front of us.

6 Judge, for all of this, we need your help and the  
7 power of the Court. We are counting on that power to ensure  
8 that in this generation, the promise of change for the  
9 department is finally kept. Thank you, Judge, for arranging  
10 these hearings. And I want to thank all of the people who plan  
11 to speak today and tomorrow.

12 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you as well. I really  
13 appreciate all the comments from counsel today. So I thank  
14 you.

15 With that, we are going to move to the first member of  
16 the public, and so speaker No. 1, you will be admitted into the  
17 speaker's room now, and we'll await your comments. So thank  
18 you.

19 MS. HICKEY: Your Honor, I am checking to see what is  
20 happening.

21 THE COURT: Thank you. My technological capabilities  
22 may not be as good as yours and the host's, so I appreciate  
23 your checking on that. Thank you.

24 MS. HICKEY: Your Honor, I would suggest that we move  
25 to speaker number two. I don't think it's a technological



1 thing. I think perhaps speaker one has been unable to join yet  
2 and we'll then move speaker No. 1 to the end of the queue so  
3 they will have an opportunity to speak at the end.

4 THE COURT: Okay. Very well. So, if we could admit,  
5 then, speaker No. 2 into the participant room, that would be  
6 appreciated. Thank you.

7 MS. FRAADE: Hi. Hello. My name is Rachel Fraade. I  
8 am a social worker here in Chicago and I was present at the  
9 Decolonize Chicago protest at Buckingham Fountain and later  
10 moving on to Grant Park. At Grant Park, police brutalized our  
11 crowd of protesters. I was personally pepper sprayed and tear  
12 gassed. The burning continued for hours all over my body.  
13 Over and over I could see Chicagoans who could not see, who  
14 could not breathe. I couldn't spray water into people's eyes  
15 fast enough to soothe the burning, and everywhere I looked,  
16 people were calling for medics. At the front of my line were  
17 people with bikes. Cops stole the bikes and threw these bikes  
18 to the ground and were purposely breaking them. As I left, I  
19 saw piles of bikes twisted and stolen, which took away people's  
20 primary form of transportation, only because they were used to  
21 protect us from the violence we knew the police were about to  
22 bring upon us if they got through the line of bikes.

23 And we were correct. The police pepper sprayed us,  
24 tear gassed us, and beat us with batons. They pointed to  
25 people in the crowd. I saw our protective line, and they were

1 marking their perceived leaders to later target for violence or  
2 arrest. I saw one medic -- and at every protest medics are  
3 clearly marked as such -- with blood streaming from their head  
4 due to a baton strike. I also saw at least one other  
5 individual with blood streaming from their head. I saw people  
6 who could barely move, who could barely see because they had  
7 been pepper sprayed so badly. When I was tear gassed, I had  
8 mucous streaming from my nose and my mouth. I could not stop  
9 coughing even through my mask. And all of this was in quarters  
10 we were enclosed into in the middle of a pandemic that is  
11 spread through respiratory droplets, so the police  
12 substantially increased all of our risk of contracting  
13 potentially deadly COVID-19.

14           Eventually, we retreated. And if you have ever been  
15 in Grant Park, you know that the way out is over a hill and  
16 over a stone wall. Cops pushed us up this hill and over a  
17 stone wall as we walked backwards. We were facing them in  
18 order to make sure we could protect ourselves. So we were  
19 walking backwards up a hill and over a stone wall after we had  
20 been beaten, pepper sprayed and tear gassed, and otherwise  
21 traumatized, and they were beating us even more because we  
22 weren't moving fast enough.

23           They beat people who tripped as they were walking up  
24 the hill. They beat people as they were trying to step  
25 backward over a stone wall. And, again, we were retreating.

1 We were leaving the park and this was not enough for the  
2 police. They were inflicting purposeful, unnecessary violence  
3 against injured protesters. This was not in the interest of  
4 anyone's safety. This was in the interest of a statue on  
5 public land, in fact on unceded Native American land, which we  
6 had every constitutional right to protest.

7           When we left Grant Park they continued to chase us  
8 with pepper spray and threats, and for blocks afterwards,  
9 despite our visible injuries as we were fleeing. Police were  
10 beating people who could not see where they were going because  
11 of the tear gas in their eyes. Their eyes were swollen, tears  
12 streaming down their faces, clearly and visibly unable to see  
13 and walk quickly, and yet they walked behind them with batons.  
14 I was simultaneously fleeing, bringing others along in my arms,  
15 and spraying water into our eyes because the police would not  
16 stop beating us.

17           THE COURT: Thank you very much for your comments. I  
18 do appreciate it. I can't actually see the red markers, but I  
19 think we are ready to move on to speaker No. 3, please.

20           MR. LEWIS: Hello, your Honor, and all other  
21 listeners. I am Djimon Lewis, a college student at Illinois  
22 State University, and I was at the protest on July 17th at  
23 Buckingham Fountain, and then moving up the street to the  
24 Columbus statue. And I came there in support of Black Lives  
25 Matter to protest a fascist statue commemorating Benito

1 Mussolini on unceded land.

2 By the time we left the fountain and marched up the  
3 street, there was a considerable police presence, but  
4 everything was peaceful as we intended. Then we got to the  
5 statue and immediately we were met with forceful resistance.  
6 Cops were shoving and pushing people that were in the front  
7 line back.

8 I saw multiple cops grab objects and push protesters  
9 and try to hit them with it. The first thing I remember seeing  
10 in detail that really kind of traumatized me was I saw an  
11 officer literally grab a protester, push him down the hill, and  
12 then they started shoving people on the hill without warning.

13 I saw another police officer tackle a protester who  
14 was (unintelligible) another protester, as they tried to take  
15 the statue from peaceful protesters. And I saw the person who  
16 had gotten tackled beaten in their head with a baton until they  
17 were bleeding profusely. And the officer did not remove  
18 himself until after the person was clearly incapacitated. And  
19 no other officers removed that officer, either.

20 Within seconds of that incident, from my advantage  
21 point, because I had moved, I was shoved back to a vantage  
22 point on the hill to create space because I was not with any  
23 other protester that could protect me. I did not know anybody.  
24 I saw an officer try to punch a person with a bike in the face,  
25 while trying to grab the bike from them, and then pepper

1 spraying them directly in the face.

2           Once they pepper sprayed the person directly in the  
3 face, they grabbed their bike, hit them with it, and then  
4 tossed the bike into another pile of bikes, effectively  
5 breaking it and taking their property. The next thing I saw  
6 from my vantage point before I was forced to flee because of  
7 tear gas and forced to flee the scene with other protestors  
8 back and up and over the hill, I saw an officer taunting  
9 protestors with his badge number and name covered, repeatedly  
10 calling protestors expletives and using foul language.

11           I was increasingly getting scared of the situation  
12 because it looked so brutal. There were multiple people  
13 suffering from wounds, bleeding profusely from their noses and  
14 their heads, getting beat indiscriminately with batons, and I  
15 felt the need to try to create a space, a barrier between  
16 myself and the other police officers with the other protestors  
17 who were also being teargassed and beaten.

18           I saw another person who -- I actually saw this person  
19 on the way to safely leaving the area; they were getting their  
20 heads wrapped. And that was just among the things I have seen.

21           THE COURT: Thank you for your comments. I really  
22 appreciate it.

23           I think we're ready to move to the fourth speaker  
24 then, please.

25           MS. KAFURA: My name is Cailie Kafura. I use she/her

1 pronouns. I am 27 years old. I am with Rising Tide Chicago  
2 and I work as a nanny.

3 On July 17th, young folks from across Chicago arrived  
4 at the Columbus statue to make a change that the City of  
5 Chicago was too racist to make themselves: To remove a statue  
6 of a colonizer who committed genocide and enslaved people.  
7 What followed was nothing less than an atrocity as the Chicago  
8 Police Department, who pretends to protect and serve the people  
9 of this city, unleashed violence that has left our entire  
10 community traumatized.

11 CPD used batons to repeatedly beat folks to the point  
12 where blood was pouring down the faces of my friends and their  
13 shirts changed color. Medics providing urgent first aid to  
14 people were also beaten or dragged away from the severely  
15 injured by the police.

16 Friends of mine were teargassed and pepper sprayed at  
17 point blank until they were burned, blinded, and throwing up.  
18 Some were left to sit in jail while experiencing this  
19 excruciating pain without any medical attention whatsoever.

20 CPD ripped bikes from the hands of people who depended  
21 on them as their only means to get them to work, and then used  
22 them as weapons against those very same people. Some folks who  
23 tried to document these abuses faced retaliation in the form of  
24 being punched and shoved by CPD. The police who did not beat  
25 anyone stood by and grimaced as their colleagues broke many

1 laws that they're supposedly supposed to uphold.

2 This is why we say that there are no good cops.  
3 Adding absolute injury -- adding insult to injury, numerous  
4 people who were arrested went missing in the system as the  
5 police refused them phone calls, food, water, medical  
6 attention, and did not even fill out paperwork for hours so we  
7 could not find our friends and family.

8 A reminder that the Chicago Police Department unleashed  
9 all of this violence on to their own Chicagoans --  
10 (unintelligible due to audio breaking up) -- all to protect a  
11 statue of a colonizer. All of my friends are still traumatized  
12 from that day and all of the countless days that CPD and Lori  
13 Lightfoot have been collaborating on kettling, trapping,  
14 beating, macing, and dehumanizing us on the streets of Chicago.  
15 Young Black and Brown folks are being brutalized for literally  
16 protesting police brutality.

17 The actions of the police and the City should  
18 demonstrate to you all exactly why we need far more than  
19 reform. We need you all to actually listen, actually act,  
20 defund and abolish CPD because blue lives murder and Black  
21 lives fucking matter.

22 THE COURT: Thank you for your comments.

23 We can move on to speaker 5, please.

24 MS. SALEH: Hello. Can you hear me?

25 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

1 MS. SALEH: I apologize. I am having some technical  
2 issues. Good afternoon, your Honor, and everyone present to  
3 give their testimony in this historical moment of power for  
4 Black and Brown youth organizers.

5 My name is Mariam Saleh. My pronouns are she and her.  
6 I'm a 24-year-old Palestinian organizer speaking on behalf of  
7 the Black Lives Community Coalition. It is a new group founded  
8 by my friend Ken Davis that focuses on empowering and  
9 protecting Black and Brown communities throughout Lake County  
10 through policy, training, change and community.

11 I am a Palestinian Muslim with refugee parents, and  
12 I've been involved my entire life in liberation work and have  
13 spent the last six years in Chicago organizing with groups such  
14 as VJPSOT, Chicago Rights, and various others. The parallels  
15 of genocide and systemic oppression against Black people in  
16 America, particularly at the hands of law enforcement, and  
17 Palestinians under Israeli occupation are disturbingly similar.

18 On Friday, July 17th, I attended the rally for Black  
19 and Indigenous Solidarity to stand against police brutality on  
20 both local and national levels. When I arrived, the crowd was  
21 gathered around the Buckingham Fountain. As we walked toward  
22 the statue, CPD arrived in riot gear guarding the statue in  
23 masses. I was in front of the crowd when the violence of the  
24 police erupted. Without warning, CPD began to strike dozens of  
25 peaceful protesters in the head and all over their bodies with



1 batons to the point of severe injury. Even as protesters tried  
2 to disperse, CPD kept on hitting with batons. The majority of  
3 the faces I saw with bloody heads were Black.

4 As we ran away, we were gassed, which made it hard to  
5 breathe. I choked on thick chemicals that were burning in my  
6 eyes. Moments later they began to aggressively spray everyone  
7 in the face with mace in front of me, including one of my close  
8 friends. A mixture of mace and tear gas made it increasingly  
9 difficult to breathe and see, and I witnessed them steal  
10 protest marshals' bikes and throw them at youth activists.

11 In 2018 the American Public Health Association  
12 revealed that police brutality is an epidemic at this time.  
13 The military provides police with close to \$800 million  
14 annually, and this continues the oppression towards the Black  
15 and Brown community. Outside of this protest, my experiences  
16 with law enforcement include militarized police presences in  
17 many public areas, as well as sexual harassment from CPD in  
18 those spaces, and as well as on-the-ground protesting.

19 My experiences at the rally were not the first time I  
20 have witnessed this disproportionate violence at the hands of  
21 the authorities. However, since that Friday, my mental health  
22 has drastically declined as it was a re-traumatizing  
23 experience. The excessive funding given to CPD makes it  
24 further unlikely to get help. We know that crime is not  
25 committed out of a vacuum. It is imperative that we fund

1 social institutions to prevent crime.

2 \$95 million should not be given to fund the cop  
3 academy in Garfield Park. Already that's a hotspot for law  
4 enforcement. That money needs to be redistributed to Black and  
5 Brown communities where over 54 schools and 6 mental health  
6 facilities were closed under Rahm's administration. We need to  
7 abolish policing systems and defund the police to stop the  
8 cycle of crime and invest in the communities themselves  
9 instead.

10 Thank you for allowing me this opportunity to speak.

11 THE COURT: Thank you very much for participating. I  
12 think we are up to Speaker No. 6, so if that person can be  
13 admitted to the room.

14 (Pause in proceedings.)

15 MS. SHEMANSKI: Hello. My name is Aimee Shemanski. I  
16 am a resident of the 46th Ward in Chicago, and I have heard a  
17 lot of people talk about the protest in later July. I would  
18 actually like to talk about earlier on, my experience on  
19 May 30th. So very -- I think one of the first ones.

20 My partner and I, we arrived near the river at about  
21 5:00, 5:30, and things were still mostly peaceful, but somewhat  
22 rowdy. And between about 5:30 and 6:30, there was steadily  
23 escalate -- there was a steady escalation of really just  
24 sentiments. And at every step of the way, it was CPD that  
25 would kind of instigate this escalation.

1           We were near the front of the line, directly face to  
2 face with officers. And I noticed to my left a tall, white  
3 gentleman in, like, a black zip-up that seemed to actually know  
4 the officers. He wasn't -- he didn't seem to be part of the  
5 protest, and he was actually leaning forward and chatting with  
6 the officers, which was quite difficult to do with the volume.  
7 And they were doing everything they could to incite panic, but  
8 this man really stood out to me because he later dropped, like,  
9 a smoke bomb, and it was, like, yellow-colored. It was just  
10 like a cheap thing from any roadside stand that you could get  
11 in Indiana, and it was really designed to incite panic.

12           As the situation started to escalate, we watched them  
13 push the line back. And they singled out a woman who had been  
14 yelling quite loudly on my right. And as they were pushing us  
15 back, pushing us back, we climbed up on the cement planters  
16 that were there in the plaza that groups of people were  
17 standing on. And they singled her out specifically, and they  
18 kind of manhandled her, physically. wrapped their arms around  
19 her. And I watched her, really, be thrown to the ground. And  
20 when she rose her hands were bloodied and dirtied, as well as  
21 her knees.

22           We moved on. They started to funnel us up the street.  
23 And as we went up the street, we were following one of the  
24 leaders, one of the organizers of the protest, and we could  
25 hear it escalating behind us. And as we heard shouting and

1 then, like, a loud crash, we decided to duck out through an  
2 alley. And at the end, we -- I heard, like, three loud pop,  
3 pop, pop.

4 And I grew up with guns around. It sounded like  
5 gunshots. I believe they were nonlethal rubber bullets because  
6 I didn't see anything about protesters being actually shot in  
7 the news. And it continued to escalate from there over the rest  
8 of the night, but absolute terror in that moment. People  
9 shouted about shots being fired and just ran.

10 Thank you.

11 THE COURT: Thank you very much for your comments.

12 I think we're up to No. 7 now, please.

13 MS. HICKEY: Your Honor, if you want to move on to No.  
14 8, it does not appear that No. 7 is on the line or in the  
15 queue. We will add them to the end.

16 THE COURT: Thank you. I am just looking at my  
17 attendance list too, and I'm seeing the same. So we'll go ahead  
18 and skip over No. 7 for the moment and move on to speaker No.  
19 8, please.

20 (Pause.)

21 MS. HICKEY: Your Honor, we are going to have to move  
22 to No. 9.

23 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. So we're up to No. 9,  
24 and we'll leave 1, 7, and 8 in the queue for the end of the  
25 proceeding today.

1 MS. HICKEY: Your Honor, if you want to move to  
2 No. 10, I know No. 10 is ready. I am sorry. I'm only looking  
3 down because I am trying to monitor the speakers in the queue.

4 THE COURT: I appreciate that. And I am also trying  
5 to keep track of where to pick up again when we get through the  
6 45th for today. So we'll move on to speaker No. 10, please.

7 MS. HICKEY: And I am doing the same, your Honor, so I  
8 can help cue you at the end.

9 THE COURT: Wonderful. Thank you. Thank you very much.

10 MR. MICHAEL KAISER-NYMAN: Hi. Thanks for letting me  
11 speak at this session. Thanks for holding this session.

12 I went to a number of protests in -- mostly in the two  
13 weeks or so directly after George Floyd's murder, and wanted to  
14 share a few things that I experienced and that I saw there.

15 Some of the protests I went to were in the downtown  
16 area, some were on the north side, and some were on the south  
17 side. And kind of reflecting on my experience, one of the first  
18 really shocking things, or maybe not so shocking for some of  
19 us, is just the dramatically different police response at these  
20 events.

21 One of the events I went to on the north side was in a  
22 relatively affluent white neighborhood. And there were -- I am  
23 not a professional at this, there were maybe 1,000, 2,000  
24 people there, and I saw five officers the entire time I was  
25 there. And that was a really nice change from the protests that

1 I had been at downtown and on the south side, where at times it  
2 felt like there were more police officers than protesters.

3 And, you know, as somebody who doesn't face a lot of  
4 police in my day-to-day life, this was a really stark,  
5 personal, eye-opening experience about the different ways that  
6 people experience police presence depending on where they live  
7 and their race.

8 I was also really surprised at the relatively few  
9 police who wore masks, especially given just the degree to  
10 which we, our city and our state, are suffering from the  
11 pandemic. I was pleasantly surprised that I almost never saw  
12 protesters without masks. I was very disappointed that I, in  
13 the first week or so of the protests, I almost never saw police  
14 masks. As they continued, I did see some with masks, but I  
15 would estimate maybe 10 percent of police who were wearing  
16 masks. And these are from people who are supposed to be  
17 keeping us safe and they were putting our health at risk.

18 Most of the time that I was involved in the protests,  
19 I personally did not feel unsafe. The times that I felt most  
20 unsafe were the times I was around the police. When I was  
21 around police wearing riot gear, when I was around police who  
22 had helmets on, face shields down, that was when, to me  
23 personally, the protests felt most unsafe. I never felt unsafe  
24 around any of the other protesters, but when there was this  
25 militarized response from the police, I felt like anything bad

1 could happen at any particular moment and it was really nerve  
2 wracking.

3 The only time that I felt like there was a real,  
4 immediate, present possibility of violence and danger was at a  
5 protest that was ending around -- around sunset. And as the  
6 protest was concluding, some of the protests -- what seemed  
7 like organizers were encouraging us to move along more quickly.  
8 And then I realized it was because we were getting close to the  
9 curfew time. And as the protest was wrapping up (no audio)...

10 MS. HICKEY: It appears, your Honor, that Michael  
11 Kaiser-Nyman's internet went out, but he was also out of time.  
12 So we can move on to the next speaker, No. 11.

13 THE COURT: Very well. Thank you. So if we could  
14 admit speaker 11, please.

15 MR. EUGENIO: I am J. Michael Eugenio. I use he/they  
16 pronouns. I am (inaudible) mixed and I work at a community  
17 non-profit in Woodlawn. On July 17th at the Black and  
18 Indigenous Solidarity rally, I won't ever forget the look on  
19 their faces, the gleeful rage and vitriol as they ripped the  
20 mask off my friends' faces to pepper spray them. She had to  
21 quarantine after that for fear of exposure because, obviously,  
22 we later found out they sprayed before it was authorized over  
23 the scanner.

24 I won't forget the callous cheers in which they hit a  
25 stranger in the head with a baton and then ripped her bike

1 away -- she had put herself between a police officer and a  
2 baton because they were targeting Black youth because there was  
3 someone recording them beating someone else. They then threw  
4 the bike onto another protester, and looking back at us with a  
5 wink as another officer picked up the bike to stomp on it  
6 before adding it to the growing pile. The pile of bikes has  
7 yet to be returned to protesters.

8 I won't forget the frenzied stare-down as a white  
9 shirt pulled a knife out to slash bike tires and his clear  
10 frustration that protesters were the ones who had to  
11 de-escalate the situation. I won't forget the tinge of regret  
12 in their eyes as they realized how much spray they deployed,  
13 choking on spray only to look and see how much they made us  
14 suffer, and banned by the Geneva Convention. We weren't  
15 prepared. Laughing through their coughs.

16 I especially won't forget a few faces, blank faces of  
17 the cops as they stood behind fearful and in awe of what their  
18 fellow officers were capable of. Just last week that same  
19 disaffected disdain I saw on the grin of a white-shirt officer,  
20 no badge, no body cam, as they tried to rush through a barrier  
21 to get to the young Black organizer rallying against CPD's  
22 shooting a Black youth and giving him a million dollars bail.  
23 That officer was clearly frustrated when officers protected the  
24 protesters, though just the next day they illegally chased,  
25 kettled, sprayed, beat, threatened with the barrel of a rifle,



1 arrested, and sexually harassed many of those same organizers.

2 And earlier that week, some of those young Black women  
3 later joking with their abusers. All of these people were  
4 expressing their First Amendment rights, standing in public  
5 parks and streets protesting that systemic abuse, police  
6 brutality, the lack of compassion and the lack of  
7 accountability.

8 I have a hard time sleeping. I have a hard time  
9 working and focusing. I keep thinking back to their looks of  
10 absolute vitriol, the searing gas on my skin. They don't see  
11 as human much less as someone to protect. or serve. My mouth  
12 and throat were full of ulcers, worrying that they will kill  
13 and lie the same way they did from Fred Hampton to Laquan  
14 McDonald. At least Rahm could acknowledge, after years of  
15 pushing, how racist CPD is.

16 How long will it take Lori to make that  
17 acknowledgment? How many will have to suffer? How long will  
18 she continue to value property over people? It makes me sorry  
19 to be a Chicagoan. It shows me there is absolutely nothing to  
20 reform the system.

21 Much of what I have described and I have seen and  
22 heard about so, so much more goes against the extremely  
23 incremental. consent decree. Even if we met all of its  
24 measures, I don't think we'll be safe right now. I keep on  
25 because. I know how much more others have suffered. We must

1 defund and abolish CPD. There's -- there's no saving it. We  
2 must protect Black lives. We should be building the city we  
3 wish to save, not wasting our time reacting to its oppression.  
4 Thank you.

5 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you for your comments.

6 I think we are up to No. 12 now. Is that right?

7 MS. HICKEY: That's correct, your Honor.

8 MR. GEORGE: Hello. Thank you, your Honor. Thank you  
9 everyone and thank you everyone present. My name is Landon  
10 George. I use he pronouns. I am a farmer and musician. I lost  
11 my job as a musician in North Carolina. What I did was I came  
12 up to Wisconsin to start work on farm.

13 While in Wisconsin, we sell our produce at farmers'  
14 markets in Chicago, so I would frequent the city every weekend,  
15 usually Friday through Sunday. I was in Chicago, and I heard  
16 about the rally that was going on at the Buckingham Fountain on  
17 the 17th of July. I appeared at this rally. What I saw was  
18 atrocious and it is making me shake just thinking about it.

19 We started at Buckingham Fountain. Everybody was  
20 getting ready, getting excited, talking about justice. But  
21 when we moved to Grant Park to -- (audio breaking up) -- the  
22 entire mass of the movement, they were pushing us up. It felt  
23 being -- like I said, I am a farm worker and it literally felt  
24 like I was kettled and pushed by these cops who were heavily  
25 armed and in riot gear.

1           When we got to the monument of Columbus, the first  
2 thing I saw was cops grabbing people's bikes, throwing them  
3 against the ground, throwing them at the people who owned the  
4 bikes. (Audio breaking up) -- forced them -- I had to stop  
5 (inaudible) -- on the ground (inaudible). The cop grabbed my  
6 neck and threw me to the ground. Why did you do that? The next  
7 thing I know we're at the protest. Everybody stands up around  
8 us. The police (inaudible) and literally the blood (inaudible).

9           These guys wanted violence and they wanted blood and  
10 they got that pretty soon. You can see the scar on my head.  
11 This is the scar that I got from a baton to the head from the  
12 CPD. It was the same guy who grabbed me by the neck. And I  
13 guess he had something to prove. When I got hit by the baton.  
14 in the head, I couldn't see anything. Blood covered my eyes  
15 and face. I was rushed back by unknown people, helped by  
16 strangers, and my head got wrapped. I then got back to my truck  
17 and drove all of the way to Wisconsin. This kind of violence is  
18 insane because it is happening to good citizens. I don't know  
19 what else to say, but we have to defund this.

20           THE COURT: Thank you for your comments. I am sorry we  
21 didn't catch them all, but we caught as many as we could. But  
22 thank you.

23           I think we're to No. 13, please.

24           (Pause.)

25           MS. WISE: Hi, everyone. Can you hear me?

1 THE COURT: Yes, we can hear you. Thank you.

2 MS. WISE: Okay. Hi. Thank you for having me. My name  
3 is Jeannine Wise. I am 45 years old. I live in Chicago and I  
4 am a chef and a culinary instructor. I just wanted to note that  
5 it was very traumatizing to hear from the attorneys from the  
6 City defending the CPD. That was very painful.

7 So on May 30th I went to peacefully protest the murder  
8 of George Floyd, and to put myself between Black people and the  
9 police because I believe that Black lives matter. In the  
10 afternoon, I ended up on the Wabash bridge. The police formed a  
11 line and had horses behind them. And they did not call to  
12 disperse at that time.

13 I was between the police and some Black people that I  
14 didn't know. And the police -- there was an officer pushing  
15 into my chest horizontally with a baton like this, and he was  
16 pushing me very, very hard. And I was afraid of stumbling. I  
17 was trying to hold my ground, but I wasn't fighting. I never  
18 raised my voice. And I was afraid that I was going to fall on  
19 the ground and get trampled because the police were advancing,  
20 but also because of how much it hurt to have the baton pushed  
21 into my ribcage and my chest.

22 I asked him to stop and he wouldn't. He kept shoving  
23 me. So I put my hands up. I thought he would stop if I was  
24 protecting myself, but he shoved the baton into the fingers of  
25 my bone and was pushing with his body weight. And so I screamed

1 and I said, "Stop. Please stop." So he gave me a look, and he  
2 jumped to a person next to me, which was a Black person and  
3 started shoving him even harder. And I said, "Stop. Stop.  
4 Please stop."

5 And the police officer next to him looked at me and  
6 said, "You want to be in it. Now you're in it." And he  
7 grabbed me by my neck and he lifted me up, and I flew. I went  
8 airborne by my neck. He dragged me backwards so quickly that my  
9 shoe flew off and my hat flew off. He dragged me down the  
10 street through horse poop so hard that my back was scraped up  
11 and bleeding. And then two other officers jumped on me and I  
12 was screaming, "Stop. You got me. You got me. You won."

13 They put me in zip ties. I sat on the curb of the  
14 Trump Tower for three hours. They -- this is when the bridge  
15 went up. I sat on a sheriff's bus for three hours. They took us  
16 to Belmont and Western, didn't let us in, had no females.  
17 Didn't tell the females that we were there, to process us. I  
18 was in zip ties for six hours, very tight.

19 They told us if we didn't want to be arrested, we  
20 shouldn't have burned the city down. None of us had been  
21 involved in any burning or looting or anything. Then I was in  
22 jail for the night. My name cleared at 3:00, I had no warrants,  
23 at 3:00 in the morning. They wouldn't let me out until 8:00.  
24 To this day I have no idea if I have been charged with  
25 anything. They said it would be disorderly. conduct. It was

1 terrifying. It was brutal. It was traumatic. And it was  
2 uncalled for.

3 Thank you for your time. Thank you for hearing me.

4 THE COURT: Thank you for your participation. I  
5 appreciate it.

6 I think we are at No. 14.

7 And just so everybody knows, at 3 o'clock we are going  
8 to take a break for 15 minutes. We are going to switch court  
9 reporters at that time, and so we'll keep going until then in  
10 the speaker queue. And we are at No. 14. So if 14 could be  
11 brought in as a participant, please.

12 MS. HICKEY: Your Honor, my understanding is that 14  
13 is not in the queue, so we are going to go to No. 15, who is  
14 ready. And we'll add 14 to the end and recall them, if they  
15 possibly then have a better internet connection.

16 THE COURT: Okay. Very good. So we are up to No. 15,  
17 then.

18 MS. HICKEY: Correct, your Honor.

19 MS. POCHEL: Hi. My name is Janie Pochel. I am from  
20 Chicago. I live in Albany Park. I was at the July 17th rally,  
21 the solidarity rally. As we got to the statue, I saw the police  
22 just started beating people, to me it seemed like for no  
23 reason.

24 As people started -- as the police started coming on  
25 there was a hill -- I was with children. I work with the youth

1 group, so I was with kids. The youngest one was eight. She was  
2 up on the hill on Roosevelt. And that's where a lot of the  
3 young people, a lot of the disabled people, people trying to  
4 run from the police violence were being pushed onto the street  
5 towards Lakeshore Drive because they were -- they were, like,  
6 kettling us into that area.

7 As they jumped over the barricade, they just started  
8 indiscriminately beating people. My eight-year-old niece got  
9 pepper sprayed. They watched police just start punching people  
10 in the face. We all watched them just punching people in the  
11 face for no reason, just for being there, for practicing their  
12 rights.

13 We stayed just a little while longer because we  
14 couldn't get out because the police were forcing us back and  
15 pepper spraying people as they were trying to escape. My niece  
16 has had a hard time sleeping. They are severely traumatized.  
17 They cry every time they see a cop now. I didn't think that  
18 our -- it was a nice rally. It was a good time and then the  
19 police violence just really made that a hard thing.

20 And even before that, on May 30th, the police were  
21 pulling people's masks off. After that, they just, you know, at  
22 the July 17th, I was with other kids. Some of them had asthma.  
23 And it was the same thing that we have heard over and over  
24 again. The police were just beating people for basically no  
25 reason. And, yeah, that's all. That's all I have to say. Thank

1 you.

2 THE COURT: Thank you, very much.

3 No. 16, I believe. I think I see that she is in the  
4 queue here. So we can go ahead with No. 16, please.

5 MS. SCOTT: Hello. My name is Caroline Scott. I am  
6 24 years old and I use she/her pronouns, and I attended the  
7 July 17th solidarity rally at Buckingham Fountain and the  
8 subsequent. march to Grant Park.

9 When we approached the Columbus statue, I saw hordes  
10 of police cars coming. I was facing Lake Shore Drive. So they  
11 asked for white people to come to the front. So I joined a  
12 front line with white protesters, many of whom had bikes.

13 Initially, some CPD officers came up to us; none of  
14 them were wearing masks. They were in full riot gear. They saw  
15 us. They turned around to another side. Then a few minutes  
16 later they came back. And at the line of white people there was  
17 one Black man who was not with the line. When they came back  
18 and saw this line of white people, they went for the Black man  
19 at the end of the line. They grabbed him. He jumped back when  
20 they grabbed at him for simply standing, you know, with the  
21 protestors. You know, he jumped back. They grabbed him. There  
22 were three officers on him, pulled him to the ground face down  
23 and then arrested him and took him away. In a line of white  
24 people, they went after the one Black man.

25 After that, officers -- a couple of officers stayed



1 with us, and then most of the action was coming from the other  
2 side. At that point, I started to feel the tear gas, even  
3 though it was coming from about probably about 100 feet away.  
4 You know, breathing became more difficult. My eyes started to  
5 burn.

6 Then I saw a cop teargas three people about six feet  
7 away from me. At that point, the tear gas became very  
8 aggressive. I couldn't breathe. None of us could breathe. We  
9 all needed to back up. We were coughing. We had to take off  
10 our masks. Like I said earlier, no police were wearing masks.  
11 We needed to share water. All of this was extremely dangerous  
12 given the conditions of the pandemic, but we could not breathe.  
13 My skin was burning. My eyes were burning. And we had to  
14 recover. And then at that point, we started to push back.

15 And there was no verbal warning from police at all of  
16 any of their activity. When we were pushing back, I was waiting  
17 for one of my friends who I was with who had a bike and her  
18 bike was damaged. I was waiting for her to join us. I had a  
19 police officer scream at me to walk faster. Eventually we were,  
20 you know, pushed back up against the -- going up the hill.

21 But, again, I will note that there was no verbal  
22 indication from CPD officers. It was organizers telling us to  
23 back up and organizing us to back up. Whereas, police officers  
24 were simply approaching.

25 When I joined other people as we moved back, I saw so

1 many people who were bloody and beaten. Once we got back onto  
2 the street, police did start kettling, and at that point me and  
3 the people who I was with, we left.

4 When we got home, I was washing my mouth out with this  
5 red poison for about five minutes. I took a shower the next  
6 day when I woke up, my arms were still burning. And I was  
7 still spitting out poison from my mouth. And that was my  
8 experience while exercising my constitutional right to protest.

9 THE COURT: Thank you very much for your comments. I  
10 appreciate it.

11 MS. HICKEY: Your Honor, at this time No. 17 and 18  
12 are not in the queue. So if you want to go to No. 19.

13 THE COURT: Very good. Thank you. I am starting to  
14 track the same way you are, so I appreciate you  
15 double-checking. We'll go on to No. 19, please. Thank you.

16 MS. PULLEY: Hi. Thank you for having these public  
17 hearings. I was at the -- I was also at many of the protests  
18 that have happened over the course of the last three months.  
19 And I'm going to limit my comments to discussing what I  
20 personally experienced at the July 17th protest.

21 I was at the protest along with thousands of other  
22 Chicagoans. I was standing at the perimeter of the action in  
23 an attempt to take pictures and video. I was shoved to the  
24 ground and pushed into the people standing in front me by CPD.  
25 I was kicked, shoved, and beaten while simultaneously being

1 yelled at by CPD to move.

2 To provide a fuller picture of the situation that I  
3 was exactly in, and to understand the scope of the physical  
4 impossibilities, I will describe to you very briefly the  
5 parameters. I was leaning against the concrete wall. And in  
6 front of me were thousands of people. The Chicago police then  
7 jumped over this wall yelling at us to move where we had  
8 nowhere to go and then proceeded to shove us to the ground,  
9 kick us, and beat us.

10 Under no just society was this reasonable, nor was it  
11 in keeping with our supposed constitutionally protected rights  
12 to freedom of assembly, to petition the government for redress  
13 of grievances, and protecting our freedom of speech, all of  
14 which are found in the First Amendment to the Constitution.

15 When I was finally able to get up, I witnessed the  
16 police spraying unknown chemical agents of varying colors --  
17 they were yellow and they were white -- directly into people's  
18 faces. I saw one person's entirely formerly white shirt dyed  
19 red because of the gashing wounds that were bleeding profusely  
20 out of his head.

21 I saw people collapsed on the ground unable to get up  
22 because they were being beaten by a baton. I then could not  
23 breathe because I started inhaling the toxic chemical agents in  
24 the air and had to grab strangers who were next to me in order  
25 to stabilize myself.

1 CPD is under the consent decree, but they do not  
2 believe that it is real and that it has any effect on their  
3 operating. Their behavior has increased in violence, continuing  
4 the unconstitutional pattern and practice of racist behavior  
5 that prompted the consent decree in the first place and that  
6 were found in the report by the Department of Justice. There  
7 has been zero change to their behavior.

8 And I implore the Court to understand that even during  
9 the consent decree, CPD violence has increased, not decreased.  
10 If this occurred in any other country, this would produce deep  
11 condemnation and scorn for the country's populations, and  
12 nothing has been produced out of that because the story of what  
13 we are experiencing is not being told.

14 During this consent decree, there has been no  
15 consequence for CPD for the brutality, for these violations of  
16 our human rights, and we must then ask, is this consent decree  
17 going to be a cover for an illusion of change, or is it going  
18 to actually produce change felt on ground by everyday people in  
19 Chicago?

20 How many of us have to die? How many of us have to be  
21 beaten? How many of us have to be tortured? How many of us  
22 have to be ignored before change occurs? How many of us will  
23 be unable to breathe like George Floyd, like so many of us who  
24 were pepper sprayed and couldn't breathe at the protest? How  
25 many of us will continue to have to relive this trauma again

1 and again because this fight is not about a choice? It is  
2 about our actual lives. It's about survival.

3 We will continue to be beaten while we are trying to  
4 save our lives, but will the Court intervene? Now is the time  
5 for the Court to intervene and be on the side of justice.  
6 History is watching our actions closely and will be taking  
7 extreme lessons with every step and misstep that is taken in  
8 this moment.

9 THE COURT: Thank you very much.

10 I think No. 20 is in the queue, so I think we can  
11 please admit No. 20 to the participant list.

12 We do not actually. I think I saw No. 20's name in  
13 there earlier, but I don't see it now.

14 MR. GUILLORY: I am sorry. My name is Kobi Guillory.  
15 I am with the Chicago Alliance against Racism and Political  
16 Suppression and Black Lives Matter Chicago. I was assaulted by  
17 CPD twice over the past few months. The first time was on  
18 May 30th at the protest downtown. I was with a large crowd that  
19 was kettled into a bridge near Trump Tower.

20 For those who don't know, kettling is when the police  
21 barricade a crowd into a very small area and make that area  
22 smaller and smaller and smaller, and during that time they give  
23 these dispersal orders, but they make it impossible for people  
24 to disperse. So that just gives them a chance to brutalize and  
25 make mass arrests on protesters.

1           And personally, I was hit with batons multiple times  
2 over the course of four hours when it was impossible for me to  
3 leave that area.

4           People were being shoved. People were being hit with  
5 batons in the head. I saw one person get pepper sprayed by the  
6 police. Police were making threats to us, verbal threats. Their  
7 badge numbers were covered. Many were not wearing face masks.  
8 And I had marks on my forearms and on my stomach for days after  
9 that, after that event.

10           And then on July 17th, I was teargassed at Grant Park,  
11 and it was like many people are describing. I couldn't see. I  
12 couldn't breathe. The tear gas was in my throat. It was burning  
13 my arms. My shirt was soaked, my facemask was soaked, and so I  
14 was completely discombobulated.

15           And while I was standing there unable to see what was  
16 going on, unable to breathe, a police officer shoved me to the  
17 ground with a baton and threatened to hit me with it. And the  
18 people who helped me were the medics. And I do want to also add  
19 that the medics were targeted by CPD as well. People who are  
20 identified -- who identify themselves visibly as people who are  
21 there to help people, who are there to help keep people safe,  
22 were also being targeted by CPD, were also teargassed, also  
23 beaten, and also had their bikes stolen by CPD.

24           And one thing that other people have mentioned as well  
25 is that all of this is happening during a pandemic. When we

1 have had to listen to the City say for months that there is no  
2 money for protective equipment for nurses, there's no money for  
3 masks for everyone, there's no money to pay for people's  
4 housing during one of the worst economic crises we have seen  
5 since the Great Depression, but they have money to pay officers  
6 overtime so they can brutalize protesters. They have money for  
7 tear gas, but there is no money to keep people safe from this  
8 virus that is killing predominantly or disproportionately Black  
9 and Brown people.

10 So one of the things that was said by the CPD -- I  
11 mean by the City's lawyers at the start of this is we need to  
12 build trust between the communities and the officers or  
13 whatever. And quite frankly, with all due respect, I think  
14 that's bullshit. I think what we need to do is listen to what  
15 the people are actually saying. The people are demanding that  
16 CPD be defunded. That are demanding CPAC so that we can hold  
17 these people responsible for what they are doing to us.

18 The people know how we are going to end this trauma,  
19 so we need to listen to the people. You all need to listen to  
20 the people. because the problem is that we don't have the  
21 control over the police. We don't have control over our own  
22 communities, and that's what we need. We need control. We don't  
23 just need to be providing little pieces of info a minute at a  
24 time. We need to control the situation. Thank you.

25 THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you for your comments.

1 I don't see No. 21.

2 MS. HICKEY: That's correct, your Honor. We want to  
3 move to No. 22.

4 THE COURT: I see 22 and 23 in the queue, though. So  
5 if we could please move on to 22 and 23.

6 MS. BAILE: Hello, can you hear me? Hello. My name is  
7 Charlotte Baile. I am 24. I am a white Jewish woman who works  
8 as a restaurant worker and a professional artist. I have three  
9 counts of police brutality that I would like to speak to.

10 The first was on the big protest to protest George  
11 Floyd's murder on March 30th downtown. I was working as a  
12 marshal, and I was going to help somebody who had had their  
13 pants ripped open by CPD, who were surrounded by six or seven  
14 cops. And I went to go help this person put their pants on and  
15 I was shoved in the chest with a baton, shoved to the ground  
16 and I hit my neck and back, among other things, among being  
17 screamed at and not really given any orders or directions, just  
18 being screamed at.

19 The second was on June 1st, I was caught at the Uptown  
20 at the Wilson Red Line stop. I was one of about seven or eight  
21 white people. There were about 40 or 50 Black people. There  
22 were about 150 riot cops.

23 When the clock struck 9:00, the riot cops. charged us.  
24 There was no order of dispersal. There was just mayhem.  
25 instantly. I remember crouching over a 60-year-old Black man



1 who they were kicking and beating with a baton, maybe four or  
2 five cops at a time beating this man. And when I went over by  
3 him, they hit me on the back of my neck, my back and my legs,  
4 and there was another Black man next to him who kept saying, "I  
5 didn't do anything wrong. I didn't do anything wrong," over and  
6 over again.

7           Later, I would find my friend who had been beaten over  
8 the head multiple times and had her glasses broken into her  
9 scalp and I had to pick glass shards out of her head before she  
10 went to the hospital for a concussion. We found our other  
11 friend who had been beaten so badly he couldn't walk and had a  
12 gash on his leg that would not stop bleeding, and he passed out  
13 from blood loss into my arms before he went to the hospital.

14           And finally, I want to talk about July 17th. I was at  
15 the protest in order to support solidarity, and also to put my  
16 body between CPD and Black and Brown protesters. And I was  
17 gassed three separate times, which had an immediate effect on  
18 me. My throat closed up immediately. There was no coughing. It  
19 was -- my throat closed instantly. and I began to choke and  
20 cough in order to start breathing again. And I couldn't.

21           And I had to crawl on the ground and grab people's  
22 legs in order for them to carry me to the medic encampment  
23 which then got gassed. After I got out of the medical  
24 encampment that got gassed, I pulled contacts from somebody's  
25 eyes who had been pepper sprayed in the face and then I turned

1 around and saw somebody bleeding from the eyes because they had  
2 been pepper sprayed so badly.

3 I cannot ever forget these events. This trauma will  
4 never go away. And I have only started experiencing this two  
5 months ago. This is a drop in the ocean to what other people  
6 have happen to them every single day.

7 Thank you so much for your time.

8 THE COURT: Before you go, can I ask your name and  
9 what number you were? I am sorry. It sounds like that might  
10 have been No. 24.

11 (No audible response from the speaker.)

12 MS. HICKEY: I believe she was No. 22 and her name was  
13 Charlotte Baile. It's the wrong name under 22 that you have on  
14 your list, your Honor. I apologize.

15 And I believe No. 23 is ready.

16 THE COURT: Okay. Very good. Thank you.

17 So No. 23 then. Thank you.

18 No. 23.

19 MS. WILLIAMS: Hi. My name is Katie Williams. I am 37  
20 years old. I am a farmer and I am a student.

21 I'm going to speak mostly about my experiences at the  
22 protest on July 17th that ended up at Grant Park. I showed up  
23 to that protest in, like, a silk tank top, some cotton shorts,  
24 with a backpack with a book in it. I had no intention -- I had  
25 no idea what was going to go on. I didn't know where the police

1 were. I didn't know what the protesters were planning on doing,  
2 and I wasn't prepared to protect myself in any way from  
3 anybody.

4           It became obvious that the protesters were going to be  
5 able to get to the statues when they began to throw cans of  
6 water at the police. The police obviously weren't going to be  
7 able to stand there anymore and things were definitely going to  
8 get violent at that point. So when the police left -- left the  
9 statue and left it to the protesters, I was on the front line  
10 of the line of bikes that formed so that the people who were  
11 inside trying to take down the statue were protected, or were  
12 at least distanced from the police.

13           Everybody on the line, everybody on the outside,  
14 everybody that was facing the police, everybody that was facing  
15 all of the police violence that day had done nothing wrong.  
16 They hadn't thrown a single can of water. They had not thrown a  
17 firework. None of them even knew what was going on. I can  
18 promise you that.

19           Everyone next to me was wearing cotton. They brought  
20 their bike. It's the most important thing probably to them in  
21 the week. They just had silly little backpacks on. They were  
22 just out there trying to convince the City that standing behind  
23 a genocidal rapist is not the sort of symbol we want in the  
24 middle of our city.

25           So, anyway, while in the front lines, I got hit in the

1 head with a baton when I was trying to get a police officer to  
2 stop hitting somebody on the ground. A number of police  
3 officers were dragging another person by their hair. Their  
4 hair was getting ripped out. Again, I just tried to ask the  
5 police officers to stop. They shoved me. I got hit again, that  
6 time across the chest. I got dragged by the police. through --  
7 they tried to steal my bicycle. I held onto my bicycle harder  
8 than they thought I was able to which made them very angry and  
9 made a number of them jump on top of me and try to hit me and  
10 get the bike from me.

11 The most painful thing was holding onto the bicycle --  
12 well, the two things were the police hitting me with the baton.  
13 I still can't -- I don't have full movement of this wrist and  
14 hand from where they struck me with the baton. And then the  
15 pepper spray which burned my skin for over 24 hours.

16 So I mean, I guess nobody has talked about so far the  
17 fact that the protesters did throw water cans. at the police  
18 and this is what -- oh, I've got to go, but I just have to say  
19 they were mad at those protesters and they didn't care to seek  
20 any sort of justice for them through any sort of means. And  
21 instead, they decided to beat their way through them, through a  
22 bunch of peaceful protesters.

23 THE COURT: Thank you for your comments.

24 MS. HICKEY: Your Honor --

25 THE COURT: By my count -- I don't see 24, but we're

1 on -- 25 through 28 I do see. Is that what you have, Maggie?

2 MS. HICKEY: That's correct, your Honor.

3 THE COURT: So if we can move through 25, 26, 27 and  
4 28, and then we'll see where we stand with respect to the  
5 3 o'clock break. Okay. So thank you.

6 MS. HICKEY: Thank you, your Honor.

7 MR. KARL: Hello, everyone. Thank you. My name is  
8 Elliott Karl. I am 30 years old, a fourth generation Chicagoan.  
9 A recent master's of public policy graduate from the University  
10 of Chicago. I have been active in the movement for Black lives  
11 since 2015, mostly serving in security roles where I seek to  
12 protect peaceful protestors from the police and the conflicts  
13 that can arise between the two of them. I am trained in  
14 de-escalation and self-defense only.

15 Two years ago I returned to Chicago from Oakland,  
16 California. In California, I often saw officers intimidate and  
17 invoke conflict with protesters, especially when it involved  
18 racism. and police violence. And that's not a surprise. to me.

19 I have, however, been really surprised on how things  
20 have rolled out in my home city, and especially on May 30th and  
21 July 17th.

22 You see, on May 30th, I was surprised to see a 6-foot,  
23 250-pound man, white police officer squeeze his way between a  
24 building and crowd of people and crack a baton on the head of a  
25 five-foot five woman of color. I was surprised to see how

1 blood squirts from someone's head with every heartbeat. I was  
2 surprised because it didn't need to happen and no one was made  
3 more safe.

4 I was later surprised when they shut down public  
5 transportation. and raised bridges. I was surprised it took me  
6 almost two hours running from gangs of police officers downtown  
7 to get back to my bike. so that I could get home. I was  
8 surprised because it didn't have to happen.

9 I was surprised because officers routinely pushed  
10 their bodies up against me in the security roles. They  
11 whispered into my ear telling me to be smart, watch out, get a  
12 real job, and so much more violent, homophobic things. And  
13 these are fellow civil servants who are confused about what  
14 commitment to community looks like.

15 And on July 17th during the Columbus statue protest, I  
16 was especially surprised when I was beaten by the Chicago  
17 police without orders to disperse, without a warning, and  
18 without a route to disperse into. I was standing with other  
19 bike security volunteers forming a barrier between a piece of  
20 property and the people they are sworn to. protect.

21 I was surprised when the mob rushed us -- the mob of  
22 cops rushed us. We couldn't move our bikes fast enough. I was  
23 surprised when they ran with clubs drawn in their hands, our  
24 hands in the air. I watched groups of police officers, five  
25 people deep, beat people who were in fetal positions under

1 their bikes.

2 I was surprised when I was sprayed with pepper spray  
3 in the eyes from two feet away. I was blinded. I couldn't see.  
4 I couldn't get away fast enough or I would have complied. I  
5 would have complied. I couldn't get away. We couldn't get away.  
6 There was no amount of washing that would get the burn off of  
7 my body five hours later.

8 I am surprised by the PTSD. I am surprised by how long  
9 it took the bruises to heal. I am surprised that we were not  
10 able to keep us safer, although we tried and we tried.

11 I am a white man. I am a civil servant. And I am only  
12 sometimes treated like a BLM protester. But this is a movement  
13 being lead by Black and Brown youth. And if this could happen  
14 to someone like me, what will happen to them? Who is keeping  
15 them safe? It is not the police.

16 I will not be surprised again. We must defund and  
17 abolish the Chicago Police Department. Thank you.

18 THE COURT: Thank you. We have No. 26, then, please.

19 MR. ANDERSON: Hi. I am Tim Anderson. I am a white  
20 man in my late 30s. I do analytics consulting for a living.

21 I attended the rally on July 17th in solidarity with  
22 the Black and Indigenous youth organizers. The events began  
23 with joyful performances. When I arrived at the Columbus statue  
24 with my bike, people had surrounded the statue and there were  
25 no police. I stopped on the hedge-covered hill leading up to

1 Roosevelt Road. Four minutes later, I noticed a young organizer  
2 on Roosevelt. An officer had knocked out her front teeth and  
3 her face was bloodied.

4 Minutes later, a mob of officers rushed down the hill.  
5 I froze, expecting professionalism. Those around the statue  
6 linked arms for safety. I slowly and calmly moved towards the  
7 officers and stopped, wanting to remain safely. but unsure how.  
8 The officers' angry taunts immediately escalated into  
9 indiscriminate use of shoves, batons, and pepper spray. For the  
10 moment I was spared as officers rushed to join in beating  
11 someone who they had knocked to the ground and dragged away  
12 from the base of the statue.

13 Suddenly an officer shoved me. I moved closer to the  
14 street but was soon confronted by another. Seconds later, he  
15 pushed me. I flew backward receiving bruises and abrasions on  
16 me knees and arms, and he threw my bike into the street. I  
17 collected it and spent the next half hour observing more  
18 abuses, including the arrest of a legal observer and the  
19 confiscation of hundreds of bikes.

20 My heart raced from the trauma for hours. I will be  
21 all right, but not all Chicagoans are. A few years ago, I and  
22 many of my fellow professionals watched as President Obama  
23 highlighted young community organizers. Later we marched with  
24 the March for Our Lives in solidarity with Black and Brown  
25 youth fighting gun violence, police disinvestment in their



1 communities. Their stakes are much higher than mine.

2 Last Saturday, I saw images of many of those same  
3 young organizers, including one who led community outreach for  
4 Mayor Lightfoot, run for their lives from a police riot and  
5 kettling tactics led by Superintendent Brown clad in riot gear.  
6 They seemed to placate the presence of the Chicagoland Chamber  
7 of Commerce and other property management who invoked white  
8 flight earlier in the week if the mayor would not support them.

9 The next morning, CPD released a PR campaign  
10 criminalizing the protesters' exercise of First Amendment  
11 rights in efforts to protect each other in contrast to a failed  
12 action earlier in the day. These are tragic repetitions of  
13 racist processes foundational to policing and won't be  
14 corrected until local budgets get federal relief and  
15 communities take control of the police. Thank you.

16 THE COURT: Thank you very much.

17 I think we are at No. 27, please.

18 MS. BRAUN: Hello. My name is -- can you all hear me?

19 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

20 MS. BRAUN: Yeah. Okay. My name is Carly Ann Braun. I  
21 am 27 years old. I use (inaudible) she/her pronouns. The first  
22 incident of police assault I want to talk about happened in  
23 Grant Park on July 17, 2020, in the late afternoon, early  
24 evening. I was linked with another protester and a cop shoved  
25 me to the ground. From the ground I saw my friend, who was

1 clearly marked as a medic, likewise shoved down.

2           Then the cop who had just shoved me to the ground  
3 forcibly pulled me up. He grabbed my left bicep and forcefully  
4 pulled me to my feet. I turned to get my bearings and put my  
5 hands in the air. When another officer in a dark uniform about  
6 20 feet from me sprayed a rust-colored liquid at the right side  
7 of my face, burning both my eyes, my cheek, and most notably  
8 the inside of my ear, which was very, very painful.

9           I turned away and started walking up the hill with a  
10 wet mask covering my mouth and my nose and pepper spray in my  
11 eyes. I was disoriented and trying to fend off the panic,  
12 trying to breathe. I was headed to the street away from the  
13 statue when I realized I was about 10 feet away from another  
14 police officer. And he was standing at the top of a hill  
15 yelling right at me. Mostly blinded, partially deaf, and  
16 struggling to breathe, it was too late when I realized the cop  
17 was telling me to back up, and he pushed me hard in the chest.  
18 I was very confused because wasn't the point of macing me to  
19 get me to leave?

20           When I didn't move fast enough, the officer pushed me  
21 again in the chest, this time seemingly as hard as he could. It  
22 was such a hard push I rolled down the hill. Luckily my friends  
23 found me, washed my eyes, washed my face, and I could see well  
24 enough to watch as we retreated with blue helmeted police  
25 officers spraying people all around me.

1           As my friends and I were leaving, I was shocked by the  
2 attitude of the police officers. As a white person who is  
3 generally treated with a lot respect from police officers,  
4 these police officers were extremely emotionally escalated and  
5 behaved unprofessionally in a way that I could never behave in  
6 my job without receiving serious reprimand.

7           I remember seeing one particularly cruel officer  
8 telling us that we were stupid. And he very notably had a  
9 Black-and-blue-striped band stretched across his badge covering  
10 his ID number.

11           Secondly, on August 16th I attended a protest at  
12 McKinley Park at 2:00 p.m. At the end of the beautiful  
13 family-friendly rally, we marched on to Western, where police  
14 swarmed around us. One officer in a white shirt was yelling at  
15 people to get off the street. He grabbed a guy right next to  
16 me by the elbows, put him in handcuffs saying, "You just walked  
17 right past me. You're getting cuffed," and put him in the back  
18 of a police car.

19           I was incredibly shaken by these experiences because  
20 my whole life until now I was told that police were supposed to  
21 keep me safe, but now I know that they are perfectly willing to  
22 violate my constitutional rights and meet me and other  
23 protestors with excessive force and escalate violence.

24           THE COURT: Thank you very much.

25           I think No. 28 is in the queue as well. So if we could

1 please move on to No. 28.

2 MR. GRAHAM: Hello. Thank you for this opportunity to  
3 speak. And thank you for the many people sharing their  
4 harrowing stories with you.

5 My name is Rick Graham and I am here representing the  
6 Northwest-Siders for Racial Equity and Justice. Our mission is  
7 to educate, engage and mobilize northwest city residents, city  
8 and suburbs alike, in order to ensure rapid and full  
9 implementation of the Chicago police consent decree and build  
10 equity and wide avenues for community. voices and policing.  
11 Our purpose is to ensure that police operations are grounded in  
12 racial equity and that the police are just in their conduct,  
13 and that's difficult right now.

14 As a community-based organization, we work directly  
15 with the northwest-side citizens and civics who report back to  
16 our communities on district progress. We will also coordinate  
17 with other local groups across the city, learning, sharing our  
18 findings, and lending our voices when needed, all with the goal  
19 of ensuring that progress being made by CPD on the consent  
20 decree is comprehensive in scope, citywide in its reach, and  
21 most critically is equitable toward all communities.

22 To the last point, there was a march in my northwest.  
23 side in support of the murder of George Floyd and in support of  
24 the Black Lives Matter movement. CPD officers were on hand, and  
25 over a thousand people. marched. The officers were not

1 carrying any batons in their hands. There were no helmets, no  
2 shields at their arms. Some smiled. Most responded when  
3 greeted. And I can't help contrast our experience of policing  
4 with what I have seen on the news, what you are hearing today,  
5 and doubtless will hear from others in other communities over  
6 these two days.

7 At the very least, Northwest-Siders for Racial Equity  
8 and Justice expect that the monitors of this decree and the  
9 Court will not allow this moment to pass. We expect that  
10 whatever enforcement options that exist in the decree will be  
11 exercised to ensure that changes are made, that all voices are  
12 heard, and that people across this city can experience policing  
13 that is fair and equitable and police officers will both serve  
14 and protect in a just manner.

15 We expect this decree to result in operational  
16 policies that are written, built into officer training, and  
17 enforced to promote racial equity. And we expect a citywide  
18 citizen-led oversight process that will be codified in law in  
19 order to survive changes in leadership.

20 Thank you.

21 THE COURT: Thank you very much for your comments.

22 By my count, we are -- of the next five, we only have  
23 No. 30 in the attendee list at the moment. Do you have the  
24 same, Maggie?

25 MS. HICKEY: I do. No. 30 is ready. I do not see

1 No. 29. I haven't counted ahead as fast as your Honor. I'm  
2 going through it.

3 THE COURT: We'll move on to No. 30 if we can, please,  
4 and we'll keep putting the other folks who we're skipping into  
5 the queue for the second call.

6 So Speaker No. 30 can go ahead, please.

7 Hello, can you hear me?

8 THE COURT: Yes. Thank you.

9 MS. ANTUNEZ: My name is Adriana Antunez. I'm a  
10 resident of Chicago, a college student, and a trained advocate  
11 for survivors. Let's get into it. We came together on July 17th  
12 in solidarity with Black, Brown, Indigenous folks who are being  
13 brutalized by CPD and oppressed by the racist system we live  
14 under. It's a righteous act of protest to tear down symbols of  
15 genocide and white supremacy, especially since our mayor  
16 refused to listen to the people of Chicago.

17 On that day, CPD did what it does best. They protected  
18 property over people. CPD beat and brutalized Black, Brown, and  
19 Indigenous bodies in order to protect a statue of a rapist, a  
20 tyrant, a mass murderer. That's what CPD protected. CPD does  
21 not and do not protect the people of Chicago. The people of  
22 Chicago have to protect themselves from CPD.

23 CPD already had reclaimed ground by the statue when  
24 they further terrorized protesters. I was forced to watch a  
25 fellow protester, a friend, be beaten right in front of me.

1 His hands were in the air. He wasn't resisting. CPD still  
2 beat him. They left bruises on his back. His knee was so  
3 bloody, the blood soaked through his pant leg.

4 Then they advanced. An officer dug his baton into my  
5 chest, ignoring my cries that he was touching my chest, he was  
6 touching my breast. His solution for that was to shove his  
7 baton against my gut before proceeding to shove it into my  
8 chest once again. I felt his fist push into my breasts; I felt  
9 his baton press into my breasts. Then they hosed us down with  
10 pepper spray as if we were rabid dogs, when in fact they were.  
11 CPD pepper sprayed protesters, medics, legal observers during a  
12 pandemic that targets (inaudible). Officers weren't even  
13 wearing masks.

14 I am 22 years old and I now know the shape and color  
15 of a police can of pepper spray. An officer sprayed us from  
16 3 feet in front of us. We were choking on the poison in the  
17 air. People were writhing in the pain. I couldn't help them.  
18 CPD refused to let us help them. We were tripping over each  
19 other and ourselves. trying to get away from them.

20 We were forced by CPD to jump over concrete barriers.  
21 We were shoved by CPD, and when we fell due to their force,  
22 they towered over us and shouted at us to keep moving.

23 I am five-foot two, 105 pounds. CPD left bruises on my  
24 breasts. I had to walk around for days with bruises on my  
25 breast. The pain of being pepper sprayed lasted over five

1 hours despite the multiple showers I took. I threw up in the  
2 shower due to being gassed. It was only after the pain subsided  
3 from being pepper sprayed that I noticed bruises on my legs,  
4 how my knees were scratched in trying to get away from them.

5 And on August 15th, nearly a month after the display  
6 of police officer brutality, police in riot gear once again  
7 gassed and severely injured civilians. Is this who you want in  
8 your schools? You cannot reform your way out of this. Black  
9 lives matter. Defund CPD. Decolonize Chicago.

10 And to the lawyers of the city that stated that we  
11 have to get along with these pigs who beat and brutalize young  
12 people, screw you. Fuck 12. I yield my time.

13 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

14 Maggie, I don't know if you have cross-checked me, but  
15 I am up to 35 as the next one I see in the participant list.

16 MS. HICKEY: That's what I see your Honor.

17 THE COURT: Then let's admit participant 35 into the  
18 participant room please.

19 MR. DICOLA: Can you hear me, your Honor?

20 THE COURT: Yes. Thank you. We can.

21 MR. DICOLA: Good afternoon, your Honor. My name is  
22 Joseph DiCola, and I am a legal-aid attorney in Chicago and a  
23 member of National Lawyers Guild. And -- I work part-time at  
24 the NLG in Chicago as the legal observer administrator.

25 Legal observers, or LOs, are typically lawyers, law



1 students, or legal workers. Legal observers are volunteers who  
2 have completed an attorney-supervised training to observe the  
3 activities of law enforcement in relation to demonstrators  
4 exercising their First Amendment rights. This includes  
5 documenting any arrests, use of force, intimidating display of  
6 force, denial of access to public space, and any other behavior  
7 that tends to restrict demonstrators' ability to express their  
8 political views.

9 When the arrests occur, LOs gather names and contact  
10 information to allow attorneys and loved ones to follow up with  
11 CPD about the arrest. LOs sometimes serve as witnesses in the  
12 criminal or civil proceedings that arise from arrests and  
13 excessive force at protests.

14 We wear bright green hats that say Lawyer National  
15 Guilt Observers. NLG Chicago LOs have observed in all about 60  
16 protests since May 30th. LOs have observed CPD using force not  
17 in self-defense. And I will also note that the majority of  
18 officers refused to wear masks to prevent the spread of  
19 COVID-19.

20 On May 30th, police in riot gear chased protestors  
21 through the streets in multiple locations and times, grabbing  
22 and beating people at random with fists and batons. A young  
23 teenager was seized and beaten by police for no reason on the  
24 Wabash bridge. LOs saw police drive cars through crowds. And  
25 one of the LOs was beaten. and arrested.

1           On May 31st, we observed a team of SWAT officers exit  
2 their vehicle, pepper spray LOs and about seven demonstrators  
3 without saying a word, and then return to the vehicle and drive  
4 away. In Grant Park, dozens of officers in riot gear attacked  
5 a crowd of protesters causing many injuries and stole bikes  
6 from protesters. CPD targeted the LOs with pepper spray as LOs  
7 gathered to get arrestee information, and intentionally knocked  
8 an LO's notebook from their hands and blocked them from  
9 retrieving it.

10           On July 18th in front of the mayor's house, CPD  
11 officers drove a vehicle onto the sidewalk, striking  
12 demonstrators, bending a bicycle in half, and dislodging a  
13 trash can bolted to the ground.

14           On August 15th, I was an LO at a protest downtown.  
15 CPD responded with hundreds of police in riot gear to a  
16 relatively small march, composed mainly of Black and Latin  
17 young people. Police used pepper spray on protesters, LOs, and  
18 medics. CPD was yelling "forward march," as they repeatedly  
19 advanced on the group from Michigan and Wacker to LaSalle and  
20 Adams.

21           CPD rushed the crowd repeatedly and attacked the  
22 medics. After driving the people onto LaSalle, CPD blocked  
23 Adams and Monroe and began beating and arresting people who had  
24 not outrun the rushing line of riot police. I never heard any  
25 dispersal orders issued, and CPD did not let me and two other

1 attorney LOs leave upon our request.

2 We were detained for 10 to 15 minutes in the kettle.  
3 CPD insisted that we empty our bags and leave our property  
4 behind before they permitted us to leave. And they seized a  
5 green hat that a legal observer had. LOs observed that  
6 Superintendent Brown was present on LaSalle while the kettle  
7 was in effect.

8 Our LOs' experiences demonstrate the City's pattern of  
9 disregarding the consent decree and the First Amendment rights  
10 of protesters. Based on the oppression LOs have witnessed, CPD  
11 wishes to silence protesters' critiquing of the police budget  
12 and the institution of policing. Thank you very much, your  
13 Honor.

14 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, sir.

15 Let's see. Let's do one more speaker, and then we'll  
16 do the break because I see the next court reporter has walked  
17 into the courtroom to set up her equipment. And it takes a bit  
18 of time to shift gears here, so we will do one more before the  
19 break.

20 I didn't see speaker 36 in the list here, but I do see  
21 speaker 37. So let's move on to 37, please, and then we'll take  
22 the break. Okay?

23 (Slight pause.)

24 Now that I look, I thought I saw 37 -- go ahead.

25 MS. BALL: Okay. Good afternoon, your Honor. Thank

1 you everyone for being here today. My name is Lizzy Ball. I am  
2 speaking as a private citizen and resident of Chicago, 26th  
3 Ward.

4           When I first signed up to speak at this session a long  
5 week ago, I had planned to talk about how as a social worker  
6 and a mental healthcare provider, I have witnessed the toll of  
7 police terror on our communities, especially on Black and  
8 indigenous people, people of color, LBGTQ people, and people  
9 with disabilities, whom CPD routinely target, harm, and  
10 terrorize. However, I now can speak firsthand to the horrors  
11 of police brutality. Please take care that what I am about to  
12 say is disturbing.

13           On Saturday, August 15th, a few days ago, while I was  
14 riding my bike alongside a youth-led protest in the Loop who  
15 were speaking out against police brutality, I was surprised and  
16 attacked from behind, beaten off my bike and to the ground by  
17 several grown men in riot gear with batons and violently  
18 arrested. Very few wore masks. My bike was stolen and my  
19 backpack was destroyed. Rather than being read my rights,  
20 several cops shouted in my face without masks, "You lost."

21           I spent the night locked up enduring further terror,  
22 dehumanization, and the denial of basic human rights. During  
23 the 14 hours I was detained -- 12 of which were documented by  
24 the police -- I was caged by -- with several wonderful people  
25 who had experienced similar systematic terror and violence by

1 the CPD, including nurses, journalists, and very young  
2 organizers.

3 We were covered in pepper spray. Unable to socially  
4 distance, bruised, battered, and yet we remained strong by  
5 supporting each other. I trust my community to protect me. I do  
6 not and never will trust the police to protect me or my loved  
7 ones. "You lost," the cop yelled. This is not a game for  
8 communities who live in terror and trauma from the police.

9 We can all see clear as day that CPD has no intent of  
10 honoring any consent decree or any letter of the law. We must  
11 stop this overfunded, unchecked violent gang immediately. We  
12 must take action against this violence. I say this from a place  
13 of love. The healing begins only by condemning and defunding.  
14 CPD. Thank you. And free Mohawk.

15 THE COURT: Thank you very much. So we will resume at  
16 3:15. And by my count, we have 15 people out of the first 37  
17 who were skipped over, so we'll go starting with No. 38. We'll  
18 finish up to 45. And then we'll just recall, kind of as if we  
19 were in a status call, set of status hearings, we'll just  
20 recall the cases one after the other. And hopefully those  
21 individuals who were skipped over earlier today will be on the  
22 line starting at 3:15 and we'll march through until everybody  
23 has been given a second opportunity today.

24 So with that I thank everybody for your attention and  
25 your patience. And right at 3:15 we'll start up again. So

1 thank you, everybody.

2 (Recess taken from 3:00 to 3:15 P.M.)

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1 THE COURT: Okay. Good afternoon, everybody. I just  
2 want to confirm with the Monitor that she is ready to  
3 proceed.

4 I can see you. Are you ready to proceed?

5 MS. HICKEY: I am ready, your Honor. I believe we  
6 are on No. 38.

7 THE COURT: Okay. Very good.

8 And Inspector General Ferguson, are you there too?

9 MR. FERGUSON: I am.

10 THE COURT: Okay. Excellent. And you're ready to  
11 proceed as well?

12 MR. FERGUSON: Yes, I am. Thank you, Judge.

13 THE COURT: Okay. Wonderful. Before we proceed, I  
14 just -- I am not a producer of social media at all. I don't  
15 know how to Tweet, I don't know how to post, but I know many  
16 people do. And I just want to remind everybody that this is an  
17 official court proceeding, and the rules about recording court  
18 proceedings apply. So I just want to remind everybody of that,  
19 and that's not permitted because this is a court proceeding.

20 And with that, my recollection, and I think you just  
21 said this, is we're up to 38; is that right?

22 MS. HICKEY: That's correct, your Honor, No. 38.

23 THE COURT: Okay. Very good. And I see that person  
24 is in the queue here. So if we could move on to Speaker  
25 No. 38, that would be most appreciated. Thank you.

1 MS. CARBON: Good afternoon. Can everyone hear me?

2 THE COURT: Yes, thank you, we can hear you fine.

3 Thank you very much.

4 MS. CARBON: Thank you very much. Your Honor, I wish  
5 to thank you, Ms. Hickey, the Independent Monitoring Team, and  
6 all the people behind the scenes working for this opportunity  
7 to allow me to participate in this listening session.

8 My name is Suzanne Carbon. I live in the 39th Ward.  
9 I am a private citizen. Hearing the testimonies today of those  
10 violated by those who should be protecting them is  
11 heartbreaking.

12 I approach this opportunity to address those in power  
13 to offer some practical solutions. In reading through the  
14 consent decree, the PBPA lieutenant contract, and the  
15 monitoring plans, I was struck again and again by the lack of  
16 accountability and consequences for misconduct and lack of  
17 implementation. The current system is clearly broken, which we  
18 all know. What I'd like to do is offer two ideas that may help  
19 bolster accountability and would help rebuild community trust.

20 One: Today, when CPD police officers are sued, they  
21 do not pay anything from their own pockets to resolve the  
22 claims. I believe this financial -- financial insulation from  
23 accountability of the consequences of their actions is due to  
24 indemnification. Chicago and other cities and counties across  
25 the country have these -- I'm having a hard time with the



1 word -- indemnification policies, which means the city pays  
2 defense attorneys, costs, and any settlements or judgments that  
3 arise from officer actions on the job.

4 While the agreement with Chicago and the CPD include  
5 some exceptions for willful or egregious misbehavior, it has  
6 really been the general rule not to indemnify -- it has been  
7 the general rule not -- the exception to indemnify officers,  
8 even though there is reasonable basis to decline to do so.

9 Since the city allocates the money to the department  
10 during the annual budgeting process, coverage comes from  
11 central funds. This central fund then picks up and fights the  
12 tab for misconduct that, really, you and me, the taxpayers,  
13 pick up -- pay for.

14 In doing some research, I see the residents have  
15 bankrolled about 500 million in payouts, which, by the way, is  
16 about what our budget shortfall is. This arrangement fails to  
17 achieve any kind of deterrence goals or accountability for  
18 officers.

19 I suggest a better remedy for accountability would be  
20 for police officers to carry professional liability insurance.  
21 The city would pay the basic insurance premium, but an  
22 officer's premium would increase due to lawsuits or other risky  
23 behavior, making the officer responsible for paying the  
24 difference. This approach would allow plaintiffs to recover  
25 damages when their rights were violated, and these payoffs

1 would have financial consequences for the officer, making them  
2 have skin-in-the-game and some accountability. Since the PBPA  
3 contracts and political pressures often make it very difficult  
4 to fire officers, incorporating internal financial pressures  
5 might convince poorly performing officers they should choose a  
6 different line of work.

7 Further, I implore the monitoring team to consider  
8 having Chicago and its municipal liability insurers consider  
9 conditioning immunity on the CPD adopting the consent decree  
10 reforms you're working so hard to implement. A benefit for CPD  
11 on this approach could be a reduced premiums for adoption and  
12 measured decreases in your consent benchmarks. Additionally,  
13 this data could be used to inform training, policies,  
14 supervision and disciplinary decisions moving forward.

15 Lastly, I think another way to incentivize internal  
16 compliance would be to make police testimony inadmissible in  
17 court without body camera footage to support assertions. Video  
18 footage camera provides complete, concrete evidence of a police  
19 encounter without relying entirely on the police report and the  
20 officer's memory to help -- and it would help defense lawyers  
21 understand all the details of a police encounter and possibly  
22 clear up any discrepancies in favor of their client.

23 I hope video-recorded -- I hope video, recorded from  
24 police body cameras, are also being used to train new and  
25 existing officers on how -- what to do -- on what to do and not

1 to do during difficult encounters with the public.

2 I thank you for your time, and I yield my time if I  
3 have any remaining.

4 THE COURT: Great. Thank you very much. I  
5 appreciate it.

6 MS. CARBON: Thank you.

7 THE COURT: In looking at the list here, I think the  
8 next speaker who is in the queue here is No. 41.

9 Is that what you have as well, Maggie?

10 MS. HICKEY: That's correct, your Honor.

11 THE COURT: Okay. Very good. So if we could have  
12 Speaker No. 41, please.

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Good afternoon, your Honor. My name  
14 is Cruz Rodriguez, and I am a second year law student at Loyola  
15 University Chicago School of Law.

16 I was a participant in what started off as a peaceful  
17 protest on Saturday, May 30th, in response to the murder of  
18 George Floyd. The peacefulness was disrupted when CPD showed  
19 up, ready to violently fight us. It felt like we were enemies  
20 and they were a military force sent to eliminate us.

21 At around 4:30 PM, I made my way to State and  
22 Madison, where there was a heavy police presence at the  
23 intersection. They all, in riot gear, circled around a CPD  
24 vehicle used to transport arrestees, facing protesters with  
25 their batons in hand. I was walking east on Madison, where I

1 came to see two officers who did not have their badge numbers  
2 or name tags on. They also did not have their body cameras  
3 under uniform. I approached and asked if they could identify  
4 their badge number or which precinct they were from. One  
5 laughed at me, while the other raised his baton at me to back  
6 up. One told me to "F" off and another spit in my direction.

7 At the same intersection at 4:37 PM, I witnessed two  
8 white-shirt police officers and three blue-uniformed ones run  
9 over to a stagnant car on the southwest side at the  
10 intersection. I was in front of the vehicle recording. I  
11 heard one officer tell the young Latino girl who was driving to  
12 turn off her vehicle. Four seconds later, he reached into her  
13 window, opened her car door and pulled her out of the vehicle  
14 from her left wrist. He immediately put his hands under her  
15 shoulders and pulled her arms up very aggressively, arresting  
16 her. This all happened in a time span of 20 seconds from the  
17 time he ran up to the vehicle. And she was a 17-year-old  
18 minor.

19 At 6:18 PM, I made my way north on State Street and  
20 Randolph after what seemed to be 100 officers began to move  
21 north behind me with their batons out. When I made it slightly  
22 north of the intersection, they ran towards us and began  
23 hitting and arresting everyone in sight. I recorded as a woman  
24 was arrested by two officers from behind, one being a  
25 white-shirt police officer. She was not facing them, she was

1 looking down on her phone when they pulled her to the ground by  
2 her ponytail from behind. Then they flipped her over onto the  
3 ground facing her down by the ponytail once again. Three more  
4 officers ran over. One kicked her on the right hip.

5 Throughout the summer, I experienced much more  
6 disrespect and abuse from CPD officers at other protests,  
7 including being told -- including being sexually harassed and  
8 saying, quote, "Nice short-shorts, faggot," end quote, by an  
9 officer in a passing CPD vehicle while I was on the sidewalk.

10 As a legal professional, I cannot see how the city is  
11 proud of the supposed professionalism of CPD. CPD attempts to  
12 justify these responses by mentioning the destruction of  
13 private party. But what I remember from my first year of law  
14 school is that the law values personal rights over property  
15 rights. These deadly and violent responses from officers are  
16 unjustified.

17 And that's all I have for today. Thank you for your  
18 time, your Honor.

19 THE COURT: Thank you for yours as well.

20 I think the other two I see in the queue here are 43  
21 and 45. Is that right? Is that what you have as well?

22 MS. HICKEY: That's correct, your Honor.

23 THE COURT: Okay, great. So we can move on to  
24 No. 43, please.

25 MR. MICHAEL: Hi. Thank you, your Honor. My name is

1 Cody Michael. I'm a resident of the Buena Park neighborhood  
2 here in Chicago, Illinois.

3 On May 30th of this year, I was attending one of the  
4 many protests in downtown Chicago. My friend, Kyle Ryan, a  
5 fellow Buena Park resident, attended with me.

6 While I witnessed several acts of minor civil  
7 disobedience, there was nothing I witnessed in the crowd around  
8 me that could have justified what came next. After marching in  
9 the streets for several blocks, without incident, near the  
10 intersection of Jackson and Dearborn, a battalion of 20 to 40  
11 CPD officers in full riot gear marched through the group of  
12 protesters to engage in what I now know is called kettling.  
13 After sectioning us off from the larger march ahead of us, they  
14 blocked the intersection and formed a circle. This is when  
15 tensions escalated.

16 There was a young woman of color standing right next  
17 to us who was fully exercising her right to free speech with an  
18 officer who was staring her down. After a protester on the  
19 other side of the intersection threw a water bottle into the  
20 middle of the police circle, with seemingly no other  
21 provocation, this officer, who I now know was Officer Hector  
22 Morales, Badge No. 13068, proceeded to beat this woman right in  
23 front of our eyes. She was young, maybe 5'3", 120 pounds  
24 soaking wet. My friend, Mr. Ryan, jumped in to defend the girl  
25 and put his body between them. He was met with several billy

1 club hits and got pushed over a Divvy bike that was left in the  
2 streets, probably because our mayor ordered them shut down.

3 After watching Officer Morales beat this woman and  
4 take down my best friend, he then turned towards me, club  
5 raised. I will never forget the look of rage in his eyes as he  
6 turned towards me. By the way, I was raised I stand, don't  
7 sit, in the face of injustice. I'll fully admit, I dropped my  
8 protest sign and ran towards him at this point, and I paid the  
9 price for it. Officer Morales proceeded to beat me so hard his  
10 club broke. This attack happened at exactly 3:32 PM. I know  
11 this because the attack that broke his baton also destroyed my  
12 wristwatch.

13 After Officer Morales broke his baton on me, he was  
14 whisked away into the crowd of CPD, and the situation  
15 de-escalated. The woman, Mr. Ryan, and myself were neither  
16 arrested for whatever conduct justified our beating, nor were  
17 we offered any medical attention.

18 I would also like to note the majority of the CPD  
19 officers I witnessed were not wearing face masks at this  
20 protest and most of the others I attended. I also witnessed  
21 numerous officers with covered badge numbers and without body  
22 cams or had their body cams turned off when they were obviously  
23 on duty.

24 Mr. Ryan and I sustained minor injuries, and I'm glad  
25 to report that we are okay. I know, and I've heard today, that

1 most people of color are not so lucky. I'm not here to suggest  
2 this for myself, I'm here because the City of Chicago deserves  
3 better. I refuse, as a resident of this city and this country,  
4 to have my tax dollars fund my own beating in the street and  
5 the systemic beating and murder of Black people and other  
6 minorities. I do not believe that any amount of reforms, all  
7 of which have been tried and so far have failed in every city  
8 and town that has even attempted, are sufficient for the CPD.  
9 I believe that the CPD should be dismantled and rebuilt from  
10 the ground up, the majority of their multibillion-dollar budget  
11 redistributed to alternative, nonviolent solutions and  
12 community investment. Lori Lightfoot and CPD leadership have  
13 proven to me, far beyond a reasonable doubt, that they are  
14 incapable of serving and protecting our great city. Thank you.

15 THE COURT: Thank you very much.

16 I think the only one speaker left in the queue is  
17 No. 45. And then I'm going to go back through, just to make  
18 sure that nobody else has come back from the prior ones who  
19 were skipped over. So if we could go to No. 45, please.

20 MS. CAMPANELLI: Thank you, Judge Dow. Can everybody  
21 hear me?

22 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

23 MS. CAMPANELLI: Thank you so much, Judge Dow, and  
24 all of you, for allowing me a few minutes today.

25 So the core of any reform is to rebuild the trust



1 that has been lost between the CPD and the community it serves.  
2 We don't trust the police because of how they treat the people  
3 they arrest. Those arrested are routinely denied access to a  
4 phone and denied access to counsel. They're isolated and  
5 intimidated.

6 As the public defender of Cook County, I believe that  
7 the grandest gesture that Chicago police could make to restore  
8 this trust that we keep talking about is one of the simplest:  
9 Give those arrested access to a phone within an hour of arrest.

10 So since 1963, Illinois law has guaranteed that those  
11 arrested shall be allowed access to a phone to make a  
12 reasonable number of phone calls within a reasonable amount of  
13 time after arrest. This isn't happening, Judge. Since April  
14 of 2018, I have had a police station representation unit to go  
15 to the police stations whenever there is a request. We're  
16 getting calls only for about one percent of those arrested.  
17 And when we show up, after being called, my lawyers get the  
18 runaround. They're obstructed by the police. They're told the  
19 client has been moved. They're told he was never there. All  
20 false claims by the police. Because of COVID, my lawyers could  
21 not physically go to the police stations, so I asked the  
22 Chicago police, with the help from the Independent Monitor and  
23 the Inspector General, to allow phone contact between my  
24 lawyers and those who called us for help. Chicago police would  
25 not agree to allow phone communication, unless those arrested

1 first signed a waiver that absolved the police for not  
2 providing a private setting for an attorney-client phone call.

3 We've been collecting data since 2018, and I have  
4 been keeping score. The overwhelming number of those arrested  
5 never get a phone call. And for those who do, it generally  
6 takes five hours before they do. Yet, even with these dismal  
7 numbers, judge, in two years, we've visited 2,054 clients and  
8 walked out uncharged 367. That's 18 percent of those we  
9 visited who never should have been arrested at all.

10 If phone access were provided to everyone within an  
11 hour of arrest, trust would return. Communities would know  
12 that the Chicago police treat people humanely and that they  
13 care about their rights. Suspicion would be replaced by  
14 cooperation. Instead, we are met with antagonism, deception,  
15 and trickery.

16 Over the past two-and-a-half years, we have gotten  
17 every excuse from Chicago police obstructing access to our  
18 clients. The most common are: He is not in custody; we don't  
19 know where he is; he is at a different police station; he is  
20 not under arrest, so you can't see him; we don't acknowledge  
21 your Declaration of Rights form; it's our policy not to allow  
22 you to see the client until he is processed; or, he didn't ask  
23 for a lawyer.

24 All these statements, Judge, are simply Chicago  
25 police denying my clients access to their Fifth Amendment

1 rights. And certainly this has continued during the protest.

2 So police play with our lives. And they complain,  
3 then, that they don't get cooperation. Well, why should people  
4 cooperate? Instead of raising bridges, we need to lower them.  
5 Instead of cornering and trapping protesters, we need to march  
6 with them. Why are they fighting so hard against this, Judge?  
7 Why do they intimidate people, ask yourself, instead of  
8 treating people with dignity? It would bring a lot of trust.

9 I am asking you to look at this consent decree and  
10 change the language, by the way, which is currently, "when  
11 practicable," which doesn't comply with the Illinois law.

12 Thank you.

13 THE COURT: Thank you very much as well.

14 Let me go back, then, just to make sure because I  
15 know we said at the beginning that we would go back in order.  
16 So I'm just going to read off the numbers, and if any of these  
17 speakers are present, I'll pause a few seconds and see if  
18 anybody raises a virtual hand to jump in.

19 So we skipped No. 1. My list says Jennifer Tagler.

20 No. 7, No. 8, No. 9, No. 14, No. 17, 18, 21, 24, 29,  
21 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 39, 40, 42, and 44.

22 I have not seen the attendee list change at all in  
23 the time I've been reading that, so it appears that no one else  
24 has come into the queue.

25 Can I ask the Monitors, is your list the same as

1 mine?

2 MS. HICKEY: Yes, your Honor.

3 THE COURT: Okay, very well. Well, as I said at the  
4 beginning, we will have a similar process tomorrow, except the  
5 lawyers won't get the first half hour. So we will start with  
6 Speaker No. 1 on the Thursday list at 1:00 o'clock, and we'll  
7 follow the same format as we did today.

8 I do want to thank, and I know I speak with the  
9 thanks also of the Monitor and the Inspector General, everyone  
10 for participating today. And I do invite all of those, either  
11 who did not get a speaking slot, or for some reason were unable  
12 to appear at the speaking slot they did get, to submit written  
13 comments. And I'm certain that you could submit any other  
14 information you may have, too. A lot of people have mentioned  
15 videos, what they may have taken with their phone, or  
16 otherwise. I'm sure if you have that type of information as  
17 well, you can submit that to the Monitor and/or the Inspector  
18 General. I know both have also talked about the different ways  
19 you can do that. And so we encourage everybody to come forward  
20 with their stories and their information. The more complete  
21 the information that is received, the better job we can do of  
22 documenting it, and it will all be reflected in the Monitor's  
23 Report.

24 Before we end for the day, let me just ask both the  
25 Monitor and the Inspector General whether they have any

1 additional comments they want to make?

2 MS. HICKEY: I have nothing, your Honor. I just  
3 wanted to thank everyone for sharing their experience with us.

4 MR. FERGUSON: And the same for me.

5 THE COURT: Okay, very well. Well, the court will be  
6 in recess until 1:00 PM tomorrow, and we will call the case  
7 promptly at 1:00.

8 Thank you very much, everybody, and have a good  
9 night.

10 MS. HICKEY: Thank you, your Honor.

11 \* \* \* \* \*

12 C E R T I F I C A T E

13 We certify that the foregoing is a correct  
14 transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled  
15 matter.

16  
17 */s/ KRISTIN M. ASHENHURST, CSR, RDR, CRR*

18  
19 */s/ SANDRA M. MULLIN, CSR, RMR, FCRR* August 25, 2020

20 \_\_\_\_\_ Date  
21 Official Court Reporters  
22 United States District Court  
23 Northern District of Illinois  
24 Eastern Division  
25

Appendix E:  
Listening Session Transcripts  
August 20, 2020

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1                                   IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
2                                   NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS  
  EASTERN DIVISION

3	STATE OF ILLINOIS,	)	Docket No. 17 CV 6260
4	Plaintiff,	)	
5	vs.	)	
6	CITY OF CHICAGO,	)	Chicago, Illinois
7	Defendant.	)	August 20, 2020
			1:00 PM

8                                   TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS - INDEPENDENT MONITOR LISTENING  
9                                   SESSIONS  
  BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT M. DOW, JR.

10 APPEARANCES:

11		
12	Independent Monitor:	MS. MAGGIE HICKEY
13		
14	Deputy Monitor:	CHIEF (RET.) RODNEY MONROE
15		
16	Inspector General City of Chicago:	MR. JOSEPH M. FERGUSON
17		
18		
19		
20	Court Reporter:	SANDRA M. MULLIN, CSR, RMR, FCRR
21		Official Court Reporter
22		219 S. Dearborn Street, Room 2260
23		Chicago, Illinois 60604
24		(312) 554-8244
25		sandra_mullin@ilnd.uscourts.gov

1 (The following listening session proceedings were held via  
2 telephonic and videoconference.)

3 THE CLERK: Okay. 17 Civil 6260, State of Illinois  
4 versus the City of Chicago.

5 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Carolyn.

6 Good afternoon, everybody. Welcome to the second day  
7 of this special session of court in State of Illinois versus  
8 City of Chicago.

9 Today will be another opportunity for members of the  
10 community to speak, so I will keep my remarks very short. You  
11 may notice today that I'm not wearing a mask because I have  
12 changed the venue into my office. It's really for my own  
13 convenience of not having to wear a mask, since I have to speak  
14 a lot in the next four hours, and also my court reporters don't  
15 also have to wear a mask. And I'm sure they can do their job  
16 better if they don't have to wear a mask. So that's why I'm in  
17 back here in my chambers without a mask. But other than that,  
18 we will try to proceed today in exactly the same fashion we did  
19 yesterday.

20 And, again, I give my great thanks to the folks who  
21 put this together, both from the monitoring team and also from  
22 the clerk's office of our district court, that we have a great  
23 technology platform. We have the help of our sign language  
24 interpreters, our captioning service, and court reporters for  
25 today's proceeding, and I want to thank everybody for all their



1 great effort in pulling this together. We have tried our best  
2 to model these sessions on the fairness hearings that were held  
3 in October of 2018. And I think yesterday, technologically,  
4 this went very smoothly. So I thank everybody.

5 I want to take a quick moment to introduce the  
6 individuals whom you will see on your screen for the entire  
7 afternoon. The Independent Monitor, Maggie Hickey, the  
8 Inspector General, Joe Ferguson, and the Deputy Monitor Rodney  
9 Monroe. So I want to thank them.

10 And, of course, you'll be able to see our sign  
11 language interpreters all day too. And I know it's a very  
12 arduous task for them to go an hour and a half or two hours at  
13 a time, so I thank them.

14 These listening sessions and the accompanying written  
15 comment period arise out of the Independent Monitor's  
16 invocation of her authority to prepare special reports on  
17 issues that are covered by the consent decree. The report that  
18 she is currently preparing focuses on the response of the  
19 Chicago Police Department and the City of Chicago to the rise  
20 in First Amendment activity, the civil unrest, and the related  
21 law enforcement activities over the past few months.

22 As with the fairness hearings, it is important that  
23 we hear from everybody who would like to be heard in this  
24 process. We're only able to accommodate approximately 100  
25 people between these two days to give oral comments, but we

1 invite written comments from anybody who is interested in  
2 providing them. The deadline for that is 4:30 today. And the  
3 procedures for providing the comments are available both on the  
4 docket of this case and also on the Monitor's website.

5 To make sure that everyone is clear on how we're  
6 going to proceed today, especially technologically, I am going  
7 to ask the Monitor to please briefly summarize the mechanics  
8 and the ground rules for today on the platform. And I do also  
9 want to remind everybody that this is an on-the-record federal  
10 court proceeding, and the rules that apply in our district to  
11 court proceedings apply today, including those that prohibit  
12 recording and picture taking. I would just ask that everyone  
13 kindly respect those rules.

14 So if I could ask the Monitor, if you could, again,  
15 lay out the framework for today, that would be very helpful.  
16 Thank you.

17 MS. HICKEY: Thank you, your Honor, I am happy to do  
18 that. I want to thank everyone in advance for their  
19 participation, and I want to offer a special thank you to Judge  
20 Dow's team, Inspector General Ferguson's team, and my own team,  
21 for working and facilitating this virtual listening session.

22 We had over 540 registered to sign up for these Zoom  
23 listening sessions, and the speakers for the listening sessions  
24 were randomly selected from that group. To maximize our  
25 connection and to increase efficiency, only the people who are

1 scheduled to appear or speak are on the Zoom meeting. The  
2 public may view each session live on YouTube with a slight  
3 delay, about 20 seconds. The YouTube links for today are  
4 available on the Independent Monitoring team's website,  
5 cpdmonitoringteam.com. I'll repeat that,  
6 cpdmonitoringteam.com. Our website also includes a link to  
7 live transcription, which is available during the session. The  
8 court's listening session order is also available on our  
9 website, which provides instructions on how to file written  
10 comments.

11 For the speakers on today's call, you will not have  
12 the ability to turn on your microphone or camera until Judge  
13 Dow calls your number. He will only be calling the number, for  
14 efficiency sake, and also because there have been some movement  
15 of names. So only your number will be called. You should have  
16 received your speaker number via e-mail last Friday,  
17 August 17th.

18 When the court calls your number, the meeting host  
19 will make you a Zoom panelist to begin speaking. For those of  
20 you on a computer, Zoom will automatically log you in and out,  
21 you may see your screen switch, and then you will be prompted  
22 to turn on your camera and microphone and begin speaking. For  
23 those of you on telephone, your line will be un-muted after the  
24 judge calls your number.

25 You will also be provided a visual cue. The speakers

1 will see green to start, yellow means you have 30 seconds left,  
2 and red means you are out of time. For people who call into  
3 the meeting, we will provide a virtual 30-second warning. For  
4 those speakers, please also keep an eye on the chat function,  
5 as the IMT may send messages through that service, if  
6 necessary.

7 If you are not available when the court calls your  
8 number, you will be moved to the end of the list for today, and  
9 the court will call your number again at the end of the day.

10 If you have any logistical questions during the  
11 session, please contact this e-mail: [Listeningsessions -- with  
12 an s -- @cpdmonitoringteam.com](mailto:Listeningsessions--withans--@cpdmonitoringteam.com), which is also listed on the  
13 IMT's website.

14 Finally, these hearings are for the community to have  
15 a direct voice with the court. The Independent Monitoring Team  
16 and the Inspector General's office, though, do want to hear  
17 from the community on a continuing basis.

18 Thank you again for your patience and your  
19 understanding as we use a virtual platform during this  
20 unprecedented time.

21 Thank you, your Honor.

22 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. And I also  
23 wanted, again, to offer the Inspector General a moment to say  
24 anything that he would like at the beginning of the proceeding.

25 So, Mr. Ferguson, anything you would like to say.

1           MR. FERGUSON: Thank you, Judge. Very briefly, and  
2 working off of where Maggie's remarks ended, just one other  
3 quick note before turning to the important business of hearing  
4 from everyone who is in the queue and signed up. These  
5 court-hosted listening sessions are just one of several avenues  
6 for community input and the expression of lived experience to  
7 inform this joint inquiry on which we will be publicly  
8 reporting. Today's listening sessions are, by their nature,  
9 both public and part of the official record of the court  
10 proceedings being conducted pursuant to the authority of the  
11 consent decree. So if for whatever reason anyone who is  
12 speaking, listening or watching today wishes further  
13 opportunity to provide feedback, input or articulate their  
14 particular experiences, or wishes to provide it to the IMT or  
15 to the Inspector General's office in a less public setting or  
16 format, please be aware that there are opportunities to do so,  
17 including doing so anonymously. And we strongly encourage you  
18 to do so.

19           For those purposes, the IMT's contact information,  
20 again, is [www.cpdmonitoringteam.com](http://www.cpdmonitoringteam.com). And the Inspector  
21 General's office contact information is found at  
22 [www.igchicago.org](http://www.igchicago.org).

23           Thank you, Judge.

24           THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. So I would like to  
25 commend our speakers yesterday for adhering to the time limits,

1 and I'd just like to again ask for, out of respect for all  
2 speakers, that every speaker please conclude their remarks at  
3 the three-minute mark.

4 And I just want to also advise everybody that, as we  
5 did yesterday, we will take a 15-minute break at 3:00 o'clock,  
6 which will allow the court reporters to switch out. And it  
7 takes them a few minutes to uninstall one set of equipment and  
8 install the other set. So that will be our only break for  
9 today.

10 And the monitor and I will try to help each other out  
11 again by trying to confirm who is in the speaker queue and who  
12 is not so we can proceed efficiently.

13 And, with that, I believe we're ready to start with  
14 Speaker 1 for today, but I do not see that speaker in the  
15 queue.

16 Maggie, do you see that speaker in the queue?

17 MS. HICKEY: I am double checking. I do not, your  
18 Honor, but I will still call out No. 1 in case they may have  
19 registered under, you know, somebody else's e-mail or their,  
20 you know, partner's, or something. So if we --

21 THE COURT: Sure. That makes good sense.

22 MS. HICKEY: Yes.

23 THE COURT: Okay. So if Speaker No. 1 could proceed,  
24 that would be great -- a great thing to do, so please start.

25 MS. HICKEY: It does appear that Speaker 1 is not

1 present, so let's go to Speaker No. 2.

2 THE COURT: Okay. Speaker No. 2 I see is in the  
3 queue, so we can go on to Speaker No. 2, please.

4 MR. TORRES: Hello. I am Speaker No. 2 in the queue.  
5 Can everyone hear me okay?

6 THE COURT: Yes, thank you very much.

7 MR. TORRES: Thank you. Hi, my name is Seth, and I  
8 use he/him or they/them pronouns. I am a 24-year-old  
9 transgender Latino person. I work as a theatrical lighting  
10 designer and a live event Zoom specialist.

11 On July 27th in Grant Park, I was with a group of  
12 protesters demanding the removal of all racist statues,  
13 including Columbus, as well as the demand to pass CPAC, reduce  
14 CPD budget by at least 75 percent, and return the stolen land  
15 we were on to Indigenous people.

16 I became an impromptu medic. Usually people with  
17 some kind of medical training sign up in advance, bring  
18 first-aid supplies, and coordinate to treat anyone injured.  
19 There weren't enough medics for everyone injured. I've had  
20 extensive first-aid training, and I had some first-aid supplies  
21 on me, so I started helping people.

22 For about an hour, I circled the outside of the  
23 protest to catch anyone injured. The air was thick with pepper  
24 spray, and at times it was hard to see and breath. It was  
25 chaos with everyone running around and trying to avoid being

1 beaten by the police.

2 In that time, I watched the police hit at least five  
3 people in the head or neck with their batons and hit so many  
4 more in the leg, arm, back and chest. I watched the police  
5 spray multiple people directly in the face with pepper spray.

6 When we started to retreat, there was still many  
7 people who -- injured people who needed help. The police had  
8 formed a perimeter around the statue, so I thought it was safe  
9 to keep treating people where I was. I was so focused on  
10 helping people who were bleeding and blinded, but I didn't see  
11 the police continue pushing forward. My friend kept saying:  
12 Seth, we've got to go. And I look up to see the police  
13 continuing to move towards us and using their batons to beat  
14 people and pepper spray, those around injured, and the medics  
15 trying to help them.

16 At that time, everyone was at least 500 feet away  
17 from the statue, and I was at least a thousand feet away.  
18 There was no reason to continue pushing forward and hurting  
19 people after we had clearly moved away and had no intention of  
20 going back towards the statue.

21 Every time I watched a police officer hit someone or  
22 spray someone in the face, I just kept thinking to myself that  
23 these officers do not think we are people. I feel a trauma  
24 around that night. I'm grateful I walked away physically  
25 unharmed, but I still get flashbacks on watching the police



1 hurt those who were already injured and the medics who  
2 volunteered to help. We hadn't done anything to deserve this.  
3 I never saw a protester harm a police officer in any way. I  
4 never felt less cared about, less protected, and less safe than  
5 I did that night. I will never feel safe around a Chicago  
6 police officer again because I know that those officers do not  
7 care about me as a person. Their actions prove it. No one who  
8 says they protect and serve and then turns around to beat and  
9 pepper spray people can expect me to believe them.

10 Thank you for your time, your Honor.

11 THE COURT: I thank you for your time as well.

12 If we could move on, I don't see No. 3 in the queue,  
13 but let's find out if No. 3 is actually present.

14 MS. HICKEY: I do not believe they are, your Honor.  
15 If you want to move on to the next number.

16 THE COURT: Okay. So Speaker No. 4 could be let into  
17 the participation room, please.

18 OLIVIA: Hi, can you hear me?

19 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

20 OLIVIA: Excellent. I'm Olivia Lopattlsad  
21 (phonetic), she/they pronouns. I'm a 23-year-old artist, and  
22 I'm here to discuss the police brutality I experienced while I  
23 protested police brutality, specifically on the night of  
24 June 1st in Uptown. I will also preface by saying that I often  
25 walk with a cane as a result of a 30-foot-fall I survived three

1 years ago. And I say this not for you to offer me more  
2 sympathy as a disabled person, but because I want everyone  
3 listening to understand that CPD did what they did to me as I  
4 screamed and clutched my cane.

5 As I thought about how to fill this time, I  
6 considered what I might say that could make you understand. I  
7 could talk about how they beat my knees as I tried to run  
8 towards someone who was being beaten worse than me, causing me  
9 to fall and taking my cane from me.

10 I could tell you how three of them dug their boots  
11 into my shoulders and knee and screamed threats masklessly in  
12 my face.

13 I could talk about how officers held my partner down  
14 in a fetal position and beat his genitals and his leg until his  
15 phone in his pocket bent and his shin split open.

16 I could tell you about how I was clubbed on the head  
17 from behind, glasses shattering into my skull bone, and an  
18 officer in front of me yelled: That's what you get. Have you  
19 ever wondered what it feels like to pull glass shards out of  
20 your own head, to see your best friend screaming and sobbing  
21 and know there is nothing you could do to make her safe? Have  
22 you ever thought your partner might be dead? Because I could  
23 tell you about that.

24 I could talk about all the ways in which CPD broke  
25 their own rules in order to prey on their citizens, emboldened

1 by an unconstitutional emergency curfew -- thank you Lori  
2 Lightfoot -- that made our active protest de facto illegal.

3 But ultimately what I need you to understand, because  
4 I didn't understand it until I experienced it, is that police  
5 have a monopoly on violence. They dress in gear designed for  
6 warfare, and at their disposal are weapons banned in warfare.  
7 And on a whim, they may use unbridled amounts of violence  
8 against you. This is not a felony for them, it is rarely even  
9 a citation, it is their job. It is a probable felony for you  
10 to defend yourself against them. That means that, if and when  
11 an officer decides to attack you, no matter who you are or what  
12 you have done, that officer has 100 percent jurisdiction over  
13 your body, your pain, and your survival.

14 That night, my partner and I were both hospitalized.  
15 I would be treated for my head wound and diagnosed with a  
16 concussion, and he wouldn't stop steadily bleeding until they  
17 stitched him up four hours later. We weren't arrested. They  
18 weren't interested in actually enforcing the curfew, rather,  
19 they waited for curfew so they would have an excuse to beat us.

20 Countless times since that night I have looked at my  
21 partner brutalized, traumatized, unable to walk, and I reflect  
22 on the fact that, if it had not been for our simultaneous  
23 beating, if I had seen him being brutalized, there is not one  
24 thing in the world I would not have done to make that stop. I  
25 promise you that, in order to keep him from being harmed, I

1 would have done anything, and I would absolutely be in jail  
2 right now. It's something I haven't stopped thinking about  
3 since that night.

4 When it comes down to it, we are legally bound to  
5 watch the police slaughter anyone they see fit. To intervene  
6 is literally illegal. I defy anyone to look me in the eye and  
7 claim that they would defer to the judgment of a stranger  
8 beating their loved one to death.

9 Thank you for your time.

10 THE COURT: Thank you.

11 I think we have Speaker No. 5 is in the queue,  
12 please.

13 MS. LEYVA: Hello, can you hear me?

14 THE COURT: Yes, we can.

15 MS. LEYVA: Hi, my name is Jailene, and I'm from  
16 Chicago. I am here today to share what I witnessed and  
17 experienced on July 17th. Before this call, and even before  
18 registering, I felt anxious, and my hands began to tremble at  
19 the memory of the police brutalizing members of my community.

20 The police (unintelligible) on people and sprayed  
21 them directly in the face. I personally could not breathe and  
22 was constantly gagging and crying so badly that most of the  
23 people tried to comfort me in the middle of the police  
24 brutalizing everybody.

25 I saw the police trample people with their own bikes.

1 I saw one young black man being assaulted with his own bike  
2 after being pushed to the ground, his legs were caught  
3 underneath his bike, and he was helpless. And, yet, the police  
4 pushed the bike onto his body and kept trying to beat him.

5 I also saw a young man of color bleeding profusely  
6 after being hit by the police. His head, face, entirely, and  
7 glasses were -- and his shirt, too, were completely covered in  
8 blood, and he was still bleeding as the police continued to  
9 attack him. No, they did not pull him aside for medical  
10 attention. Like, they just kept beating him and pulling his  
11 shirt, and even ripping it.

12 I saw a person on the ground ask me for my help and  
13 for water. They begged for comfort and reassurance as they  
14 were being beaten by the police. At another point, the police  
15 moved together to another side, but one of the officers looked  
16 so enraged by just, like, our right to protest that he  
17 disobeyed this collective decision and went back just to lunge  
18 at a protester.

19 A dear friend of mine was also attacked by the  
20 police. Her bike was taken. But before her bike was taken,  
21 she was beat by it. She was stuck underneath the bike as well.  
22 And she actually had to spend a lot of time on her own to  
23 recover physically and emotionally from this event.

24 Although I am a Latina, I know that I have a  
25 privilege. So when all of this was happening I tried -- gave

1 my white privilege to help people out. And in the middle of  
2 this chaos caused by the police I saw that, despite me getting  
3 injuries and feeling almost, like, almost breaking down after  
4 all the strain of, I don't know what, there were moments where  
5 the police didn't even try to attack me because they saw me as  
6 a small white woman. They attacked men. They attacked men of  
7 color. They attacked black men. They attacked white people  
8 too, but you could see the bias in action when I was there in  
9 the front lines and I was selectively seen.

10 After the police finally took control of the Columbus  
11 statue and pushed everyone out brutally, I saw one police  
12 officer take off his hat and (unintelligible) as though this  
13 were some type of game where, I don't know, we were some  
14 criminals, or some thugs, or something, and not there as our  
15 civil, like, right to protest. They even cheered and started,  
16 like, joking with each other and laughing despite multiple  
17 people sustaining so many injuries that medics -- the few  
18 medics that we had could not keep up with how many people were  
19 being injured.

20 And even as we were moving back to Grant Park, just  
21 to continue with the general protest and march, the police, we  
22 were all walking away because the police told us to. And one  
23 of the people that stayed back to make sure everyone left  
24 safely was taken by the police. And so it doesn't even matter  
25 if we, like, left or not, the police were still harassing us,

1 they were still yelling at us. They still tried to intimidate  
2 people. And even though this person asked for the help of  
3 white people when they were taken, the police didn't care.

4 And I know that there was people there that were  
5 minors, there was high schoolers there, there was young college  
6 students, there was members of the community who tried to,  
7 like, help each other out because nobody, nobody that I saw  
8 there ever tried to reach out for the police, that were helping  
9 us.

10 We held each other. We hugged each other. We  
11 communicated sometimes as strangers to make sure that we got  
12 home safe because the police were not the ones to talk to,  
13 especially considering that they made people bleed, they stole  
14 their bikes, they crushed their bodies under the tires and  
15 under bikes.

16 And so I, as a community member, would like to see  
17 the police defunded by at least 75 percent because they did not  
18 keep the community safe. They prefer to beat on people and  
19 spray them directly in the face over a statue that does not  
20 take kindly over human life.

21 Thank you for your time.

22 THE COURT: Thank you for your time as well.

23 Speaker No. 6 in the queue?

24 MS. HICKEY: I don't believe so, your Honor. We will  
25 also call seven, who I don't see in the queue, but I know eight

1 is. But just in case there is a phone number, we will call  
2 No. 6 and then No. 7.

3 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. So if No. 6 does not  
4 sound like is available at this time, we will skip to No. 7.  
5 Is No. 7 available?

6 Okay. Maybe we will move on to No. 8, then, please.

7 AMBER: Can everyone hear me?

8 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

9 AMBER: My name is Amber, she/her, I'm black, I'm  
10 26-years-old, and I work in a research center at the University  
11 of Chicago. I have been to a number of protests this summer  
12 where I have seen CPD officers initiate attacks and use  
13 unprovoked violence against protesters. Today I'll focus my  
14 comments on an incident that happened to me, specifically on  
15 July 17th at Grant Park. During a Black Indigenous Solidarity  
16 Rally, I witnessed a CPD officer grab a woman's bike and pull  
17 it away from her. As he pulled it, she fell to the ground, and  
18 he started pepper spraying her as she laid on the ground. I  
19 ran over to help her -- help pull her up and pull her away from  
20 the attack, and when I got to her, he started spraying me too.  
21 I turned to run, and as I was running away from him, I felt his  
22 baton crack down on my head. So to be clear, after he finished  
23 pepper spraying the woman who was laying on the ground, he hit  
24 me over the head as I was running away from him. Right away I  
25 lost the ability to hear anything. I lost my balance. My head



1 started bleeding profusely. My clothes were immediately soaked  
2 in blood.

3 Later that day, at that same event, I was detained by  
4 CPD officers. They put zip ties on me, first so loosely that  
5 my hands slipped out of them, and they accused me of breaking  
6 out of them. So then they put them on so tightly that they  
7 were cutting into my wrists and left bruises around my wrists  
8 for days, actually. I repeatedly asked officers why I was  
9 being arrested. I never got an answer. I asked officers  
10 repeatedly to please loosen the zip ties because they were  
11 causing extreme pain, and one officer told me verbatim: That's  
12 too bad, you shouldn't have been protesting.

13 Eventually I was told that I had been wrongfully  
14 detained, and I was free to go. And I immediately went to the  
15 hospital to get staples in my head from the baton injury.

16 I just want to say that swinging a baton at the head  
17 of unarmed, fleeing young people doesn't feel like public  
18 safety to me, it feels like terrorism. Refusing to loosen zip  
19 ties from around someone's wrist because they shouldn't have  
20 been protesting doesn't feel like protection, it feels like  
21 political repression. Pepper spraying a woman who is laying on  
22 the ground does not feel like doing your job, it feels  
23 personal, and it feels completely barbaric.

24 I was -- that was sincerely the most horrific thing  
25 that I ever experienced. Outside of the physical pain I was

1 in, I was completely terrified the entire time. I'm still  
2 traumatized. I never did anything wrong. I never posed a  
3 threat to any officer, and, yet, I still experienced this level  
4 of violence and complete disregard for my safety and my life.  
5 And beyond the disregard for my life, it's clear to me, after  
6 the experiences that I had this summer, that these officers are  
7 completely blood-thirsty and sadistic, and they are eager to  
8 inflict this cruelty towards anyone who dares to speak out  
9 against them, especially Indigenous people.

10 We cannot train this away. We have to defund this  
11 racist, murderist, torturist police department, abolish the  
12 police and rethink public safety entirely. Thank you.

13 THE COURT: Thank you for your comments. I  
14 appreciate it.

15 Speaker No. 9, please.

16 MS. HAYDEN: Hi. Can everybody hear me?

17 THE COURT: Yes, we can, thank you.

18 MS. HAYDEN: Wonderful. My name is Megan Hayden. I  
19 am white, 25 years old, my pronouns are they/them. My bike is  
20 my primary transportation.

21 On July 17th, I was bike-marshalling for the first  
22 time. Bike marshals are used to facilitate a protest and  
23 create a barrier between protesters and the police when needed.

24 I'm going to jump to the moment when things  
25 escalated. So fireworks were thrown by protesters. The police

1 were pushed back from the statue. Another marshal and I threw  
2 down our bikes and ran towards what appeared to be like a  
3 growing skirmish. I saw three officers dragging and beating a  
4 man who was bleeding from the head. I approached with my hands  
5 open, yelling to get them to stop. A hand grabbed the front of  
6 my shirt, and I was thrown out of the way by an officer, and  
7 then I watched them take the man away.

8 And then shortly after, I was -- my attention was  
9 sort of pulled to the right where the police were surrounded  
10 around a tree, like up a hill and around some trees, to try to  
11 surround us, and then we rushed to create a bike line. Once  
12 the line was established, we were harassed by an especially  
13 irate officer who was threatening a protester with a baton. I  
14 got hit because I put my hand to shield them. I saw the same  
15 officer threatening protesters with jail time. He was clearly  
16 bothered by people's disrespect and took it out with  
17 aggression.

18 I continually de-escalated officers from retaliating  
19 at protesters who were insulting them. There was some friendly  
20 banter with one officer. He even told me I was doing a good  
21 job. I wish I told him that he needed to do a better job at  
22 de-escalating his co-worker. It's not my job to make sure his  
23 fellow officer keeps his cool.

24 Things broke into chaos as soon as the people in  
25 brown uniforms came. I heard no order of dispersal, and there

1 was no warning of gas. They sprayed a brown chemical agent in  
2 the air and our line broke. People started running,  
3 (unintelligible) assisting them. The police gave no exit plan.  
4 Instead, they caused chaos. I watched officers beat people  
5 with batons until they let go of their bikes and the police  
6 took them away. None of the bikes were abandoned willingly.

7 I was helping people move away from the gas and was  
8 aware of an officer nearby using pepper spray indiscriminantly.  
9 His actions were uncontrolled and erratic. A protester near me  
10 held up their umbrella to shield us. One officer grabbed the  
11 umbrella, while the other sprayed us. I was sprayed in the  
12 face from less than two feet away. In pain and shock, I let go  
13 of my bike to shield my eyes. After someone flushed my eyes, I  
14 tried to find my bike. It's my primary form of transportation.  
15 Another protester managed to get the frame back, but the front  
16 wheel had been ripped off by a police officer.

17 I had bruises for days afterwards, and the burning  
18 lasted well past 24 hours. Sometimes I still have trouble  
19 sleeping, getting all -- angry -- getting angry all over again.

20 Nothing the police endured matched what they  
21 unleashed. It was wildly unjust, and I hope the court takes  
22 that into account.

23 Thank you for your time.

24 THE COURT: Thank you for your time as well.

25 Speaker No. 10, please.

1 MS. DAVIS: Hello. Hi. Can you hear me okay?

2 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

3 MS. DAVIS: Hi everybody. My name is Kimberly Davis.  
4 She/her/hers. I am a 24-year-old black woman and organizer. I  
5 am the founder of the abolition focus group Black Lives  
6 Coalition Lake County, which focuses on policy change,  
7 antiracism education and community engagement. I am currently  
8 studying clinical social work at the University of Chicago.

9 On July 17, 2020, I attended the decolonized  
10 Zhigaagoong protest to show local and national solidarity  
11 against police brutality. When I arrived at the Buckingham  
12 Fountain, protesters were gathered, waiting for further  
13 instruction. Shortly after, the protest began to move uphill  
14 and then downhill towards the Columbus statue. As we  
15 approached, I saw CPD in riot gear circled around the statue,  
16 blocking it from protesters. As we approached, I saw -- as we  
17 continued, popping sounds filled the air, and I began to see  
18 thick black and grey smoke and sparks of red.

19 When the protesters attempted to pass the statue, CPD  
20 took batons and began beating dozens of protesters attempting  
21 to pass the statue. They then began to throw bicycles at  
22 protesters and steal the bicycles of safety marshals. I saw  
23 dozens of protesters, mainly black, with bloody face injuries  
24 fleeing from the statue.

25 As this happened, chemicals began to fill the air,

1 making my eyes water and my lungs irritated. We were forced to  
2 run backwards up the hill and then back down to the main  
3 street. As we started walking back to the fountain, CPD was  
4 lined on either side of the road. I was also informed that my  
5 friend, who also attended the protest, was severely maced after  
6 having a bicycle thrown at her face.

7 Every day I bear witness to the genocide of my  
8 people. I have attended over a dozen protests in the last two  
9 months, and I know what I have witnessed has changed my  
10 psychological well-being forever.

11 By doing this work, I am reminded of the damage White  
12 Supremacy has done to myself and the Black and Brown people of  
13 this nation. Every day I live with the ongoing fear that I  
14 will die at the hands of police brutality. This fear stays  
15 with me on the streets that I march in, the home that I live  
16 in, and in the future I see for myself and my people. As steps  
17 are not taken towards defunding and abolishing the police, we  
18 sacrifice the well-being of our youth and future generations to  
19 come.

20 As long as there is air in my lungs, I will use every  
21 last breath I have to fight against this system and what it has  
22 done to my people.

23 Thank you for your time, your Honor.

24 THE COURT: Thank you very much for your comments. I  
25 do appreciate them.

1           Let's see, I don't see No. 11, Speaker No. 11, in the  
2 queue, but we'll make a call out and see if Speaker No. 11 is  
3 present.

4           MS. HICKEY: I believe you can move on, your Honor.

5           THE COURT: Okay. I do see the next several speakers  
6 in the queue, so Speaker No. 12, please?

7           Okay. How about No. 13?

8           Oh, there is No. 12.

9           MR. RAFAEL: Hi, my name is Luis Rafael. I attended  
10 the Black and Indigenous Solidarity Rally. And for full  
11 disclosure, I just want to say that I usually don't participate  
12 in protests. I'm an introvert. I feel left out when I don't  
13 chant along, so that day, I went because it was, like, just a  
14 very peaceful protest. It was endorsed by, like, the Chicago  
15 Teachers Union. And the reason I mostly went was because, in  
16 the past, I seen that it's usually about 60, 70, even 100  
17 police officers in riot gear, but not one paramedic in site.  
18 And that, to me, is very alarming, especially because of the  
19 brutality that we've been noticing nationwide, not just in our  
20 city.

21           With prior knowledge from an EMT course at Malcolm X,  
22 I went in as just a medic in incognito mode. And it wasn't  
23 until when I saw that a police officer was beating a person on  
24 the floor, it was -- I believe it was a person who was  
25 Caucasian because usually they're the ones on the bikes under

1 the title of marshal. They put themselves in front of the  
2 people and the police. So the police threw the person on the  
3 floor and (unintelligible) punching them in the face, which  
4 then -- so I jumped off from my EMT course two years ago to  
5 pursue philosophy and public policy. So at that point I told  
6 the police officer, hey, there is no need to -- there is no  
7 need to keep on punching the person in the face. If you have  
8 to arrest him, if you must, arrest him, but please stop  
9 punching him. The police -- you could tell he was high on  
10 adrenaline, so I knew that if I touched his hands, that would  
11 be, for some way it would be an act of violence on my end. So  
12 to stop the punching, I threw my body over his face -- well,  
13 over the person on the floor's face. I expected the blows on  
14 my back, but then the police officer's partner came from the  
15 other side and whacked me in the head with a -- I wish it was a  
16 baton, it was a pole he found on the floor. And then I looked  
17 up and that same police officer was whacking people just with  
18 that pole he found on the floor. It was like from -- it was  
19 from a sign.

20 So I just -- I told him, I said: Hey, man, at this  
21 point, you know, you're no longer serving the people, you're no  
22 longer protecting the people, now you're terrorizing them.  
23 Look at yourself. And then he saw the blood gushing down. And  
24 I said: Actually, can I get your badge number? Because I knew  
25 that he saw the blood, and he got scared, he started walking



1 back. And then he kept on turning around so I wouldn't see his  
2 badge number, which, at that point, the blood started gushing  
3 down my glasses so I couldn't see any longer. And I'm very  
4 blessed and grateful that there was a lot of other medics who  
5 were there as volunteers.

6 And that's what I saw, just a lack of the city  
7 sending out medics. And, yeah, I saw a lack of accountability  
8 for police. And I think even doctors have a more strict --  
9 well, if doctors keep on making mistakes, like their license  
10 will get revoked. But there is no such thing with police.  
11 There is no one there holding them accountable.

12 So the only thing that, if I can, if I may ask is  
13 that we take a look at the need of exchange of power and defund  
14 police. And, actually, just prevent violence by sending -- or  
15 creating, like, a crisis response team where you have, like,  
16 sociologists go and attend situations. And, again, fund our  
17 schools. The ones here in the south side of Englewood, which  
18 is where I live, they're very underfunded. And this is where  
19 we would like to see the money go, rather than police who are  
20 just reacting to situations like this one.

21 THE COURT: Thank you for your comments, sir. I  
22 appreciate it.

23 Speaker No. 13, please.

24 MS. OWA: Hello, can you hear me?

25 THE COURT: Yes, I can hear you. I'm sorry, yes, I

1 was muted myself. I apologize. Yes, we can hear you. Thank  
2 you.

3 MS. OWA: My name is Ashabi Owa. I am an organizer  
4 and artist in Chicago. My pronouns are she/they. I'm  
5 currently about to start at Loyola University in Clinical  
6 Mental Health Counseling Program. And I would just like to  
7 talk about my experiences on May 30th, as well as July 17th.

8 The protest May 30th, was, again, a peaceful one. It  
9 only started to escalate when the police got notice that they  
10 were able to use brute force against protesters. I, amongst  
11 several other people, were in the crowd trying to make sure  
12 that other people that were hurt (unintelligible) were staying  
13 safe. Whenever I go to protests, if I'm not organizing them  
14 myself, I usually try to document everything. And at the  
15 protest of May 30th, I was present with my partner and their  
16 other partner, and we were there being present, trying to make  
17 sure that people were staying safe. I had to step away and  
18 make sure that the people who were protecting us were able to  
19 do that. Those people happened to be white. They were not the  
20 police. The police were antagonizing us and beating us with  
21 their batons and grabbing people and shoving them to the ground  
22 and also beating them until they were bleeding. I had to watch  
23 as my partner, who was trying to protect me, had a baton shoved  
24 in their face by a police officer who would not let up. And  
25 from there, I had to put my body in front of the police and my

1 partner so that they were okay.

2 After that incident, we had to run and get away  
3 because they kept hitting us, shooting flares into the air and  
4 throwing smoke bombs and tear gas into the crowd when the  
5 National Guard came. And we had to run away and find an area  
6 to escape because all the bridges were lifted when the curfew  
7 was enacted at least 20 minutes before police started attacking  
8 us.

9 That was the incident on the 30th, and I'd like to  
10 continue with the incident on July 17th at Grant Park.

11 That protest, again, started very peacefully. There  
12 was no antagonation from us. We were first at Buckingham  
13 Fountain, and then we walked towards Grant Park. From there,  
14 police officers started grabbing umbrellas, started shredding  
15 banners, started attacking protesters with batons and tear gas.  
16 Again, like I mentioned, I have my camera on me whenever I go  
17 to protests, and I was able to document all of these things  
18 that occurred. I was able to see that the police were  
19 attacking other people. They were attacking my friends. I saw  
20 police teargassing other people in their face, not even two  
21 feet away from them. As I was documenting, I had police come  
22 and kettle around us. There was a police officer that whipped  
23 out their baton and started yelling, "Get back before I beat  
24 the fuck out of you." From there, one other protester, who is  
25 an organizer, came and started recording them, and that was the

1 incident that led to them calming down.

2 Me, as a black woman, I usually don't feel safe  
3 coming to protests because I'm fully aware that police don't  
4 look out for me and take care of me. And the only time I felt  
5 safe was when I was around people of community. The police  
6 officers were not there to take care of me or make sure that I  
7 was okay, they just came after blood and came to attack people.

8 At one point I was standing, watching this man who  
9 was on the ground kneeling, with his fist in the air, and the  
10 police started to move forward. As I was trying to see why  
11 this man was kneeling on the ground, I walked around, and I saw  
12 that he had a gash in his head, and he was bleeding profusely,  
13 from his head down to his pants. There was blood, and he  
14 wouldn't get up off the ground until police started to stop.  
15 At that point, I had to call a medic to make sure this person  
16 stopped bleeding off from his head, and, from there, police  
17 officers started teargassing us and making sure that we were  
18 being pushed away back to Buckingham Fountain. From this  
19 moment forward, I didn't realize that I was also teargassed,  
20 and the moment I realized that was when I started crying after  
21 seeing one of my friends who came to see if I was okay.

22 I think something that is reiterated in a lot of  
23 these conversations is that police are here to protect us.  
24 There is no reason for us to be at these protests in fear for  
25 our lives when we're just here to make sure our voices are

1 being heard, our demands are being met.

2 It's very clear the money that's being to allocated  
3 CPD is not being used to protect the people that are paying  
4 their taxes and paying their bills and paying the communities  
5 to make sure that we're okay. It's very clear that CPD needs  
6 to be defunded and that all of those funds would be allocated  
7 towards schools and underfunded areas in Chicago.

8 That's all I have to say. Thank you so much for your  
9 time.

10 THE COURT: Thank you for yours. I appreciate it.  
11 If we could move on to Speaker No. 14, please.

12 MS. JACKSON: Hello. Can everybody hear me?

13 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

14 MS. JACKSON: Hello, my name is India Jackson.  
15 She/hers. I am a black, 19-year-old college student from the  
16 south side of Chicago, and I am with an organization called  
17 GoodKids MadCity. I am going to try my best to keep this short  
18 and concise.

19 On August 15, 2020, I attended a protest downtown in  
20 the loop. While we were marching, I overheard somebody say  
21 that the police were going to start teargassing folks, so we  
22 all started running, but to no avail. We ended up being  
23 kettled in as the police started teargassing the crowd and  
24 started beating people with their batons and sticks, and stuff.  
25 And I was hit in my back with a baton, like, four times. And I

1 was teargassed. Luckily the tear gas didn't make it into my  
2 eyes, but I have permanent marks and discoloration on my arm  
3 and my legs from the tear gas touching my skin.

4 As I was trying to run, I saw the police ram a man so  
5 hard down on the concrete that his forehead started gashing  
6 blood. And I was hoping that seeing him bleeding would be  
7 enough to make them stop attacking this man, but they proceeded  
8 to haul him up and starting hitting him some more with his  
9 batons before they arrested him.

10 So we were eventually all kettled in until the police  
11 started going "bag check" and letting people out. And they  
12 didn't really let everybody out because they were specifically  
13 looking for people to arrest. I was one of the lucky ones that  
14 got out. But as I was pushed out of the scene, they closed it  
15 off, and, like, I watched helplessly as five of my friends were  
16 wrongly beaten and detained.

17 I hope that people can see this and see that this is  
18 a perfect example of (audio breaking up) CPD because at this  
19 point they are being paid (unintelligible) color, and that's  
20 not right. They are being paid, and we need money for  
21 resources.

22 That's all I have to say. Thank you for your time,  
23 your Honor.

24 THE COURT: Thank you very much for yours.

25 Let's see, we can move on to No. 15, then, please.

1 SPEAKER KERSTETTER: Hello. Can you hear me?

2 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

3 MS. KERSTETTER: Okay. Thank you. Hello. My name  
4 is River Kerstetter. I am 28-years-old, and I am an Indigenous  
5 artist and teacher living in Chicago. My pronouns are she/her.

6 On July 17th, I attended the Black Indigenous  
7 Solidarity Rally in Grant Park to show solidarity with my Black  
8 and Indigenous sibling, working for an end to structural racism  
9 and police brutality and to protest the statue of Christopher  
10 Columbus, a racist and violent man who represents hundreds of  
11 years of genocide slavery and white supremacy.

12 When the crowd arrived at the statue, police  
13 surrounded us, leaving us with no way to leave. I joined other  
14 protesters in linking arms in order to protect more vulnerable  
15 people from potential violence. Many police officers were not  
16 wearing masks and many were laughing or openly cursing at  
17 protesters. Soon after surrounding us, police began to shove  
18 and teargas people without warning or explanation. I'd like to  
19 remind all those listening that tear gas is banned in war by  
20 the 1925 Geneva Convention, but for some reason police are  
21 allowed to use it on protesters.

22 At some point, I asked a nearby officer: Why are you  
23 hurting us? To which he responded: Because you're not  
24 listening. This is how this works.

25 This comment was very alarming to me because the

1 police were telling us to move but left us no way to leave, and  
2 I couldn't see how our presence could justify such  
3 disproportionate violence.

4 Without warning, a police officer shoved me to the  
5 ground and beat me repeatedly on my back and ribs with a baton.  
6 I tucked my head beneath my arms and didn't fight back. I  
7 don't remember much from this moment because all I could feel  
8 was blinding pain from being hit over and over with a baton.

9 After some time, others helped separate me from the  
10 officers. Police continued to beat and gas other people. Many  
11 people, including many young people, were screaming out for  
12 medical attention, but police did nothing to help them.

13 When we tried to leave, officers let my friend pass,  
14 but told me I would have to go another way, although it was  
15 unclear as to why. Because my friend is white and I am  
16 Indigenous, I couldn't help but wonder if the officer was  
17 treating us differently because of the color of our skin.

18 Eventually, the police did let me pass, and my friend  
19 and I went home. I was left with a large bruise on my back,  
20 cuts on my legs and sharp pain in my ribs. These injuries and  
21 memories of the violence I witnessed made it extremely  
22 difficult for me to sleep and go about my days for several  
23 weeks.

24 Later, on July 27th, my doctor diagnosed me with a  
25 bruised rib. As I'm speaking today, almost a month later, my



1 rib is still in pain. Many of my friends who attended the  
2 protest that day were also hurt, gassed and traumatized by  
3 police.

4 I am horrified at how violent the police acted  
5 towards protesters that day and how they have hurt many other  
6 protesters recently. I was left with a bruised rib, but I know  
7 that Black Chicagoans and other people of color are treated far  
8 worse by Chicago police every day.

9 I feel that the Chicago police abuse their power, and  
10 our city would be much safer for everyone if we defunded the  
11 police and fund things that actually keep us safe, such as  
12 housing, healthcare, education and food for all.

13 Thank you, your Honor.

14 THE COURT: Thank you very much for your comments. I  
15 appreciate it.

16 I do not see 16 or 17 in the queue, but let me ask if  
17 No. 16 is available to speak now.

18 MS. HICKEY: I believe you are correct, your Honor.  
19 And if you want to just call out 17, and then we can move to  
20 18.

21 THE COURT: All right. How about, is 17 available to  
22 speak now?

23 Okay. It appears that Speaker No. 18 is in the  
24 queue, so if we could move on to Speaker 18, please.

25 MS. ARTIS: Hello.

1 THE COURT: Hi.

2 MS. ARTIS: Sorry, do you hear an echo at all?

3 THE COURT: I did, but now I just hear you.

4 MS. ARTIS: Okay, great. My name is Elizia. I am a  
5 resident of Chicago, here to talk about my experiences this  
6 spring.

7 On Saturday, May 30, 2020, I chose to protest the  
8 lack of humanity afforded to Black individuals when they  
9 encounter the police. That Saturday was not my first or last  
10 protest in this vein, as I am a Black woman with a Black  
11 mother, father, and brother, hoping to raise a Black child.

12 My encounter with the Chicago Police Department took  
13 place at roughly 6:30 PM. I say roughly because my first  
14 correspondence with friends about the incident began at  
15 6:45 p.m. It took us at least ten minutes to run to our car  
16 safely from where the incident took place, the intersection of  
17 North State and West Kinzie, in the patio section of the  
18 restaurant called the Public House.

19 CPD blocked off State and Kinzie in front of us, and  
20 they were encroaching on State and Hubbard behind us. While  
21 witnessing minor spats in which protesters yelled at the  
22 police, I was under the impression that we were being let  
23 through the police line to meet up with other protesters  
24 approaching from the west on Kinzie. This was not the case.

25 As we moved towards our friends and peers, the police

1 used shields and batons to push people back. This is when I  
2 saw a young man pushed to the ground by a police officer and  
3 beaten while he used his hand to try to shield his face. Since  
4 the surrounding officers were not trying to stop this from  
5 happening, I shouted: You can't do that. Simultaneously, a  
6 younger woman next to me threw a dirt clod from the Public  
7 House patio in the police's direction. I want to make this  
8 very clear, not at them, and not even a symbol of something  
9 like that would ever cause an armed officer to say that they  
10 feared for their lives.

11 Three officers approached us while, due to poor crowd  
12 control, a small group of protesters also fled toward us. The  
13 protesters knocked over the young woman next to me. As more  
14 protesters and police approached, I chose to cover her body so  
15 she would not get trampled. At this point, the police reached  
16 us, and I was beaten with a baton on my back. I estimate the  
17 officer beat me for 15 to 30 seconds. I can't say for sure  
18 because I was focused on blocking the young woman who was  
19 covering her head as an officer reached around me to beat her.  
20 I also focused on the uniqueness of my screams. This was the  
21 first time I heard myself make a sound I could only describe as  
22 a combination of shock, fear, and gurgling pain.

23 When the officers stopped beating me, he said: Get  
24 the "F" out of here. This was the first time an officer told  
25 me I couldn't be in that location. I froze for a moment and

1 said "no" because I was helping the young woman look for her  
2 phone that fell out of her hand as she covered her head from  
3 the beating. The officer who beat me, and another, began  
4 shouting at the two of us. So I said: Okay, but tell us where  
5 to go so we don't get beaten again. There is no where to go.

6 The police slowly rearranged the human-made barricade  
7 around the mayhem to let us out. My husband and I then ran  
8 through a series of alleyways to avoid the many police  
9 barricades.

10 Thank you for your time.

11 THE COURT: Thank you very much for your comments.

12 I think we can move on to No. 19, then, please.

13 MS. GALLO: Hello. Can you hear me all right?

14 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

15 MS. GALLO: Good. My name is Stephanie Gallo. I am  
16 a Master's nursing student and EMT. I am a volunteer street  
17 medic for Chicago Action Medical and attended the July 17,  
18 2020, Black and Indigenous Solidarity Rally as a medic. I did  
19 not see any city or publicly funded medical group there. All  
20 the medics I know of are volunteers. My statements do not  
21 represent Chicago Action Medical or any other organization.

22 For the past decade, I have worked as a wilderness  
23 EMT in some of the wildest and most extreme regions of our  
24 earth. I have seen and treated grizzly bear attacks, sea lion  
25 bites, jellyfish stings, extreme heat and extreme cold

1 injuries. I have saved near-drowning victims. None of those  
2 incidents echo in my mind as much as the violent police  
3 brutality and subsequent civilian injuries I witnessed on  
4 July 17, 2020, at the Indigenous People's Rally in Chicago.

5 I will not be comparing these police actions to  
6 anything I have seen in nature because they are incredibly  
7 unnatural and inhuman actions. I saw one police officer bounce  
8 from foot to foot and wave their arms and baton around, mocking  
9 protesters. I saw police officers spray peaceful people with  
10 sensory-crippling sprays and hit their hands to rip away their  
11 bicycles. The police then shoved and threw people. The police  
12 were not being judicious in who they chose to brutalize. The  
13 police were targeting every single person they encountered,  
14 even my fellow medics. I saw people beg for police to stop  
15 touching them and hurting them and to leave them alone.

16 At one point, I was assisting a woman self-administer  
17 her inhaler for her asthma that was exacerbated by the  
18 chemicals the police were spraying. I looked up to see a line  
19 of six police with helmets on and batons out walking towards  
20 us. I turned to my fellow medic and said: I'd really like to  
21 not get beat up today. He agreed, and we grabbed this woman  
22 under her shoulders and helped her to an area away from the  
23 oncoming police.

24 It was reported by CPD and media that civilians were  
25 using broken-off parts of banners as weapons. The only people

1 I saw do this were police officers. I saw an officer pick up a  
2 piece of PVC pipe and swing it at a line of people with  
3 interlinked arms, while these people backed away from the  
4 threatening officer. The officer then threw the pipe at the  
5 legs of these retreating people.

6 As I treated patients, clouds of sensory-crippling  
7 sprays rained down on me. On that evening, I could feel the  
8 burning effects on my skin, in my nose and eyes for hours  
9 afterwards. We ran out of water we were using to flush  
10 chemicals out of the eyes of those that the police sprayed.

11 I have attended multiple protests in Chicago as a  
12 civilian and a medic. And as you already know, my observations  
13 are not an island. This is a part of a pattern of brutality on  
14 civilians at the hands of the Chicago Police Department. The  
15 City of Chicago and the Chicago Police Department has failed  
16 the people and will continue to fail the people if drastic  
17 changes are not made right now. Thank you for your time.

18 THE COURT: Thank you very much for your time.

19 I think we're on to No. 20; is that right?

20 MS. HICKEY: Yes, your Honor, that's correct. And I  
21 believe No. 20 is ready in the queue.

22 MS. REYNOLDS-TYLER: Can you hear me?

23 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

24 MS. REYNOLDS-TYLER: Thank you. My name is Trina  
25 Reynolds-Tyler, and my pronouns are she/they, and I'm 27 years

1 old. I'm a Chicago native and a recent graduate of the  
2 University of Chicago here at School of Public Policy. I am a  
3 data analyst and an organizer.

4 On May 30th, minutes after I arrived downtown, I saw  
5 police attempting to illegally arrest friends of mine. The  
6 police were shoving the crowd who was peacefully marching down  
7 the street. This peaceful march was met with police shoving  
8 and pulling people into them in an attempt to disrupt the  
9 protests and arrest them. While they were not successful, many  
10 people were bruised and stepped on, including myself. As soon  
11 as the police began to engage with people, everyone began to  
12 scream, and the order that existed before police had arrived  
13 dissipated. People were confused and began to swarm. Police  
14 contributed to a vortex of chaos and escalation.

15 As I approached a bridge near the Trump Tower, I  
16 realized that we had been kettled. Hundreds were surrounded by  
17 police officers. This felt incredibly unsafe. Not only  
18 because the police were closing in on us, but also because  
19 there was little room for space to protect ourselves from  
20 COVID-19. At that point, many people started sitting on the  
21 bridge, unsure of where to go next.

22 I noticed the officers began to ready themselves to  
23 move because they positioned their batons across their bodies  
24 and formed a stronger line. Officers began to synchronicity  
25 say "move," while pushing the people who were already packed

1 like sardines on the bridge. People were screaming for them to  
2 stop, yelling that they couldn't breathe and demanding that --  
3 to let people through.

4 It felt like I was in the middle of a rugby scrum,  
5 squeezed between people and often being lifted off of the  
6 ground because the pressure of my body was so intense. I  
7 repeatedly told officers stop pushing because someone behind me  
8 was having trouble breathing and was laying on the ground. I  
9 repeatedly told officers to stop pushing because they were  
10 hurting me. An officer hit my leg with a baton multiple times  
11 during an arrest of someone beside me who was dragged in, head  
12 first, and thrown across the police line by police officers.  
13 Because of the police pushing, I was separated from the people  
14 that I came with, the people who would keep me safe.

15 On that day, police participated in reckless  
16 endangerment. They put the lives of so many people in  
17 jeopardy, while -- who were protesting, practicing their First  
18 Amendment right to protest. Police presence escalated tensions  
19 and created a dangerous space for everyone near or around the  
20 protest. They did not report the force that they used. My  
21 friend, through FOIA request and footage, has confirmed that  
22 the police do not always submit tactical response reports when  
23 they use force, and thus TRRs are not an accurate measurement  
24 of the use of force and abuse of power.

25 When police are in proximity to people, situations



1 become violent. The data generation -- generating process or  
2 the data that we use to determine that police are doing a  
3 better job is flawed. I know people who have been stopped and  
4 searched without receiving records of that search, seen  
5 complaints of violence by police where TRRs were only generated  
6 after being called out, and body cameras that police -- where  
7 police officers have the discretion about whether or not they  
8 turn them on.

9 We need to reduce the power of police and have first  
10 responders that are rooted in care.

11 Thank you.

12 THE COURT: Thank you very much.

13 I don't see Speaker 21 in the queue, but I'll ask if  
14 Speaker 21 is available.

15 MS. HICKEY: I don't believe so, your Honor. I  
16 believe No. 22 is ready, though, so if you want to call No. 22.

17 THE COURT: Speaker No. 22, then, please. Thank you.

18 MS. DELANEY: Hello. Can you hear me?

19 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

20 MS. DELANEY: Thank you so much. Hello, my name is  
21 Erin Delaney, she/her. I am a labor organizer. I will focus  
22 today on one of the instances of police violence I have  
23 experienced over the past few months in Chicago.

24 On July 17th, I was attacked by a Chicago police  
25 officer while on Roosevelt Boulevard. I attended the march

1 that day which led Chicagoans to the Columbus statue. While  
2 watching police flood the green leading up to the statue, with  
3 no audible call for dispersal, and no opportunity to do so,  
4 unprotected Chicagoans were met with a sea of swinging batons.  
5 Screams of help came from the crowd. People were climbing on  
6 top of each other trying to find a way out. Someone, pulled  
7 out by protesters, bleeding from their head so badly that they  
8 could not stand. They were covered in blood. I saw orange  
9 Mace streaming up from the crowd like fountains.

10 My husband and I ran to the concrete barrier on the  
11 south side of the statue. We were assisting injured people  
12 trying to disperse. My husband attended to one person who was  
13 maced so badly they could not walk or see. He put him on his  
14 back and carried him to safety away from police. There was an  
15 officer approximately two feet in front of me wearing no  
16 protective mask. I said: I am just trying to get people out  
17 of here safely. He said nothing and maced me directly in my  
18 face. I could feel the Mace soaking the front of my body  
19 completely. He then beat me repeatedly with his baton, hitting  
20 it on my left arm and back multiple times with enough force to  
21 draw blood. The officer then maced me again on the left side  
22 of my face, soaking the side of my body.

23 My husband returned to pull me away from the peace  
24 officer who was beating his wife. Fortunately -- I'm sorry, my  
25 husband was maced as well. The officer tore his bike from his

1 hands and whipped his baton at his head. Fortunately, the bike  
2 got in the way of the officer's swing and only a small cut was  
3 left on my husband's forehead. His bike was confiscated. I  
4 could not see. I pulled my mask off. This was the only time I  
5 had to remove my mask at a protest. I struggled to breathe. I  
6 have severe asthma. I was not only incapable but afraid of  
7 destroying my only inhaler by contaminating it with Mace. The  
8 burning was unbearable. I was shaking uncontrollably. I  
9 remember stumbling, my bike still in my hands, just screaming  
10 down the street. My husband pulled me along. I cried out for  
11 water. While surrounded by officers sworn to protect and  
12 serve, only volunteer medics came to my aid. The burning did  
13 not subside for days. The injuries on my arm and back are  
14 still healing.

15 I would like to remind the judge that I pay the  
16 salary of the man who saw it fit, who without a word, maced me,  
17 beat me, and then maced me again.

18 The Chicago Police Department should have been  
19 disbanded a century ago when they murdered labor organizers at  
20 Haymarket, decades ago when Jon Burge's torture became public  
21 knowledge, the day after Rekia Boyd was murdered. I am  
22 appalled by Lori Lightfoot's obviously clouded judgment in  
23 respect to the wildly irresponsible police force. The thin  
24 blue line is choking the life out of the city.

25 Free Mohawk Johnson, who remains incarcerated at Cook

1 County Jail after his bail has been paid and dismantle CPD.

2 Thank you for your time today.

3 THE COURT: Thank you for your comments.

4 Speaker No. 23, please.

5 MS. NOEL: Hello, your Honor. Can you hear me?

6 THE COURT: Yes, we can hear you. Thank you.

7 MS. NOEL: Thank you, your Honor. I say this in  
8 honor of: I am Rekia Boyd. I watched it. The criminals, the  
9 froth, and the cowards. Men who have no right to be police  
10 officers and women unnecessarily wielding military weapons. We  
11 have pictures of cops with no masks during the COVID pandemic  
12 that has been devastating the community from which they work.  
13 And they have had massive COVID infection rates at CPD and at  
14 least three confirmed deaths.

15 I saw women who weren't protesting. Mia Wright,  
16 Tnika Tate, Kim Woods, snatched out of their car, and a cop put  
17 his knee on Mia's neck, which can only be described as a pure  
18 act of terrorism and a hate crime after the George Floyd  
19 incident. They totaled Tnika's car with their baton. And to  
20 add insult to injury and further harm, they charged Mia  
21 criminally, an innocent young woman.

22 I absolutely do believe Mayor Lightfoot sacrificed  
23 the south and west sides, and I expect full economic recovery  
24 by next election, or you, your Honor, should hold her solely  
25 responsible for all of the consent decree violations.

1           Additionally, I am disappointed in both Kim Fox and  
2 the mayor in their handling of violent police action versus  
3 looting and other rebellious violence. Therefore, Womens' All  
4 Points Bulletin, WAPB, as a Campbell plaintiff and coalition  
5 member with the power to enforce the consent decree orally  
6 moves this court to:

7           One: Use your inherent power to launch federal  
8 investigations under DOJ law against the officers who violated  
9 both the consent decree and the constitutional rights of our  
10 constituents, citizens and protect them federally -- I'm sorry,  
11 and prosecute them federally.

12           Two: Order a line-item budget of the police and fire  
13 department budgets, under the CD's transparency paragraphs to  
14 uncover waste and inefficiency.

15           Three: To recognize the community working groups and  
16 order a one-on-one meeting with the MOU stakeholders in regards  
17 to the inclusion of community working groups and policy  
18 creation, improvements, monitoring and guiding principles of  
19 enforcement.

20           Four: To order CPD to provide the data necessary to  
21 assist each working group in writing policy that can be  
22 statistically measured for improvement.

23           We have recommendations. We have specifically  
24 recommended to the Chicago Police Department the enactment of  
25 two successful programs that include Crisis Assessment Cars and

1 Oregon's CAHOOTS Program. We would like to submit these  
2 programs' successes for your approval to include in the consent  
3 decree. Please let us know if we need to move the court in  
4 writing, or our oral motions will suffice.

5 And I have one question for you, your Honor. Can you  
6 have two police safety unions in one city?

7 THE COURT: That question I'll have to take under  
8 advisement because I don't have the answer off the top of my  
9 head.

10 I thank you for your comments, and I think it would  
11 be helpful, actually, if there is specific things you want to  
12 put them in writing. I mean, obviously there will be a  
13 transcript of this proceeding, but there may need to be some  
14 background and some context for your request that would be more  
15 than you could possibly do in three minutes. So it would be  
16 helpful if you wanted to put anything in writing that would be  
17 in the nature of a specific request for relief. Okay?

18 MS. NOEL: Yes, sir. Thank you, your Honor.

19 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much for your  
20 comments.

21 I do not see Speaker 24 in the queue specifically,  
22 but that doesn't mean Speaker 24 is not available. So if  
23 Speaker 24 is available, this will be your time.

24 MS. HICKEY: Your Honor, I do not believe Speaker  
25 No. 24 is available, or online, so if we could move to 25.

1 THE COURT: Okay. Speaker No. 25, then, please.

2 Thank you.

3 MS. HIYAMA: Hello, can you hear me?

4 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

5 MS. HIYAMA: Hi, my name is Clare Hiyama. I use  
6 she/her pronouns. I'm 26, and I'm a health educator living in  
7 Ravinswood Chicago. And when schools are in person and in  
8 session, I teach all over the city.

9 As a Chicago resident, it has pained me greatly to  
10 see the gulf between what we would expect as public servants  
11 and what we are actually experiencing at the hands of the  
12 Chicago Police Department. I have been and continue to be  
13 appalled at the actions of CPD over the last three months.  
14 They have terrorized many people in the city for decades. And  
15 in recent months, they have shown no willingness to change or  
16 to take responsibility for their actions. Even in the face of  
17 overwhelming video evidence of their violence, they have not  
18 been able to admit that their actions have been excessive.

19 I was at the protest in Grant Park on July 17th,  
20 where I saw CPD's brutality firsthand. Like many others have  
21 said, I saw them hit a protester in the head, and I saw the  
22 blood running down his face from his temple. I saw them  
23 spraying protesters without warning with an unknown substance  
24 from hoses, and immediately after, everyone in the vicinity was  
25 coughing and crying and throwing up. And this is all during an

1 airborne respiratory pandemic. I saw them push down individual  
2 protesters and rip their bikes out of their hands. I saw them  
3 beat people who were trying to run away from them. Even when  
4 they were looking right at people in clear need of medical  
5 assistance, CPD offered none. Only later did I see a video of  
6 them beating the friend I attended with. We had gotten  
7 separated in the chaos that night. And that was really hard to  
8 watch.

9 One of the things that showed me the most that night  
10 was the way that the officers on the scene laughed at us. When  
11 we begged them to leave people alone, they laughed. When we  
12 were walking away from the scene, they were mocking us. It  
13 felt like they view Chicagoans who are fighting for justice as  
14 enemies, and they treat us that way.

15 I was there that night because I believe the city  
16 needs to invest in marginalized communities through healthcare,  
17 housing, mental health services, help fund schools, and to diet  
18 us from punitive carceral systems of control.

19 What I saw that night reaffirmed my belief that CPD  
20 cannot create or uphold public safety and that we must defund  
21 them.

22 As a culture, we think that it's really important to  
23 have police to protect us, but I, as a young white-passing  
24 woman would be so reluctant to call upon them because of the  
25 risks that that would entail. Not only of how they might treat



1 me, but also of how they might treat people in my neighborhood  
2 if they came in response to a call.

3 As a health educator, I often get questions from my  
4 students about what they should do if they experience sexual  
5 violence. And it's one of the most emotionally difficult parts  
6 of my job. I wish I could tell them there are people that you  
7 could call who would come quickly, who would treat you with  
8 respect, who would keep you physically and emotionally safe and  
9 who would help you get long-term support, but I feel it would  
10 be completely irresponsible as an educator to tell them that  
11 CPD are those people. The possible costs are too great.

12 Thank you for your time.

13 THE COURT: Thank you for your comments.

14 I don't see Speaker 26 in the queue, but if  
15 Speaker 26 is available, please go ahead.

16 MS. HICKEY: I believe you can move on, your Honor,  
17 to No. 27.

18 THE COURT: Okay. Speaker 27, then, please.

19 MR. JOYNT: Hello, can you hear me?

20 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

21 MR. JOYNT: Great. Hello, my name is Matthew Joynt,  
22 and I am a 36-year-old film composer, artist, small business  
23 owner and resident of Chicago. I'm white, and I use he/him  
24 pronouns.

25 For the last six years, I've regularly engaged in

1 public protest against policing. During that time, I've  
2 witnessed and experienced a dramatic increase in police  
3 brutality, including extensive retaliatory use of lethal force  
4 against BLM and the movement to defund CPD. This summer has  
5 been no exception.

6 At the protest on May 31st, I witnessed an officer  
7 deliberately hit a teenage girl in the face with his baton,  
8 visibly shattering the bridge of her nose.

9 On June 2nd, I witnessed a young protester ask CPD  
10 Officer Andrew Gorlewski, Badge No. 7804: "Don't you care about  
11 my black life? Won't you even think about why we're here?" He  
12 responded: "I don't care about black lives, and I will not  
13 think about it."

14 On July 17th, I witnessed CPD pepper spray an adult  
15 educator continuously until she began to go into shock.  
16 Moments later, officers laughed as they pepper sprayed me at  
17 one-foot range, stole my bike, beat me to the ground and hit me  
18 repeatedly in the face and body.

19 Since the approval of the consent decree, the 2019  
20 federal mandate allegedly designed to bring reform,  
21 de-escalation training and accountability to the hellish  
22 policing practices witnessed by the DOJ in Chicago, we've been  
23 met with nothing but the opposite. This is because this is not  
24 an issue of police reform or a few bad apples. The entire  
25 institution of policing from the time of its inception in this

1 country as slave patrol to the present is a racist project  
2 designed to protect the power, property and capital of white  
3 people. But we fail to address our shameful legacies of  
4 community disinvestment, segregation, planned impoverishment  
5 and the ongoing criminalization of our Black and Brown  
6 neighbors, whose ancestors were kidnaped into slavery and  
7 exploited to build this country on stolen, Indigenous land.

8 If we want to talk about looting, let's start with  
9 white people. If we want to talk about public safety, let's  
10 establish a civilian police accountability counsel and defund  
11 the police by 75 percent, investing instead in non-carceral  
12 social services, education and mental health.

13 As one protest sign recently read: The safest  
14 communities don't have the most police, they have the most  
15 resources, which is why we will continue to be in the streets  
16 even in the face of the police intimidating us, lying about us,  
17 doxing us online, beating us, arresting us, kettling us,  
18 stealing from us, mocking us and smearing us in the press until  
19 we see the resourcing of Black and Brown communities and the  
20 defunding of the violent, ineffectual and racist system called  
21 the police. Thank you.

22 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Our next speaker is  
23 No. 28, please.

24 MR. DRAKE: Hello. Can everybody hear me?

25 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

1 MR. DRAKE: Thank you. Good afternoon. I want to  
2 begin by saying that, if the city was half as committed to the  
3 consent decree as the attorney represented to this court  
4 yesterday, then in the words of the late Senator Abe Bernicoff,  
5 we wouldn't have gestapo tactics in the streets of Chicago.

6 My name is Michael Drake. I'm a 2020 graduate of the  
7 UIC JM Law School, where I graduated in the top ten percent of  
8 my class. I'm also a veteran. I deployed to Afghanistan as an  
9 infantryman with the 2nd Cavalry Regiment from 2010, 2011. I  
10 bring up my service to fully contextualize what I say next:

11 CPD's use of force against peaceful protesters has  
12 horrified me.

13 On May 30th I attended protests as a legal observer  
14 with the NLG. On that day, I witnessed CPD officers attack  
15 protesters with a viciousness and a disregard for human life  
16 that I have not seen since witnessing Afghan police officers  
17 attack suspected Taliban members. I was at Trump Tower when  
18 CPD attempted to push protesters off of the Wabash bridge. I  
19 was in the very front of the protesters, wearing a legal  
20 observer hat. Officers are pushing us back with batons and  
21 protesters behind us were pushing us forward. To my left, CPD  
22 dragged a young woman to the ground and began kicking her and  
23 beating her with a baton. Another protester attempted to  
24 shield her and got the same treatment.

25 I attempted to get their names to send to the Mass

1 Defense Committee, which provides free legal representation to  
2 arrested protesters. While trying to get the names of the  
3 people being assaulted by the CPD, an officer hit me in the  
4 throat with his baton. As he attempted to do so again, I put  
5 my arm up to block it. After that, a number of officers began  
6 hitting me in the head with a baton. Other officers grabbed me  
7 from behind, ripped me over a concrete barrier, where they  
8 continued to beat me. Two other protesters attempted to stop  
9 the CPD from beating me and was beaten as well. I'm unsure of  
10 how long I was kicked, punched and hit with batons. After the  
11 beating, I was unable to sit or move for a week without extreme  
12 pain.

13 I was arrested and taken to the 18th Precinct where I  
14 was held without charge in a urine-soaked cell for over  
15 12 hours. Multiple attorneys and recent law grads were unable  
16 to ascertain my location for hours. No one in jail was given  
17 any informational or allowed any phone call until after NLG  
18 attorneys managed to find me, figure out where I was and send  
19 me legal representation.

20 All that pales in comparison to what I saw last  
21 Saturday, August 15th. In the most heinous act of  
22 (unintelligible) violence that I've witnessed in 29 years of  
23 life, I watched CPD officers clear out media before attacking  
24 injured people being treated by medics on the sidewalk. The  
25 CPD kicked people and medics, hit them with batons and

1 destroyed medical supplies. CPD officers hit me, shoved me and  
2 called me a pussy for pointing out the people who they were  
3 assaulting were injured. I was wearing a NLG legal observer  
4 hat that day as well.

5 CPD's behavior last Saturday was barbaric. If our  
6 country followed any international human rights allegation,  
7 that act alone would have violated multiple human rights  
8 treatment. If that act occurred during international conflict,  
9 it would have violated the Geneva Convention. But none of  
10 that, nor the consent decree, stopped CPD.

11 After that act, the CPD only became more aggressive.  
12 They kettled protesters (unintelligible) exit. They ran into  
13 kettled crowds while screaming and banging the sides of their  
14 batons. It was textbook psychological warfare.

15 CPD removed all legal observers from the area and  
16 prevented medical aid while they did God knows what to two  
17 unlucky protesters who did not manage to escape who were  
18 primarily young Black and Brown people.

19 The CPD is the (unintelligible) of the junta, and the  
20 city thanks them for it. I imagine some officers already  
21 (unintelligible) their awards of valor due to rogue acts of  
22 beating teenagers senseless. The city blames agitators and  
23 umbrellas for the August 16th violence. However, those that  
24 were there know what happened, and no enhanced suspected edited  
25 video submitted by the CPD can (unintelligible) what they did

1 that day.

2 As I address this honorable court, CPD has not been  
3 made to answer to the crimes. I doubt they will and never have  
4 been. Regardless, I urge the honorable court to require the  
5 CPD to follow the consent decree which requires, amongst other  
6 things, proportional use of force. Thank you.

7 THE COURT: Thank you for your comments.

8 I do not see 29, 30, or 31 in the attendee's queue.  
9 Maggie, do you see any of the next three?

10 MS. HICKEY: No, your Honor. I believe you've now  
11 called them, and No. 32 is ready.

12 THE COURT: Okay. So we can go ahead and move to 32  
13 then, please.

14 MS. MULLEN: Hi. Can you hear me?

15 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

16 MS. MULLEN: All right. One second. Good afternoon  
17 and thank you for the opportunity to speak. My name is  
18 Margaret Mullen, and I am a 24-year-old DePaul graduate,  
19 Chicago native and daughter of two Chicago police officers. My  
20 mother retired as a Sergeant from the First District, and my  
21 father was shot in the line of duty when I was six months old,  
22 catastrophically injuring him and initiating me into the  
23 Chicago Police Memorial Foundation and Gold Star family  
24 communities.

25 As a person who has grown up within the police

1 community, I have an intimate understanding of how the police  
2 think, what they talk about, how they spend their time, and I  
3 detest the fact that the police venerate the people in their  
4 circle and demonize the people outside of it. While  
5 protesting, I rarely identify myself as a Gold Star family  
6 member. But when I did, I watched officers soften their glares  
7 and listen to me. It is unacceptable that the subjugation of  
8 the Black body is so normalized that, until I identified myself  
9 as a Gold Star member, the police would not consider what I had  
10 to say. The police should treat every community member with  
11 the same respect that they treat those in their circle.

12 On May 31st and July 17th, I bore witness to the way  
13 the people I was taught would keep me safe attacked my peers,  
14 brutalized young people and blatantly lied to the public about  
15 their actions afterwards.

16 On May 31st, we openly denounced looting in every  
17 intersection where we rallied while we watched people break  
18 into stores and run across intersections with cash registers  
19 and other goods. There was a clear distinction between those  
20 participating in the protest and those who were looting. And  
21 it is important to note that, until we reached downtown Hyde  
22 Park, there was not a single officer to be seen.

23 When the protest disbanded around 7:00 PM at 53rd and  
24 Lake Park, there was a rush of approximately 15 squad cars that  
25 arrived in riot gear and started a police line blocking people



1 from heading west to make it back home before curfew.

2 On July 17th, I participated in the decolonized  
3 Zhigaagoong march from Buckingham Fountain to Grant Park. I  
4 witnessed police officers get trapped inside the area taken  
5 over by protesters. I saw the look of terror on their face  
6 when they realized they were circled, and they were allowed to  
7 walk out without a scratch. Ten minutes later, they beat young  
8 people silly. I witnessed people screaming and crying with  
9 swollen appendages, cracked skulls, blood streaming down their  
10 faces and accumulating all their clothes. There was coughing  
11 and vomiting from the chemicals released in the area, and I was  
12 dumbfounded by the level of force exhibited against the people  
13 the police claim to serve and protect.

14 With all of these experiences being hurtful and  
15 traumatic, the absolute worse part of the July 17th experience  
16 was Superintendent Brown's press conference the following day.  
17 I watched as Super Brown blatantly lied to the public regarding  
18 what prompted the violence on July 17th. He presented a video  
19 claiming to be evidence of protesters taking apart a banner  
20 with pre-sharpened PVC to jab and throw at the police. What I  
21 saw was the police pull the banner apart in order to hit the  
22 people behind the banner with their batons. The moment I saw  
23 Superintendent Brown lie to the public, any remainder of good  
24 faith in our leaders was destroyed.

25 There is a bridge that must be built between the

1 police and the community they serve. With public servants like  
2 Super Brown and Mayor Lightfoot, publicly demonizing protesters  
3 to maintain a good public image, the people of Chicago are  
4 going to continue to suffer. How are we serving and protecting  
5 the community when we lie to the public?

6 Judge Dow and Monitor Hickey, the people of Chicago  
7 need you to step in. CPD is not upholding the standards set by  
8 the consent decree, and it is actively hurting people. I am  
9 hurting. My life was fundamentally altered because of the  
10 violence against the police, and for far too long we have  
11 accepted excuses from our leaders and scapegoated the actions  
12 of individuals like Jason Van Dyke, rather than acknowledge the  
13 role that police have played in protecting property and the  
14 suppression of Black and Brown people.

15 I believe that meeting 100 percent of the milestones  
16 set by the consent decree is a start, but only by defunding CPD  
17 by a minimum of 75 percent will we be able to treat the root  
18 causes of crime instead of relying on a reactionary system that  
19 hurts people every day. Thank you.

20 THE COURT: Thank you for your comments.

21 I think Speaker No. 33, I believe, is -- I think I  
22 saw. Well, I'm not sure. Is Speaker No. 33 in the queue,  
23 please?

24 MS. HICKEY: Your Honor, I don't believe Speaker 33  
25 is. I, like yourself, mistakenly thought they were. But if

1 you want to call 33 and 34, I do not believe they have signed  
2 on. But No. 35 is ready.

3 THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's do one more call for  
4 33 and 34.

5 Okay. Let's try No. 35, then, please.

6 THE COURT: I think you may be on mute. I think  
7 we're getting there. I think you still may be -- there we go.

8 MR. JAWORSKI: Can you hear me?

9 THE COURT: We can hear you now. Thank you.

10 MR. JAWORSKI: Okay. Thank you so much, your Honor.

11 My name is David Jaworski. My pronouns are he/him. I'm 29,  
12 and I live on the north side of Chicago.

13 On July 17th, I attended the Black Indigenous  
14 Solidarity Rally at Buckingham Fountain. Afterwards, we  
15 started marching and ended up at the Columbus statue.  
16 Immediately I heard screaming and calls for help as police in  
17 riot gear with batons surged towards the statue. I walked my  
18 bike to a line of bike marshals standing, unmoving, not given  
19 official calls to disperse. We were trying to slow a group of  
20 police about to beat protesters. I was targeted by a  
21 white-shirt officer about twice my size. He was un-gloved,  
22 unmasked, and he picked me up by the throat, lifted me off the  
23 ground and threw me. I was choke-slammed by a police officer  
24 acting look a professional wrestler fighting to the audience.  
25 I got back on my feet and got ahold on my bike as he tried to

1 steal it from me. During the scuffle, I was being trampled and  
2 lost my left shoe. I was shoved again and fell onto a bike.  
3 My foot caught between the spokes. I was shoved and trampled  
4 again while on the ground and my pinky toe snapped between  
5 those spokes. Panicked and injured, I had to pull myself and  
6 my bike from the officers and hobbled away. Had I not been  
7 wearing my helmet, I would have likely been concussed from  
8 being thrown so many times. I was separated from my two  
9 friends that I went with and began calling them so we could  
10 leave. However, police had everyone surrounded so it would  
11 have been impossible anyway.

12 After ten minutes, I found one of my friends and told  
13 them about my foot. Concerned, they offered to take me to the  
14 paramedics. The ambulances were parked on Columbus near the  
15 Roosevelt entry section, next to all the cop cars, beyond the  
16 line of armed police, brutalizing protesters, making it  
17 impossible to get proper medical care, even if one could trust  
18 those that were standing with the very people beating them.

19 I finally got through to my second friend who had got  
20 swept up and was standing with protesters on the south side of  
21 the statue, beyond the police that had just beaten me. My  
22 friend had sounded scared and did not want to be there but also  
23 was not about to leave the people by their side opened and more  
24 harm. I lost contact with that friend and saw a red-orange  
25 cloud in the area. Everyone around me started coughing, and I

1 heard calls for medic every ten seconds. They were coughing,  
2 and they had to take off their mask because they had been  
3 pepper sprayed. I found out my friend was hit on their arms  
4 with a baton until they could no longer hold their bike. Their  
5 bike was stolen from them, and they were pepper sprayed, their  
6 whole body burned, and that it soaked into their genitals for  
7 hours afterwards. My bike was broken, my friend's stolen, and  
8 had we not been able to get a ride from another friend, I would  
9 have had to walk the five miles home on a swollen injured foot.

10 I am testifying today because I believe my story  
11 should be heard. I am a peaceful person that was attacked by a  
12 violent, uncaring organization. I lost already scarce work  
13 because of my injury and possible exposure to COVID.

14 My story and identity are now known to the police and  
15 their supporters who released the name and addresses of people  
16 who already have suffered trauma at the hands of the CPD. We  
17 saw this on their Twitter account on the 15th of August. My  
18 friend, who is an organizer had to -- I had to move them  
19 because they were doxxed and people had showed up to their  
20 home, faces covered, trying to attack them and terrorize them.  
21 We feel scared and vulnerable from the very people designated  
22 to serve and protect us, but they don't care.

23 Thank you, your Honor.

24 THE COURT: Thank you.

25 If I'm right, No. 36 was already a cancellation at

1 the beginning; is that right?

2 MS. HICKEY: I believe so, your Honor.

3 THE COURT: Okay. So we're on to Speaker No. 37,  
4 please.

5 MR. MERCADO: Hello, your Honor. Hello, everyone.  
6 My name is Juan Mercado. I use he/him pronouns, and I am a  
7 Latino person of color. I am currently employed by Howe  
8 Corporation as an inside sales coordinator. I do not represent  
9 them with these statements.

10 I was at the decolonized rally and march on  
11 July 17th, along with my partner, which began at Buckingham  
12 Fountain and made its way to the Columbus statue. We were  
13 there in solidarity with the Black and Indigenous organizers,  
14 demanding to defund CPD, get police out of CPS, and amongst  
15 other demands.

16 I will focus my testimony on what I witnessed at the  
17 Columbus statue. And I also want to point out that there is a  
18 video of, you know, things being thrown at officers. I heard  
19 rumors that there was rocks and frozen water bottles. I can  
20 confirm that I personally did not see anything of the sort.  
21 And, even so, police dispersed from the statue and were safe  
22 and then returned. And, here, as protesters were finally  
23 surrounding the statue, police were on our perimeter at this  
24 point, and they were up on the street, they were in the  
25 walkway. For a while, everyone was just standing around,

1 including police. And then at some point CPD made multiple  
2 attempts to try and get through the crowd and get to the  
3 statute. They used the batons and their Mace to beat and spray  
4 anyone in their path, and, you know, against unarmed protesters  
5 who were of no physical threat to them. In one specific  
6 instance, I recall two officers laying on top of a gentleman  
7 who was lying on the ground. They were on top of him. And  
8 knowing that people have suffocated when police have been on  
9 top of them and died, I yelled at them to get off of him. At  
10 that time, one police officer stood up, walked toward me and  
11 yelled something at me. I believe he said: What you're doing  
12 is wrong, as he proceeded to hit me with his baton on my left  
13 arm. And then I backed up, and I got caught up with someone's  
14 bike. And as I'm frantically trying to get uncaught, you know,  
15 we're afraid that we're going to get hit again, that we're  
16 going to get sprayed, I see two more officers get on top of the  
17 man lying now in a fetal position on the ground and all of them  
18 started to beat him with the batons.

19 Finally, once I got relief, I began tending to people  
20 who were maced, or sprayed, giving them eye flushes. Many of  
21 them were screaming in agony, gagging, coughing. And a couple  
22 of them mentioned that the police sprayed them directly into  
23 their eyes, targeting their eyes.

24 You know, at this point it felt like a battle zone.  
25 It felt -- it was scary to see. I couldn't believe what I was

1 seeing with my own eyes. It wasn't on a phone screen.

2 Anyway, eventually the police rallied back onto the  
3 street and later, once more police arrived, and I believe  
4 National Guard, or people in olive fatigues, they finally  
5 rushed the crowd one last time, breaking through, using their  
6 Mace again and using their batons.

7 And I just want to say that was not a display of the  
8 police protecting people, this was a display of police  
9 protecting inanimate objects. And it's clear to me now that we  
10 do need to defund CPD and reinvest in communities. There were  
11 so many cops there from different districts that those  
12 resources can be better used to serve our communities. And  
13 that's all I have to say. Thank you for your time.

14 THE COURT: Thank you for your time.

15 I don't see No. 38 in the queue, but I do see Speaker  
16 No. 39. So if we could move on to Speaker No. 39, please.

17 MR. HOLDAHL: Hi. Can everyone hear me okay?

18 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

19 MR. HOLDAHL: Hi, my name is Val Holdahl. I'm white,  
20 I use they/them pronouns, and I am 28 years old. I have  
21 participated in community organizing for the last four years,  
22 one of my primary roles being in direct action setting serving  
23 as a street medic. I was trained in 2017 as a street medic by  
24 a collective called Chicago Action Medical. I'm speaking on  
25 behalf of myself as a voluntary street medic and protester and



1 someone who has personally experienced and witnessed harm by  
2 CPD. My statements do not represent Chicago Action Medical the  
3 Street Med Org, or any organization. Although I do voice my  
4 support on behalf of the 2018 Black Lives Matter Chicago  
5 consent decree and any Black Indigenous people of color,  
6 community members who reinforce their complaints regarding the  
7 violent, physical and emotional harm caused by Chicago Police  
8 Officers and their department.

9           Although there are several incidences I could speak  
10 on, I will be focusing on July 17, 2020, the Black and  
11 Indigenous People's Rally held at Buckingham Fountain.

12           When we began marching, there were already dozens of  
13 fully armored officers waiting for our arrival with batons,  
14 multiple types of guns harnessed on their bodies and chemical  
15 devices that released toxic sprays. Crowds began to gather  
16 around the statue. Police lined up surrounding everyone with  
17 their bikes and blocking off most paths to exit. You may  
18 recognize this tactic as kettling. Protesters were  
19 non-violently attempting to protect the most vulnerable people,  
20 and they were met with brutal force by the police for doing so.

21           This led to the dozens of people getting pushed down  
22 or off their bikes, having their bikes taken, destroyed or  
23 stolen and used as weapons by the police to knock down more  
24 bystanders. I watched multiple individuals get beat with  
25 batons directly to their head, face, chest, arms, nearly

1 everywhere on their body for nearly standing in the middle of  
2 the commotion. I watched people I love get that, happen to  
3 them too. None of the protesters I saw were fighting the  
4 officers, even while they were being beaten and provoked. I  
5 could not count the number of protesters affected by the  
6 chemical weapon sprayed that evening. I also was affected by  
7 the sprays they were using. It felt like sharp and stinging  
8 objects were stuck in my throat, and I coughed so hard I almost  
9 vomited. This happened to me multiple times that night. I saw  
10 protesters having asthma and panic attacks from the spray, in  
11 addition to the debilitating injuries from being beaten with  
12 batons, bikes, and even PVC pipes. Along with the other  
13 medics, I spent most of the time rinsing protesters' red and  
14 inflamed eyes out with water to delete the effects of the  
15 chemical weapons. I continued to see bloody head injuries,  
16 contusions, raw abrasions to skin and numerous other injury.

17 Later in the evening, there was jail support  
18 organized at 51st and Wentworth and Division and Laramie  
19 precincts. The detained individuals were not provided medical  
20 care and were held for hours with chemical spray burning on  
21 their skin and their eyes. My partner was one of those  
22 detained. It destroyed her glasses, and she couldn't see for  
23 hours on top of the damage to her eyes.

24 One protester even had a seizure while under arrest  
25 and being detained and was transported to a hospital, only for

1 the care of that seizure, not to address the intense bodily  
2 harm caused that evening by the police officers. The police  
3 department demanded this protester's return to the precinct  
4 after becoming stabilized from the seizure.

5 I hope that by sharing what I have witnessed due to a  
6 very small insight to only a few of the times I have seen  
7 police brutality against protesters, this is not even including  
8 the ongoing police brutality against Black and Brown lives,  
9 people experiencing homelessness and people with disabilities  
10 that I've seen as a bystander. I have seen the use -- police  
11 use protests and demonstrations as an excuse to bully,  
12 intimidate and abuse people exercising their First Amendment  
13 rights because protesters are seen as quote-unquote  
14 "resisting."

15 Since I don't have the time to go over other events  
16 where I have seen lethal force against protesters by police, I  
17 will just say the dates: May 30, June 1st, August 9th and  
18 15th, all within 2020. And none of these officers were wearing  
19 masks or even practicing COVID-19 precautions.

20 Police should be prohibited from harassing and  
21 trolling the families and communities of people murdered by the  
22 police. The police need to be held accountable for their  
23 actions. They need to be removed from protests, and the police  
24 department budget needs to be reallocated because their  
25 presence promotes the opposite of feeling protected. They want

1 to instill scare, and they know that. Even you all know that,  
2 and so do the political leaders of Chicago. Yes, that includes  
3 Lori Lightfoot. Thank you.

4 THE COURT: Thank you for your comments.

5 We have Speaker No. 40, then, please.

6 MS. BETZEL: Can everyone hear me?

7 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

8 MS. BETZEL: Thank you. My name is Alex Betzel. My  
9 pronouns are she/her/hers. I'm white, I'm 30 years old, and  
10 I'm a fundraiser at WTTW Channel 11 and classical WFMT 98.7.

11 On May 30th, at about 2:00 PM, I rode my bike down to  
12 Daley Plaza to join the protests there against the pattern of  
13 police brutality by the Chicago Police Department, as well as  
14 the brutal death of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor.

15 I got off my bike and started to March with the other  
16 protesters, and at about 4:00 o'clock, we started to approach  
17 the Trump Tower. That is when police began to push into the  
18 crowd. I turned, and I started to walk away from the police,  
19 and at that time one officer ripped my bike out of my hand and  
20 another threw me on the ground. They trailed back into the  
21 crowd of protesters, and over about the next hours they  
22 continued to push into the protesters.

23 I was on the front line of protesters, and at that  
24 time Officer Angelo Gallegos pressed his baton horizontally  
25 against my chest and also my neck. I turned my head so the

1 baton wouldn't be directly against my windpipe, and he  
2 continued to push. He pinned me up against the protesters  
3 behind me until I couldn't talk. And then at that point I  
4 couldn't breath anymore, and I couldn't keep my feet underneath  
5 me, the crowd was moving so much, and my knees gave out. So he  
6 was pressing the baton against my neck so hard that I couldn't  
7 fall to my knees. I was hanging by his baton.

8 When I started to go completely limp, another  
9 protester called him off, said, she is choking, she can't  
10 breathe, she can't breathe, take off your baton. I think that  
11 protester saved my life that day.

12 Later that day, I also watched the police swing their  
13 batons and hit protesters in the head, the neck, the shoulders  
14 the face. Mainly protesters of color. I watched groups of six  
15 or seven officers target individual, unarmed protesters and  
16 chase them down, tackle them, beat them with their batons and  
17 arrest them.

18 For the next couple of days, my throat hurt so bad.  
19 It hurt to talk and cough. I had pain in my neck for almost  
20 two months following that protest, and I still have trouble  
21 focusing at work because of the intrusive memories and the  
22 rising sense of panic. I am seeking additional therapy for the  
23 emotional trauma, and it haunts me to this day.

24 Thank you for your time.

25 THE COURT: Thank you for your comments. We can move

1 on to Speaker No. 41, then, please. I think you're on mute.

2 MR. HANNIGAN: Okay. How about now?

3 THE COURT: Much better. Thank you.

4 MR. HANNIGAN: All right. Thank you. Sorry about  
5 that.

6 THE COURT: That's okay.

7 MR. HANNIGAN: Hello, my name is Matt Hannigan. I'm  
8 a resident of Chicago, Illinois. Thank you for this  
9 opportunity to speak. I attended a demonstration which began  
10 at Millennium Park on Saturday, August 15th and would like to  
11 relay my observations.

12 Once the group of demonstrators convened at Michigan  
13 and Wacker, the police quickly surrounded us on the east, west  
14 and south, while the north side of the intersection was blocked  
15 by a raised drawbridge and a large truck, essentially trapping  
16 us. It was immediately apparent that the police, who  
17 outnumbered the protesters by a factor of at least 2-to-1,  
18 would not be treating us as the peaceful protesters that we  
19 were. The officers arrived clad in helmets, visors, batons and  
20 armed with pepper spray. Despite the ongoing pandemic, very  
21 few officers wore face masks.

22 Not long after the police surrounded the protesters,  
23 I witnessed a ranking officer in his 50s or 60s in white  
24 short-sleeve shirt and black vest walk from the west side of  
25 the intersection to the east. Instead of simply walking around

1 the perimeter, he chose to walk through the group, clearly as  
2 an act of intimidation. I saw him violently shove a young  
3 woman out of his way for no reason other than to assert his  
4 dominance over the crowd. The officer could have easily walked  
5 behind the large truck parked at the base of the bridge, a path  
6 that would have been clear of my protesters. I would like to  
7 stress the importance of this. His use of unwarranted violence  
8 was extreme and completely unnecessary and ultimately  
9 avoidable.

10 A few minutes later, I saw protesters take out  
11 umbrellas. The police violently ripped their umbrellas out of  
12 many of the protesters' hands and then began hitting them with  
13 their batons. I would like to make clear that the umbrellas  
14 were not used in any sort of menacing, threatening manner. I  
15 witnessed unarmed protesters wearing nothing but regular  
16 clothing get beat on the head and arms by Chicago police  
17 officers in full protective gear. How can it be a crime to  
18 carry an umbrella?

19 Soon after I witnessed pepper spray deployed within  
20 inches of protesters' faces. It's difficult to describe the  
21 feeling of seeing protesters being pepper sprayed by CPD, but I  
22 became extremely fearful for my safety. Not at the hands of  
23 the protesters, but at the hands of the Chicago Police  
24 Department. I witnessed young people stumble into the middle  
25 of the interaction, blinded by pepper spray, writhing in pain,

1 panic and confusion, ripping their masks off to breathe and  
2 screaming in agony. The use of pepper spray in the midst of a  
3 respiratory pandemic seems like an extremely cruel and callous  
4 response to a group of young people just trying to make their  
5 voices heard. With the smell of pepper spray fresh in my  
6 nostrils, I left the area.

7 I'd like to make clear that the violent police  
8 response to this peaceful protest was completely unwarranted.  
9 The protesters were simply exercising their First Amendment  
10 right to free speech and assembly. The police violated that  
11 right by beating and pepper spraying us. CPD clearly did not  
12 have safety of anyone in mind.

13 Thank you very much.

14 THE COURT: Thank you. Let's see, we have about ten  
15 minutes until we're going to take the midafternoon break, so  
16 let's move on to Speaker 42, then, please.

17 MS. ZELDIN: Hi. Can you hear me?

18 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

19 MS. ZELDIN: Thank you, your Honor. My name is Wendy  
20 Zeldin. My pronouns are she/they. I am 35 years old. I'm a  
21 parent of an eight-year-old CPS student, and I manage a  
22 farmer's market on the south side.

23 On July 17th I attended the Black and Indigenous  
24 Solidarity Rally at Buckingham Fountain. I marched to the  
25 southern edge of Grant Park with a handful of my friends. We



1 were hopeful and energetic. I was happy to be out supporting  
2 the incredibly youth activists and was inspired by the kindness  
3 and generosity that I saw around me. Complete strangers  
4 offered me snacks, water, hand sanitizer as we walked. I felt  
5 encouraged and optimistic.

6 Where at first police were surrounding the Columbus  
7 statue, they quickly retreated to the outskirts of the park.  
8 My friends and I were also near the park edge, where we stood  
9 chanting and cheers, peacefully exercising our First Amendment  
10 rights. The police were blocking the one (unintelligible) exit  
11 by us, just sort of Roosevelt. They stood there for about  
12 20 minutes, casually chatting and leaning against their bikes.  
13 I remember looking at their riot gear and thinking it was so  
14 ridiculous that they'd come with batons and helmets dressed for  
15 a battle. I had on overalls and a crop top, which I would have  
16 never worn, had I known what was coming.

17 After about 20 minutes, suddenly multiple vans pulled  
18 up right behind the officers. Dozens more cops in full riot  
19 gear came out, including a couple in white shirts. Within a  
20 minute of arriving, they began distributing cans of pepper  
21 spray. Some of them (unintelligible) all the cannisters and  
22 yelled out a warning. We started chanting: Don't do it.  
23 Don't do it. Those were the last words out of my mouth before  
24 my friends and I were assaulted by CPD. They gave us no  
25 warning whatsoever. They didn't ask us to move. They didn't

1 ask us to leave. They didn't tell us that we needed to  
2 disperse or else they'd attack. There was no opportunity for  
3 compliance. They didn't care about our safety, our health, or  
4 our well-being. They didn't want us to disperse, or they  
5 wouldn't have been blocking the exit. They wanted to hurt us.  
6 They sprayed the chemicals directly toward my face. I ducked  
7 and squatted down, immediately blinded and coughing profusely,  
8 wanting to get my face away from other people because I am  
9 terrified of contracting COVID. The cops sprayed more straight  
10 onto the back my head, also the nape of my neck. My skin was  
11 on fire, and I couldn't breath. I knew I needed to run away  
12 and get fresh air, but as I tried to stand up to leave, they  
13 sprayed me again. I had no idea where any of my friends were.  
14 I couldn't see. I just heard batons cracking and people  
15 screaming on all sides of me.

16 (Audio breaking up) trying to escape, and strangers  
17 pulled me away and flushed my eyes out. When I could  
18 eventually see, the scene was horrific. Officers were  
19 brutalizing protesters with their batons and bikes. A young  
20 man walked by me with blood pouring out of his mouth, running  
21 down all over his shirt. It took me hours to clean the  
22 chemicals off of my clothing, my skin and my hair.

23 I went to sleep crying, my body still searing from  
24 the spray. I had to be up for work at 5:00 AM. I ran the  
25 farmer's market the next day with my hands, my neck, and my

1 knees still on fire. It took a whole 24 hours for the pain and  
2 burning to stop. I was covered in bruises on my ribs and my  
3 back. I use a birth control that makes it so that I don't  
4 menstruate. But after that night, I was bleeding for days. A  
5 nurse friend of mine told me it was potentially triggered by  
6 the chemicals, but most likely it was a result of the extreme  
7 trauma and stress. I have experienced disassociation, extreme  
8 anxiety and nightmares regularly since this event.

9 CPD assaulted me for doing nothing more than standing  
10 in a park peacefully chanting with my friends, exercising my  
11 right to protest, and I will never forget this. I am fully  
12 aware that this experience is nothing compared to what so many  
13 Black and Brown people encounter regularly from the CPD. This  
14 corrupt institution must be defunded, and those resources must  
15 be reallocated to social workers, mental health specialists and  
16 non-partial justice practitioners who will truly serve and  
17 protect us. Thank you very much.

18 THE COURT: Thank you for your comments.

19 I don't see Speaker 43, but I do see Speaker 44. I  
20 don't see 45, but I do see 46. So, let's see, if we can move  
21 to Speakers 44 and 46, and then we'll take the break after  
22 that.

23 So if Speaker No. 44 is available, that will be  
24 great.

25 MS. FLORES: Hello. Can you hear me?

1 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

2 MS. FLORES: My name is Patricia Flores. My pronouns  
3 are she/her, and I'm 26, and I'm white. I have volunteered to  
4 speak at this hearing today because I am deeply concerned about  
5 how CPD has handled the recent protests. I have attended  
6 various protests. The following will focus on my experience on  
7 May 30th and July 17th.

8 I have been shoved, hit and had to inhale pepper  
9 spray from CPD officers who most often have their badge numbers  
10 covered. I have seen protesters with head wounds gushing  
11 blood. I have seen them have their bikes stolen, and I have  
12 seen them kettled by cops, as well as trampled and beaten with  
13 batons.

14 I left most of May 30th and July 17th protests with  
15 bruises on my torso and calves from police hands and batons.

16 Although the role of police officers is supposed to  
17 be to serve and protect, they have shown at protests that they  
18 are only there to serve and protect their fellow officers.

19 They unite to unleash violence on people protesting  
20 police violence. They watch out for each other, but they do  
21 not care for protesters at all. They treat us not as people  
22 but as an inconvenience.

23 The way CPD has responded has only proven they cannot  
24 be trusted to keep us safe, as they repeatedly reign violence.

25 The fact that I have seen no officers stand up to

1 their colleagues in order to stop this violence, there is a  
2 violent and corrupt nature of CPD as a whole. The violence CPD  
3 has unleashed on protesters would be criminally punishable if  
4 anyone without their uniform did it, and I do not believe  
5 officers deserve to be exempt simply because they're officers.

6 CPD has shown us that they cannot be trusted over and  
7 over again. They have harmed our communities immensely in a  
8 time of great need, and I find their actions to be grotesque  
9 and despicable.

10 I cannot forget the violence I have seen and  
11 experienced on May 30th and July 17th. The memories weigh  
12 heavily on my mind, as I am sure it does on the other  
13 protesters' minds.

14 I do not want to leave today without mentioning that  
15 the violence from CPD during these protests will also have very  
16 negative mental health impacts on all who attended.

17 CPD has mentally and physically harmed the people  
18 they are supposed to protect. They need to be held  
19 accountable, and they need to be defunded. Thank you.

20 THE COURT: Thank you.

21 I think our final speaker before the break, then,  
22 will be Speaker No. 46.

23 MR. CRAIG: Can you all hear me?

24 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

25 MR. CRAIG: Thank you for giving me a chance to speak

1 today. My name is Kyle, I'm a resident of Chicago. I'm here  
2 today to share my concern for the severe and unwarranted police  
3 violence I have witnessed during the Saturday, May 30th protest  
4 against systemic racism, police brutality in downtown Chicago.

5 At around 6:30 PM, my wife and I were standing at the  
6 intersection of north State Street and west Kinzie Street. We  
7 were standing in front of the Public House Restaurant, when a  
8 line of Chicago police officers passed us on foot going west on  
9 Kinzie. At this point, a protester said something to the group  
10 of officers that I was unable to hear. An officer who had  
11 already walked past us broke off with a group of officers, then  
12 turned around and walked back about 10 to 15 feet east towards  
13 the protester and began beating him with his club. Another  
14 officer then stepped in and also started hitting the protester.  
15 The two officers continued hitting the protester, even when he  
16 was on the ground, tucking his head into his chest and covering  
17 his head with his arms in an attempt to block their blows.  
18 Shocked protesters then began telling the officers to stop this  
19 brutality.

20 At this point, police officers began charging us from  
21 all sides, shoving us with their batons. A young woman fell to  
22 the ground and was getting trampled by the group. I stopped to  
23 help her before I was able to pull her -- and before I was able  
24 to pull her up, I felt a push from a police officer. This  
25 officer repeatedly shoved me extremely forcefully with his

1 baton, which he was holding horizontally with both his hands,  
2 hitting me in the face and chest. He pushed me about 20 feet  
3 down State Street until he caused me to fall to the ground,  
4 knocking my glasses off and breaking my camera, which I was  
5 holding in my hand. This interaction left a large, dark purple  
6 bruise on my right arm that lasted for weeks after the protest.

7 After getting helped up by other protesters, I  
8 couldn't see where my wife was. Distraught, I went to try and  
9 find her. I was confronted by the same officer that slammed me  
10 to the ground and said to him: Please, my wife is over there,  
11 pointing to the corner of State and Kinzie. This officer then  
12 shoved me again, striking me in the face three times with his  
13 baton and said: I don't care, you shouldn't have come here,  
14 you "F-er," but said the word.

15 A few seconds later, I reunited with my wife who had  
16 been struck repeatedly on her back by police. By this time,  
17 huge crowds of officers were now coming towards protesters from  
18 all streets in all directions and tear gas was being deployed.  
19 At this point, we left downtown, running through alleyways to  
20 escape from the officers' barricades. I'd also like to note  
21 that neither my wife nor I ever heard any warning from police  
22 that we needed to disperse. One second we were standing there  
23 and the next second getting hit with batons.

24 Thank you for your time, your Honor.

25 THE COURT: Thank you for your comments.

1           And I want to thank everybody, this first session,  
2 for comments. We're going to take a break until 3:15 to allow  
3 the court reporters to switch out, and then, when we pick up,  
4 it will be Speaker No. 47 is where we'll pick up for the second  
5 session today. So, again, thank you all for your attention,  
6 and we'll resume at 3:15.

7           (Recess from 3:00 p.m. to 3:15 p.m.)  
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1 THE COURT: Good afternoon, everybody. Thank you for  
2 your patience. I've tried to go through with the Monitor  
3 during the break to make sure that we do not miss anybody. So  
4 we'll pick up with Nos. 47 through 60, and then we'll go back  
5 and make another pass through those who were skipped over  
6 previously to see if anyone has gotten back on the line here.  
7 So with that, I think -- I don't see 47, 48 or 49 in the queue,  
8 but if any of those folks is in the queue if they could please  
9 speak up now. If not, I think we'll move to No. 50, please.

10 MS. HICKEY: I believe, your Honor, No. 50 was a phone  
11 number which seems to have dropped off. So maybe they'll call  
12 back in and we'll recall the numbers at the end. Maybe they  
13 dropped off at the break and they will be calling back in.

14 THE COURT: Okay. That will be fine. And as I said,  
15 we'll make another sweep here after we get to 60. So I don't  
16 see No. 51 but I do see No. 52, so if No. 52 could be admitted  
17 into the participant space, and then we will hear from No. 52.

18 I think you're still on mute.

19 MR. SAKER KUNKEL: Good afternoon, your Honor, members  
20 of the court. My name is Samuel Saker Kunkel. I use he/him  
21 and they/them pronouns and I work as a maker and repair person  
22 of orchestral stringed instruments. Thank you for the  
23 opportunity to address you directly.

24 I would like to use my time to describe my personal  
25 experience with the excessively brutal and zealously applied

1 crowd control tactics by the Chicago Police Department on  
2 July 17th, 2020. The purpose of today's action was to rally  
3 for solidarity with the Black and Indigenous citizens of our  
4 city, who are among the most marginalized ethnic groups in  
5 America both historically and critically. Today's chronology  
6 already being a well-established part of the public record, I  
7 will deal only with the actions taken directly on my own  
8 person. The exact order of events is cloudy somewhat, so  
9 please bear with me.

10 With the largest part of the group dispersing, I found  
11 myself unsure of what to do until I observed a women in  
12 indigenous dress resolutely standing her ground with her arms  
13 raised. In the spirit of solidarity, I chose to take a  
14 position beside her. Having already witnessed the making and  
15 the pawning of other protesters, I felt obliged to offer what  
16 protection my presence could possibly offer.

17 It was then that the small group of protesters,  
18 perhaps 15, I found myself among was approached by officers.  
19 After a single, half-mumbled order to move back went  
20 unacknowledged, we were rushed by a phalanx of police using  
21 batons to shove and grapple.

22 In the midst of this clash, I was dealt a burst of  
23 mace by an officer. The effects were rapid. I tasted a harsh,  
24 metallic bitterness and my eyes began to burn fiercely,  
25 reflexively clamping shut. The effects were disorienting and

1 debilitating per design. Off balance and unaware of my  
2 surroundings, I was shoved to the ground, and upon landing  
3 dealt two blows of the baton by an officer. I was unable to  
4 see, much less menace.

5 Collecting myself as best as I was able, I pulled the  
6 closest person to me from the melee and began to retreat,  
7 feeling a sense of shame and cowardice at being so easily  
8 rebuffed, matched only by gratitude for my co-dissident  
9 flushing my eyes of chemicals outlawed for use in war by the  
10 Geneva Convention.

11 It was not until after I had reached the half mile to  
12 the safety of the medical tent at Buckingham Fountain that I  
13 was able to assess my injuries. A few scrapes from falling. A  
14 growing bruise on my right kneecap from the second club strike,  
15 and a nasty, deep cut on my left shin from the first, bleeding  
16 profusely. My wounds were not as bad as some, but we're not  
17 here to compare scars, we're here to assess the behavior of  
18 people who so callously applied such brutality. At no point  
19 did I provoke or provide pretext for such force to be applied  
20 against myself beyond the thin pretense of disobeyed order.  
21 (inaudible).

22 Any one of the methods applied against me could have  
23 been effective alone. Having sprayed chemicals -- illegal on a  
24 battlefield -- into my eyes, I very reasonably could have  
25 already been considered neutralized. Hurling me to the ground

1 was, shall we say, redundant, and the batoning spiteful. My  
2 interaction illustrates the eagerness on the part of police to  
3 use force not only as a method of detaining those suspected of  
4 committing a crime, but as a punitive measure alone.

5 This Court does not need me to outline how these  
6 practices subvert due process and cheat the Court and the  
7 citizenry, or how presumption of innocence becomes moot when  
8 the police add to their already overladen list of  
9 responsibilities, the role of the judge, jury, and all too  
10 often executioner.

11 I want to end by saying that police are the only group  
12 in America who possess a legal pretense to use violence against  
13 those who they identify as their political adversaries. A  
14 privilege actively defended by politicians, a powerful union,  
15 and popular mythology. Thank you for your time.

16 THE COURT: Thank you for yours. I do not see speaker  
17 53. I saw speaker 54 before the break, but I don't think that  
18 person has returned yet. So I think we're on to speaker  
19 No. 56, please.

20 MR. BAIRE: Hello, can you hear me?

21 THE COURT: Yes, we can. Thank you.

22 MR. BAIRE: Hi. Thank you, your Honor. Thank you,  
23 everyone. My name is Max Baire, and I'm a  
24 Puerto Rican-Lebanese resident of Chicago's north side. On  
25 July 17, 2020, I attended the solidarity rally in Grant Park in

1 Chicago. When I first arrived at the park to stand in  
2 solidarity with Chicagoland defenders, it was a peaceful scene.  
3 It was hot out and I was tired from a long week of work, but my  
4 spirits were lifted because of the immense outpouring of love  
5 and energy coming from the Black and Indigenous demonstrators.  
6 We were angry, yes, and we were protesting. But we were also  
7 singing and dancing and using this moment to celebrate just  
8 what it is what we're fighting for.

9 But, you know, as we heard already, what began as a  
10 peaceful protest eventually turned into a violent one.  
11 Violence that was initiated, agitated, and exacerbated by the  
12 Chicago Police Department. We started at Buckingham Fountain  
13 and eventually made our way to the Christopher Columbus statue  
14 near the intersection of Columbus and Roosevelt. I walked  
15 myself and my bicycle along with the group and decided to  
16 integrate my bike with the marshals who were keeping us safe.

17 I positioned myself in a row of other cyclists around  
18 the Columbus monument, and we interlocked the axles of our  
19 bikes together to form a barrier protecting less-shielded  
20 demonstrators. At one point, we were knocked over by the  
21 police, and I became pinned between my bike and another.  
22 Eventually I had gotten up and we formed another barrier.

23 When one officer had enough of us, he had briefly  
24 asked us to make a hole. A difficult order to follow taking  
25 into account the sheer volume of people. When the officer

1 didn't immediately get his way, he attempted to rip my bike  
2 from my hands. I didn't let go and he began to club my wrists  
3 with his baton. An action he appeared to take pleasure in  
4 judging from the smile on his face. Two strikes on my left  
5 wrist and a third on my right. On the third blow I was  
6 reminded of a formerly broken wrist bone and I let go for fear  
7 of re-breaking it. So he had ripped the bike from my hands,  
8 and once it was in his possession, I witnessed him toss it  
9 behind him and that was the last I ever saw my bike.

10           Shortly after, I witnessed a different officer  
11 standing with a few cops to the right of my assailant, spraying  
12 a red can over and into the crowd I was a part of. I was very  
13 suddenly overcome with a burning sensation in my eyes, which  
14 quickly spread to my nose, throat, and the rest of my body.

15           Within minutes the pain from getting struck in my  
16 wrists was now secondary to the burning sensation consuming my  
17 body. The burning in my nose and throat caused me to take off  
18 my mask, and being that we are in the midst of a pandemic, this  
19 was a tremendous risk for those around me, but the police gave  
20 me no choice. I wailed for help for a medic I had no way of  
21 getting to. But the only ones in eyeshot were surrounded by  
22 police officers that had proven distrustful to me.

23 Fortunately, my fellow demonstrators helped me as best they  
24 could. I couldn't see through the chemical in my eyes, so a  
25 kind stranger in the crowd had to guide me back to the fountain

1 where I would eventually regroup with my friends.

2 That was the longest half-mile I ever walked, and the  
3 pain only intensified all over my body. It was impossible not  
4 to notice that the police did nothing to help the people who  
5 were in pain, myself included, they were protecting property.  
6 When I eventually regrouped with my friends, we were able to  
7 recruit another to give us a ride from our park to our homes.  
8 With my bike stolen and my friend's bike broken by the police,  
9 this was our only option of getting home without walking or  
10 taking the train. A situation many had to endure after  
11 suffering similar or even worse acts of violence.

12 When I eventually made it home, I spent several hours  
13 in the shower and an ice bath to get this chemical burning off  
14 my body. The following day, after another shower, the burning  
15 was manageable. But then the pain in my wrist came into  
16 clearer focus. My right index finger was actually bruised as  
17 well and appeared infected, and I couldn't bend it without  
18 tremendous pain. I also had welts on my wrist from the baton  
19 strikes. These marks are still visible all over my body over a  
20 month later, but the emotional and mental trauma lingers as  
21 well.

22 The Chicago Police Department failed the people of  
23 Chicago on July 17th of 2020, as they have done before and  
24 continue to do. They failed to keep us safe; rather they  
25 actively endangered the lives of people protesting the very

1 injustices that they commit.

2 THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you for your comments.

3 MR. BAIRE: Thank you.

4 I think speaker No. 57 is in the queue, though, so  
5 we'll please admit speaker 57.

6 MS. HICKEY: Your Honor, if after 57 you want to go  
7 back to 56, I believe 56 is in the room. So we'll let 57 go  
8 and then go back to 56.

9 THE COURT: Okay. Very good.

10 MS. SUTTLE: Hello. Can you hear me?

11 THE COURT: There we go. Yes, now we can hear you.

12 MS. SUTTLE: So good afternoon, your Honor, and others  
13 who have joined us today for day two of this Federal Court  
14 Listening Session. My name is La'Rie Suttle. I'm 24 years  
15 old. I use she/her/hers pronouns, and I'm working with the  
16 City of Chicago and members in the Chicago community on the use  
17 of force policy for the Chicago Police Department.

18 I think that it is important to state that the things  
19 that I'm about to say are a reflection of my own views and  
20 experiences, not the use of force task force as a whole. This  
21 task force was created June 15, 2020, and so far this year I've  
22 only attended two protests in the Bronzeville community, both  
23 of which were peaceful, thank God.

24 But last month in July, I decided to attend a press  
25 conference for a young community organizer named Miracle Boyd



1 after watching the video that went viral on the web of an  
2 officer knocking her cell phone to the ground and punching her  
3 in the face, knocking out some of her teeth and walking away.

4 In the viral video, I saw a lot of things taking place  
5 between blue-shirt officers and protesters, but what stood out  
6 to me was the white-shirt officers watching and allowing  
7 whatever took place to go on. So as a member of the use of  
8 force task force, I immediately raised an issue in our group.  
9 I asked to review three legal bulletins from the Office of  
10 Legal Affairs on police protesters encounters, use of force,  
11 and the First Amendment and the modified consent decree.

12 Additionally, I also reviewed eight general orders,  
13 which I will physically include in my written statement due  
14 August 28th by 4:30 p.m. But if this is not true I will follow  
15 up with the appropriate parties following this listening  
16 session. But the general orders relate to the duties,  
17 responsibilities, procedures, and investigations involving use  
18 of force in general, but specifically in terms of the First  
19 Amendment.

20 Currently, I don't have the authority to tell you more  
21 about that, if there is a violation or not. But I do want to  
22 state on the record that I am growing deep concern for how the  
23 Chicago Police Department trains officers to handle situations  
24 involving use of force in general. But specifically encounters  
25 with protesters, as well as internal and external

1 accountability and transparency measures involving situations  
2 with use of force in general, but especially with police and  
3 protesters.

4 So I thank you for allowing me the opportunity to  
5 speak on the record today. And moving forward, I pray that  
6 this police department doesn't miss an opportunity to  
7 effectively and constitutionally police. With that, I will  
8 hold back and thank you for your time.

9 THE COURT: Thank you very much. I appreciate it.

10 I think speaker 56 was the previous person who spoke  
11 was Max Baire, that's what I have here. So it looks to me just  
12 from the queue that I -- that nobody up through 60 is in the  
13 queue, but I think I see some names in the queue that were  
14 amongst the original group from the morning. So I'm going to  
15 start back at the top of the list here and I see speaker No. 3  
16 is now in the cue. So if speaker No. 3 -- it's Delaney Coe is  
17 the name I have here. That would be great. Thank you.

18 MS. HICKEY: I believe a person will be speaking on  
19 behalf of Delaney Coe. Mike, if you will admit No. 3.

20 THE COURT: That is correct. Thank you.

21 MS. TENDAJI: I was there on May 30th, downtown where  
22 I saw protesters being kettled repeatedly by the police, being  
23 teargassed. I saw protesters also being beaten with batons.  
24 Also on the 1st of June in Hyde Park -- I think it was the 1st  
25 of June -- I attended a very peaceful protest, organized by

1 some young people, I am not sure who they actually were.

2 As the protest dispersed, police began pushing people  
3 towards the lake, and most folks had their cars west. And  
4 people couldn't get back to their cars. There was a very tense  
5 stand off when an officer brandished a rifle at the crowd.

6 Eventually we were able to get through and get to  
7 where our cars were parked, where some people were coming out  
8 looting an Ulta, we stopped to get their name and information,  
9 you know, to pass on to their family. And police began pushing  
10 me, my friends and my family against the wall with batons. And  
11 then hitting us with the batons, which resulted in my friends  
12 coming in to stand between me and the officers and my family,  
13 particularly, children. They were beaten repeatedly with  
14 batons, laid on the ground, just covering themselves being hit  
15 by batons repeatedly.

16 At some point an officer put his knee on my friend's  
17 neck, the same way that George Floyd was killed. Another  
18 friend, she protected him, seeing that, just dove onto his body  
19 and took a lot of those baton hits for him.

20 At least five of my friends were badly bruised with  
21 baton marks and then thrown in jail for that that day.

22 Since then, I know as well a good friend in Black  
23 Lives Matter Chicago was beaten badly at a protest on Belmont.  
24 That person is disabled and walks with a cane. I was also  
25 there on the 17th, where my son was pepper sprayed badly. My

1 nephew had his tooth broken by cop with a baton. There was no  
2 opportunity for folks to disperse. The orders to disperse over  
3 these past two protests, I've witnessed officers doing nothing  
4 to protect and serve, but to brutalize, and who seemed to, as I  
5 heard another person testify today, to smile, seemed to enjoy  
6 brutalizing Chicagoans.

7 I -- the hardest was during the protest in Hyde Park.  
8 I was thrown to the ground. My ribs were cracked and I stood  
9 in front of an officer whose sleeve was covered in my friend's  
10 blood. This officer was saying how he wanted to protect me.  
11 He wanted to protect us. Who stood there while other officers  
12 beat and brutalized folks. I just left town this weekend to  
13 return to find out that once again, young people, my nephew  
14 included, young folks who have been in my house, 17-year-olds  
15 who were pepper sprayed, and kettled, and beaten by police  
16 again. This was during the consent decree, so it's clear to me  
17 that the Chicago Police Department is not taking anything  
18 seriously about mandates to protect or serve or to follow the  
19 actual law that they are sworn to uphold. Their intention is  
20 clearly brutality and dehumanizing Chicagoans who don't believe  
21 that they should be receiving over \$4 million a day.

22 THE COURT: Thank you for your comments.

23 Let's see. I think I see speaker No. 7, I think, is  
24 in the queue now, so perhaps we can admit speaker No. 7,  
25 please.

1 MS. MACLAUCHLIN: Hello.

2 THE COURT: Hi.

3 MS. MACLAUCHLIN: Hi. Thank you for the time. My  
4 name is Claire MacLauchlin. I am a 38-year-old mother of two.  
5 I work in publishing and I live in Avondale. On Saturday, May  
6 30th, I attended the protest against police brutality at Daley  
7 Plaza. This was my first time attending a protest in Chicago,  
8 although I attended many protests in my former hometown of New  
9 York City.

10 At first, the protest felt like many others I had  
11 attended. There was a sense of joint purpose and community,  
12 albeit masked. My fellow protesters and I chanted. We held  
13 signs. I saw families with children, and I had, in fact,  
14 considered bringing my sons to this protest. I had brought  
15 them to others in the past. But my sister had been to a  
16 peaceful protest in Oakland, California, the previous day where  
17 the crowd was set upon by the police and pepper sprayed, so I  
18 left the kids at home and instead brought remedies for pepper  
19 spray.

20 So, again, it was largely a peaceful protest, albeit  
21 one that was about police brutality and a little bit negative  
22 towards the police, some of the chants, et cetera, but, again,  
23 that is our right to use our words to express displeasure about  
24 the people who are supposed to be serving us and who we pay.

25 When the police appeared on the scene, the mood

1 immediately shifted. They were dressed in riot gear. The  
2 majority of them were maskless. They had batons in their hands  
3 already, although, again, we were protesting peacefully.

4 I think the worst thing that I had seen up to then was  
5 somebody spray painting on the sidewalk. I don't think a baton  
6 is the answer. So, yes, batons in hand, zip ties in hand, they  
7 began setting up barricades and boundaries that were arbitrary.  
8 They sort of created a circle in the middle of one street to  
9 reroute us.

10 Being that it's the middle of a pandemic, there really  
11 wasn't anybody on the street, other than the protesters. Every  
12 car I saw was a car that was part of the protest, honking with  
13 signs in solidarity. The protest didn't seem to be stopping  
14 anybody going about their day, but the police were not treating  
15 us like we were allowed to be there.

16 I saw police knocking signs out of people's hands.  
17 One young man was sitting on his car with a phone in his hand.  
18 I saw a police officer come and knock that out of his hands.  
19 So, yes, they created discord and chaos instead of allowing us  
20 to march peacefully.

21 At one point, I'm not sure what happened, there was a  
22 loud bang. People were running in panic. I was almost  
23 trampled. I was lucky to get behind a column. As the woman  
24 before me mentioned, she had a disabled friend with a cane. I  
25 saw a disabled woman with a cane who was luckily able to get

1 behind a column as well.

2 And, then, ultimately, I would just like to say that  
3 the decision on the part of the mayor to shut down the trains  
4 that day -- this was a protest that was set to go from 2:00  
5 til 5:00. It trapped a lot people, myself included, in the  
6 downtown area. So I saw, as I tried to figure out how I was  
7 going to get home, people wandering aimlessly, running into  
8 groups of police officers that were also seeming to be looking  
9 for protesters. It was a very unsafe feeling as the police  
10 were there. Anytime I turned on a street and saw police, I  
11 went the other way, because I had a sign. I was obviously part  
12 of the protest. The only people I saw were either part of the  
13 protest or police.

14 I just -- we pay them to protect and serve us, and  
15 that is not what they are doing. And major change is needed.  
16 I'm shaking thinking about this experience, but also just sort  
17 of the response that there has been to the protest, sort of the  
18 tone, the reporting on the protest. People are out here  
19 saying, "A change needs to be made," and instead of the police  
20 sitting down and talking to the people, they are attacking  
21 them. And I just -- it boggles my mind. That's all. Thank  
22 you for your time.

23 THE COURT: Thank you for your comments.

24 I think speaker No. 33, I think, is in the queue now.  
25 If we could go to speaker No. 33, please.

1 MS. BOYD: Hello?

2 THE COURT: Yes, hi, we can hear you.

3 MS. MIRACLE BOYD: Hi. This is Miracle Boyd. I'm a  
4 youth member of Good Kids/Mad City on the south side of  
5 Chicago. I'm here to talk about what happened on the night of  
6 June 17th. I was attending the decolonizing police and Chicago  
7 protesting rally, and I was (inaudible) approached by a police  
8 officer for recording a man being arrested.

9 At first I was moving away, because I had heard that  
10 they were, like, trying to, like, tear down the statue. So I  
11 decided to leave because I had been out there for a long while.  
12 But I heard my friend crying, and so I went over to help. And  
13 I started a video of what was going on. And as our video was  
14 going on, I saw a white woman being beat with batons by two  
15 police officers on the two. They had a bike stand on top of  
16 her. I see a guy who was beaten at first with a baton had his  
17 head busted open and blood was gushing from his head.

18 And so I was recording a guy being arrested by the  
19 police, and the police were dragging him away and I was walking  
20 towards him, like, trying to get him to say his last name so  
21 that he could get legal help, and two police officers walked up  
22 to me and one of them punched me. And my phone hit me in the  
23 mouth and my tooth was knocked out. I had to get a root canal  
24 and still today -- just yesterday, I finally received my final  
25 dental work.



1           I have been distraught ever since the event happen. I  
2 haven't been able to eat correctly. Every time I see police  
3 now, I have some sort of fear that they'll, like, try to harm  
4 me again or whatever, something like that.

5           But the events that happened that night were truly  
6 traumatizing. I have never experienced something so horrific  
7 like that, and just to be assaulted by one member of the  
8 biggest union in America, it was like a slap in the face  
9 because I am a youth organizer, and this is what we fight for,  
10 so...

11           There were a lot of these incidents transpired, and,  
12 you know, I'm not really excited about what happened. I wasn't  
13 even calling for officers to be arrested, but to have  
14 restorative justice circle with me because I focus on  
15 restorative justice in my community, and I believe that jail is  
16 a place for no one.

17           Also, the fact that this cop who was talking to me, he  
18 also assaulted a Muslim woman before in the year of 2012. When  
19 I found out who he was, I did my research myself, and also  
20 found out that he uses force more than 96 percent of other  
21 officers, so I want to highlight what is happening and the type  
22 of people who the Chicago Police Department are hiring, you  
23 know, to deal with civilians. And all of the protests have not  
24 been peaceful at times, but I don't think that protesters  
25 should ever be attacked by police. And like I said, it was a

1 slap in the face that I was harassed by police and, you know  
2 physically attacked and this is now something I have to deal  
3 with.

4 And afterwards I was receiving death threats on social  
5 media, and a lot of pain has been coming my way. That is all I  
6 wanted to say. Thank you for hearing me, your Honor.

7 THE COURT: Thank you for your comments, and I really  
8 thank everybody for their comments.

9 I am looking in the queue right now, and Maggie maybe  
10 you can help me, but I don't see anybody in the queue right now  
11 who has not spoken. But if I am mistaken, if there's anybody  
12 who needs to be admitted into the queue, I think this would be  
13 the time because I think we have gone through the entire list.  
14 Do you see anybody who I've missed Maggie?

15 MS. HICKEY: I have not seen anybody else, your Honor,  
16 and I am just checking with my IT team here to see if there's  
17 anyone else, but I believe everybody that is in the queue has  
18 had an opportunity to speak, and all of the rest that had  
19 signed up for various reasons, I'm sure, were unable to join us  
20 today.

21 THE COURT: Okay. Very well. I want to again thank  
22 everybody and remind everybody of what both the Inspector  
23 General and the Monitor said, which is this was not the only  
24 way to participate.

25 We have written comments that I will be happy to

1 receive on my docket, and I'm sure both the Inspector General  
2 and the Monitor will be happy to receive your comments in all  
3 sorts of different ways, whatever is most comfortable for you,  
4 I think, is really what the touchstone is for submitting your  
5 views. And I know the Monitor is hard at work with her team  
6 and there will be a report at the end of this. This is just  
7 part of the information gathering, so, again, with gratitude to  
8 our clerk's office, and all of the IT folks of the Monitoring  
9 team and her law firm for setting this up.

10 I have nothing further to add for today, but I did  
11 want to give both the Monitor and the Inspector General an  
12 opportunity to say any final words they want to say. So I will  
13 turn to you first, Maggie.

14 MS. HICKEY: Thank you very much, your Honor. I would  
15 just like to say thank you to everyone who participated today  
16 and lent their voice and allowed us to hear what was happening  
17 in our city. Again, thank you very much for sharing your  
18 story.

19 THE COURT: And Joe, any final words from the  
20 Inspector General's Office?

21 INSPECTOR GENERAL FERGUSON: I echo that. I  
22 appreciate everyone's willingness to step into the space and  
23 step in it in such a public way. If there is more to be said  
24 or anyone watching has more that they want to say, again, the  
25 Monitor's website or the IG's website. Thank you.

1 THE COURT: Okay. Very well. Thank you, everybody.  
2 I also want to make a special thanks to the interpreters who  
3 are still going and the court reporters who are still going as  
4 well. Those are very hard jobs and it's very intense to do  
5 this for this period of time, and you all are magnificent and I  
6 thank you for your help. So thank you, everybody. And this  
7 session is in recess.

8 MS. HICKEY: Thank you.

9 (Proceedings concluded at 3:48 P.M.)

10 \* \* \* \* \*

11 C E R T I F I C A T E

12 We certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from  
13 the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

14  
15 /s/ SANDRA M. MULLIN, CSR RMR, FCRR

16 /s/KRISTIN M. ASHENHURST, CSR, RDR, CRR August 25, 2020  
17 Date

18 Federal Official Court Reporters  
19 United States District Court  
Northern District of Illinois  
20 Eastern Division  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Attachment 1.  
Office of the Illinois Attorney General  
Comments  
July 16, 2021

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**OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
STATE OF ILLINOIS**

**KWAME RAOUL  
ATTORNEY GENERAL**

July 16, 2021

Margaret A. Hickey  
Independent Monitor  
Schiff Hardin LLP  
233 S. Wacker Drive, Suite 7100  
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Via Email ([MHickey@schiffhardin.com](mailto:MHickey@schiffhardin.com))

**Re: Independent Monitoring Team’s Special Report, *The City of Chicago’s and The Chicago Police Department’s Response to Protests and Unrest in Year Two of the Consent Decree (May 2020 – November 2020) (the “Special Report”)***

Dear Ms. Hickey:

The Special Report details numerous disturbing incidents of misconduct, disrespectful behavior, and excessive force by Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) officers in response to protests and civil unrest in Chicago from May to November 2020. Details of these incidents, compiled by the Independent Monitoring Team (“IMT”) based on hundreds of hours of video footage, interviews, and community testimony, plainly reveal the consequences of the City’s and CPD’s delayed implementation of the Consent Decree.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the Special Report finds that the City’s and CPD’s ability to hold officers accountable for these incidents has fallen far short of the Consent Decree’s requirements, due to insufficient documentation, widespread misconduct, and understaffed and opaque systems of accountability. As a result, any attempt to fully document problems or hold officers accountable will be inherently incomplete because of CPD’s failure to consistently follow body-worn camera and reporting requirements during these critical events.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In the most recent reporting period, “the City and the CPD did not meet most of the deadlines and compliance obligations.” Independent Monitoring Report 3 (Amended), *State of Illinois v. City of Chicago*, 17-cv-6260, ECF No. 942 (Apr. 8, 2021), at 10.

<sup>2</sup> Special Report at 34.

Statements from community members about CPD's response to racial justice protests in 2020, provided during the listening sessions hosted by Judge Dow, demonstrate the harmful impact CPD's response had on these mostly peaceful protesters. These incidents further eroded CPD's ability to build trust with the community it serves, one of the core commitments of the Consent Decree.

**I estimate the officer beat me for 15 to 30 seconds. I can't say for sure because I was focused on blocking the young woman who was covering her head as an officer reached around me to beat her. I also focused on the uniqueness of my screams. This was the first time I heard myself make a sound I could only describe as a combination of shock, fear, and gurgling pain.**<sup>3</sup>

~ Community Member

**The CPD kicked people and medics, hit them with batons and destroyed medical supplies. CPD officers hit me, shoved me and called me a p\*\*\*\* for pointing out the people who they were assaulting were injured.... After that act, the CPD only became more aggressive. They kettled protesters . . . They ran into kettled crowds while screaming and banging the sides of their batons. It was textbook psychological warfare.**<sup>4</sup> ~ Community Member

OAG acknowledges and appreciates the IMT's efforts and attention to the sensitive nature of the events underlying the Special Report. OAG offers the following comments regarding the Special Report's findings and recommendations.

### **Findings: Systemic Failures in CPD's Response to Demonstrations**

1. ***Lack of Accountability.*** As the Special Report and the February 2021 report from the City of Chicago Office of Inspector General ("OIG Report") make clear, the City's and CPD's failure to reform accountability systems as required by the Consent Decree had widespread consequences during the 2020 protests. Patterns of disturbing and pervasive officer misconduct include the findings that:<sup>5</sup>

- Officers obscured their nameplates and badges during demonstrations;<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Community Listening Session Day 2 (Aug. 20, 2020) Transcript at 125:15-22, [*hereinafter* "Transcript Day 2"].

<sup>4</sup> *Id.* at 143:24-144:3, 144:11-14. Kettling "involves officers surrounding protesters to corral them before making arrests." Wyattte Grantham-Phillips, Tyler J. Davis, Nick Coltrain, "What is Kettling? Here's a look into the usage and history of the controversial police tactic," USA TODAY, June 25, 2020, available at <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/06/24/kettling-controversial-police-tactic-black-lives-matter-protests/3248681001/>.

<sup>5</sup> *See e.g.*, Community Listening Session Day 1 (Aug. 19, 2020), Transcript at 25:11-15 [*hereinafter* "Transcript Day 1"], describing police pulling medics away from bleeding protesters; *see also Report on Chicago's Response to George Floyd Protests and Unrest*, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE CITY OF CHICAGO (February 18, 2021), at 37 [*hereinafter* "OIG Report"], noting "Protesters reported seeing and experiencing apparently indiscriminate uses of force by CPD members. They described seeing CPD members tackle, punch, and use batons to strike peaceful protesters in the head and neck."

<sup>6</sup> Special Report at 8, 193-94, 209; OIG Report at 123-26. One community member described seeing "an officer taunting protesters with his badge number and name covered, repeatedly calling protesters expletives and using foul language." *See e.g.*, Transcript Day 1 at 24:2-10.

- Officers failed to document, or insufficiently documented, uses of force;<sup>7</sup>
- CPD's mass arrest procedures precluded effective discipline and accountability;<sup>8</sup> and
- CPD failed to track the distribution of OC spray canisters to officers.<sup>9</sup>

These actions significantly impaired efforts to achieve meaningful accountability. As a result, the Special Report notes few examples of officer discipline, including only one instance related to an officer refusing to wear a body-worn camera<sup>10</sup> and one instance where an officer was stripped of his police powers.<sup>11</sup>

As outlined in the Special Report, these failures in CPD's documentation and accountability systems violate numerous provisions of the Consent Decree.<sup>12</sup>

2. ***Unnecessary Uses of Force and Failure to Use De-escalation.*** The Special Report and community member statements illustrate widespread improper uses of force by officers, as well as dangerous officer escalation tactics that violate the Consent Decree, including:

- Advancing on docile crowds with batons in hand;<sup>13</sup>
- Punching protesters;<sup>14</sup>
- Swinging batons to strike protesters in the head;<sup>15</sup>
- Indiscriminately using OC spray (pepper spray), including on children;<sup>16</sup>
- Using protesters' bikes as weapons;<sup>17</sup>
- Kettling crowds and then hitting people who could not escape;<sup>18</sup> and
- Injuring people and not providing or requesting the medical aid needed to treat their injuries.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Special Report at 205-06.

<sup>8</sup> OIG Report at 118.

<sup>9</sup> Special Report at 145-46.

<sup>10</sup> *Id.* at 94.

<sup>11</sup> *Id.* at 211.

<sup>12</sup> For example, the Consent Decree requires that the City, CPD, and Civilian Office of Police Accountability ("COPA") maintain an electronic case management system that allows for tracking and analyzing allegations of retaliation against individuals engaged in First Amendment activity, ¶ 509(f); requires that nearly all uses of force are documented, justified, and reviewed by a supervisor, ¶¶ 218-235; and requires CPD to mandate that officers provide their name and star number to any member of the public upon request, ¶ 433.

<sup>13</sup> Special Report at 133.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at p. 98. *See also* Transcript Day 1 at 42:7-12.

<sup>15</sup> Special Report at 98. *See also* Transcript Day 1 at 38:11-12; *see e.g.*, Transcript Day 2 at 155:24-156:2. *See also* OIG Report at 37, noting "Protesters reported seeing and experiencing apparently indiscriminate uses of force by CPD members. They described seeing CPD members tackle, punch, and use batons to strike peaceful protesters in the head and neck."

<sup>16</sup> Transcript Day 1 at 42:8-9; Transcript Day 2 at 110:1-2.

<sup>17</sup> Special Report at 98, a video showing an officer in a "bike tug-of-war with a protest and then appear[ing] to throw the bike at the person [the officer] was tugging with." *See also id.* at 89, "Officers grabbed people's bikes away from them." *See also* Transcript Day 1 at 24:2-8; Transcript Day 2 at 103:1-4.

<sup>18</sup> "Kettling" refers to a tactic whereby officers surround a group and contain it in a small area with little or no opportunity to leave. Special Report at 12, 132-33; Transcript Day 1 at 42:3-6. *Id.* at 45:1-3.

<sup>19</sup> Special Report at 198.



These actions are contrary to the Consent Decree's requirements governing use of force by officers,<sup>20</sup> which specifically prohibit officers from using force to retaliate against protesters engaging in protected First Amendment activity,<sup>21</sup> and require CPD to use de-escalation techniques and allow individuals to voluntarily comply with orders so as to prevent or reduce the need to use force at all.<sup>22</sup>

3. ***Biased and Disrespectful Policing.*** Unbiased and respectful policing are at the core of the Consent Decree, which requires CPD officers to “interact with all members of the public in an unbiased, fair, and respectful manner” and “refrain from using language or taking action intended to taunt or denigrate an individual, including using racist or derogatory language.”<sup>23</sup> Yet instances of officers using inappropriate, disrespectful, and derogatory language towards community members, frequently coupled with force, permeate the Special Report, including:

- Officers handcuffing, restraining and detaining, aggressively pushing, swearing at, and refusing a request for water from an apparently pregnant woman;<sup>24</sup>
- Officers swearing at reporters and treating them disrespectfully;<sup>25</sup>
- Officers regularly swearing at and speaking disrespectfully to protesters, including:
  - An officer telling a protester “Shut the f\*\*\* up, a\*\*hole.”<sup>26</sup>
  - An officer telling an arrestee “... I threw your a\*\* to the ground, and you cried. You one p\*\*\*\*\* a\*\* b\*\*\*\*\*. Big a\*\* b\*\*\*\*\*.”<sup>27</sup>
  - An officer saying to a protester “... Dealing with savages ain't a part of my job.”<sup>28</sup>
  - An officer saying to a protester “Get back before I beat the f\*\*\* out of you.”<sup>29</sup>

As one protester testified, “... the officers on the scene laughed at us [w]hen we begged them to leave people alone ... It felt like they view Chicagoans who are fighting for justice as enemies, and they treat us that way.”<sup>30</sup> These widely documented interactions indicate that the mindset and attitude that many police adopted during the protests were deeply harmful to CPD's ability to effectively and respectfully protect the City and its communities.

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<sup>20</sup> See, Consent Decree ¶¶ 153, 164.

<sup>21</sup> *Id.* ¶ 163.

<sup>22</sup> *Id.* ¶ 162. See also *id.* ¶¶ 207-09, requiring officers to issue verbal commands and warnings to the subject “prior to, during, and after the discharge of an OC device” and “allow a subject a reasonable amount of time to comply with a warning prior to using or continuing to use an OC device.”

<sup>23</sup> See, e.g., *id.* ¶¶ 51-2, 54.

<sup>24</sup> Special Report at 73.

<sup>25</sup> *Id.* at 97.

<sup>26</sup> *Id.* at 74.

<sup>27</sup> *Id.* at 79.

<sup>28</sup> *Id.* at 104.

<sup>29</sup> Transcript Day 2 at 117:23-24.

<sup>30</sup> See *id.* at 137:19-1:38:14.

## **Recommendations**

1. ***Accountability & Discipline.*** OAG concurs with IMT's recommendation that the City and CPD must take action now to hold officers accountable for failures to comply with policies, such as those requiring use of body-worn cameras, mandating respectful behavior, and governing uses of force.<sup>31</sup> Accountability is a central requirement of the Consent Decree and is essential to ensuring legitimacy and community confidence.<sup>32</sup> Unfortunately, the City's and CPD's failures to properly document and report uses of force and other required data have further hampered their ability to conduct the thorough and timely investigations required by the Consent Decree.<sup>33</sup> To address this moving forward, CPD must take corrective action to enforce officers' compliance with policies regarding body-worn cameras and display of badges and nameplates, and implement robust training to emphasize that officers who fail to comply with these policies will face progressive discipline.<sup>34</sup> As the Special Report notes, community members and the Coalition have also raised concerns that CPD's existing standards for relieving police powers are insufficient to ensure accountability.<sup>35</sup> OAG looks forward to further discussion with the IMT, the City, and the Coalition regarding CPD's accountability systems.
2. ***Policy Development.*** As CPD has acknowledged, the 2020 protests revealed gaps in a number of CPD policies and procedures.<sup>36</sup> OAG appreciates the revisions that CPD has made to date and agrees with the IMT that further policy revisions are necessary on topics including use of force, mass arrests, First Amendment-related procedures, respectful and unbiased policing practices, and accountability. The City and CPD must continue to prioritize policy development under the Consent Decree; as noted in the Special Report, past efforts by the City and CPD to circumvent the typical Consent Decree revision process have resulted in new problems and delays.<sup>37</sup> Finally, CPD must solicit and incorporate meaningful community input, such as the recommendations of the Use of Force Working Group, into these policy revisions.<sup>38</sup>
3. ***Training and Data.*** Once these revised policies and procedures are finalized, CPD and the City must also ensure that officers receive adequate training, including for future large-scale demonstrations, and that the data collected is tracked and analyzed as required by the Consent Decree. For example, CPD must ensure that trainings cover appropriate crowd-

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<sup>31</sup> Special Report at 202-03.

<sup>32</sup> See, e.g., Consent Decree ¶ 419.

<sup>33</sup> Special Report p. 205-10. The City has not met any level of compliance for 53 of the 72 accountability related Consent Decree Paragraphs. Independent Monitoring Report 3 at 533.

<sup>34</sup> See, e.g., Consent Decree ¶ 238(i) (officers who knowingly fail to comply with the body-worn camera policy may be subject to progressive discipline and training), ¶ 433 (requiring officers to provide identifying information such as star numbers to any member of the public), ¶ 576 (requiring CPD to randomly audit body-worn camera recordings of civilian interactions to assess officers' compliance with policy and to "take corrective action to address identified instances where CPD officers have not complied with CPD policy as permitted by law, and will identify any trends that warrant changes to policy, training, tactics, equipment, or Department practice"), and ¶ 587(o) (requiring CPD's automated electronic data system to include "all violations" of CPD's body-worn camera policies).

<sup>35</sup> Special Report at 211-12.

<sup>36</sup> *Id.* at 148.

<sup>37</sup> *Id.* at 174.

<sup>38</sup> *Id.* at 160, footnote 319.

control techniques and discourage kettling.<sup>39</sup> Kettling violates the de-escalation techniques required by the Consent Decree, because crowds kettled by officers cannot physically comply with dispersal orders. CPD should train officers on updated use of force and de-escalation policies as soon as possible.

4. **Community Engagement and Information Gathering.** In order to rebuild community trust, CPD must prioritize Paragraph 46 of the Consent Decree, which requires CPD to “solicit, consider, and respond to input, feedback, and recommendations from the community in each district about its policing efforts and strategies.” The Special Report suggests that some of these engagement practices, such as meetings with community groups or social media monitoring, also offer information-gathering opportunities for CPD.<sup>40</sup> Nonetheless, the purpose of Paragraph 46 is to require CPD to gather feedback about its own policing efforts, not to surveil or gather intelligence about community groups. As the Special Report notes, the IMT and OAG have not received any materials from CPD regarding its social media engagement and information-gathering teams.<sup>41</sup> OAG is concerned, however, about emerging reports suggesting that CPD employed its 2020 Summer Operations Center to surveil community groups on social media and collect intelligence about political demonstrations – allegedly leading to the City issuing a cease and desist order against the Chicago Freedom School for feeding and helping protesters.<sup>42</sup> Any surveillance action by CPD requires exceedingly close scrutiny to protect constitutional rights and comply with Consent Decree requirements, and should not be mistaken for required community engagement.
5. **Mobile Field Force Training.** OAG agrees with the IMT’s concern regarding roving teams: “[w]ithout clear policies, standard operating procedures, or goals—including those for the City’s future responses to protests or unrest—we continue to have concerns regarding the challenges that these types of teams present and Chicago’s troubling history with roving teams.”<sup>43</sup> The Special Report recommends that CPD explore the creation of Mobile Field Force Teams to respond to future mass demonstrations – but only if such teams are properly trained, certified, equipped and transparent to the public.<sup>44</sup> Given the IMT’s and OAG’s ongoing concerns regarding the implementation of CPD’s Critical Incident Response Team and Community Safety Teams,<sup>45</sup> OAG will closely monitor any CPD efforts to create or expand new citywide teams.

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<sup>39</sup> In addition to the readily surmisable concerns associated with a tactic aimed at trapping individuals, experts also argue that kettling can increase tensions and likely result in more use of force. Grantham-Phillips, “What is Kettling? Here’s a look into the usage and history of the controversial police tactic.”

<sup>40</sup> Special Report at 113.

<sup>41</sup> *Id.* at 125. CPD and the City has blocked the release of CPD records related to its social media monitoring programs. Madeline Buckley, Gregory Pratt, “ACLU files suit against CPD seeking records on beefed-up social media monitoring following protests and looting last year,” CHICAGO TRIBUNE (July 15, 2021), available at <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-aclu-lawsuit-cpd-social-media-20210715-okvhabuazhqhaz5phakssloza-story.html>.

<sup>42</sup> Jim Daley, “Surveilling Dissent,” SOUTH SIDE WEEKLY (July 7, 2021), available at <https://southsideweekly.com/surveilling-dissent/>.

<sup>43</sup> Special Report at 135.

<sup>44</sup> *Id.* at 135-37.

<sup>45</sup> *Id.*

OAG acknowledges the efforts made to date by the City and CPD to address issues raised in the Special Report, and urges the City and CPD to engage the community as it works towards not only compliance with the Consent Decree, but also building trust with Chicago residents. OAG looks forward to continuing discussions with the City, the IMT, and the Coalition regarding these matters.

Respectfully,

KWAME RAOUL  
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cc: Tyeesha Dixon, Allan Slagel, Counsel for the City of Chicago (via email)

Attachment 2.  
City of Chicago Comments  
July 16, 2021

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**City of Chicago's Comments on IMT Special Report**

*July 16, 2021*

Pursuant to Consent Decree Paragraphs 663 and 665, the City provides the below comments to the Independent Monitor Team's ("IMT") July 8, 2021, draft report titled, *The City of Chicago's and the Chicago Police Department's Response to Protests and Unrest in Year Two of the Consent Decree* (the "Special Report").

The City does not concede any of the facts, findings, or conclusions in the Special Report. Nothing in this response, or the City's lack of a specific response, should be deemed an admission by the City of any wrongdoing or liability.

The City notes that IMT's July 8 draft includes numerous selected quotations from individuals who offered public comments at the listening sessions conducted before Judge Dow on August 19-20, 2020. As indicated in IMT's report, these remarks were not offered in the form of sworn testimony, and the speakers were not subject to questioning or cross-examination. The truth and accuracy of such accounts therefore have not been verified. The City notes that these remarks do not alone offer a complete picture of relevant events.

The City submits the attached comments from the Chicago Police Department ("CPD") (Attachment A).

# **ATTACHMENT A**



**Lori E. Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police · City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue · Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

July 16, 2021

The Chicago Police Department (“Department”) submits the following response to the Independent Monitor Team’s (“IMT”) report titled *The City of Chicago’s and the Chicago Police Department’s Response to Protests and Unrest in Year Two of the Consent Decree* (the “Special Report”)

## I. Introduction

2020 was an unparalleled year not only in Chicago but across the globe. In a year that began with a global pandemic that impacted the lives of every person and required the shut-down of major cities to help stem the spread of COVID-19, a deadly virus. A year that saw food shortages, unprecedented deaths, and blanket unemployment across major portions of the economy. A year that saw wide-spread large protests and civil unrest that presented a nation-wide law enforcement challenge in every major city across the United States. Unrest that included calculated and organized attacks on the police and fellow protestors attempting to peaceably exercise their First Amendment rights. In a year that included so many unmatched events one thing remained constant, the members of the Chicago Police Department (the “Department”) stepped up to serve the residents of and visitors to the City of Chicago. As the Independent Monitor Team (“IMT”) points out in its report titled *The City of Chicago’s and the Chicago Police Department’s Response to Protests and Unrest in Year Two of the Consent Decree* (the “Special Report”) this service was not without its flaws and the Department can and must improve. However, what should also be noted is the selfless service of these members. At a time when so many others had the opportunity to quarantine and isolate to protect themselves and their families, these officers stepped forward at risk to both themselves and their loved ones to answer the call from the City.

While most people who will read the IMT’s Special Report will think about what they saw on television and in media reports about the events of May 29-June 1, July 17, August 10 and August 15, the members of the Department will think about what they lived. They will remember their attempts to protect those who wanted to express their First Amendment rights, the people they walked along-side for miles to ensure no car drove into them, to ensure their rights were protected. They will remember those who expressed their gratitude for the work the officers did and the conversations they had with perfect strangers. They will unfortunately also remember the days and nights when they had things thrown at them and terrible things yelled at them. The officers at the Columbus statue will remember the organized mob they faced there, a group that to date law enforcement (state and federal) have been unable to identify. There is a tendency to focus on the few that responded to residents in a way they should not have or those that may have violated the rules. These should be considered the exception and not the rule. What should not be lost are the officers who worked without days off, over twelve hours a day to quell a riot and how what they did was in service to the City and its residents.



The IMT's Special Report critically examines the responses of the City of Chicago (the "City") and the Department to the protests and unrest beginning at the end of May 2020 through November 2020. The Special Report breaks IMT's analysis into four main categories and provides corresponding recommendations to improve the City and the Department's operations and procedures. The four areas IMT examines in the Special Report are (i) planning and preparation, (ii) policies, (iii) training and (iv) accountability and transparency.

Throughout the Special Report the IMT recounts situations that occurred throughout the city which involved Chicago Police Department members. The Department does not admit that the factual scenarios recounted throughout the report occurred as they are a summary and not a complete and accurate statement of the incidents from all perspectives. Additionally, these factual scenarios are the IMT's interpretation of a snapshot in time and do not include the events both before and after. Nothing in this response shall be deemed an admission by the Department or City to any wrongdoing by members. That said, the Department has made great strides to improve its response to large protests and civil unrest. Throughout the last year the Department has worked with the IMT, the OAG and members of the Coalition to address concerns to the Department's response last year and to make changes to its policies, training, preparedness and accountability. This has been done to not only move towards compliance with the Consent Decree but to be a better organization as it serves the residents of this city and its many visitors.

## II. Planning and Preparation

IMT issued six recommendations related to the City and Department's planning and preparations to respond to protests and civil unrest. Each of these recommendations is addressed separately below.

### **Response to Recommendation 1 - Expand planning operations cross all internal and external entities and partners by, among others,**

#### **(1) Establish a multi-Facet Planning Team**

It is important to note that the Department has used the National Incident Management System ("NIMS") for all planning and resource coordination since the 2012 NATO Summit, and it has made significant improvements to its multi-facet planning teams since the 2020 civil unrest. In 2020, the Department established the "Special Events" "Multi-Faceted Planning Team" that consists of internal Department command staff and members from the Bureaus of Patrol (specifically the affected District and Area command), Counterterrorism and Special Operations (Intelligence, SWAT, Canine, Bomb Squad, Helo, Marine etc.), Detectives and Internal Affairs and other specialty resources including Public Information Officers, videographers and Legal Officers as needed. In 2020, the Department recognized that a component was missing from the "Special Events" team and, in response, added the Office of Community Policing to planning. The Department's external planning team partners ("City Partners") consist of:

- Office of Emergency Management and Communications ("OEMC"),
- Traffic Management Authority ("TMA"),
- Chicago Fire Department ("CFD"),
- traditional and emergency medical services,

- the Deputy Mayor for Public Safety,
- the Mayor's Office Department of Cultural Affairs and Special Events,
- Illinois State Police ("ISP"),
- Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System (ILEAS) and Mutual Aid Box Alarm System ("MABAS") when possible,
- Chicago Transit Authority ("CTA"),
- Business Affairs and Consumer Protection ("BACP"),
- The Chicago Department of Transportation ("CDOT"),
- Streets and Sanitation,
- Water Department,
- Department of Bridges,
- Chicago Public Schools,
- Weather Service,
- Aldermanic Ward Offices

The Department has also included community outreach workers as part of the planning process for certain events which occur in the communities that these outreach workers serve. Prior to 2020, when protests and potential unrest coincided with other preplanned large-scale events like sporting and entertainment events, those entities are invited in the planning or made aware of the results of those planning meetings. Normally the planning meetings would take place in person in a collective meeting environment, but during 2020 the meetings were largely hosted over virtual meeting platforms for required social distancing.

As mentioned above, since the unrest in the summer of 2020, the Department has expanded its internal planning resources to include the Office of Community Policing ("OCP"). OCP played a significant role in the planning and preparation in 2020 as it relates to protest demonstrations and other nontraditional community and or culturally relevant incidents. The relationships that OCP fostered both before and after 2020's civil unrest have been beneficial in providing a communications conduit to organizers and others who are looking to express themselves and want to do so peacefully.

## **(2) Modifying Current Planning Template**

The Department along with its City Partners continue to evaluate, refine and implement improvements to our event planning processes. We recognize that each event is unique and must be looked at individually from a whole of government approach to create an "All Hazards" comprehensive public safety plan. The goal of such a plan is to effectively and efficiently allocate resources (personnel and equipment), and coordinate the sharing of information and intelligence amongst all planning partners.

## **(3) Conducting Tabletop Exercises for Command Personnel**

The Department has partnered with its public safety partners to plan and execute Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack simulations and tabletop drills at all major Sports and Entertainment Venues as well as at several retail corridors and high-rise office buildings within the Central Business District over the past several years. CFD has conducted NIMS familiarization workshops and tabletop exercises for supervisory personnel including the ranks of Sergeant, Lieutenant, Captain and all Exempts

at the Chicago Fire Training Academy. However, that training stopped as the Department was restructured and in leadership transition throughout the Command Staff ranks because of both Command Staff (Exempt) turnover in 2019 and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. In the fourth quarter of 2020, The Department began to conduct numerous tabletop exercises covering the new Emergency Mobilization Plan (“EMP”). The EMP was developed during and with input from the after-action debriefings of the George Floyd Protest, Civil Unrest, and Looting incidents of 2020. The EMP is a detailed and layered All Hazards mobilization plan with increasing levels of response utilizing all available city resources to prevent, deter, mitigate, and recover from any situation including protection and mitigation at retail corridors throughout the City not just in the Central Business District. Lastly the Department, OEMC and CFD each recognizing the need for an updated City-wide emergency response plan across all agencies contracted in 2019 with a private entity to evaluate current policy, procedures, internal response and mobilization processes, operational plans, and orders of each agency and to develop a comprehensive plan for emergency response for the City. That private entity is tasked with hosting two tabletop exercises evaluating current response plans in an All Hazards threat environment and develop an all agency City-wide response plan. The first City-wide tabletop was executed on June 9, 2021 with multiple scenarios and multiple Exempt and non-exempt supervisory role players and staff from the Department, CFD and OEMC as well as other City agencies. The evaluations from that exercise are still being tabulated but they should provide insight as to core competency as well as recommendation for improvements in training, equipment and personnel. The second exercise is expected to be completed by the end of 2021.

**Response to Recommendation 2: Enhance intelligence gathering and dissemination capabilities by, among other things:**

**(1) Tracking National and International Events that May Impact Chicago:**

Recognizing that Chicago is representative of the global community, Department members have and will continue to analyze local, national and international events and act accordingly based on any verifiable, credible threat intelligence it receives or generates whether through electronic or human intelligence sources. The Department has improved its Open-Source media analysis capabilities by investing in advanced training for select personnel. The Department partnered with Federal agencies to develop this program and continues to work with these partners to improve its analysis capabilities. The Department will continue to invest in its analytical personnel by providing them with increased opportunities through inter-agency and taskforce assignments to enhance their skillsets to identify, produce, and disseminate analytical intelligence products to the Department that can be acted upon with an increased degree of accuracy. The Department also has improved its intelligence gathering and information sharing with regional municipalities, states agencies and federal counterparts across the country. These relationships will increase the Department’s intelligence gathering and analysis abilities far into the future.

**(2) Identifying Potential Protest Groups<sup>1</sup>:**

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<sup>1</sup> The Special Report lists “identifying potential protest groups” twice, in both subsections as (2) and (4) of IMT’s recommendation for Intelligence and Communication. Special Report p. 108, Sec. 2(2) and (4).

The Department strives to identify all organized protest and demonstration groups in advance of any advertised, planned, or (where possible) spontaneous events. When feasible, the Department contacts known or repeat event organizers in advance of any such event to establish a rapport and to ensure the safety of all in attendance, including possible counter-protesters. The Department supervisor in charge of the protest or demonstration always attempts to speak privately with an organizer to understand the goal(s) of the protest or demonstration and, where possible, to facilitate a peaceful outcome for the safety of all involved. The lawful expression and exercise of First Amendment-related activities is paramount and those rights go hand-in-hand with providing a safe environment for all.

### **(3) Conducting Formal Meetings with Protest Organizers and Community Stakeholders:**

The Department also attempts to host formal meetings with protest groups and community organizers to foster communication and trust-building prior to any protest, march, or demonstration. These meetings help in planning a safe event, as well as managing resource allocation. Active listening is key to building and earning trust and can be the best way to ensure the safety of all involved. The Department will continue to make every effort, as it did in 2020, to host meetings with known groups and demonstration organizers.

OCP has been at the forefront of creating and building trust in this area. Not all interactions have been successful, particularly when the goal of the organizers is to protest the existence of police in the first instance, but the Department intends to build on those interactions in order to reach common ground. The Department understands that some demonstrators and organizers feel their credibility will suffer if they engage in conversations with the Department, but the Department will continue to attempt to bridge those divides and use every means at its disposal to build trust and foster continuing dialogue and community engagement.

### **(4) Improving Social Media Engagement:**

The Department has trained a select group of personnel in open-source social media analysis. The personnel receive extensive training and undergo random screening to ensure the integrity of the program. The program is under constant review for possible improvements in personnel selection, training and equipment. The Department will continue to invest in its analytical personnel by providing them with increased opportunities through inter-agency and taskforce assignments to enhance their ability to identify, produce and disseminate analytical intelligence products that can be acted on with an increased degree of accuracy.

**Response to Recommendation 3: Continue New Forms of Community Engagement by, among other things, (1) clearly communicating time, place and manner restrictions; (2) conducting community-sentiment assessments; (3) engaging with community review of and comment on policies and training; (4) creating and maintaining community and business safety plans; (5) improving victim services**

#### **(1) Clearly Communicating Time, Place and Manner Restrictions**

As a preliminary matter it should be noted that during the incidents of civil unrest, OCP actively met with organizers and participants in order to gain timely insight of demonstrator's intentions

including but not limited to routes and protest plans which assisted in mitigating misunderstandings and confusion. In addition to establishing clear lines of communication, OCP functioned as an on-scene conduit to respond to the immediate concerns of demonstrators in order to deescalate tensions. That said, the Department needs to do better. The issue of communications during the course of a protest or civil unrest has been raised over the past year and the Department has worked with the IMT, OAG and Coalition to clarify its procedures in the First Amendment Directive G02-02. To this end, the Department is exploring the ability to alert participants of a protest or unrest via emergency alert on their cell phone of a dispersal order or restrictions. These alerts would be geocoded to specific locations, such as streets or intersections, to limit the alert only to individuals involved in the protest or unrest. The Department is currently working with the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC) to provide this alert.

Moreover, recognizing that many people who protested in 2020 came for the first time, OCP is actively working to engage community and advocacy organizations that led and organized protest or rallies in 2020. Through this outreach, OCP hopes to establish new relationships that will hopefully lead to an ability to have open communication, or at least awareness, of a planned protest or rally and the opportunity to provide any support.

### **(2) Conducting Community-Sentiment Assessments**

Since 2017, the Department has partnered with Elucd, a survey and research company that collects and analyzes average trust and safety scores among residents. The surveys ask residents to rate how safe they feel in their communities and how much they trust the police. Additionally, the surveys invite respondents to provide open-ended feedback about what they identify as their top crime concerns and community engagement recommendations. These responses, along with the average score numbers, are provided monthly to the Department. OCP has allowed district commanders direct access to the information so they can review it and adjust their crime fighting and community engagement strategies as needed.

In another step towards transparency, the Department recently made the sentiment scores available to the public on the Department webpage and can be found here:

<https://home.chicagopolice.org/statistics-data/data-dashboards/sentiment-dashboard/>

### **(3) Engaging With Community Review of and Comment on Policies and Training**

OCP began to engage more robustly with communities on various policies, including many high-profile policies like use of force and other impartial policing policies. In June 2020, shortly after the beginning of the civil unrest, the Department launched a community working group to review and provide recommendations on its use of force policies. Despite some initial challenges, the Department continued to meet with the working group for over a year, with the last meeting held in mid-June 2021. From these conversations, the Department implemented many changes and revisions to the policies to incorporate suggestions and recommendations discussed during the working group.

Additionally, in the fall of 2020, OCP led focus groups open to the public on the following policies:

- Response to Hate Crimes
- Limited English Proficiency / Language Access
- Prohibition of Sexual Misconduct
- Interactions with Children and Youth
- Interactions with People with Disabilities
- Interactions with Religious Communities

Over 200 people from the community participated in these focus groups and provided feedback to the Department on ways to improve or revise the policies. Public surveys were also made available to the public which garnered over 3,000 responses collectively. In 2021, OCP has continued to work to incorporate community feedback into those policies, including engaging with communities on the draft policies as available before finalizing.

In May 2021, OCP launched a comprehensive engagement plan on the Department's new foot pursuit policy. The engagement plan includes public comment on the policy, a public input form, community conversations open to the public, and deliberative dialogues that community and advocacy groups are invited to sign up for. The engagement runs through the middle of July.

Finally, OCP has begun the development of a long-term and comprehensive engagement plan on all policies requiring community input. The plan will provide a clear roadmap for how the Department will engage with diverse communities around each policy and training.

Though not directly tied to policy, OCP has begun the development of a crisis response plan that can be implemented following an incident of police violence or excessive force either in Chicago or another city. The response plan will be trauma-informed and used as a means of healing between police and communities following an unfortunate incident that may create harm, distrust, or trauma within the community or police department. Though related to use of force, the plan will not specifically engage on use of force policy and will be geared towards community healing and building. OCP is working with the Office of Equity & Racial Justice in the Mayor's Office and community organizations to develop the plan.

#### **(4) Creating and Maintaining Community and Business Safety Plans**

After the initial civil unrest in May-June 2020, OCP participated with the Department of Business Affairs and Consumer Protection ("BACP") in hosting and briefing local Chambers of Commerce of the "Whole of Government" neighborhood protection plans for retail and business corridors. These briefings allowed for local business to address concerns and created clearer lines of communications.

Also, in 2020 OCP in conjunction with all (22) districts conducted 43 community input meetings with communities from across the city centered around gathering community input on crime priorities and community engagement priorities. These conversations helped to support each district's creation of a District Strategic Plan. These meetings allowed communities across the city to inform crime enforcement and community engagement decisions made at their district level.

The overall attendance from 2019 to 2020 increased 135% for the first set of meetings and 22% for the second set of meetings (2019 first set of meetings: 840 attendees and 2020 first set of meetings: 2,004 attendees; 2019 second set of meetings: 990 attendees and 2020 second set of meetings: 1,210 attendees)

A post meeting survey completed by participants related that over 90% of the participants either agreed or strongly agreed to the statement, “I felt the process allowed my voice to be heard”.

These 43 meetings and the community input that was given went to directly informing each of the (22) district’s strategic plans for 2021. Additionally, to maintain transparency and increase community trust, each of the (22) district strategic plans are posted online on the Department’s page underneath the “Community” tab.

Following the civil unrest during the summer of 2020, The Office of Community Policing working in conjunction with the Department research and development published Special Order S02-03-13 *Community Policing Business Public-Safety Initiative* (which was implemented on 31 August 2020). The order is a district-level community problem-solving initiative to address public safety issues involving businesses within each district, including the assignment of Business Liaison Officers.

OCP additionally provided further guidance following civil unrest to business liaison officers in each district. The business liaison officer was tasked with being the point of contact in every district for any instances related to protests, civil unrest or looting within their business corridors. Additionally, they would work in conjunction with the district’s Strategic Decision Support Center (“SDSC” room) to identify any potential for civil unrest within their business corridors. They were tasked with keeping an hourly log of events as follows:

1. Incidents occurring at businesses and around the business corridors.
2. Intelligence gathered that may alert to looting or other criminal activity on and near businesses. Events such as vehicles gathering or staging.
3. Phone calls fielded from business owners as well as phone calls made to business owners. Example: at 1030hrs spoke to John Doe, a manager at ABC foods who was concerned with a large group gathering. OEMC notified, officers responded and coded the event
4. Log events of stolen rental vehicles, thefts from car dealership, panel trucks or vehicles that may facilitate criminal activity, including RD#s.

##### **(5) Victim Services**

In 2020, OCP expanded its victim services to begin including victims of non-fatal gun crimes. Three Crime Victim Advocates were hired to launch the Crime Victim Services pilot. The pilot remains ongoing and OCP is continually evaluating it to determine next steps on expansion.

Further, OCP is currently hiring for three additional Domestic Violence Advocates. These civilian positions will support victims and survivors of gender-based violence in connecting with

supportive resources, investigation follow ups, and other needs the victim or survivor may have.

OCP recently expanded its Civil Rights Unit to include new community liaisons focused on specific affinity populations throughout the City. This includes 6 LGBTQ+ liaison, an Immigrant Outreach Liaison Officer, a Homeless Outreach Liaison Officer, and a Religious Minorities Liaison Officer. Additionally, each districts community policing office now has an Affinity Liaison Officer that is dedicated to engaging with and supporting historically marginalized and minority communities within that district. Through this expansion, OCP hopes to increase its ability to engage with communities that have historically had more challenges and less trust with police and begin to re-establish those relationships in a more positive way.

#### **Response to Recommendation 4: Create, train, and equip specialized Mobile Field Force Teams across all CPD Areas**

The Department agrees that it is important to create, train and equip Mobile Field Force Teams city-wide and has taken steps to implement this recommendation. In its After Action Report, the Department acknowledged the importance of Mobile Field Force (“MFF”) training. Prior to the 2012 NATO summit the Department implemented this training and employed Mobile Field Force units as a means of protecting peaceful protestors from agitators, inciters, and wrongdoers. The Department failed to continue this training after NATO and nine years later when civil unrest came to Chicago it was left underprepared.

Since the summer of 2020, the Department has implemented a Mobile Field Force Training program for the Critical Incident Response Team (“CIRT”) and Community Safety Teams (“CST”). Members assigned to CIRT often respond first when a police presence becomes necessary at large-scale, lawful gatherings and demonstrations. As such, field supervisors and police officers assigned to those units (e.g., 001st District, 018th District, CIRT, CST, Tactical Teams, etc.) primarily responsible for responding to large gatherings have since begun to attend eight-hour ‘refresher’ trainings on MFF policies and tactics. In addition, the Education and Training Division started providing MFF-specific ‘refresher’ training department-wide on July 23, 2020. In addition to what is set forth in this section, the Department refers to its response to Recommendation 1 in the Training Section below.

#### **Response to Recommendation 5: Better prepare for department-wide officer wellness and support, including providing and tracking protective equipment, transportation, hydration, food, facilities, and relief (¶¶381–86)**

Since the civil unrest of 2020, the Department has implemented a new software system to document, keep track of, and assure follow ups to traumatic incidents, such as officer involved shootings. Supervisors enter the officer(s) info into the system and provide information such as time and date of incident, type of trauma, date officers were notified of being placed into the Traumatic Incident Stress Management Program (“TISMP”), and date of initial debriefing. The software automatically notifies officers who have been placed into the TISMP program of policy and procedures regarding mandatory trauma debriefings. The assigned clinician to each incident maintains information of the status of the offices as date placed into code 48 and date released.

Moreover, to assure 24-hour response to officers in need the Professional Counselling Service



has expanded office hours during extended deployments. During these times, the EAP building is open from 0800 until 2230. Throughout these times operations are as follows:

- The building will be open as a cooling center;
- Seven alcohol and drug use meeting will be held each day. Four meetings will be on Zoom and three will be in person. Officers will be able to join the meetings from any location or join the live ones at the EAP office;
- One officer will be readily available to address any emergencies/crises including walk-ins;
- Peer Support members will address roll calls on a rotating basis; and
- On call clinicians will be available 24/7 to respond in person to any crises/needs.

**Response to Recommendation 6: Conduct a feasibility study regarding the acquisition, prioritization, allocation, and tracking of resources for officer wellness and responding to protests and unrest (§§377, 379)**

The IMT correctly points out the Department’s lack of resources at the beginning of the Civil Unrest and the necessity to purchase a number of items to attempt to aid the officers who were working tirelessly to respond to the unrest. The IMT focuses its analysis primarily on three items: BWC, radios and mobile field force equipment and OC spray. Since the unrest of 2020, the Department has taken steps to increase its supplies and it moves into a position of better preparedness.

First, since the civil unrest last year the Office of Public Safety Administration (“OPSA”) has deployed over 1,100 BWCs to a variety of units. As set forth in the chart below, BWCs have been distributed as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u># of BWCs</u>
CST	308
CIRT	288
CIT	15
Mass Transit	205
Traffic	44
SWAT	28
Counter Terrorism	40
Summer Mobile	60
Central Detention	24
Area 1 Detectives	24
Area 2 Detectives	24
Area 3 Detectives	24
Area 4 Detectives	24
Area 5 Detectives	24
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Total	1,132 BWCs

Moreover, by the end of July 2021, the Department intends to have BWCs deployed at the following locations for the use of the officers assigned to these locations: Public Safety Headquarters, Homan Square and the Training Academy. In addition, OPSA is including Body Worn Cameras on the battery truck that is deployed during long protests and civil unrest to provide additional BWCs if necessary. The details of this battery truck have not been finalized yet.

As discussed during interviews conducted by the IMT, the Department is in the midst of a multi-year contract that provides for the upgrade of police radios. At the end of this contract the Department will have fully transitioned to those updated radios.

### III. Policies

The Special Report makes two broad recommendations for changes to the Department policy regarding the response to protests and civil unrest. The Department provides the following comments in response to those general recommendations, which can be found on page 137 of the Special Report.

#### **Response to Recommendation 1: Create Standard Operating Procedures for initiating Emergency Operations Center and Forward Command Posts, establishing clear roles and responsibilities for all levels of command**

While the IMT recommends the creation of Standard Operating Procedures it should be noted that portions of an Emergency Operations Center are already set forth in the Department's directives. For example, directive G05-03, *Critical Incident Response Program* (December 7, 2017), defines and explains the concept of establishing a "forward command post". The forward command post is defined as follows: "A secure location near the exterior of the structure or outside the protected area designated by the first supervisor on-scene not assigned to a contact team and assigned by the field lieutenant/watch operations lieutenant of the district of occurrence. The Forward Command Post is used to support the protected area and causality collection point." Directive G05-03 provides direction for the establishment of the "Forward Command Post" for critical incidents, hazardous material incidents, and active criminal threat situations.

The Special Report also references Department directive S05-07-01, *Emergency Action Plans*, and cites the updating of Department emergency plans for all Department facilities. Clear roles for several levels of command have been identified in the recently revised and published directive G02-02, *First Amendment Rights* (April 13, 2021). This directive, which is referenced in the Special Report, defines and provides operational circumstances for when a "Field Commander" and "Incident Commander" designation would be appropriate during a First Amendment response. The directive describes the Field Commander as "[t]he highest ranking on-scene Department member who reports directly to the overall incident commander and is responsible for the Department's on-scene response to the incident". It defines the incident commander as "[t]he designated Department member who is responsible for the Department's overall response to the incident."

#### **Response to Recommendation 2: Update and develop CPD policies, with an enhanced focus on (1) Use of Force, including mass arrests, (2) First Amendment-related policies, (3) core policing values regarding ethical policing practices and a commitment to fair, unbiased and respectful interactions; and (4) accountability.**

### **(1) Use of Force**

The Department's Research and Development Division has recently published a suite of updated use of force directives that received no objection from the Office of Attorney General. These directives are:

- G03-02, *De-Escalation, Response to Resistance, and Use Of Force*;
- G03-02-01, *Response to Resistance and Force Options*;
- G03-02-02, *Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report*;
- G03-02-03, *Firearm Discharge Incidents – Authorized Use and Post-Discharge Administrative Procedures*;
- G03-02-04, *Taser Use Incidents*;
- G03-02-05, *Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Devices and Other Chemical Agent Use Incidents*;
- G03-02-06, *Canine Use Incidents*;
- G03-02-07, *Baton Use Incidents*; and
- G03-02-08, *Department Review of Use of Force*.

These directives were positively mentioned in the Special Report's side-by-side chart analysis and are in effect during the Department's response to protests and unrest. Currently, the Department's mass arrest procedures are outlined in directive S06-06, *Mass Arrest Procedures* (September 27, 2018). Directive S06-06 delineates Department members' responsibilities and provides procedures for classified mass arrest circumstances.

### **(2) First Amendment**

The Department recently published two directives—G02-02, *First Amendment Rights* (Apr. 13, 2021) and D20-08, *Reporting the Response to Crowds, Protests, and Civil Disturbances* (Nov. 02, 2020)—that address the Department's response to First Amendment activities. As the Special Report notes, the following significant changes have been implemented through the revised version of Directive G02-02: the definition of First Amendment assembly, a description of crowd management techniques; revised and defined procedures for crowd dispersal orders with reporting requirements, and an outline of crowd management procedures. Similarly, Directive D20-08 implemented the following significant changes: definitions of a "squad" and "platoon;" the introduction of an "officer line formation" that can act as a "static human barrier or can be mobile to move, channel, or disperse a crowd;" and the introduction of the Incident Response Form (CPD-11.302) to document the formation of "squads" as a result of a crowd's actions.

### **(3) Core policing values regarding ethical policing practices reflect a commitment to fair, unbiased, and respectful interactions with the public**

The Special Report also recommends that the Department directives ensure that core policing values regarding ethical policing practices reflect a commitment to fair, unbiased, and respectful interactions with the public. The Department has published multiple directives that address the core policing values. For example, in the recently published suite of use of force directives, each of the directives contains the "sanctity of life" definition, which reads as follows:

The Department's highest priority is the sanctity of human life. The concept of the sanctity of human life is the belief that all human beings are to be perceived and treated as persons of inherent worth and dignity, regardless of race, color, sex, gender identity, age, religion, disability, national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, marital status, parental status, military status, immigration status, homeless status, source of income, credit history, criminal record, criminal history, or incarceration status. Department members will act with the foremost regard for the preservation of human life and the safety of all persons involved.

In addition, Directive G04-01, *Preliminary Investigations* (Dec. 30, 2020), contains the following in its policy statement:

Fair, unbiased, and respectful interactions during calls for service and preliminary investigations provide an opportunity to strengthen community trust and foster public confidence in the Department. Department members will act, speak, and conduct themselves in a professional manner, recognizing their obligation to safeguard life and property, and maintain a courteous, professional attitude in all interactions with the public.

Similarly, Directive G01-01, *Vision, Mission Statement, and Core Values*" (May 21, 2019), the Department emphasizes the following core values: professionalism, integrity, courage, dedication and respect. The Directive also includes the following definition of respect:

Respect means that we treat each other and the communities we serve as we would like to be treated: with compassion and dignity. Within the Department, we strive to ensure all members are supported and empowered, regardless of rank or position. Outside of the Department, we strive to partner with the communities we serve through transparency, accountability, and building mutual trust. We recognize that the respect we owe to our communities is not conditional, and we recognize that respect as a value must permeate every police action we undertake.

Several directives, including G02-02, *Community Policing Mission and Vision* (Dec. 31, 2020); G04-01, *Preliminary Investigation* (Dec. 30, 2020); and G01-09, *Supervisory Responsibilities*" (May 10, 2021) include a section regarding procedural justice and legitimacy. These three directives have the procedural justice and legitimacy language as follows:

The Department continues its commitment to establish procedures consistent with the concepts of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy, with the goal of strengthening the relationship with the community and ultimately improving officer safety and efficiency. The concept of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy consists of the following four principles: giving others a voice (listening), fair and transparent decision making based on the facts, respectful treatment, and trustworthiness.

#### **(4) Accountability**

Finally, the Special Report recommends that the Department create directives that reflect accountability for Department members. Here again, the Department has published multiple directives that address holding Department members accountable for their behaviors. For example, directive G01-09, *Supervisory Responsibilities* (May 10, 2021), contains an entire section titled “Accountability.” Some language included in the “Accountability” section reads as follows:

Department supervisors are responsible for holding Department members under their command accountable for their actions and have a duty to report allegations of misconduct. As such, Department supervisors will identify any adverse behavior or misconduct and ensure that it is adequately addressed through employee assistance resources, corrective action, timely and appropriate training, or referral for discipline.

Additionally, Directive G03-02, *De-Escalation, Response to Resistance, and Use of Force* (Apr. 15, 2021), includes a specific section on “Accountability,” which provides:

All Department members are obligated to ensure compliance by themselves and other members with Department regulations, policies, and the law. Consistent with the Department directive titled *Complaint and Disciplinary Procedures*, Department members will be held accountable for using force that violates law, this directive, or other Department policy. Reminder: Department members are reminded that discipline, up to and including separation from the Department, may be administered for any misconduct or violation of policy.

Directive G01-01, *Vision, Mission Statement, and Core Values* (May 21, 2019), also emphasizes accountability through its language regarding the essential value of respect:

Respect means that we treat each other and the communities we serve as we would like to be treated: with compassion and dignity. Within the Department, we strive to ensure all members are supported and empowered, regardless of rank or position. Outside of the Department, we strive to partner with the communities we serve through transparency, accountability, and building mutual trust. We recognize that the respect we owe to our communities is not conditional, and we recognize that respect as a value must permeate every police action we undertake.

The Department is continuing to build on the recent success above to further refine Department policies related to the response to crowds, protests, and unrest. For example, the Department is currently reviewing and revising S06-06, *Mass Arrest Procedures* (issued September 27, 2018), to ensure the directive is consistent with current operational structure, provides clear direction to Department members on their roles during a mass arrest incident, and reflects the core principles and practices identified in the recent revisions (April 15, 2021) to the use of force suite of policies.

Moreover, the Department continues to engage IMT, OAG, the Coalition, and the Court to refine the Department's response to First Amendment activities. This dialogue has led to additional revisions to G02-02, *First Amendment Rights* (April 13, 2021), which are aimed at addressing the expectations of the community and the concerns over protecting First Amendment rights. This work will strengthen the

Department's policies on the response to protests and reaffirm the Department's commitment to accountability during responses to First Amendment activities.

The Department also continues to engage IMT and OAG on accountability issues and the Department's complaint and disciplinary structure. These discussions will result in significant revisions to the following accountability policies: G08-01, *Complaint and Disciplinary Procedures* and G08-01-02, *Initiations and Assignment of Investigations into Allegations of Misconduct*. The policy revisions will not only strengthen the Department's overall accountability process, but also bolster the structure for reporting and identifying misconduct, including within the context of the Department's response to First Amendment activities.

Finally, in response to IMT's recommendation on policy revisions to ensure the Department values core policing principles, the Department will continue to build on the existing policies in G01-01, *Vision, Mission, and Core Values*. The Department continues to review and revise, through the procedures outlined in the Consent Decree, policies associated with impartial policing, equitable treatment, and courteous and dignified treatment. In particular, the Department will revise G02-01, *Human Rights and Human Resources*, and G02-04, *Prohibition on Racial Profiling and Other Biased-Based Policing*, to clarify the prohibitions on discrimination, bias-based policing, and retaliation and to reinforce the Department's commitment to dignified, equitable, and respectful treatment of the public by all Department members in all circumstances, including First Amendment activities.

## IV. Training

### **Response to Recommendation 1: “Develop training programs for leadership, commanders, and supervisors as teams on Mobile Field Force operations and rules of engagement.”**

In April 2021, the Academy implemented a 2-hour “Field Force Operations for Leaders” course for senior executive service and command staff members. The goal of this training is to provide senior executive service and command staff members of the Chicago Police Department with instruction on the effective field force operation and overall police response to crowds, protests, or civil disturbances. At the conclusion of this class, participants are able to:

- identify considerations related to the First Amendment and public gatherings;
- identify considerations related to the Fourth Amendment and public gatherings;
- identify specific responsibilities of the designated exempt-level member related to public gatherings and reportable uses of force;
- explain the components of a successful Mobile Field Force (MFF) deployment;
- identify the composition of Mobile Field Forces (MFF) based on the Miami Model; and
- recall crowd control tactics used to control civil action/disorder.

### **Response to Recommendation 2: Provide adequate training for all officers on new or revised policies, including use of force, de-escalation, batons, and personal OC spray.**

The Department has offered the 8-hour Crowd Control and Management course annually since 2018

which includes training on use of batons in a First Amendment setting. In 2021, a new 16-hour Advanced Field Force Operations course was developed and is being implemented, with Critical Incident Response Teams, Community Safety Teams, Detail Unit, and Bureau of Patrol Tactical Teams scheduled to attend starting in April. The Department further developed a training projection to accommodate training the remainder of available sworn members in the 8-hour Crowd Control and Management Course in 2021.

In the Special Report, the IMT states that “most recruit and in-service training is not hands-on or scenario-based.” (Special Report, p. 169.) This paragraph describes the fact that Department members with less seniority do not have the same field experiences as veteran officers who were part of events that involved the tangible application of tactics, policies, and procedures, such as NATO. This is not representative of the amount of hands-on or scenario-based training members receive in training, such as:

- The 7-hour recruit training on Crowd Control and Behavior includes 2 hours on team tactics application;
- The 8-hour in-service Crowd Control and Behavior course includes 4 hours of formation drills and activities; and
- The 16-hour in-service Advanced Field Force Operations course includes 8 hours of formation drills and activities and a scenario.

**Response to Recommendation 3: Provide refresher training on (1) the people’s right to record officers, (2) uniform requirements, (3) respectful interactions, (4) providing and requesting medical aid, and arrestee rights.”**

The Department has implemented regular training via eLearning and streaming video and developed training bulletins to promote the regular reinforcement of policy and procedures regarding the right to record officers, uniform requirements, respectful interactions, providing and requesting medical aid, and arrestee rights. More specifically, in 2020 and 2021, the Department added several in-service course offerings providing instruction on the people’s right to record officers, uniform requirements, respectful interactions, providing and requesting medical aid, and arrestee rights. All sworn personnel were enrolled in eLearning training on foot pursuits, body worn cameras, de-escalation, response to resistance, and use of force, in addition to weapons discipline-focused courses such as firearms qualifications and MK9 OC spray. Streaming videos and training bulletins, which are important training tools to ensure Department members have regular review of key concepts, techniques and practices offered in in-service training, also were provided in these subject matter areas. Further, in 2020 and 2021, the Department delivered regular refresher training via streaming videos on topics such as crowd control, the First Amendment and public gatherings, and mass arrests. The Department posted messages on its Administrative Message Center, available on the Department’s intranet site, reminding members of various refresher training resources, with direction that the reminder consistently be announced in roll calls to inform members. The following is a summary of portions of trainings that are directly responsive to one or more of IMT’s recommendations in this section of the Special Report:

- **Foot Pursuit eLearning:** “Once the scene is safe and as soon as practical, request appropriate medical aid when an individual is injured, complains of injury, or requests medical attention. Department members may provide appropriate medical care consistent with the member's training.”

- “REMINDER: For use of force incidents resulting from a foot pursuit, as soon as it is safe and feasible to do so, members will provide life-saving aid consistent with their Department training, including the Law Enforcement Medical and Rescue Training (LEMART) training, to injured persons until medical...”
- **Orientation to De-Escalation, Response to Resistance, and Use of Force eLearning:** The section “Medical Attention” was revised to include existing policy that provides in relevant part, "for use of force incidents involving Department members, as soon as it is safe and feasible to do so, members will provide life-saving aid consistent with their Department training, including the Law Enforcement Medical and Rescue Training (LEMART) training, to injured persons until medical professionals arrive on scene. If the scene is safe and the person in custody is secure, Department members will not interfere with emergency medical personnel when providing treatment to injured persons. "Duty to Intervene" added to eLearningG03-02-06 - Department now prohibits the use of canines in response to crowds, protests, or civil disturbances. An Exempt-level incident commander will respond to canine deployments as a use of force.
- **Body Worn Cameras eLearning:** Illinois law allows the public to record on-duty officers in public or when officer has no reasonable expectation of privacy. Violation of law may constitute disciplinary actions and criminal penalties.
- **MK9 OC Spray eLearning:** If the subject appears to be in physical distress beyond the expected discomfort, complains of injury or makes you aware of a pre-existing medical condition, request the appropriate medical aid, including EMS (CFD).
- **Firearms Qualification eLearning:**
  - The Department's highest priority is the sanctity of life of human life. Department members will act with the foremost regard for the preservation of human life and the safety of all persons involved.
  - Once the scene is safe and as soon as practical, immediately request emergency medical services for an injured person through OEMC.
  - Sworn members may provide medical care consistent with their training to any individual who has visible injuries, complains of being injured, or requests medical attention.
  - Treat all injured persons with dignity and respect.

**V316 Crowd Control Formations Streaming Video was shown to the Department with required viewing on the following dates:**

8 June 2020 - 11 June 2020  
31 Oct 2020  
26 Apr 2021 - 29 April 2021  
31 May 2021 - 3 June 2021

**V402 First Amendment and Public Gatherings Streaming Video** (including recording on the public way, rendering aid, treating persons with courtesy and dignity, uniform requirements (i.e. identifiers, BWC, and COVID-safety face masks) **was shown to the Department with required viewing on the following dates:**

02-09 Nov 2020  
19-22 April 2021  
14-17 June 2021



**V417 Mass Arrest Procedures Streaming Video was shown to the Department with required viewing on the following dates:**

- 17-23 April 2021

**Training Bulletins**

- **ETB 20-06 Public Gatherings and First Amendment** – Topics include recording on the public way, rendering aid, treating everyone with courtesy and dignity, uniform (identifiers, body worn camera, and Covid masks)
- **ETB 17-03 Body Worn Camera** – “The Department’s community relations strategy includes building and fostering collaborative relationships through positive engagements and public trust. All interactions with the public are opportunities to enhance the perception of the police and build public trust. Audio and visual recordings from the body worn camera can improve the quality and reliability of investigations and increase transparency.”
- **ETB 17-05 Taser CEW** – “The sanctity of human life is the Department’s highest priority. The concept of the sanctity of human life is the belief that all human beings are to be perceived and treated as persons of inherent worth and dignity. Department members will act with the foremost regard for the preservation of human life and the safety of all persons involved. Taser discharge and request emergency medical services (EMS) if the person has been exposed to electricity, the probes penetrated their skin, or the person appears to be in any physical distress or complains of injury. Department members are prohibited from removing Taser barbs embedded in a person's flesh.”
- **ETB 17-04 Expandable Baton** – “The sanctity of human life is the Department’s highest priority. The concept of the sanctity of human life is the belief that all human beings are to be perceived and treated as persons of inherent worth and dignity. Department members will act with the foremost regard for the preservation of human life and the safety of all persons involved. ...upon gaining control of the person request emergency services if the person appears to be in physical distress, complains of injury, or has sustained a strike to the head or neck from a baton.”
- **ETB 16-01 Principles of Force Mitigation** – “The sanctity of human life is the Department’s highest priority. The concept of the sanctity of human life is the belief that all human beings are to be perceived and treated as persons of inherent worth and dignity. Department members will act with the foremost regard for the preservation of human life and the safety of all persons involved.”

## V. Accountability

In the Special Report, IMT makes six recommendations that relate to the Department’s accountability for Officers. Each of those specific recommendations will be addressed below. In its introductory section on Accountability, IMT states, “This enforcement should include recognition of officers who followed policies and appropriate accountability for those who did not.” (Special Report 184-185) In response, the Department notes that Bureau of Internal Affairs (“BIA”) coordinated with the Awards and Recognition Section to establish the [compliments@chicagopolice.org](mailto:compliments@chicagopolice.org) email address and a Department monitored compliment form for the public. A link to the Department compliment form was added to BIA’s public-facing website (next to the “submit a complaint” link) in May, 2021.

The Awards and Recognition Section will process these compliments in accordance with established procedure so that they appear in a department member's complimentary history. In addition, BIA has reached out to the Civilian Office of Police Accountability ("COPA") to ensure that compliments received via COPA's online form are forwarded to the Awards and Recognition Section for proper processing. BIA currently awaits response from COPA.

**Response to Recommendation 1: Improve reporting and documentation on uses of force, arrest, deployments, dispersals, officer wellness and safety, all injuries, and use of OC spray**

As a preliminary matter the Department refers to the section above in the policy response that addresses the Department's documentation of use of force. This overlaps with the Department's response to the accountability recommendation herein. During a mass arrest situation BIA ensures that BWC-equipped officers are assigned to each BIA Sergeant deployed to oversee a mass arrest incident. BIA continues to coordinate with forward command of each Area Deputy Chief when appropriate to ensure the presence of a BWC-equipped officer. Additionally, Central Detention van drivers have been issued BWCs. As for reminding officers about uniform requirements, The Office of Constitutional Policing and Reform issued 5 AMC Messages regarding Uniform and Appearance Standards during 2020 (#256716-June 2, 2020; #256717-June 2, 2020; #256767-June 4, 2020; #260794 –September 2, 2020, #262130-November, 5, 2020). Further the IMT states in its Special Report that members failed to self-report in any event related to civil unrest. This is not correct. Officers depicted on video in a significant incident did self-identify to BIA. (Incident at the office of Congressman Rush)

**Response to Recommendation 2: Increase transparency regarding discipline, including decisions to strip or not strip officers of police powers (§410, 567)**

As a preliminary matter, IMT's reference to Paragraph 410 is unclear, as that paragraph references administrative duty assignments after discharging a firearm, which is not a disciplinary process. It has no application to relieving officers of their police powers. "Stripping" is an informal term for relieving an officer of police powers. Relief of powers is a non-disciplinary process based on the authority of the Superintendent. (*See Special Report* 198) As to the officers that "flipped off" protestors and the officer that used "a homophobic slur," as described on page 193 of the Special Report, a full review of the incidents indicated that these officers acted unprofessionally in response to actions by members of the public that could be considered provocation. Those officers were temporarily relieved of their police powers, which provided a respite from additional near-in-time encounters with the public.

BIA has made improvement in transparency efforts in 2021. This year, BIA created the first-ever Quarterly Report in compliance with paragraphs 550 and 551 of the Consent Decree. BIA also included a comprehensive explanation of its structure, its jurisdiction over the Department's investigations, and the entire complaint process. The format of BIA's Quarterly Report was well-received by IMT and OAG. The Quarter 2 and Quarter 3 reports for 2020 were published to BIA's public-facing website in March and April, 2021, respectively. Final revisions for the Quarter 4 2020 report are underway. Additionally, BIA has updated the Accountability Dashboard, electronically published Administrative Summary Reports, and distributed informational brochures/posters regarding the complaint process.

**Response to Recommendation 3: Address personnel needs across accountability systems, including COPA investigators, CPD Force Review Division, BIA, and CPD supervisor ratios (¶¶343, 356, 521, 575, 700)**

The Department agrees with this recommendation and will strive to incorporate it in light of various manpower shortages and requirements or staff Department-wide.

**Response to Recommendation 4: Allocate sufficient City and CPD resources to review and analyze data, including tagging and auditing body-worn-camera video footage (¶¶352–53, 576, 700)**

BIA's CMS has undergone continuous improvement in 2021 to support the ability to review complaint data.

**Response to Recommendation 5: Continue to review and increase methods of transparency with Chicago's communities, regarding crime-reduction strategies, officer-involved shootings, and other police activities (¶¶10, 12, 17, 54, 334)**

The Department refers to its response to Recommendation 3 in the Planning section above wherein it addresses the steps taken by OCP to increase transparency with community members.

**Response to Recommendation 6: Create After Action procedures—including body-worn camera review and opportunities for community engagement—after each operations plan (¶¶8–10, 347–51)**

The Department continues to consider how to incorporate a city-wide after-action review and will take into consider the IMT's recommendations as it moves forward.

The Department appreciates the opportunity to respond to the Special Report and looks forward to its continued collaboration with the IMT as it moves forward with further reforms.



**After Action Report: The Chicago Police Department's Response to Civil Unrest between May 29, 2020 and June 12, 2020**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the wake of George Floyd’s tragic death, large-scale peaceful demonstrations followed by civil unrest spread from Minneapolis to major cities across the country. Chicago was not immune to this expression of outrage. In Chicago, we saw a form of violent unrest unseen since the late-1960s.

Importantly, this report intends not to confuse the widespread criminal activity with the many lawful, First Amendment-protected demonstrations that took place during the same time period. The Chicago Police Department (“Department”) remains committed to vigorously safeguarding individuals’ Constitutional rights.

The Department had planned for large, peaceful protests. However, violence and looting often accompanied those protests. According to the Major Cities Chiefs Association (“MCCA”), 62 percent of major city law enforcement agencies reported having experienced looting incidents, 56 percent reported having experienced arson incidents, 26 percent reported having police cars burned, and 72 percent reported having officers injured.<sup>1</sup>

The scale and chaotic nature of the large-scale, unprecedented civil unrest that inundated the city from May 29, 2020 through June 12, 2020 (“the Events”) also led to a number of misconduct complaints filed against Department members by both Department leadership and the public. The Civilian Office of Police Accountability (“COPA”) and the Department’s Bureau of Internal Affairs (“BIA”) continue to investigate these complaints.

The Department has an established collection of tactics, techniques, and strategies at its disposal to facilitate a safe, lawful, and collectively restrained crowd control effort that integrates the concepts of procedural justice, de-escalation, and impartial policing. None of these tactics include the use tear gas<sup>2</sup> or rubber bullets as a means of crowd control. Instead, the Department only permitted the use of oleoresin capsicum<sup>3</sup> (“OC”) devices, commonly known as “pepper spray,” during the Events.

On June 16, 2020, the Department initiated an After Action Review (“Review”) of its response to the Events. Department leaders and supervisors of various ranks attended a series of debriefings moderated by in-house counsel and city attorneys during which the group reviewed specific actions and initiatives undertaken by the Department in response to the Events. Department leadership identified both successes and areas for improvement to prepare for any future incidents requiring a similar, large-scale emergency response.

The discussion covered topics including planning, operations, resource allocation, and communications. While the Department continues to fulfill its everyday functions as the nation’s second-largest municipal law enforcement agency, it simultaneously continues to

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<sup>1</sup> Major Cities Chiefs Association, *Report on the 2020 Protests and Civil Unrest*, 9 (2020).

<sup>2</sup> See *id.* at 18 (listing municipal law enforcement agencies that reported using CS gas—also known as “tear gas”).

<sup>3</sup> See *Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Devices and Other Chemical Agent Use Incidents*, General Order G03-02-05 § I, II (February 29, 2020).

deliberately implement certain policies, procedures, and systems that can safely, lawfully, and effectively facilitate future responses to both planned and unplanned events.

The Department recognizes the value of an honest, thoughtful reflection on its strengths and areas it can improve. This report includes observations organized into five distinct, but related core capabilities:

**ACCOUNTABILITY | PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS | COMMAND AND CONTROL | TRAINING | COMMUNICATION**

It is tremendously difficult to anticipate the unpredictable. Progress, however, demands that the Department acknowledge its capacity to adapt as circumstances change. To this end, lessons learned have since informed other large mobilization efforts (e.g., the announcement of the grand jury's decision regarding the tragic death of Breonna Taylor, the 2020 Presidential Election, and New Year's Eve).

For additional information, please refer to the below-cited (and other) Department policies, procedures, and orders, which remain publicly accessible via [directives.chicagopolice.org](https://directives.chicagopolice.org).





## CORE CAPABILITIES

Five core capabilities repeatedly emerged during the Review with respect to the Events. These themes include:

### I. ACCOUNTABILITY

Swift, decisive actions amidst chaotic situations characterize the lived experiences of so many Department members who suddenly found themselves tasked with controlling large-scale civil unrest and co-occurring, widespread criminal activity. But absent accountability, police legitimacy falters and the city's trust in its police department ultimately erodes. Oversight and accountability are essential to a more effective Department and safer communities across Chicago.

The Department recognizes the importance of holding its members accountable when they fail to adhere to its rules and regulations. To this end, the Department values impartial, thorough investigations guaranteeing due process for members accused of wrongdoing and ensuring that those who feel mistreated recognize the process as one that is fair, transparent, neutral, and that offers them a voice.

According to Civilian Office of Police Accountability (“COPA”) data, individuals filed 591 complaints of misconduct between May 29, 2020 and June 11, 2020.<sup>4</sup> Of these allegations, 59 percent were referred to the Department's Bureau of Internal Affairs (“BIA”) and 41 percent remained within COPA's portfolio.<sup>5</sup> Department leadership continues to review complaints of misconduct related to the Events to identify common themes in order to continually improve its training, policies, and procedures. BIA worked collaboratively with COPA by promptly reviewing a myriad of photographic and video evidence in an intensive effort to identify officers accused of misconduct.

BIA personnel were also proactively deployed to monitor the arrests and processing of individuals taken into custody. This enabled individuals directly responsible for internal oversight to see firsthand that the Department's tactics, techniques, and strategies for facilitating a safe, lawful, and collectively restrained crowd control effort were properly implemented. None of these tactics include the use tear gas<sup>6</sup> or rubber bullets as a means of crowd control. Instead, the Department only permitted the use of oleoresin capsicum<sup>7</sup> (“OC”) devices, commonly known as “pepper spray,” during the Events.

The Department did not use tear gas or use rubber bullets at any point during the Events. To date, a substantial number of these misconduct investigations have been adjudicated by COPA and/or BIA with, in many cases, disciplinary action.

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<sup>4</sup> Civilian Office of Police Accountability, *All Complaints Report*, Protest Related Information (June 17, 2020), <http://www.chicagocopa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/All-Complaints-Report-5-29-to-6-11-v4.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> *Id.*

<sup>6</sup> See Major Cities Chiefs Association, *supra* note 1, at 18.

<sup>7</sup> See *Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Devices and Other Chemical Agent Use Incidents*, General Order G03-02-05 § I, II (February 29, 2020).

## II. PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS

The Department has a long history of managing large-scale events as early as the 1893 World's Fair. Since then, its members have protected attendees at a diverse array of pre-planned, large-scale events, such as the city's many annual music festivals, parades, sporting events, and First Amendment-protected gatherings.

In advance of these gatherings, the Department typically spends weeks planning and preparing alongside its local, state, and federal partners, to best ensure public safety and the protection of Constitutional rights. Previous to the 2020 Events, this often involved working directly with event organizers to ensure their safety and that of attendees by, for example, organizing routes and providing crowd control.

In the lead up to the first days of the Events and throughout, the Department reached out to event organizers but struggled to establish an on-going dialogue. Similarly, about 60 percent of major city law enforcement agencies reported to the MCCA that a lack of protest organizer cooperation "was the most significant challenge with respect to managing protest-related incidents."<sup>8</sup>

While the Events unfolded, the Department largely relied on its experience managing large-scale, planned events and gatherings. Some police officers who had stood beside demonstrators at the 2012 NATO Conference and the 2017 Women's March found themselves leading in administrative roles and other officers, once more, walked the streets of the city's central business district. But as the Events concluded, it became increasingly apparent that the Department must continue to adapt to an ever-changing social, political, and economic landscape.

Members of the Department must be as prepared to respond to large-scale, unplanned incidents as they are to respond to routine traffic crashes, disturbances, and crimes-in-progress. This is best accomplished through a deliberate, continuous cycle of improvement incorporating training, policy revisions, and regular preparedness drills.

## III. COMMAND AND CONTROL

By emphasizing command and control, the Department can promote a bi-directional flow of information between front-line police officers and the command center. The Department is at a distinct advantage as there is already deep-rooted deference to hierarchy, strict adherence to procedure, and an organizational culture that encourages systems thinking.

To this end, the Department has long recognized the value of a systematic, proactive approach consistent with the National Incident Management System ("NIMS"), which follows a unified Incident Command System ("ICS") framework.<sup>9</sup> Under NIMS/ICS, the highest-ranking on-site Department member, responsible for the Department's overall response, takes on the role of "Incident Commander." This individual typically takes control at a Forward Command Post

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<sup>8</sup> See Major Cities Chiefs Association, *supra* note 1, at 27.

<sup>9</sup> See *Critical Incident Response Program*, General Order G05-03 § II-A-1 (December 7, 2017).

“FCP”), a secure location established by the first field supervisor on-scene—typically located just outside the immediate vicinity of a critical incident.

Department leaders manage the incident from a FCP until a full-scale Operations Center (“OC”) is established at the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (“OEMC”). But earlier this summer, the Department had, for the first time, established a Summer Operations Center (“SOC”) at OEMC—which enabled a coordinated, proactive response to violent crime by the city’s public safety, regulatory, infrastructure, and other agencies. In turn, the Department was able to quickly transition the existing SOC to a full-scale OC at the onset of the large-scale, unprecedented civil unrest.

As a result, Department leaders could more efficiently manage available resources (and resolve incoming resource requests) from the same centralized location where they were ultimately making command-level decisions. However, the Department faced a unique challenge in that Department leaders and key members lacked recent, up-to-date training or practice on NIMS/ICS policies and procedures.

#### **IV. TRAINING**

Training is a strategic priority for the Department. Over the last several years, for example, the Department has invested in Force Mitigation,<sup>10</sup> Procedural Justice and Legitimacy,<sup>11</sup> and mental health crisis intervention training,<sup>12</sup> among many other training topics.

While recruit training includes exposure to Mobile Field Force (“MFF”) and mass arrest situations, many newer Department members (including those brought on during a dramatic hiring push started in late-2016) did not experience the same tangible application of those tactics, policies, and procedures as those older, more-experienced police officers who were deployed to, for example, the 2012 NATO Conference.

And while the Department was lauded for the efficacy with which it employed MFF units during the 2012 NATO Conference to protect hundreds of peaceful demonstrators from agitators, inciters, and wrongdoers, it took place nearly a decade ago—before some of the Department members working during this unprecedented, large-scale civil unrest were on the job or in senior leadership positions.

As a result, the Department could not rest on experience alone to guide those in the field through the civil unrest. It is essential that the Department commit to ensuring all necessary field units receive updated field force training moving forward.

#### **V. COMMUNICATIONS**

Collaboration requires communication. While the city’s businesses and retailers might have known that large-scale demonstrations were planned, they could not have anticipated the extent to which they would be victimized by widespread looting, burglary, and vandalism. To

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<sup>10</sup> See *Force Options*, General Order G03-02-01 § III (February 29, 2020).

<sup>11</sup> See *Community Relations Strategy*, General Order G02-03 § IV-A (September 15, 2017).

<sup>12</sup> See *Responding to Incidents Involving Persons in Need of Mental Health Treatment*, Special Order S04-20 § IV (April 25, 2018).

proactively support those same businesses and retailers, the Department must look to how it interfaces with those businesses and other city agencies and determine a better, more effective means of offering resources and information designed to withstand any future incidents of civil unrest.

The Department must also better facilitate communication between Department leaders and law-abiding, peaceful individuals engaged in First Amendment-protected activities—even when event organizers cannot (or refuse to) be identified. This is integral to the on-going transparency the Department owes to the individuals whom they serve.

Similarly, the Department recognized in the aftermath of the Events the importance of facilitating direct communication between members assigned to the Bureau of Detectives (“BOD”) and partners in the business and retail community to most efficiently investigate felony looting, burglary, property damage, and other crimes when they are, in fact, committed during large-scale incidents of civil unrest.

Finally, the Department must address identifiable barriers to efficient internal communications. This is the most important means of cultivating an organizational culture in which cynicism and apathy are widely displaced by professionalism and an urgent compassion, empathy, and sense of purpose. Such improvements will lead to better-informed Department members and proactive, rather than reactive, accountability.

## DISCUSSION

### Accountability

This section delineates strengths and potential areas of improvement for operational capabilities aligned with the “Accountability” objective.

- Strengths:**
- (1) Collaboration with the Civilian Office of Police Accountability
  - (2) Bureau of Internal Affairs members detailed to field operations
  - (3) Prompt review of objective, verifiable evidence

- Weaknesses:**
- (1) Reactive, rather than proactive, supervision and accountability
  - (2) Inability to efficiently identify and analyze event-related complaints
  - (3) Length of time for disposition of complaints

### Improvements:

#### ROLL CALLS

#### ANALYSIS:

Substantive, meaningful efforts to hold Department members accountable for wrongdoing must be proactive rather reactive. It is essential that Department leaders constantly reinforce the significance and importance of deescalating tense situations while safeguarding the Constitutional rights of all Chicagoans. This can occur only where Department leaders cultivate a values-driven culture in which cynicism and apathy are displaced by professionalism and an urgent compassion, empathy, and sense of purpose.

Given the nature of police work, Department members often find themselves separated from many of their colleagues for a majority of their work days—except, naturally, during roll call.

Unfortunately, the chaotic nature of the Events often kept Department members from leading roll calls with Department members in advance of their deployments to a given area. Instead, these Department members geared up and responded to the Events as soon as practicable; a well-intentioned but ultimately ineffective decision. This precluded Department leaders from communicating specific plans (and their underlying rationales) with those field supervisors and/or Department members ultimately expected to execute them.

In addition, some Department members were observed during the Events with their names and/or badges removed from their uniforms or otherwise obscured in violation of Department policy.<sup>13</sup> This could have been avoided

<sup>13</sup> See *Uniform and Appearance Standards*, Uniform and Property U04-01 § II-A-3 (March 11, 2020).

had supervisors, per that same Department policy, “inspect[ed] uniformed members at . . . roll call.”<sup>14</sup>

There is an overarching concern among Department leadership regarding how roll calls are conducted in each district and various specialized units. Roll call is the most direct opportunity for Department leaders—namely Sergeants, Lieutenants, Captains, and Commanders—to cultivate a specific culture within and among their chain of command.

However, roll calls often differ in length, breadth, and scope depending on the individual leading the briefing. As a result, the Department often sees rumors, speculation, and an insular distrust among its membership rather than a sincere understanding of its higher-level decision-making and strategy.

**ACTION:**

Some of the Department’s leaders are inherently capable of the task before them. Others, however, may need support from senior leadership as they develop certain soft skills necessary to facilitate the Department’s long-term vision and goals from a supervisory position.

The Department is committed to better equipping supervisors with the training, tools, and resources necessary to hold roll calls in which information is shared, standards are enforced, and the Department’s principles are proactively fostered. This starts with a deliberate effort to identify best practices and provide in-service training to Department leaders on how to hold effective roll calls.

**MASS ARREST**

**ANALYSIS:**

At times, Department members found themselves making a relatively significant number of arrests while a continued police presence was necessary to ensure public safety. In those instances, the Incident Commander or highest-ranking, on-scene member of the Bureau of Patrol had the capability of declaring a “mass arrest” incident.

The Department has a substantial written procedure governing mass arrest incidents<sup>15</sup> that works in theory but, during the Events, broke down in practice. This appeared attributable in part to the chaotic nature and unprecedented geographic scope of the Events. For example, Department members effecting arrests were required to complete “Mass Arrest Cards”—duplicate paper forms capturing limited information including, but not limited to, probable cause for arrest and the transporting unit’s information.

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<sup>14</sup> *Id.*

<sup>15</sup> See *Mass Arrest Procedures*, Special Order S06-06 § II-B (September 27, 2018).

But many Department members lacked familiarity with formal mass arrest policies and processes as a result of limited (if any) involvement with actual, tangible applications of the procedure; not all incidents at which multiple arrests are effected are mass arrest incidents. Nor were many duplicate mass arrest forms immediately available during the Events where widespread criminal activity was occurring.

As a result, many of the individuals arrested during the Events were either released without charging (“RWOC”) or had charges filed against them dropped by prosecutors because the arresting officer or officers could not be identified. These individuals may have been involved in serious, criminal wrongdoing (e.g., looting, arson, violence, etc.) during the Events and may never be held accountable as a result.

**ACTION:**

Department members assigned to BIA and BOD worked in tandem to supervise and facilitate mass arrest processing during the Events. When it was determined that the completion of mass arrest cards was not feasible, Department leaders informed members to document similar information verbally on their Body-Worn Cameras (“BWC”). Even so, it remained tremendously burdensome for processing officers to review hours of BWC footage for the purposes of identifying, among other things, the complainant officer, appropriate charges, and/or the time and location of arrest.

The Department intends to thoroughly review its mass arrest procedures in light of the challenges faced during the Events. This remains an on-going process involving multiple cross-functional working groups.

**TRACKING COMPLAINTS**

**ANALYSIS:**

The Department invested in a complaint-specific Case Management System (“CMS”) that was activated in February 2019. As a result, unique log numbers are now generated as complaints are entered into the system. This system permits supervisors to attach files (e.g., documents, digital evidence, etc.) to an individual log number. However, the system does not include a method by which Department leaders can easily identify groups of complaints arising from a specific, identifiable major event.

**ACTION:**

Certain weaknesses can often be addressed by modifying existing processes, procedures, and technologies. For example, the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (“OEMC”) already generates and assigns unique tracking numbers to various events and calls-for-service. Here, the Department is considering modifying the complaint CMS to include a field incorporating similar event tracking numbers. Such a modification would facilitate later analyses of complaints initiated during or associated with specific, large-scale events.

## Planning and Preparedness

This section delineates strengths and potential areas of improvement for operational capabilities aligned with the “Planning and Preparedness” objective.

- Strengths:**
- (1) Individual and collective experience
  - (2) Unified command center
  - (3) Open-minded leaders

- Weaknesses:**
- (1) Outdated, inflexible, and inefficient mass-mobilization plans
  - (2) Uncoordinated approach to securing the city’s retail corridors
  - (3) Reactive, ad hoc approach to emergency mobilization without training
  - (4) Too few body-worn cameras and antiquated protective equipment
  - (5) Equipment-related barriers to communication and transportation
  - (6) Department members were exhausted, stressed, and over-burdened

### Improvements:

#### CITYWIDE ‘LEVELED’ RESPONSE

#### ANALYSIS:

To maintain constant preparedness, the Department identified the value of a citywide, coordinated, and ‘leveled’ response to planned and unplanned events.

This addressed a number of inefficiencies. For example, the Department’s response to large-scale emergencies has long been based on two plans: “Plan Red” (using available on-duty personnel in phases) and “Plan Blue” (requiring, among other things, the recall of off-duty personnel).<sup>16</sup> In the event the Department activated a “Plan Blue,” off-duty personnel would be notified via radio and television announcements.

But with a modern, ‘leveled’ response, Department members can better anticipate whether their days off might be cancelled, hours extended, or areas of deployment shifted. Similarly, consistent ‘levels’ will enable the Department to scale an otherwise-consistent emergency response (whether localized or citywide) to any given incident.

#### ACTION:

To this end, the Department collaborated in the aftermath of the Events with public safety, infrastructure, transportation, regulatory, and other city

<sup>16</sup> See *Special Response Plans*, General Order G05-02 § II (December 7, 2017).



agencies to develop a ‘leveled’ response plan. The levels and related responses are as follows:

**Level 0:** Daily Business – a steady state

**Level 1:** Partial Response – a localized response

**Level 2:** Full Response – a citywide response

**Level 3:** Sustained Response – a continuing response

**Level 4:** Mutual Aid/State Resource – a collaborative response

These levels were designed to be ‘activated’ in advance of planned events and as unanticipated emergencies unfold. The Department will continue to collaborate with local, state, and federal partners to implement the necessary collaborative response that large planned gatherings demand.

But the city’s response to any forthcoming, unanticipated emergency situation requiring a large-scale response will rest largely on the Department and OEMC, as both operate each second of every day.

The Department has since shared a video outlining and explaining this ‘leveled’ plan with its members.

#### RETAIL CORRIDOR PLANS

##### **ANALYSIS:**

The Department recognized that both planned, large-scale events and unanticipated incidents, such as civil unrest, adversely impacted our city’s business and retail communities.

Our city’s retail corridors are essential; the Department must endeavor to include its business and retail partners in conversations as unplanned, emergency incidents of civil unrest unfold—particularly with respect to asset allocation, short-term infrastructure changes, and post-incident investigative collaboration.

##### **ACTION:**

To ensure our city’s retail corridors are protected in the event of future unplanned, large-scale incidents of civil unrest, the Department worked with the Chicago Department of Transportation (“CDOT”), the Department of Water Management (“DWM”), and the Department of Streets and Sanitation (“DSS”) to formalize its collaborative approach to allocating, deploying, and mobilizing resources to retail corridors as a means of securing them and thereby mitigating any adverse impact. CDOT, DWM, and DSS resources were strategically positioned in neighborhoods throughout the city to deter organized criminal activity while facilitating the city’s ability to rapidly and efficiently enact closures. Individuals from these agencies had direct access

to the Command Post enabling them to monitor retail corridors and quickly report criminal activity.

Department leaders recognized that District Commanders have a unique, localized understanding of community concerns, neighborhood economic lifelines, and any businesses that may be vulnerable during incidents of civil unrest. As such, the Department tasked its District Commanders with obtaining input from their community partners and identifying those specific businesses and retailers in their districts. Our retail corridor protection plans now reflect this input. These plans include information for operational purposes (e.g., how to enact closures) along with a detailed list of key points of interest (e.g., public transit, historical and cultural monuments, etc.) and contact information for businesses, local chambers of commerce, and other key community partners.

**EMERGENCY  
MOBILIZATION PLANS**

**ANALYSIS:**

Implementing the Department's new citywide, coordinated, and 'leveled' response to incidents of civil unrest required revisions to existing Emergency Mobilization Plans ("EMP"). In the face of uncertainty, adaptability demands that written policies, procedures, and internal communications sustain a shared understanding of the Department's underlying strategy while allowing for flexibility in its execution.

Evidence-based decision-making can eliminate many of the inefficiencies, redundancies, and avoidable costs associated with a reactive, ad hoc approach to incidents of civil unrest.

**ACTION:**

To this end, the Department revised its EMPs to parallel the new citywide, coordinated, and 'leveled' strategy.

The Department consulted with each Bureau Chief to ensure its assets and resources were utilized most efficiently across the city. As the Department refines existing EMPs, its leaders continue to hold drills, table-top exercises, and other conversations to ensure any and all revisions are subject to on-going evaluation and tests of operational capability.

**INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT**

**ANALYSIS:**

Body-Worn Cameras ("BWC") have become an essential tool for law enforcement officers as they offer an audio and video-recorded, first-person point-of-view of certain (and at times adversarial) encounters. BWC videos have become as important for prosecutors at the Cook County State's Attorney's Office ("CCSAO") as they have been for investigators at the Civilian Office of Police Accountability ("COPA"). Officers often feel as protected by their BWC as individuals feel knowing that police-resident encounters are

now routinely recorded. However, at the time of the Events, BWCs were largely assigned to field units (i.e., patrol) and not to each of roughly 13,000 sworn officers in various roles throughout the Department due to cost. Thus, as this was a department-wide response, many field supervisors and police officers witnessed criminal activity and made arrests for which no BWC video exists.

There were a number of individual incidents where field supervisors and police officers found themselves targeted by assailants wielding various projectiles (e.g., frozen water-bottles, aluminum cans, bricks, rocks). As a result, there were a number of officers seriously injured. These injuries included, but were not limited to, broken bones, lacerations, burns, and abrasions. Similarly, police officers across the country found themselves, around the same time, targeted with lasers in an effort to obstruct and/or permanently damage their vision. The helmets previously purchased by police officers during the academy needed to be upgraded.

In addition, 2020 was a year of unprecedented violence against Department members. Aside from the many officers who were seriously injured during violent confrontations throughout the Events, there were seventy-nine (79) police officers shot or shot at over the course of the year.

**ACTION:**

Each member of the Department assigned to patrol duties—including those on the Critical Incident Response Team (“CIRT”) and Community Safety Teams (“CST”)—has been assigned a BWC. Members in the mass transit and traffic sections have also recently been assigned BWCs. This serves, as described above, a number of functions. BWCs allow for increased transparency, create digital evidence, protect Department members from false complaints, and offer a fair and impartial documentation of events for all of the parties involved.

In addition, the Chicago Police Memorial Foundation (“CPMF”) generously acquired and donated 1,650 ballistic helmets to front-line field supervisors and police officers, upgraded to include Kevlar protection and laser beam reflectors across the affixed face shield as part of its ‘Helmets for Heroes’ initiative. These helmets will undoubtedly protect field supervisors and police officers from blunt trauma, allowing them to stand confidently between law-abiding, peaceful demonstrators and those few hostile assailants willing to do harm to others.

DEPARTMENT  
EQUIPMENT

**ANALYSIS:**

Since mid-2003, the Department has had the capacity to view and record activity occurring on the public way via remote-controlled cameras called Police Observation Devices (“PODs”). These cameras have gone through

phases of policy reviews, physical upgrades, and maintenance. These tools continue to be used with tremendous investigative utility today.

But Department leaders—many of whom watched the civil unrest unfold live from OEMC—could not effectively communicate their POD observations to field supervisors or officers because of radio communication challenges. Crowd noise alone precluded effective back-and-forth radio communication. Rogue transmissions over police radio frequencies interrupted on-going emergencies. At the same time, Department members unfortunately found themselves mobilized for so many consecutive hours that their radio batteries died in the field.

Similarly, field-deployed Department leaders and mid-level supervisors could not communicate effectively with the many law-abiding, peaceful individuals engaged in First Amendment-protected activities. It was simply too loud to open and facilitate an effective transparent dialogue about individual incidents, arrests, and/or decisions being made by Department leaders.

Even when Department members could receive information, various obstacles inhibited their ability to move around the central business district efficiently. Squad cars were destroyed (and often set ablaze) with an astounding, unanticipated frequency on the first few days and nights. This vandalism rendered the vehicles functionally useless. Similarly, when more Department members are working at a particular time (during, for example, twelve-hour shifts and/or cancelled days off) the Department simply lacked sufficient fleet capacity to provide all working officers with sufficient transportation.

**ACTION:**

A radio is, debatably, one of the most essential pieces of equipment that a police officer carries on a day-to-day basis. It is the primary means by which police officers are dispatched to calls and—perhaps more importantly—how they make emergency pleas for help. Following the civil unrest, Department leaders acknowledged a few ways which radio communications could be improved. Department members do not own the radios that they carry.

As such, the Department acquired additional Motorola 8000 series radios to make available at each of the five police areas and twenty-two districts when off-duty officers are deployed. Similarly, the Department began the process of upgrading to a secure, modernized radio system to ensure that the intensity of a given situation and/or rogue transmissions do not comprise a member's ability to communicate effectively.

In order to facilitate communication between Department leaders and the many law-abiding peaceful individuals engaged in First Amendment-protected activities, the Department recognized an urgent need to acquire megaphones (i.e., bullhorns). These hand-held devices allowed Department

leaders and mid-level supervisors to communicate with residents and police officers alike about what exactly was happening at any given time.

Department leaders also recognized the urgent need to identify alternate means of transportation for officers when more officers are working than squad cars are available. As a result, the Department assessed and developed a plan ensuring that each officer could be transported by relying on rented passenger vans and Chicago Transit Authority (“CTA”) buses. These alternate means of transportation mobilized small teams quickly and efficiently transported large platoons to pre-identified, ‘fixed’ foot posts.

PLANNING FOR OFFICER  
WELLNESS

**ANALYSIS:**

Whether a Department member’s days off may be cancelled, hours extended, or area of deployment shifted invariably impacts his or her mental, emotional, and physical well-being. The Department relies on its field supervisors and police officers to make instinctual, split-second decisions and going forward, it cannot allow things like exhaustion and stress to impact decision-making.

**ACTION:**

The Department intends to better communicate with its members as far in advance as possible when they should anticipate disruptions to their personal lives as a result of large-scale, planned events and key holidays (e.g., Memorial Day, Father’s Day, Independence Day, and Labor Day). This is, of course, in addition to the Department’s on-going commitment to better support members as they navigate the unique demands of policing and its impact on mental, emotional, and physical health and well-being.

## Command and Control

This section delineates strengths and potential areas of improvement for operational capabilities aligned with the “Command and Control” objective.

- Strengths:**
- (1) Existing Summer Operations Center (“SOC”)
  - (2) Intergovernmental relationships
  - (3) Investment in technology

- Weaknesses:**
- (1) Outdated, ad hoc incident management policies and procedures
  - (2) Inefficient method of tracking Department members and resources
  - (3) Department leaders lacked recent training on NIMS/ICS

### Improvements:

#### COMMAND POST

#### ANALYSIS:

For years, the Department has adhered to the National Incident Management System (“NIMS”)/Incident Command System (“ICS”)—the national standard for domestic preparedness and incident management. But it takes time to establish a full Operations Center. Prior to the Operations Center being established for an unplanned event, the Department relies heavily on field supervisors at Forward Command Posts (“FCP”).

#### ACTION:

Considering the value and limitations of establishing multiple FCPs, the Department created an organized process to establish both a Central Command Post (“CCP”) and Area Command Posts (“ACP”). Both remained operational for the duration of the Events, even after the full-scale OC had been established at OEMC. This allowed Department leaders to more efficiently manage available resources and resolve incoming resource requests. It also prevented a duplication of effort among field supervisors and individuals at the OC who report to the Incident Commander.

In addition, the Department recognized the immense value of having already established the SOC at OEMC. Initially, the SOC was a strategic Department effort to proactively address a predicted seasonal increase in violent crime. Having a standing SOC reduced the amount of time, effort, and resources required to establish a full-scale OC as the civil unrest escalated.

#### ICS-211 REVISION

#### ANALYSIS:

The Department requires field supervisors to complete a standard ICS-211 form, on which they can document arrival times and initial locations of

personnel and equipment. In turn, the ICS-211 form supports demobilization. But its existing iteration was not sufficient given the sheer scale of the unique circumstances underlying the civil unrest.

**ACTION:**

In October, the Department revised the ICS-211 Incident Check-in and Response forms to better and more thoroughly account for where field supervisors and police officers (in squads and platoons) are deployed at any particular time. In addition, the modernized form allows supervisors to document equipment available, individual locations, and other miscellaneous notes. The Department is evaluating how to fully integrate its ICS-211 forms with its digital scheduling system.

## Training

This section delineates strengths and potential areas of improvement for operational capabilities aligned with the “Training” objective.

- Strengths:**
- (1) In-service training
  - (2) Knowledgeable leaders
  - (3) Decentralized training

- Weaknesses:**
- (1) Insufficient field force training and lack of regular practice drills
  - (2) Officers inexperienced with civil unrest of this scale
  - (3) Co-occurring lawful demonstrations and criminal activity

### Improvements:

#### DRILLS

#### ANALYSIS:

Officers relying upon in the Department’s new citywide, ‘leveled’ response to civil unrest and revised Emergency Mobilization Plans (“EMP”) need to know these plans, policies, and procedures in advance of any future spontaneous implementation.

#### ACTION:

The Department relies on its field supervisors and police officers alike to implement plans, policies, and procedures. Going forward, operational efficacy demands prompt training on changes to long-standing plans such as the new ‘leveled’ response and revised EMPs. As a result, Department leaders need to communicate to field supervisors and police officers the many considerations underlying the Department’s response.

Using the EMPs, the Department and intragovernmental partners conducted three practice drills, testing the Department’s downtown and neighborhood-specific, and retail corridor responses. These drills offered Department leaders, field supervisors, and police officers alike a tangible view of the practical implications of EMP implementation. In addition, the drills assisted the Department in refining the already-revised EMPs.

#### MOBILE FIELD FORCE

#### ANALYSIS:

Mobile Field Force (“MFF”) units are large contingents of police officers, field supervisors, and Department leaders assembled to provide rapid, organized, and disciplined response to civil unrest. They consist of formally-structured, modular ‘platoons’ and ‘squads’ trained to perform a variety of specialized policing functions (e.g., crowd control, perimeter maintenance, traffic control,



facility security, custodial escort) in an effort to maintain order and preserve peace amid civil unrest.

Notably, the Department was lauded following the 2012 NATO Conference for the efficacy with which it employed MFF units as a means of protecting peaceful protestors from agitators, inciters, and wrongdoers. But the 2012 NATO Conference took place nearly a decade ago. Many Department members upon whom the city relied during related demonstrations have since moved to different roles or retired.

As a result, the Department could not reliably rest on experience alone to guide police officers and field supervisors through this summer's civil unrest. Officers were either unfamiliar with or unprepared to employ MFF-specific tactics, techniques, and strategies. In addition, field supervisors could not immediately mobilize the coordinated, cross-functional response demanded by the many unique circumstances underlying the Events.

**ACTION:**

In mid-2020, the Department created the Critical Incident Response Team ("CIRT") and Community Safety Teams ("CST"). Members assigned to CIRT often respond first when a police presence becomes necessary at large-scale, lawful gatherings and demonstrations. As such, field supervisors and police officers assigned to those units primarily responsible for responding to large gatherings (e.g., 001<sup>st</sup> District, 018<sup>th</sup> District, CIRT, CST, Tactical Teams, etc.) have since begun to attend eight-hour 'refresher' trainings on MFF policies and tactics. In addition, the Education and Training Division started providing MFF-specific 'refresher' training department-wide on July 23, 2020. To date, over 1,300 Department members have received this refresher training.

By April 15, 2021, the Department will establish a Domestic Preparedness Unit ("DPU") within the Education and Training Division specifically tasked with developing and offering training specific to large-scale events including, but not limited to, First Amendment-protected demonstrations and incidents of widespread criminal activity.

**FIRST AMENDMENT LAW**

**ANALYSIS:**

Concerns and criticism emerged about how the Department responded as the line between 'lawful demonstrators' and 'criminal infiltrators' became increasingly blurred by people on the streets and attending mass gatherings. The Department recognizes the importance of ensuring its members can tell the difference, even under stressful and often fluid circumstances.

Few would downplay the difficulty of balancing individuals' First Amendment rights while simultaneously protecting communities from the various symptoms of violent civil unrest (e.g., physical attacks, arson, and looting).

**ACTION:**

On October 31, 2020, the Department issued a Training Bulletin (ETB #20-06 “Public Gatherings and the First Amendment”) providing members guidance on how to assist demonstrators in most safely and lawfully exercising their First Amendment rights. Then, the Department sent instructors from the Education and Training Division to provide First Amendment-specific training to officers across the Department—with a specific focus on those primarily responsible for protecting and serving the central business district.

Department members were reminded of the elements of Illinois’ “Disorderly Conduct” statute, 720 ILCS 5/26-1 *et seq.*, and Chicago’s similar “Disorderly Conduct” municipal ordinance, § 8-4-010(a)-(j).

In addition, the Department provided materials to executive staff informing them about the legal nuances underlying law enforcement-directed dispersal orders during First-Amendment-protected activities. These materials emphasized that police supervisors should exhaust any and all tools at their disposal (when safe and feasible) prior to issuing dispersal orders.

## Communications

This section delineates strengths and potential areas of improvement for operational capabilities aligned with the “Communications” objective.

- Strengths:**
- (1) Community partnerships
  - (2) Existing SDSCs and ATCs

- Weaknesses:**
- (1) Information held in silos was not disseminated to field supervisors
  - (2) Business and retail community vulnerable to property crime
  - (3) Investigative units overwhelmed by widespread criminal activity

### Improvements:

#### INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

#### ANALYSIS:

The process of distilling and sharing information relevant to criminal and/or national security investigations is typically referred to as the “intelligence cycle.” It is widely understood as a six-phase process: (1) requirements, (2) planning and direction; (3) collection; (4) processing and exploitation; (5) analysis and production; and (6) dissemination. Like any other law enforcement agency, the Department receives a tremendous amount of incoming information from various sources. These sources include, but are not limited to, calls-for-service, community conversations, and information submitted to [CPDTip.org](http://CPDTip.org).

Strategic Decision Support Centers (“SDSC”) within each police district use this and other information to provide real-time, tactical analytic support to Department members while assisting with the strategic analysis of broader crime trends.<sup>17</sup> Area Technology Centers (“ATC”) similarly use this information to support long-term criminal investigations conducted by BOD.

But the Department recognizes that SDSCs and ATCs were largely underutilized during the Events. Each lacked a formal role within the overall Command Post structure, so personnel assigned to them—with specialized training in emerging technologies and live access to POD cameras—contributed only extemporaneous intelligence products to Department leaders.

#### ACTION:

It is imperative the Department facilitate a bidirectional, multilateral information flow that ensures both internal and, wherever possible, external transparency. As such, the Department must evaluate where obstacles exist

<sup>17</sup> See *Strategic Decision Support Center Initiative*, Special Order S03-02 § II (March 11, 2020).

within its own implementation of the intelligence cycle. This invariably involves revisiting and revitalizing the SDSCs and ATCs.

In an effort to ensure that SDSC and ATC personnel can distribute information quickly and efficiently, the Department has started to actively evaluate the process by which information is received, interpreted, processed, and disseminated. This is an on-going, cross-programmatic effort involving various units and the Department's local, state, and federal partners.

## BUSINESS ENGAGEMENT

### **ANALYSIS:**

The city's business and retail community may have known that large-scale demonstrations were planned, but it could not have anticipated falling victim to widespread, co-occurring criminal activity (e.g., looting, burglary, vandalism). The manner in which these businesses were systematically attacked and the geographic scale were unprecedented. The Department's support cannot merely be responsive. As a result, Department leaders—along with other city department including the Mayor's Office—began to proactively support the business and retail community by providing resources and information they might need to persist through and survive any subsequent incidents.

The Department similarly recognized that Department members assigned to BOD could not alone manage the sudden, dramatic increase in felony looting, burglary, property damage, and other investigations without additional personnel, resources and a coordinated means of communicating directly with business owners.

### **ACTION:**

The Department continues to work collaboratively with various intergovernmental partners to better communicate with community residents and business partners. To this end, the Department has created physical fliers, videos, and social media content as a means of disseminating essential information related to on-going patterns, investigations, and/or public safety threats to the community.

One such flier offered a few steps that businesses can take to proactively prepare for large-scale civil unrest. For example, the Department informed business owners how to sign up for "ChiBiz Alerts," which is a text-based alert system created and operated by OEMC. ChiBiz Alerts sends out emergency communications citywide or to businesses located within a particular geographical area. To date, at least 9,059 businesses have signed-up to receive these alerts. Similarly, business owners were informed how to join Chicago's Public and Private Partnership Initiative ("CP3"). CP3 partners have access to an array of resource documents regarding general security measures and emergency planning.

In addition, the Department established a Looting Task Force to coordinate investigations related to burglary, looting, vandalism, and related property crimes that occur during civil unrest. This task force has released countless pictures and videos of potential suspects to the public through the local media. Community cooperation (including thousands of incoming tips) has enabled the team to arrest a substantial number of individuals, most of whom the United States Attorney's Office ("USAO") and CCSAO have since charged with various felony offenses.

## CONCLUSION

The City of Chicago must continue to faithfully facilitate the safe, lawful, and free exercise of individuals' First Amendment rights. To this end, the Department remains committed to preventing those with nefarious intent from compromising others' exercise of their essential, Constitutionally-guaranteed rights. The Department will not stand by as local businesses are looted, vandalized, and destroyed alongside and/or under the guise of otherwise peaceful demonstrations and protests.

The facts included in this report are not exhaustive. This report is intended only to facilitate the Department's own understanding of its strengths and weaknesses with respect to the above-delineated core capabilities. As additional information emerges, the Department continues to partner with the Independent Monitoring Team ("IMT") and the Office of the Attorney General ("OAG") to review and modify procedures and responsibilities pertaining to crowds, protests, and civil disturbances in order to most effectively serve Chicago's residents and visitors.

In this effort, the Department greatly appreciates the on-going support of its many community, business, and intergovernmental partners.

Thank you.

FEBRUARY 2021

# REPORT ON CHICAGO'S RESPONSE TO GEORGE FLOYD PROTESTS AND UNREST

CITY OF CHICAGO  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL



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## ACRONYMS

ANOV	Administrative Notice of Violation
BIA	Bureau of Internal Affairs
BWC	Body-Worn Camera
CCSAO	Cook County State's Attorney's Office
CDOT	Chicago Department of Transportation
CFS	Chicago Freedom School
COPA	Civilian Office of Police Accountability
CPD	Chicago Police Department
CPIC	Crime Prevention and Information Center
CTA	Chicago Transportation Authority
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DSS	Department of Streets and Sanitation
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FRD	Force Review Division
ICE	Immigration and Customs Enforcement
IEMA	Illinois Emergency Management Agency
ILCS	Illinois Compiled Statutes
IMT	Independent Monitoring Team
ISP	Illinois State Police
LAPD	Los Angeles Police Department
LRAD	Long Range Acoustic Device
MCC	Municipal Code of Chicago
MPD	Minneapolis Police Department
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NYPD	New York Police Department
OC	Oleoresin Capsicum
OEMC	Office of Emergency Management and Communications
OIG	Office of Inspector General
RD	Records Division
RDO	Regular Day Off
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
TRR	Tactical Response Report
UCPD	University of Chicago Police Department



OIG's report provides an in-depth public narrative and accounting of that response, and presents findings on certain operational failures and shortcomings.



Breakdowns in the mass arrest process resulted in the Chicago Police Department's (CPD) failure to arrest some offenders, the unsubstantiated detention and subsequent release of some arrestees without charges, and risks to officer and arrestee safety.



During the events at issue, CPD did not fulfill its force reporting obligations and did not provide clear and consistent guidance to officers on reporting obligations.



CPD's operational response and gaps in its relevant policies crippled accountability processes from the start.

## I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On May 25, 2020, George Floyd was killed by the Minneapolis, Minnesota police. In the days that followed, protests and civil unrest engulfed cities across the country. The law enforcement response to those events, across the country and in Chicago, has been the subject of intense public and official scrutiny amidst sharp calls for police reform, transparency, and accountability. In June 2020, the City of Chicago Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the Independent Monitoring Team (IMT) overseeing the consent decree entered in *Illinois v. Chicago* launched a joint inquiry into the City of Chicago's response to the demonstrations and unrest in late May and early June. This report is the summation of OIG's findings from that inquiry. Consistent with the AP Stylebook, OIG uses the terms "protests" and "demonstrations" to describe marches, rallies, and other actions. OIG uses the term "unrest" to describe more violent or destructive criminal behavior such as looting and/or vandalism.<sup>1</sup>

OIG's report is an in-depth review of the period of May 29 through June 7, both chronologically and analytically. The report aims to present, to the extent possible based on the information and material available, a comprehensive account of the facts, including how involved parties—members of the public, CPD's rank-and-file, and CPD's command staff, among others—experienced the protests and unrest. A number of City departments beyond CPD, as well as partner law enforcement agencies, played critical roles in the City's overall response. OIG sought out information and perspectives from representatives of these City departments and external partner agencies. OIG's chronology, analysis, and findings are supported by an array of primary and secondary sources, including: interviews, video footage, radio traffic recordings, official reports and other documents, and quantitative analysis of CPD datasets.

In recognition of their different sources and scopes of authority and jurisdiction, and in the interest of avoiding the duplication of efforts, OIG and the IMT undertook fact gathering jointly but are issuing separate reports with different areas of focus. OIG's report is issued pursuant to its City-spanning jurisdiction and mandate to, among other things, promote effectiveness and integrity in City operations, and the mandate of its Public Safety section to study policies, practices, programs, and training specific to CPD and Chicago's police accountability agencies. OIG's report focuses on matters implicating violations of existing City policies, variance between CPD's then-existing policies and the conduct of its members, and the involvement of non-CPD City actors.

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<sup>1</sup> AP Stylebook (@APStyleBook), "New guidance on AP Stylebook Online: Use care in deciding which term best applies: A riot is a wild or violent disturbance of the peace involving a group of people. The term riot suggests uncontrolled chaos and pandemonium. (1/5)," Twitter, September 30, 2020 12:31 p.m., <https://twitter.com/APStylebook/status/1311357910715371520>.

The IMT's report arises from its duties to monitor compliance with the terms of the consent decree, and therefore focuses on topics covered by the consent decree.

OIG and the IMT requested and reviewed thousands of documents and conducted more than 70 interviews with CPD officials, rank-and-file CPD members, officials at other City of Chicago departments, representatives of County and State entities, and members of the public. Perspectives from members of the public were also gathered as part of the record in *Illinois v. Chicago* during two days of listening sessions held by the Court. OIG further reviewed and analyzed data on CPD's arrests and reported uses of force during the days at issue, and reviewed over one hundred hours of body-worn camera (BWC) footage and recorded radio transmissions.

This report provides an in-depth public narrative of and accounting for CPD and the City of Chicago's response to the protests and unrest in late May and early June of 2020. In doing so, this report presents findings on operational failures and shortcomings during the response, which have broad implications for CPD's policies and practices going forward. This report does not offer specific recommendations. CPD has already undertaken numerous policy revisions in the months since these events, sometimes in consultation with the IMT, as required by the consent decree. OIG was not a party to these consultations and was not made privy to the method, manner, and means through which they were conducted. Other improvements are underway and may be matters of consent decree compliance within the monitoring province of the IMT. Once new policies are in place and operational, OIG, through the regular work of its Public Safety section, will monitor developments and assess whether there remain policy and operational issues that warrant future evaluative inquiry and reporting. For now, in light of the urgency of public concern and the rapidly shifting policy landscape, OIG publishes this narrative and accompanying findings without specific recommendations, but with the intention that it inform corrective actions and reforms to CPD's policies and practices.

## A. BACKGROUND

On Monday, May 25, 2020, a member of the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) killed George Floyd while effecting Floyd's arrest by placing his knee on Floyd's neck while Floyd was restrained and lying on the ground, suffocating him. A civilian witness captured the MPD officer's actions on video, and the video spread widely and rapidly through social media.<sup>2</sup> This incident prompted the subsequent firing of four MPD officers and, eventually, the filing of criminal charges.

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<sup>2</sup> Esme Murphy, "I Can't Breathe!" Video of Fatal Arrest Shows Minneapolis Officer Kneeling On George Floyd's Neck For Several Minutes." WCCO, May 26, 2020, accessed August 26, 2020, <https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2020/05/26/george-floyd-man-dies-after-being-arrested-by-minneapolis-police-fbi-called-to-investigate/>.

The days immediately following Floyd's killing saw a rising and spreading swell of protests and unrest which included confrontations—sometimes violent—between the police and the public and widespread property damage, in cities across the United States. These events, which were covered extensively by the news media, are summarized in detail in OIG's report. Despite these early harbingers, and even as indications appeared on social media signaling the planning of large-scale public protest gatherings in Chicago, CPD was underprepared and ill-equipped for the events that followed. As late as Friday, May 29, and Saturday, May 30, 2020, CPD and the City were in possession of and in communication about significant open-source information regarding planned protests in the City and the spread of increasingly volatile events nationwide, but did not believe that information to portend anything unusual or especially concerning.

In the late afternoon and early evening of Friday, May 29, large numbers of people converged on Chicago's downtown. Late that evening and into the overnight hours, protest activity gave way to unrest, including episodic lawlessness. CPD's response that night was marked by poor coordination, inconsistency, and confusion. Even so, senior members of CPD and the Mayor's Office reported viewing Friday night's response as something of a success, referred to by some as a "win." Meanwhile, rank-and-file CPD members and front-line supervisors recalled wondering why the Department did not seem adequately concerned about what seemed to them obvious indications from news and social media that there was worse to come.

As the report describes in detail, the next several days found CPD outflanked, under-equipped, and unprepared to respond to the scale of the protests and unrest with which they were met in the downtown area and across Chicago's neighborhoods.

The response to these events involved not only CPD, but also other City departments under the authority of the Mayor, as well as non-City entities solicited to assist and work coordinately with CPD—the Chicago Department of Transportation, the Office of Emergency Management and Communications, the Cook County State's Attorney's Office, the Cook County Sheriff's Office, the Illinois State Police, the Illinois National Guard, the Illinois Emergency Management Agency, the Chicago Transit Authority, and the University of Chicago Police Department among them.

## B. FINDINGS

In addition to offering a broad-reaching, in-depth public accounting of CPD and the City's response to protests and unrest following the death of George Floyd, OIG has reached analytical findings with respect to breakdowns and failures in three specific areas: the mass arrest process, reporting on uses of force, and structural obstacles to discipline and accountability.

## MASS ARREST PROCESS

Breakdowns in the mass arrest process resulted in CPD's failure to arrest some offenders, the release of some arrestees without charges, and risks to officer and arrestee safety.

CPD's policies do not precisely define the circumstances which should give rise to the declaration of a mass arrest situation; once such a declaration is made, however, CPD members who make arrests in the field turn their arrestees over to other members for mass transport and processing. Arresting members do not accompany arrestees to a detention facility and document and process the arrest, as they ordinarily would. Instead of completing an ordinary arrest report, members are to complete a truncated "mass arrest card," or if that does not prove feasible, they are instructed to write their badge number and an abbreviation for the offense on the arm of an offender with a permanent marker before loading the arrestee into a transport vehicle.

Records—and recollections—of when, how, and by whom mass arrest declarations were made during the events of late May and early June are uneven and incomplete. In the absence of conclusive CPD records of who and how many were arrested for offenses related to the protests and unrest, OIG performed its own analysis of CPD's arrest data, suggesting that CPD made more than 1,500 related arrests between May 29, and June 7, 2020, with approximately 1,000 of those occurring on May 30 and 31.

CPD was unprepared to deal with this volume of arrests over so short a time period and this led to breakdowns in the mass arrest process. As a result, arrestees were held without proper processing providing the substantiation for the reason for and duration of their detention, with some eventually released without being charged, and some being charged with something either less or more serious than their actual conduct may have warranted. Moreover, the safety of arrestees and officers was threatened by the lengthy delays in transportation and processing.

## USE OF FORCE REPORTING

During the events at issue, CPD did not fulfill its force reporting obligations and did not provide clear and consistent guidance to officers on reporting obligations.

As a general matter, as remains the case, CPD members during the period at issue who used force were required to complete a Tactical Response Report (TRR). Among the several different relevant policies in effect at the time, however, were special provisions for use of force reporting in mass arrest situations. Some of those policies were new and, during the protests and unrest, there was significant confusion among CPD's highest ranks—and, as a natural result, among its rank-and-file members—

about whether and when members were required to complete TRRs under mass arrest protocols.

Ultimately, CPD deployed specialized force options for crowd control and failed to appropriately document those uses of force. CPD underreported uses of baton strikes and manual strikes, further resulting in an inadequate record of severe and potentially out-of-policy uses of force, and as written and effected at the time, CPD's policies on use of force reporting left important ambiguities about mass arrest situations.

## OBSTACLES TO ACCOUNTABILITY

CPD's operational response to the protests and unrest and gaps in its relevant policies crippled accountability processes from the start.

The way in which CPD responded to the protests and unrest posed critical challenges to the appropriate management of allegations of police misconduct. First, breakdowns in mass arrest processing and documentation undermined any efforts to systematically identify relevant reports and BWC footage, and CPD failed to retain any copies of a significant volume of mass arrest records. Second, CPD's emergency deployment of all available members compromised the members responsible for reviewing uses of force and conducting internal investigations by risking the involvement of those members in the very events they would be responsible for examining. Meanwhile, deficits in training and policy clarity meant that some of those events were never processed for examination in the first place. Third, there was widespread non-compliance with CPD's policy requiring the use of BWCs; during much of the time at issue, CPD members who were working outside of their regular schedules deployed to the field directly from Guaranteed Rate Field, rather than from their stations, and BWCs were not available to them. As a result, countless interactions between CPD members and members of the public were not captured on BWCs. Finally, there were widespread complaints—and evidence—of CPD members obscuring their badge numbers and nameplates while deployed during the protests and unrest. These actions, coupled with CPD's failure to keep comprehensive records to show who was deployed where and when, profoundly compromised the investigation of allegations of misconduct—beginning with the identification of accused members.

## C. CONCLUSIONS

There have been important developments since the end of the period of protests and unrest in early June, including further clashes between police and protesters in Chicago later in the summer and policy changes from CPD. The fact remains, though, that CPD was under-prepared and ill-equipped, and thus critically disserved both its



own front-line members and members of the public. While the challenges were daunting, and in some respects unprecedented in recent memory, the efforts of CPD and the City to stem unrest were marked, almost without exception, by confusion and lack of coordination in the field emanating from failures of intelligence assessment, major event planning, field communication and operation, administrative systems and, most significantly, leadership from CPD's senior ranks. In the aggregate, CPD's senior leadership failed the public they are charged with serving and protecting and they failed the Department's rank-and-file members and front-line supervisors, who were at times left to high-stakes improvisation without adequate support or guidance.

Even as new challenges arise, CPD and the City will be dealing with the negative repercussions of these shortcomings for some time. Missing reports and videos may limit or preclude prosecution of some arrestees as well as accountability for individual officers and may compromise CPD and the City's position in investigations or litigation. OIG's interviews with rank-and-file CPD members laid bare that, at least in some quarters, chaos and confusion in the command staff ranks struck a serious blow to the morale of front-line members who plainly felt failed by the Department. And to the extent that public video and public reporting captured out-of-policy, dangerous, and disrespectful actions by CPD members, the events of May and June 2020 may have set CPD and the City back significantly in their long-running, deeply challenged effort to foster trust with members of the community.

## II. PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

### A. PURPOSE

The killing of George Floyd by the Minneapolis, Minnesota, police on May 25, 2020, sparked nationwide protests and civil unrest. The law enforcement response to those events, across the country and in Chicago, has come under intense scrutiny amidst sharp calls for police reform, transparency, and accountability. In Chicago, these events came at a time of strained police-community relationships, during the pendency of a federal consent decree mandating reform of the Chicago Police Department (CPD or the Department), and leadership transition within the Department. The purpose of this report is to provide a public accounting of CPD and the City of Chicago's response to the events which unfolded in the aftermath of the killing of George Floyd, between May 25, 2020, and June 7, 2020, and to render publicly transparent the policy violations that ensued.

Many accounts have already been published regarding the events that transpired between police and protesters in other cities during nationwide protests in the summer of 2020. Police departments in Dallas, San Jose, and Cleveland released evaluations of their own agency responses.<sup>3</sup> The New York City Department of Investigation has released a report<sup>4</sup> on the New York Police Department's (NYPD) response to demonstrations, while the New York Attorney General has released a "preliminary" report—with a promise of a final report to follow.<sup>5</sup> The Office of the Independent Monitor in Denver—a local civilian oversight agency—has released a report on the actions of the Denver Police Department, and the court-appointed Independent Monitor overseeing the Baltimore Police Department's consent decree

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<sup>3</sup> Dallas Police Department, "George Floyd Protests After Action Report," August 14, 2020, accessed November 30, 2020, <https://cityofdallas.legistar.com/MeetingDetail.aspx?ID=801489&GUID=39ABA325-F468-4B8C-BC0E-19FC995311BB&Options=info&Search=>; San Jose Police Department, "Police Department Preliminary After Action Report For The Public Protests, Civil Unrest, and Law Enforcement Response From May 29<sup>th</sup> – June 7<sup>th</sup>, 2020," September 3, 2020, accessed November 30, 2020, <https://sanjose.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=4628570&GUID=4539820D-23F5-4FF1-BE9B-9FF14DA14E3A&Options=&Search=>; City of Cleveland, "May 30 City Unrest: After Action Review," December 3, 2020, accessed December 10, 2020, <https://clecityhall.com/2020/12/03/city-of-cleveland-and-the-division-of-police-release-may-30-civil-unrest-after-action-report-update-238/>.

<sup>4</sup> New York City Department of Investigations, "Investigation into NYPD Response to the George Floyd Protests," December 2020, accessed December 21, 2020, <https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doi/reports/pdf/2020/DOIRpt.NYPD%20Reponse.%20GeorgeFloyd%20Protests.12.18.2020.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> New York State Office of the Attorney General, "New York City Police Department's Response To Demonstrations Following The Death Of George Floyd," July 2020, accessed October 15, 2020, <https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/2020-nypd-report.pdf>.

commented on Baltimore PD's response to the protests in a periodic report in September 2020.<sup>6</sup>

In June 2020, the Office of Chicago Inspector General (OIG) and the Independent Monitoring Team (IMT) overseeing the consent decree entered in *Illinois v. Chicago* launched a joint inquiry into Chicago's response to the demonstrations and unrest in late May and June. The inquiry was undertaken pursuant to Paragraph 667 of the consent decree, which permits the IMT to "coordinate and confer with the OIG for the City to avoid duplication of effort."<sup>7</sup> Pursuant to a protective order sought by the IMT to facilitate coordination, and entered by the court on July 16, 2020, OIG and the IMT have maintained and shared records which are subject to limitations and protections under Paragraphs 672 and 675 of the consent decree.<sup>8</sup> Specifically, those records shared between OIG and the IMT, for the purposes of this joint inquiry are treated as records maintained by the IMT, an agent of the court, and are not public records subject to public inspection under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act, or subject to discovery in any litigation.

OIG and the IMT have jointly gathered information and are producing separate reports with different points of focus, driven by the respective entities' different legal authority, jurisdictions, and mandates. OIG—pursuant to its City-spanning jurisdiction and the mandate of its Public Safety section to study the policies, practices, programs, and training of CPD and Chicago's police accountability agencies—focuses on those matters implicating violations of existing City policies and the involvement of non-CPD City actors. The IMT—in fulfilling its duties to monitor compliance with the terms of the consent decree—focuses on topics covered by the consent decree, including command structure, equipment, and operational enforcement of use of force policies.

OIG's report aims to comprehensively present, to the extent possible and based on the information available, the facts of the events of late May and early June in Chicago, including how the involved parties—members of the public, CPD's rank-and-file, and CPD's command staff, among others—experienced the protests and unrest. Accounts of what happened from these different parties diverge widely. OIG

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<sup>6</sup> Denver Office of the Independent Monitor, "The Police Response to the 2020 George Floyd Protests in Denver, an Independent Review," December 8, 2020, accessed December 10, 2020, <https://ewscripps.brightspotcdn.com/60/23/9223ba544bb9a3e8d6597502d42b/2020gfpreport-oim.pdf>; Baltimore Consent Decree Monitoring Team, "First Comprehensive Re-Assessment," September 30, 2020, accessed October 15, 2020, <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/7220979/BPD-Consent-Decree-Report.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> The IMT is responsible for assessing CPD and the City of Chicago's compliance with the consent decree entered in *Illinois v. Chicago*. The IMT is led by court-appointed Independent Monitor Maggie Hickey. Consent Decree at 210: 667, *State of Ill. v. City of Chi.*, No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2019).

<sup>8</sup> Order Regarding Records Maintained by the Independent Monitor and the Office of the Inspector General, *State of Ill. v. City of Chi.*, No. 17-cv-6269 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2020).

has sought out many perspectives and, where possible, has checked narrative accounts against other sources of evidence. A large part of this report is dedicated to a day-by-day chronology of events in Chicago, from the evening of May 29 through June 7. Within this chronology, significant space is devoted to the first-person perspectives of police and protesters at some of the critical sites where these groups came into conflict. Where possible, OIG has put these first-person perspectives forward with direct quotes from interviews and testimonials.

In preparing and publishing this report, OIG has been mindful of the public value and importance of this accounting, as well as the transparency imperative in this report's timely release. In the months since the events at issue, OIG has sought and received thousands of records from CPD and other agencies, conducted over 70 interviews, participated in listening sessions with community members, examined social media posts, reviewed video footage and radio traffic, and conducted quantitative analysis on CPD data. Notwithstanding the volume and variety of evidence that stands behind this report, the scale of the events and the number of participants resulted in some potential sources being left untapped. For example, given that the majority of the approximately 13,000 CPD sworn members were deployed over the ten days covered in this analysis, OIG was only able to interview a small fraction of the rank-and-file officers who were on the front lines. While OIG reviewed many hours of body-worn camera (BWC) footage, it was not reasonably feasible to review all available BWC footage and other video.<sup>9</sup> The same was true of recordings of transmissions over police radios, which were voluminous, and not provided to OIG until December 2020. While CPD produced many records in response to requests from OIG and the IMT in a reasonably timely manner, many other requests remained unfulfilled for several months, and some remain unfulfilled as of publication of this report. Particularly noteworthy among those materials are certain emails from three of CPD's highest-ranking members—the First Deputy Superintendent, the Chief of Operations, and the Chief of Staff—requested on July 13, 2020. OIG and IMT repeated the request for these emails on September 14, 2020; CPD did not produce them until January 15, 2021, long after OIG interviews of all three members (and the retirement of the First Deputy Superintendent and the Chief of Operations) and after the completion of almost all other evidence gathering and interviewing on this matter. CPD also greatly delayed production of its after-action report on its response to the protests. The existence of the report was revealed as early as July 2020; however, CPD claimed that the document had been drafted by lawyers and therefore was subject to attorney-client privilege. In December 2020, CPD withdrew its privilege claim and represented that it would produce the after-action report. The report was finally produced on February 3, 2021. In the interest of timely reporting on pressing matters of public concern, OIG is

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<sup>9</sup> Additionally, as described below, BWC footage capturing relevant events was not always labelled with an identifiable report or event number, compromising any ability to identify with confidence the entire universe of technically available video.

proceeding with publication without the benefit that some of these additional sources of information might have provided.

OIG does not offer specific recommendations in this report. CPD has already undertaken a number of policy revisions in the months since these events, sometimes in consultation with the IMT, as required by the consent decree. OIG was not a party to those consultations, nor have the form or substance of that consultative engagement been disclosed to OIG. Other improvements are underway and may be matters of consent decree compliance within the monitoring authority of the IMT. Once new policies are in place and operational, OIG, through the regular work of its Public Safety section, will monitor developments and assess whether outstanding policy and operational issues may warrant future evaluative inquiry and reporting. However, in light of the urgency of public concern the rapidly shifting and procedurally opaque policy landscape, OIG has elected to publish this narrative and its accompanying findings without specific recommendations.

## B. SCOPE

Decisions on the scope of this report were made in consultation with the IMT, in order to avoid duplication of efforts and to best serve each entity's respective mandate. OIG focuses herein on the following topic areas: arrest processing and reporting; use of force reporting; BWC use; CPD's communication and coordination with other City entities and external law enforcement agencies; and structural accountability challenges.

## C. METHODOLOGY

To understand CPD and the City's response to the events of late May and early June, OIG and the IMT requested and reviewed thousands of documents, including operational plans, training materials, police reports, and command staff emails. OIG conducted over 70 interviews with individuals directly involved in the events, including members of the public, the Mayor of the City of Chicago, the Chief of Staff to the Mayor, CPD command staff, CPD rank-and-file members, Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA) personnel, personnel from other City agencies, and personnel from partner law enforcement agencies that assisted CPD in its response to the protests. CPD interviewees included but were not limited to:

- Superintendent
- First Deputy Superintendent
- Chief of Operations
- Chief of Staff to the Superintendent
- Chiefs from other operationally critical units
- Area Deputy Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs from other operationally critical units

- District Commanders and Commanders of other operationally critical units
- Police officers, Sergeants, and Lieutenants.<sup>10</sup>

A CPD organization chart of the units relevant to this report can be found at Appendix B.<sup>11</sup>

With a few exceptions, this report does not identify specific individuals by name. Interviewee statements or perspectives are given in association with a generalized description of the person's role or rank. The gender-neutral pronouns "they" and "them" are used in place of "he/him" and "she/her."

To understand the experiences of community members who participated in the events following the killing of George Floyd, Judge Robert Michael Dow, Jr., of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, along with Independent Monitor Maggie Hickey and Inspector General Joseph Ferguson, held public hearings. Additionally, OIG and the IMT each conducted interviews separately and received testimonials from community members regarding their experiences at the protests at the end of May and early June 2020. Accounts from CPD members and community members could not always be independently verified for various reasons, including lack of video footage and documentation.

OIG reviewed CPD's data on arrests and reported uses of force and conducted independent analyses on that data.

OIG reviewed over 100 hours of BWC video from CPD and the Cook County Sheriff's Office. In selecting CPD BWC video for review, OIG first identified CPD Records Division (RD) numbers associated with large numbers of arrests during the days at issue.<sup>12</sup> OIG identified the RD number that was associated with the greatest number

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<sup>10</sup> Interviews with non-command staff members were arranged through CPD, through the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 7, as well as individually in some cases. One CPD member who left the Department after the events at issue in this report was also interviewed.

<sup>11</sup> CPD published a new organization chart on its website in January 2021. Appendix B reflects the CPD organization chart that was operative at the time of the protests and unrest.

<sup>12</sup> RD numbers are unique, sequential identifiers assigned to reportable incidents. An RD number is used to identify an event, and many arrests may be associated with a single event and therefore a single RD number. This might be true under a number of circumstances, including a "mass arrest incident," which CPD defines as one in which "[t]he number of persons arrested, or likely to be arrested, would present a significant burden on the resources of the detention facility in the district of occurrence," and "[t]he incident which necessitated the arrests provides the potential for serious threat to life, major property loss, or serious disruption of 'normal' community activity." Accessed January 18, 2021, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/ContentPackages/Core/Glossary/glossary.html?content=a7a551ac-12434b53-c5c12-4ef3-0bfdale4198789ec.html?ownapi=1>; "Assignment and Processing of Records Division Numbers," November 21, 2003, accessed October 30, 2020,

of arrests between May 29 and June 7: a total of 385 arrests. According to the Case Incident Report, later generated to document the arrests, this RD number was generated on May 30 “for the mass arrest occurring at Trump Tower and other surrounding area [sic].” OIG then identified the event number associated with this RD number, and reviewed 202 videos, totaling 83 hours of recording, which were tagged with the event number.<sup>13</sup> These videos showed protest crowd control, police response to store looting in progress, arrests, and other police actions on May 30 in CPD’s 1<sup>st</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Districts. A small proportion of the videos associated with the source event number was unrelated to any protests or unrest activity.

OIG also searched for all BWC video indexed by the event numbers associated with two other RD numbers: one RD number that was associated with seven arrests related to the looting of the Macy’s store on State Street on May 30 and one RD number that was associated with 36 arrests on June 2 into the early hours of June 3, in seven districts across the city. OIG did not, however, find any BWC footage indexed by those event numbers. OIG reviewed a few other BWC videos in its review of certain specific incidents and interactions. Finally, OIG reviewed 156 BWC videos totaling approximately 19 hours from the Cook County Sheriff’s Office, which provided personnel to support CPD in the transport of arrestees.

OIG reviewed police radio broadcasts from the Citywide 6 radio channel, which CPD used to coordinate its response to the protests and unrest beginning on May 30. OIG reviewed broadcasts during the period from 12:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. and from 1:00 p.m. to 11:59 p.m. on May 30. OIG reviewed radio broadcasts from other times on a case-by-case basis, as relevant.

Consistent with the AP Stylebook, OIG uses the terms “protests” and “demonstrations” to describe marches, rallies, and other actions. OIG uses the term “unrest” to describe more violent or destructive criminal behavior such as looting and/or vandalism.<sup>14</sup>

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<http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12abe584-90812-abf7-8c5c93e79832f8ea.pdf?hl=true>

<sup>13</sup> Event numbers represent the daily sequential numbering of all events reported to the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (CPD S09-05-01). CPD’s stored BWC footage is generally indexed by associated event number. “Special Order S09-05-01 Department Reports And Letters Of Clearance,” August 14, 2003, accessed November 16, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12bcfa66-cf112-bd00-af63e43c37c4b77b.html>.

<sup>14</sup> AP Stylebook (@APStyleBook), “New guidance on AP Stylebook Online: Use care in deciding which term best applies: A riot is a wild or violent disturbance of the peace involving a group of people. The term riot suggests uncontrolled chaos and pandemonium. (1/5),” Twitter, September 30, 2020 12:31 p.m., <https://twitter.com/APStylebook/status/1311357910715371520>.

OIG uncovered some evidence suggestive of possible misconduct by individual City actors who may be subject to discipline, some of which is summarized herein. Where encountered by OIG, that evidence has been referred for appropriate disciplinary investigation.

## D. STANDARDS

OIG conducted this review in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections, Evaluations, and Reviews by Offices of Inspector General found in the Association of Inspectors General's *Principles and Standards for Offices of Inspector General* (the "Green Book").

## E. AUTHORITY AND ROLE

The authority to perform this inquiry is established in the City of Chicago Municipal Code §§ 2-56-030 and -230, which confer on OIG the power and duty to review the programs of City government in order to identify any inefficiencies, waste, and potential for misconduct, and to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity in the administration of City programs and operations, and, specifically, to review operations of CPD and Chicago's police accountability agencies. The role of OIG is to review City operations and make recommendations for improvement. City management is responsible for establishing and maintaining processes to ensure that City programs operate economically, efficiently, effectively, and with integrity.



### III. BACKGROUND

On Monday, May 25, 2020, a member of the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) killed George Floyd by placing his knee on Floyd's neck while Floyd was restrained and lying on the ground, suffocating him. A civilian witness captured the MPD officer's actions on video, and the video spread widely and rapidly through social media.<sup>15</sup> This incident prompted the subsequent firing of four MPD officers—Derek Chauvin, who had his knee on Floyd's neck, as well as three others who were on the scene—and the initiation of an investigation into the MPD officers' actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United States Attorney's Office.<sup>16</sup> By May 29, state prosecutors in Minnesota charged Chauvin with third-degree murder and second-degree manslaughter for Floyd's death.<sup>17</sup> A charge of second-degree murder was later added by prosecutors. In October, the judge in the case dismissed the third-degree murder charge but allowed the other charges to move forward.<sup>18</sup>

According to news media reporting, on Tuesday, May 26, 2020, protests began in Minneapolis at the scene of Floyd's death. Thousands of protesters met and began to march to MPD's Third Precinct. Once at the Third Precinct, some of those present began to vandalize the building and spray-paint squad cars.<sup>19</sup> MPD officers deployed with riot gear and fired chemical irritants and flash grenades at the protesters.<sup>20</sup> On Wednesday, May 27, 2020, similar conflicts between protesters and MPD occurred and looting near the Third Precinct began.<sup>21</sup> On Thursday, May 28, protesters gained

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<sup>15</sup> Esme Murphy, "I Can't Breathe!" Video Of Fatal Arrest Shows Minneapolis Officer Kneeling On George Floyd's Neck For Several Minutes." WCCO, May 26, 2020, accessed August 26, 2020, <https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2020/05/26/george-floyd-man-dies-after-being-arrested-by-minneapolis-police-fbi-called-to-investigate/>.

<sup>16</sup> The United States Attorney's Office District of Minnesota, "Joint Statement of United States Attorney Erica MacDonald And FBI Special Agent In Charge Rainer Drolshagen," May 28, 2020, accessed January 15, 2021, <https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/pr/joint-statement-united-states-attorney-erica-macdonald-and-fbi-special-agent-charge>; Esme Murphy, "I Can't Breathe!" Video Of Fatal Arrest Shows Minneapolis Officer Kneeling On George Floyd's Neck For Several Minutes." WCCO, May 26, 2020, accessed August 26, 2020, <https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2020/05/26/george-floyd-man-dies-after-being-arrested-by-minneapolis-police-fbi-called-to-investigate/>.

<sup>17</sup> Sarah Mervosh and Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, "Why Derek Chauvin Was Charged With Third-Degree Murder," New York Times, May 29, 2020, accessed November 20, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/us/derek-chauvin-criminal-complaint.html>.

<sup>18</sup> David Li, "Derek Chauvin, ex-officer in George Floyd case, has 3<sup>rd</sup>-degree murder charge dismissed," NBC News, 22 October, 2020, accessed November 6, 2020, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/derek-chauvin-ex-officer-george-floyd-case-gets-3rd-degree-n1244273>.

<sup>19</sup> Jeff Wagner, "'It's Real Ugly': Protesters Clash With Minneapolis Police After George Floyd's Death," WCCO, May 26, 2020, accessed August 26, 2020, <https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2020/05/26/hundreds-of-protesters-march-in-minneapolis-after-george-floyds-deadly-encounter-with-police/>.

<sup>20</sup> Jeff Wagner, "'It's Real Ugly:'

<sup>21</sup> Jeff Wagner, "'I'm Not Gonna Stand With Nonsense': 2nd Night Of Minneapolis George Floyd Protests Marked By Looting, Tear Gas, Fires," WCCO, May 27, 2020, accessed August 6, 2020, <https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2020/05/27/protesters-gather-where-george-floyd-was-killed-as-well-as->

access to the Third Precinct and burned it. Mayor Jacob Frey declared a state of emergency in Minneapolis after two days of protesting and unrest, and Governor Tim Walz of Minnesota activated the National Guard.<sup>22</sup> Demonstrations calling for justice for George Floyd, police reform, police defunding, and attention to the broader disparate treatment of Black communities continued into June.<sup>23</sup>

## A. NATIONAL PROTESTS AND UNREST THROUGH MAY 29

On May 27, 2020, demonstrators began organizing in other cities outside of Minneapolis. In Memphis, Tennessee, police temporarily shut down a portion of a street<sup>24</sup> following a protest in response to Floyd's death and the police killing of Breonna Taylor in Louisville, Kentucky, on March 13, 2020, and the killing of Ahmaud Arbery (not by police) in Brunswick, Georgia, on February 23, 2020. In Los Angeles, hundreds of protesters converged in the downtown area to march around the Civic Center; a group of them broke off from the march and blocked the Route 101 freeway.<sup>25</sup>

By May 28, 2020, protests in response to the killing of George Floyd and the treatment of Black communities by law enforcement had spread and were the subjects of extensive real-time mainstream media reporting across the country. In New York City, demonstrators marched to City Hall and shut down traffic, eventually leading to

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[mpd-3rd-precinct-oakdale-home/](#); "4 Men Indicted For Fire That Totaled Minneapolis Police 3rd Precinct," WCCO, August 25, 2020, accessed August 26, 2020, <https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2020/08/25/4-men-indicted-for-fire-that-totaled-minneapolis-police-3rd-precinct/>.

<sup>22</sup> "Over 500 National Guard soldiers activated to amid protests regarding George Floyd's death; Frey declares state of emergency in Minneapolis," KSTP, May 28, 2020, accessed August 26, 2020, <https://kstp.com/news/minnesota-national-guard-activated-to-control-protests-following-george-floyds-death/5743967/>.

<sup>23</sup> Amir Vera and Hollie Silverman, "Minneapolis Mayor Booed By Protesters After Refusing To Defund And Abolish Police," CNN, June 28, 2020, accessed August 26, 2020, <https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/07/us/minneapolis-mayor-police-abolition/index.html>; "Protesters gather at Governor's Residence demanding another special session," KSTP, June 24, 2020, accessed August 26, 2020, <https://kstp.com/minnesota-news/protesters-gather-at-governors-residence-demanding-another-special-session/5770782/>.

<sup>24</sup> Corinne S. Kennedy, Micaela A. Watts, and Samuel Hardiman, "'Stop Killing Black People': Demonstration Closes Union Avenue as Protestors Face Off with Counter-protestors, MPD," Memphis Commercial Appeal, May 27, 2020, accessed January 18, 2021, <https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/local/2020/05/27/george-floyd-demonstration-memphis-shuts-down-union-avenue/5269833002/>.

<sup>25</sup> Matthew Ormseth, Richard Winton, and Jessica Perez, "Protestors, Law Enforcement Clash in Downtown LA. During Protest Over George Floyd's Death," Los Angeles Times, May 27, 2020, accessed January 18, 2021, <https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-05-27/protestors-block-the-101-freeway>.

clashes with officers and many arrests.<sup>26</sup> In Columbus, Ohio, an estimated 400 demonstrators blocked an intersection and had a standoff with Columbus police officers. Protesters threw plastic water bottles, flares, and smoke bombs at the police, who responded with Oleoresin Capsicum (OC or pepper spray) to disperse the crowd.<sup>27</sup> In Denver, Colorado, shots were fired near a crowd of police accountability protesters by an unknown assailant. Later in the evening, Denver police used tear gas canisters and pepper spray to disperse crowds.<sup>28</sup> In Phoenix, Arizona, conflict between protesters and police officers arose as officers deployed pepper spray and rubber bullets while demonstrators threw objects at officers.<sup>29</sup> In Louisville, Kentucky, protests over the killing of George Floyd, as well as the police killing of Breonna Taylor, turned violent. Seven civilians sustained gunshot wounds at a May 28 protest; Mayor Greg Fischer stated afterwards that the police fired no shots at the Louisville protest.<sup>30</sup>

On Friday, May 29, 2020, rhetoric and stakes were heightened when then-President Donald Trump delivered an ultimatum to Minneapolis protesters and suggested that the military could use armed force to suppress riots. On Twitter, Trump called the protesters “thugs” and tweeted, “When the looting starts, the shooting starts.”<sup>31</sup>

In St. Louis, Missouri, a man was killed after protesters blocked Interstate 44, set fires, and broke into a FedEx truck.<sup>32</sup> In Atlanta, Georgia, protestors gathered near

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<sup>26</sup> Ali Bauman, “At Least 40 Arrests Made At Union Square Protest Over George Floyd’s Death,” WLNY, May 28, 2020, accessed August 6, 2020, <https://newyork.cbslocal.com/2020/05/28/several-arrests-made-at-union-square-protest-over-george-floyds-death/>.

<sup>27</sup> Jim Woods, “Police deploy pepper spray as protests over death of George Floyd spread to Columbus,” The Columbus Dispatch, May 28, 2020, accessed August 6, 2020, <https://www.dispatch.com/news/20200528/police-deploy-pepper-spray-as-protests-over-death-of-george-floyd-spread-to-columbus>.

<sup>28</sup> Noelle Phillips, Tiney Ricciardi, Alex Burness, Saja Hindi, and Elise Schmelzer, “Tear gas, pepper balls used on Denver crowds in George Floyd protests Thursday night,” The Denver Post, May 30, 2020, accessed August 26, 2020, <https://www.denverpost.com/2020/05/28/george-floyd-death-colorado-protest/>.

<sup>29</sup> Perry Vandell, “Hundreds protest in downtown Phoenix over George Floyd’s death; pepper spray used on protesters,” AZCentral, May 29, 2020, accessed August 26, 2020, <https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix-breaking/2020/05/28/phoenix-protest-stand-solidarity-family-george-floyd/5276289002/>.

<sup>30</sup> Bruce Schreiner and Dylan Lovan, “Mother Of Louisville Police Shooting Victim Calls For Peace,” Associated Press, May 29, 2020, accessed August 11, 2020, <https://apnews.com/article/8d411463f159e217fed1f7654f9060a0>.

<sup>31</sup> Jill Colvin and Colleen Long, “President Trump Tweets On Minneapolis Unrest, Calls Protesters “Thugs,” Vows Action: “When The Looting Starts, The Shooting Starts,” Chicago Tribune, May 29, 2020, accessed February 4, 2020, <https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-nw-trump-tweet-minneapolis-blocked-20200529-kzkxecfmuzao3nkfmftrwphauu-story.html>.

<sup>32</sup> Doyle Murphy, “Protestor Fatally Struck by FedEx Truck During St. Louis’ George Floyd Protests,” Riverfront Times, May 30, 2020, accessed January 18, 2021, <https://www.riverfronttimes.com/newsblog/2020/05/30/protester-fatally-struck-by-fedex-truck-during-st-louis-george-floyd-protests>.

Centennial Park and then moved to the CNN Center, where their numbers increased. By evening, members of the crowd damaged CNN's sign, broke the building's glass, and went inside. Atlanta Police Department vehicles parked nearby were destroyed.<sup>33</sup> Protesters in New York City clashed with the police across Brooklyn and Lower Manhattan, leaving officers and demonstrators injured. People threw bottles and debris at officers, who responded with pepper spray and arrests.<sup>34</sup> In Washington, D.C., a crowd gathered outside the White House. Officers used what appeared to be gasses and sprays to disperse the crowds, while water bottles were thrown at them; the Secret Service temporarily locked down the building.<sup>35</sup> During protests in Detroit, Michigan, a 19-year-old man was shot and killed, dozens of people were arrested, and the police deployed tear gas.<sup>36</sup>

These early protests and unrest continued across the country into early June. Polling in June 2020 suggested that between 15 to 26 million people in the United States participated in protests over Floyd's death.<sup>37</sup>

## B. PROTESTS AND UNREST IN CHICAGO

Beginning late in the week of the killing of George Floyd, the protests and unrest that flared around the country had begun to swell in Chicago. The days that followed saw large-scale public demonstrations and protests, widespread looting and property damage, and clashes between the police and the public. Several City of Chicago departments, as well as other agencies and entities acting in coordination with the City, were involved in the operational response to the protests and unrest. CPD and the City's response to those events involved multiple City departments, outside law enforcement agencies, and other County, State, federal, and private entities.

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<sup>33</sup> Fernando Alfonso III, "CNN Center in Atlanta Damaged During Protests," CNN, May 29, 2020, accessed January 18, 2021, <https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/29/us/cnn-center-vandalized-protest-atlanta-destroyed/index.html>.

<sup>34</sup> Edgar Sandoval, "Protests Flare in Brooklyn Over Floyd Death as de Blasio Appeals for Calm," The New York Times, May 30, 2020, accessed January 18, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/nyregion/nyc-protests-george-floyd.html?auth=login-email&login=email>.

<sup>35</sup> Clarence Williams, Perry Stein, and Peter Hermann, "Demonstrations for George Floyd Lead to Clashes Outside White House," The Washington Post, May 30, 2020, accessed January 18, 2021, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/demonstration-for-george-floyd-shuts-down-dc-intersection/2020/05/29/af7b5d40-a1f9-11ea-b5c9-570a91917d8d\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/demonstration-for-george-floyd-shuts-down-dc-intersection/2020/05/29/af7b5d40-a1f9-11ea-b5c9-570a91917d8d_story.html).


<sup>36</sup> Christine Ferretti, George Hunter, and Sarah Rahal, "Man Shot Dead, Dozens Arrested as Protest in Detroit Turns Violent," The Detroit News, May 29, 2020, accessed January 18, 2021, <https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2020/05/29/detroit-marchers-gather-downtown-protest-police-brutality-after-george-floyd-death/5284855002/>.

<sup>37</sup> Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bul, and Jugal K. Patel, "Black Lives Matter May Be The Largest Movement In U.S. History," The New York Times, July 3, 2020, accessed August 5, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html>.

## 1. Involved Entities and Landmark Sites

Figure 1 below shows which agencies fall under the ultimate authority of the Mayor, and which ones, by contrast, are County, State, or private actors. See Finding 2 below for further details on the deployment of and use of force by non-CPD law enforcement agencies.

FIGURE 1: AGENCIES INVOLVED IN THE RESPONSE TO PROTESTS AND UNREST



\*The Chicago Transit Authority is an independent agency established by Illinois State law (70 ILCS 3605), governed by the seven-member Chicago Transit Board. Four of the Board's seven members are appointed by the Mayor of Chicago and three by the Governor of Illinois. The Mayor's appointees are subject to the approval of the Governor and the Chicago City Council; the Governor's appointees are subject to the approval of the Mayor and the Illinois State Senate. The Board elects, from among their membership, a chairman to serve for a term of three years or for a term of their office as a member of the Board, whichever is shorter.


Source: OIG-generated chart.

Pursuant to the Municipal Code of Chicago (MCC), the Mayor “shall be ex officio coordinator of activities in cases of emergency resulting from any explosion, fire, flood, riot, storm or other cause requiring concerted measures for the maintenance of public peace and order, the preservation of life and property and the relief of suffering, or for any of these purposes.” Further, the Mayor “shall formulate, and, as occasion therefor arises, [s]he shall execute plans for the prevention of such emergencies so far as possible and for meeting them effectively when they arise.” “Obedience to” the Mayor’s orders “in executing such plans and meeting such emergencies is obligatory upon all departments and heads of departments and upon all other officers and employees of the City of Chicago.”<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> MCC §2-4-110. Notably, a key position in the Mayor’s Office with responsibilities for coordinated and concerted action is—and has long been—vacant. Pursuant to a 1954 amendment to the MCC, the Mayor “shall appoint, with the consent of the city council, an officer to be known as the mayor’s administrative officer who shall serve at the pleasure of the mayor. . . .The mayor’s administrative officer, subject to the direction and control of the mayor, shall supervise the administrative management of all city departments, boards, commissions and other city agencies established by this code and the laws of this state. In addition to such supervisory power, the mayor’s administrative officer may, in respect to any or all agencies under his supervision, establish reporting procedures, require the submission of progress reports, provide for the coordination of the activities of such agencies, and shall perform such other administrative and executive functions as may be delegated by the mayor.” MCC §2-4-020. (Emphasis added.) Since the late 1980s, City budget documents have included a position described as “Mayor’s Administrative Officer (Chief of Staff).” The Mayor’s Chief of Staff has not, however, been confirmed by the City Council as the law requires of a Chief Administrative Officer at any time during the administrations of Mayor Lightfoot or her recent predecessors.

FIGURE 2: MAP OF DOWNTOWN CHICAGO SITES



Source: OIG-generated map.

FIGURE 3: MAP OF ADDITIONAL SITES IN CHICAGO<sup>39</sup>



Source: OIG-generated map.

<sup>39</sup> See Appendix A for a map of Chicago, showing the boundary lines of CPD Areas and districts.



## 2. Chicago Up to Friday, May 29, 2020

On Tuesday, May 26, 2020, dozens of protesters met outside of CPD Headquarters to call for justice for George Floyd and highlight disparate treatment of Black and Brown communities by CPD during the COVID-19 pandemic. Public figures who were present included hip hop artist Chance the Rapper, political activist Ja'mal Green, and clergyman/activist Father Michael Pfleger.<sup>40</sup> CPD's Crime Prevention and Information Center (CPIC), which is, in part, responsible for monitoring, collecting, and disseminating intelligence (including but not limited to public source information such as news media and social media, as well as community source information) throughout the Department, sent a notification earlier that day to inform Department members of the planned protest.<sup>41</sup> Separately, beginning on Wednesday, May 27, 2020, at the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA), a senior official reported that they began to hear about and prepare for potential unrest in Chicago.

In the mid-afternoon of Thursday, May 28, 2020, CPIC sent a notification to some members of CPD's command staff notifying them that CPIC had identified a threat to burn down CPD's 6<sup>th</sup> District station on open source social media. Specifically, the poster wrote, "I wanna riot in Chicago and kill the police burn the sixth district police station dwn [sic]." The Superintendent forwarded the notification to the Mayor and senior members of her staff; the Mayor responded, "What is [happening] to the person who posted this threat?" She later wrote, in response to an update on the investigation from CPD's Chief of the Bureau of Detectives, "Thanks, Chief. Please keep us posted. We cannot live in a world where someone posts such a threat without being held responsible."

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<sup>40</sup> Derrick Blakley, "Protest Held In Chicago After Death Of George Floyd During Arrest By Minneapolis Police," CBS Chicago, May 26, 2020, accessed October 13, 2020, <https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2020/05/26/protest-held-in-chicago-after-death-of-george-floyd-during-arrest-by-minneapolis-police/>.

<sup>41</sup> CPIC is one of 75 so-called "fusion centers" operating as part of the National Network of Fusion Centers coordinated through the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as conduit hub for the two-way sharing of intelligence, analysis, and perspective regarding domestic threat and security issues. Each individual fusion center "is a locally owned and operated center that serves as a focal point in states and major urban areas for the receipt, analysis, gathering and sharing of threat-related information between State, Local, Tribal and Territorial, and federal and private sector partners." "Fusion Centers," United States Department of Homeland Security, September 19, 2019, accessed January 13, 2021, <https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers>. In addition to serving Chicago, CPIC also serves the rest of Cook County and the collar counties, and it is staffed at all times by CPD members and personnel from the FBI, DHS, and the Illinois State Police. CPIC is led by a Commander who reports to the Deputy Chief of Operations (see Appendix B). "Special Order S03-04-04 Crime Prevention And Information Center (CPIC)," August 10, 2020, accessed December 14, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57bf0-13ed7140-08513-ed71-4cecd9c378c05dec.html>.

On the same day, in Chicago's Englewood neighborhood, located within the Chicago Police Department's 7<sup>th</sup> District, there was a Black Lives Matter<sup>42</sup> protest demanding justice for George Floyd.<sup>43</sup> (See Appendix A for a map of all CPD areas and districts.)<sup>44</sup> Earlier that day, CPIC had notified the 7<sup>th</sup> District Commander and Area 1 Deputy Chief of the upcoming protest; CPIC's notification did not, however, provide an estimate of anticipated attendees. The protest became contentious, resulting in clashes between protesters and officers and leading to an arrest.<sup>45</sup> According to a Tactical Response Report (TRR) completed for the incident, the individual was arrested after shoving their phone in the face of the 7<sup>th</sup> District Commander.<sup>46</sup> As the Commander and CPD officers attempted to complete the arrest, the alleged offender ran away. When caught, the alleged offender resisted arrest by locking their arms. The District Commander reported using an arm bar to handcuff the individual.<sup>47</sup> The alleged offender stated they were having difficulty breathing and were taken to the hospital.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Black Lives Matter is a social movement dedicated to fighting racism and anti-black violence. "Black Lives Matter," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed November 16, 2020, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Black-Lives-Matter>.

<sup>43</sup> Mike Lowe, "CPD top cop responds after protesters gather in Englewood after George Floyd's death," WGN, June 1, 2020, accessed August 26, 2020, <https://wgntv.com/news/chicago-news/cpd-top-cop-responds-after-protesters-gather-in-englewood-after-george-floyds-death/>.

<sup>44</sup> At the time of the protest there were five CPD Areas covering different regions of Chicago which each oversee three to six districts, a detective's unit, and different teams. Area 1 is comprised of CPD's 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup>, and 9<sup>th</sup> Districts—the Wentworth, Grand Crossing, Englewood, Chicago Lawn, and Deering neighborhoods, respectively.

<sup>45</sup> Kelly Bauer, "Protests For George Floyd Planned For Downtown Friday And Saturday," Block Club Chicago, May 29, 2020, accessed August 26, 2020, <https://blockclubchicago.org/2020/05/29/protest-for-george-floyd-planned-for-downtown-this-weekend/>.

<sup>46</sup> A TRR is CPD's primary force reporting form. See Finding 2 below for a detailed description of CPD's force reporting obligations and TRR data analysis from the May/June protests. "CPD-11.377 Tactical Response Report," March 2019, accessed August 14, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/forms/CPD-11.377.pdf>.

<sup>47</sup> An arm bar is a manual compliance technique that involves an officer holding the subject's arm and locking the subject's elbow joint in an extended or hyperextended position.

<sup>48</sup> The next morning, a senior staffer in the Mayor's Office sent an email titled "Feedback on Englewood," and wrote, "On a positive note, we are hearing that CPD was very professional in Englewood last night and did not react when provoked."

FIGURE 4: CPD OFFICERS ARRESTING A PROTESTER DURING A MAY 28 PROTEST IN THE 7<sup>TH</sup> DISTRICT



Source: CPD body-worn camera footage.

A reportable use of force incident by a District Commander is a rare event. Throughout all of 2019, no CPD Commander, or member of any rank higher than a Commander, completed a TRR to document the use of force against a subject.<sup>49</sup> Under General Order G03-02-02, members who complete TRRs must submit them for review to their immediate supervisor.<sup>50</sup> According to a member of command staff with expertise around CPD's use of force policies, a use of force by a District Commander would have to be reviewed by a Deputy Chief, the next ranking member in their chain of command, and then by CPD's Chief of Operations, the third-highest ranking official in the Department.

At least one senior CPD member took note of the significance of the George Floyd-related protest in the 7<sup>th</sup> District. This member described the incident as the moment that they knew that unusual events were unfolding. In their words, after viewing the BWC footage of the incident and seeing the tenor and tone of the crowd, they thought, "[T]his is going to be a problem." The Superintendent was aware of the

<sup>49</sup> One Commander did complete a TRR in 2019, but it was to record action taken by a subject against the Commander, and it did not record any use of force by the Commander. The narrative section of this TRR reads in its entirety, "R/O [reporting officer] GAVE VERBAL DIRECTION TO DISPERSE A LARGE CROWD AT WHICH TIME THE OFFENDER PUSHED R/O. OFFENDER TAKEN IN CUSTODY BY ASSISTING UNITS."

<sup>50</sup> "General Order G03-02-02 Incidents Requiring The Completion Of A Tactical Response Report," February 28 2020, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-1291da66-88512-91e2-cdd76fd8ae76d83d.pdf?hl=true>.

Commander's use of force incident but did not understand the event during which it occurred to be related to the killing of George Floyd. Notably, a CPIC notification sent in advance to CPD leadership—including directly to the Superintendent's Chief of Staff—giving notice of the event in Englewood described it as, "a planned gathering today at 68<sup>th</sup> and Halsted in response to events in Minneapolis, Minnesota." CPIC had also circulated to senior command staff an image of a social media post announcing the event, which included the hashtag "#JusticeforGeorgeFloyd." When interviewed by OIG and the IMT, the Superintendent reported that he had not seen any reason for concern leading into that weekend.

During the evening of Thursday, May 28, 2020, however, a senior aide to the Mayor sent an email to the Superintendent and several members of CPD's command staff, requesting a meeting to discuss and strategize the response to potential protests on Friday and through the weekend. The senior aide stated in their message, "[o]bviously, we're all a little concerned about what could happen this weekend given what we're seeing in Minneapolis."

The following morning, on Friday, May 29, 2020, the First Deputy Superintendent sent an email to all CPD exempt members, asking that they "plan to attend roll calls this weekend (starting on 3<sup>rd</sup> watch today) to discuss the potential for spontaneous protests in response to the incident in Minneapolis.<sup>51</sup> The message to our officers should stress deescalation of volatile situations, and officer safety." In turn, one Deputy Chief emailed the District Commanders under their supervision, with a subject line that read "Minneapolis," to say, "Please personally address your role [sic] calls in regards to what happened in Minneapolis. Please prepare your officers [for] possible negative community reactions and direct them to continue to be the professional officers we are. It is important that your troops hear directly from you."

On Friday, May 29, 2020, news media indicated that there would be a planned protest that evening near the Cloud Gate sculpture ("the Bean") at Millennium Park and another protest on Saturday afternoon at Federal Plaza.<sup>52</sup> Despite the May 28 protest in the 7<sup>th</sup> District and the unrest happening in other major cities, senior members of the Department reported in interviews with OIG that they saw no indication that there would be unrest in Chicago following the killing of George Floyd. Department command staff received an intelligence notification from CPIC on May 28, mentioning a planned protest event related to the killing of George Floyd that would take place on Saturday, May 30. The notification added that protesters were planning to shut down Lake Shore Drive, and noted that there had been a similar shutdown of

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<sup>51</sup> An exempt member is a command staff member at or above the level of Commander or Director.

<sup>52</sup> Kelly Bauer, "Protests For George Floyd Planned For Downtown Friday And Saturday," Block Club Chicago, May 29, 2020, accessed August 26, 2020, <https://blockclubchicago.org/2020/05/29/protest-for-george-floyd-planned-for-downtown-this-weekend/>.

an interstate highway in Los Angeles on May 27. The CPIC notification did not mention, however, that the event in Los Angeles included vandalism of police vehicles and an injured protester.<sup>53</sup> Generally, over this period, CPIC notifications provided little mention of and no details about the protests and unrest occurring in other cities. One CPIC command staff member mentioned that national news media is one of CPIC's best sources of intelligence. Despite the national protests and unrest, based on the intelligence provided by CPIC, the Department prepared for "normal" protesting. During that week, the Mayor's Office was also receiving information about the May 30 protest from its public engagement team and CPD, but they concluded that the information was not atypical. Mayor Lori Lightfoot said in an interview with OIG that, before the events of late May and early June, "there was not necessarily an assumption" that there was "a potential for peaceful protests to turn violent."

On May 29, 2020, CPIC notified the 1<sup>st</sup> District Commander and Area 3 Deputy Chief that a protest was scheduled for 6:00 p.m. that day. CPIC, through its intelligence collection, identified a protest related to George Floyd's killing but reported not having seen anything to lead them to be unusually concerned. While the Department was monitoring the protests and unrest occurring nationally, command staff believed that such unrest was unlikely to occur in Chicago, based principally on the fact that it had not historically occurred after high-profile events, including the 2015 release of the video of the murder of Laquan McDonald by a CPD officer. One member of CPD's command staff described the Department as becoming "complacent" when it came to dealing with protests, stating that CPD should require planning and communication with protest leaders and community members.

On May 29, 2020, CPD deployed personnel to the protest at Millennium Park. Despite a CPIC notification for the event, OIG and the IMT received varying accounts from command staff about CPD's expectations, whether there was any planning by CPD, and the quality of CPD's intelligence collection in preparation for the protest. CPD did not produce a formal response plan for the event. In the late afternoon, around 5:30 p.m., a small group of around 30 protesters met at Millennium Park. According to CPD, as images of the unfolding events emerged online, more protesters joined, resulting in large-scale demonstrations in CPD's 1<sup>st</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Districts (encompassing the Loop and Near North Side, respectively).<sup>54</sup> Protesters began marching on

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<sup>53</sup> Nouran Salahieh, Tim Lynn, and Rick Chambers, "Protestors Block 101 Freeway, Smash Patrol Car Window In Downtown L.A. During Protest Over George Floyd's Death," KTLA, May 28, 2020, accessed October 14, 2020, <https://ktla.com/news/local-news/black-lives-matter-protestors-march-through-downtown-l-a/>.

<sup>54</sup> Javonte Anderson, "Protesters chanting 'George Floyd' briefly march onto Chicago highway, decrying Floyd's death in Minneapolis," Chicago Tribune, May 29, 2020, accessed August 22, 2020, <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-floyd-protest-bean-downtown-20200529-cz2zy4fuvzaova2lmqycdxe5gi-story.html>.

Michigan Avenue and State Street and blocking traffic.<sup>55</sup> Protesters also attempted to march onto the I-290 Eisenhower Expressway before CPD intervened by forming a skirmish line to move protesters off the entrance ramp.<sup>56</sup> At the peak of the protest, CPD estimated that around 200 to 400 protesters were present. CPD fielded around 60 officers as the protest developed, including at least one CPD Area bike team. CPD had to deploy teams from its different Areas and officers from other districts to help downtown. In some CPD Areas, all available teams were deployed, including Area 5, which deployed four to five Sergeants and 16 to 20 officers.

Later in the night and into Saturday morning, people committed some acts of vandalism downtown, including damaging businesses and CPD vehicles.<sup>57</sup> Early Saturday morning, CPD command staff instructed officers, on the radio, to arrest anyone committing acts of vandalism. Furthermore, groups of people had split into different areas of downtown requiring CPD to pursue throughout. Multiple Illinois State Police units were also present assisting CPD in its response. According to one officer, a Commander ordered officers to form skirmish lines and began to push some protesters north and others south on State Street. The Commander gave these orders without communicating a plan, aside from pushing protesters in opposite directions. The group being pushed south on State Street reached an area in which many officers had parked their CPD vehicles. This led to a number of CPD vehicles being vandalized; protesters slashed tires and broke windows. Since there were only two tow trucks available, officers with damaged vehicles were asked to swap tires with vehicles whose tires had been slashed to make some of them operational. In a description that conveys the prevailing confusion of the moment, an Area Executive Officer reported that, at 3:00 a.m., on Washington Street between Dearborn Street and State Street, CPD responded to protesters on walking in and out of traffic simultaneously by “kettl[ing] the group in a large area” and, in apparent contradiction, “[telling] them to leave the area.”<sup>58</sup> As the protesters were marching on Washington

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<sup>55</sup> Javonte Anderson, “Protesters chanting ‘George Floyd.’”

<sup>56</sup> Skirmish lines, which are linear formations of officers standing side by side, “represent the front line of contact and confrontation between police officers and a crowd, and can result in use of force necessary to establish the line and maintain it.” “Response to Civil Unrest: A Review of the Berkeley Police Department’s Actions and Events of December 6 and 7, 2014,” Berkeley Police, accessed January 18, 2021, <https://www.cityofberkeley.info/Police/Response-To-Civil-Unrest/lessons-learned.html>.

<sup>57</sup> Jonathon Berlin and Kori Rumore, “How The Weekend Unfolded: Timeline Of Chicago Protests, Looting And Unrest,” Chicago Tribune, June 1, 2020, accessed August 28, 2020, <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-viz-george-floyd-protest-chicago-timeline-20200531-lfkd7p6ejbennfezhxk2u5kkmm-story.html>.

<sup>58</sup> Kettling is a crowd control tactic used by police departments which entails lines of officers corralling a group of people into an area from which they are not allowed to leave or are only allowed to leave through an exit controlled by the police. Katherine Rosenburg-Douglas, “What Is ‘Kettling’? It’s A Controversial Tactic To Contain Crowds, And Chicago Police Are Accused Of Using It During Downtown Protests,” Chicago Tribune, August 18, 2020, accessed September 30, 2020,

Street, CPD formed a line of officers on Dearborn Street and another line of officers on State Street. Officers on Dearborn moved east towards State Street to close off the area. According to the Area Executive Officer, the lines of officers were only on the street leaving the sidewalks open for protesters to get off the streets and disperse on the sidewalks. As the large group began to disperse into smaller groups and head in different directions, some in the crowd began to vandalize businesses by breaking windows. Shortly after 3:00 a.m. and again at 4:00 a.m., a CPD command staff member directed on the radio that everyone be arrested.

According to arrest records analyzed by OIG, CPD arrested 112 people Friday night into Saturday morning. OIG heard varying accounts about whether mass arrest procedures were used Friday during the protest. Per policy, mass arrest procedures are declared by the Incident Commander or highest-ranking Bureau of Patrol supervisor on scene based on an assessment of, among several factors, the “probable charges to be placed against arrestees,” the “total number of arrestees,” and the “nature and situation of the circumstances surrounding the mass arrest incident.”<sup>59</sup> “Incident Commander” is not explicitly defined in the mass arrest procedures directive, but, as described below in Finding 1, is described in related directives and is typically the highest ranking CPD member on scene. However, a CPD member who referred to themselves as the Incident Commander for the event on Friday did not recall many arrests being made.<sup>60</sup> In contrast, according to CPD's Office of Legal Affairs, mass arrest procedures were instituted after the dispersal order was given on Friday night. An officer on scene described the arrest procedures in use to be “confus[ing].” A typical arrest requires the arresting officer to take the arrestee to a CPD detention facility for processing. Once a mass arrest situation is declared, in order to keep officers in the field attending to the precipitating event, arresting officers are supposed to hand off arrestees to another CPD member who transports a group of arrestees to a detention facility. Arrestees are then to be processed by still other CPD members using mass arrest cards documenting the circumstances and probable cause for the arrest which are completed by the original arresting officers (see Finding 1 below). On Friday, mass arrest documentation and arrestee processing were not being used, but officers were told to hand off their arrestees to transport drivers. Eventually, CPD instructed officers to go to the detention facility, at the end of the night, to process any arrests they made. Adding to the confusion, the Chief of Operations approved the use of mass arrest RD numbers for multiple charges. Also of note, the request and approval of the use of mass arrest RD numbers did not occur

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<https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-kettling-chicago-police-20200818-bf3qemv6cjgyfkxea6bcxanzqi-story.html>.

<sup>59</sup> “Special Order S06-06 Mass Arrest Procedures,” September 27, 2018, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12b3f6c9-62812-b3f6-c9f7463f28e17719.html>

<sup>60</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

until after 3:00 a.m. Once approval was granted, the dispatcher stated that several different RD numbers had been used up to that point in the night.

CPD command staff reported that vandalism downtown did not cease until mid-morning on Saturday. Around 5:00 a.m., after no more groups of people were seen around downtown, officers deployed from outside districts were allowed to go back to their districts. One Commander reported to OIG and the IMT that no overtime pay for officers was authorized on Friday night, and that this had been a “big Achilles heel” for the Department. Without extra personnel available, there had not been enough people to do what was necessary to respond as needed.

Despite the violence, some members of CPD’s command staff expressed their belief that CPD “won” Friday night. A senior member from the Mayor’s Office emailed CPD command staff members on Saturday morning, writing “Thank you all for your incredible work last night—you made Chicago proud.” The Superintendent responded, “officers made the city of Chicago and the police profession proud!!!”

Meanwhile, some of CPD’s rank-and-file officers told OIG that by Friday, they expected that they would face more hostility from protesters and demonstrators in the coming days; for many of them, their concerns dated back several days to news reports of disturbances around the country.

#### PERSPECTIVES: EVENING OF MAY 29<sup>61</sup>

<i>Interviewee</i>	<i>Interviewee Comments</i>
<i>Executive Officer #1</i>	The member stated that CPD’s plan for May 29, 2020, was the same as it is for every protest. Area leadership assigned a bike team to monitor the protesters. However, plans detailing which units were to be deployed, and when and where, were not communicated until the day of the protest on scene. When asked whether there was a written plan for CPD’s management of the protest, Executive Officer #1 said that there was a plan but that it was not in writing. This member said that CPD cannot make a written plan that details CPD’s strategies for a protest, because protests are dynamic and devoting time to writing down a plan for an event would be a waste. Executive Officer #1 stated they would typically create a plan of action in their head for protests, as they would for anything else. Executive Officer #1 believed CPD’s response to the protest on May

<sup>61</sup> In this section and in the other “Perspectives” that follow, OIG reports narrative accounts given either in interviews with OIG and the IMT, or during court-hosted listening sessions. These accounts are reported here as offered by participants in the events at issue, without independent verification by OIG. Narratives from court-hosted listening sessions, which were transcribed by a court reporter, are presented here as direct quotes from the speakers.



	<p>29 was very well run. The protest was managed properly, even though there was more energy from the protesters than what Executive Officer #1 had seen before. Executive Officer #1 did not think that CPD “got lucky,” but rather that CPD had the necessary resources in place and handled the protest properly.</p>
<p><i>Chief #1, Chief #2, and Commander #1</i></p>	<p>Three members of CPD’s command staff reported that the protests on Friday were a surprise, and that CPD had not received any intelligence in advance which might have predicted them. Chief #2 stated that in their experience, CPD’s intelligence had always been right; therefore, there were no preparatory meetings before the protest because no need had been identified. Chief #1 described CPD’s response on Friday as being “half a step slow” and added that CPD failed to monitor large group movements during the protests. At the end of the day on Friday, Commander #1 believed that the unrest CPD encountered that night was an isolated event and that conditions would return to normal the following day.</p>
<p><i>Police Officers #1 and #2</i></p>	<p>As Officer #1 was responding to the protest downtown, they experienced a lack of coordination on CPD’s part. Officer #1 reported that no one instructed them on what to do or where to go. They did not believe command staff had a plan in place to deal with the protesters. Officer #1 described supervisors failing to organize officers on scene, leaving officers to figure things out on their own. Broadly, Officer #1 described CPD’s strategy as “whack-a-mole,” where officers would run from situation to situation without a strategy. The officer also described seeing command staff members running into alleys without backup to make arrests. Officer #2 described CPD’s lack of preparation for the unrest as sad, since everyone with access to social media knew that violence was brewing, except for CPD command staff and City Hall. Officer #2 said that, on their own initiative, officers began to prepare for potential unrest by bringing protective gear to work with them, in spite of having received no instructions to do so.</p>

### 3. Saturday, May 30, 2020

Some CPD command staff reported that, by the morning of Saturday, May 30, 2020, they were concerned about the potential for heightened tensions during the demonstrations planned for that day, based on the events the evening before and through the night. Others, reportedly, continued to expect peaceful demonstrations. On Thursday, May 28, 2020, after receiving notification from CPIC about the planned May 30 protest at Federal Plaza, the Area 3 Deputy Chief had requested resources from the Chief of Operations, including all available 1<sup>st</sup> District foot and tactical officers, available Area 3 saturation teams, 18<sup>th</sup> District tactical officers, videographers, legal officers, Special Operations Response Team cars, traffic personnel, prisoner vans, and

juvenile arrest processing teams.<sup>62</sup> On May 29, the First Deputy Superintendent sent a memo—also known as the incident action plan—to various Chiefs, Deputy Chiefs, and Commanders regarding staffing for the Federal Plaza protest on May 30. The memo indicated that the protest would begin at 6:00 p.m., listed staffing for the event, and instructed officers on where to report. However, correspondence between members of command staff indicates that there was some information stating that multiple groups would be protesting, with some starting at 2:00 p.m.<sup>63</sup>

In anticipation of large crowds on May 30, CPD canceled regular days off (RDO) for Area teams and deployed them downtown. A senior command staff member in the Office of Operations communicated this decision to District Commanders and other members of command staff in an email at 10:33 p.m. the night before. The message further specified that “[a]ll Tactical and Area Teams will report with helmet, baton, gas mask, and crowd control gear” and many of these teams were ordered to report to McCormick Place by 2:00 p.m. The Department also ordered the deployment of standard support resources for major protests from the Special Functions Division, including Canine Units, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams, Bomb Tech Teams, and Mounted Units.

Typically, the Department prepares onsite at a planned protest a couple of hours before the event is scheduled to begin. This allows CPD to organize resources and discuss strategy. On May 30, 2020, CPD personnel arrived at Federal Plaza in advance (estimates range from one to several hours) of the 2:00 p.m. scheduled start time for the protest planned there. At 1:50 p.m., the Commander for the District in which Federal Plaza is located emailed his Deputy Chief and Chief to say, “A crowd of 500 is in federal plaza – growing rapidly.” By the time many CPD members arrived, command staff members reported to OIG that there were already protesters at Federal Plaza; a Deputy Chief estimated that thousands of protesters were already present.<sup>64</sup>

Meanwhile, on May 30, 2020, CPD used McCormick Place as a deployment center, where additional officers converged to be deployed as needed. Officers deployed from McCormick Place were transported downtown on Chicago Transit Authority buses. One command staff member, who had been charged with making parking

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<sup>62</sup> Additionally, the Area 3 Deputy Chief also requested one tactical team each from Districts 019, 020, 024 and the Commanders of districts in Area 3 to train and learn how to police protests.

<sup>63</sup> In a prior email, command staff mentioned multiple groups protesting with different start times, some groups starting at 2:00 p.m. and others at 6:00 p.m. The First Deputy Superintendent also had an email exchange with a CPIC representative, between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. on May 30, confirming that the protest was “supposed to converge at Federal Plaza at 1400 hrs.”

<sup>64</sup> There are varying CPD member accounts as to when they were supposed to meet and when protesters arrived at Federal Plaza. Some members said they arrived at Federal Plaza and saw protesters at 11:00 a.m., while others stated this occurred around 1:00 p.m.

available for officers at McCormick Place and having an area for them to meet and be organized for deployment, recalled realizing that there was no good plan in place for mobilization. The command staff member reported that they had made best efforts to get officers onto buses and sent downtown and to ensure that those officers were accompanied by someone in a supervisory position. Officers were flooding into McCormick Place just as the demonstration at Federal Plaza was starting. In total, one Deputy Chief estimated that 400 to 600 officers were deployed from McCormick Place throughout the day. According to multiple CPD command staff members, CPD had not set up its crowd control operation at Federal Plaza and immediately needed officers from McCormick Place. One command staff member characterized CPD as caught off guard, as the Department was unaware that the event's start time had been moved up. Protesters were arriving via public transportation and bikes. Additionally, a large car caravan, which originated at a demonstration organized outside the Cook County Jail, arrived downtown.<sup>65</sup>

There are varying accounts as to how and when the decision to raise the bridges occurred. According to Mayor Lightfoot, she made the decision to raise the bridges on Saturday. According to the Superintendent, Mayor Lightfoot and the Superintendent began to discuss raising the downtown bridges on Friday night, as a potential means to limit the number of protesters able to access Trump International Hotel and Tower (Trump Tower) and avoid the need to use officers to form lines to protect the building. These discussions continued into Saturday morning in conversations within CPD and with Mayor's Office personnel. A Deputy Chief stated that during a Saturday morning call during which command staff discussed the possibility of raising the bridges, they were not aware that protesters were already downtown.

Numerous command staff members reported that intelligence they received from CPIC about Saturday's demonstration was faulty or incomplete. A Deputy Chief stated that intelligence indicated that the demonstration would be attended by a few hundred protesters, but instead there were 30,000. The First Deputy Superintendent added that CPD had not received any intelligence indicating that Chicago would experience unrest similar to other cities in the country. At approximately 2:00 p.m., a District Commander working in Federal Plaza asked for information from CPD's Public Transportation Section over police radio, regarding how many groups were converging on Federal Plaza and how big they were, because the District Commander reported that the crowd size had "doubled" in five minutes.

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<sup>65</sup> Karie Angell Luc and Kevin Beese, "Looting, Damage Follow Protests In Downtown Chicago," Cook County Chronicle, May 30 2020, accessed August 24, 2020, <https://chronicleillinois.com/news/cook-county-news/lightfoot-orders-curfews-after-day-of-clashes-between-protestors-police/>. CPIC had identified the possibility of a car caravan between the Cook County Jail and Federal Plaza in a message to senior command staff members two days earlier, on Thursday, May 28, at 4:11 p.m.

## PERSPECTIVES: EARLY AFTERNOON OF MAY 30

<i>Interviewee</i>	<i>Interviewee Comments</i>
<i>Police Officer #3</i>	Police Officer #3 stated that CPD had an opportunity to develop a plan since mass demonstrations in Chicago did not start until Friday and Saturday. Other cities experienced demonstrations and unrest much earlier in the week, and CPD could have learned from those events and developed a plan. According to Officer #3, CPD "dropped the ball."
<i>Sergeant #1</i>	Sergeant #1 was downtown at Federal Plaza by 11:00 a.m. on Saturday. By 12:30 p.m. or 1:00 p.m., demonstrators were streaming in, both in car caravans and by way of the CTA. By 2:00 p.m., Sergeant #1 estimated there were 1,000 people in Federal Plaza. The Sergeant's unit was able to stop several people at State Street. At that point, the unit was face-to-face with demonstrators and subjected to very personal insults. Once calls for backup from officers began, Sergeant #1 reported not getting any direction from command staff.
<i>Protester #1</i>	Protester #1 stated that on Saturday, May 30, they drove to Federal Plaza to attend a protest around 1:00 p.m. Upon their arrival, they noticed a large police presence, with CPD members outnumbering the protesters. Eventually, lots of protesters showed up with signs and began to give speeches. Protester #1 described the feeling of sadness, anger, and frustration over what happened to George Floyd and Breonna Taylor. Eventually, Protester #1 said, the crowd started marching and chanting. It was very peaceful early in the protest.
<i>Commander #2</i>	Commander #2 arrived at Federal Plaza around 1:00 p.m. The protesters began to march at about 2:00 p.m. Before the marching began, there were more officers than protesters, but that quickly changed. As the protesters marched north on Dearborn Street, Commander #2 followed the protesters alone. Most of the people that the Commander encountered that were not marching were climbing on bus shelters and poles. After following the march for one and a half blocks, Commander #2 heard radio calls reporting that a group of CPD officers was being attacked and robbed of their equipment, so the Commander returned to Federal Plaza to reorganize. Commander #2 wished that CPD had organized a traffic plan before that time.
<i>Protester #2</i>	<p>"On Saturday, May 30, I attended the protest against police brutality at Daley Plaza. This was my first time attending a protest in Chicago [...].</p> <p>At first, the protest felt like many others I had attended. There was a sense of joint purpose and community, albeit masked [for COVID-19]. My fellow protesters and I chanted. We held signs. I saw families</p>

with children, and I had, in fact, considered bringing my sons to this protest. I had brought them to others in the past. But my sister had been to a peaceful protest in Oakland, California, the previous day where the crowd was set upon by the police and pepper sprayed, so I left the kids at home and instead brought remedies for pepper spray.

So, again, it was largely a peaceful protest, albeit one that was about police brutality and a little bit negative towards the police, some of the chants, et cetera, but, again, that is our right to use our words to express displeasure about the people who are supposed to be serving us and who we pay.

When the police appeared on the scene, the mood immediately shifted. They were dressed in riot gear. The majority of them were maskless. They had batons in their hands already, although, again, we were protesting peacefully.

I think the worst thing that I had seen up to then was somebody spray-painting on the sidewalk. I don't think a baton is the answer. So, yes, batons in hand, zip ties in hand, they began setting up barricades and boundaries that were arbitrary. They sort of created a circle in the middle of one street to reroute us."<sup>66</sup>

Between 2:00 p.m. and 3:30 p.m., some protesters headed north on Dearborn Street while other groups splintered towards Lake Shore Drive and headed east on Jackson Boulevard.<sup>67</sup> An estimated six hundred others headed north on Dearborn Street toward Trump Tower. On Lake Shore Drive, protesters blocked both north- and southbound traffic as they marched among stopped cars.<sup>68</sup> CPD officers began to clash with demonstrators, including the group of protesters in front of Trump Tower, which CPD estimated to be between 1,500 and 2,000. Some protesters began to

<sup>66</sup> Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitor Listening Sessions at 95, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2020).

<sup>67</sup> CPD radio traffic indicated reports of crowds of different sizes heading in different directions throughout the afternoon and evening of May 30. For instance, in an eight-minute stretch beginning at 3:18 p.m., CPD reported large crowds at Lake Street and Michigan Avenue, Madison Street and Dearborn Street, and Adams Street and State Street. A crowd of 3,000 people was marching eastbound on Jackson Boulevard at Michigan Avenue, and protestors were overtaking the barricades at Trump Tower.

<sup>68</sup> Jeremy Gorner, Madeline Buckley, and Paige Fry, "Mayor Imposes Curfew After Chaotic Scenes Unfold In Loop, Near North Side As Protesters Clash With Police During Demonstration Over Death Of George Floyd In Minneapolis," Chicago Tribune, May 31, 2020, accessed October 6, 2020,

<https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-loop-protests-property-damage-20200530-ncvxjtwglnfoddyj4yuhd6lwm-story.html>;

Jonathon Berlin and Kori Rumore, "How The Weekend Unfolded: Timeline Of Chicago Protests, Looting And Unrest," Chicago Tribune, June 1, 2020, accessed August 28, 2020, <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-viz-george-floyd-protest-chicago-timeline-20200531-lfk7p6ejbennfezhxk2u5kkmm-story.html>.

vandalize throughout the 1<sup>st</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Districts, including spray-painting bus shelters and damaging CPD vehicles.

In BWC footage reviewed by OIG, an officer realizes that they left a rifle unsecured in an unmarked CPD vehicle in the middle of State Street. A group of officers run to inspect the vehicle and find the tires slashed and the rear windshield shattered (see Figure 5 below). Two officers comment that someone had stolen their personal effects from the vehicle. One of the officers specifically describes a bag with house keys, a driver's license, and credit cards as the missing property. The rifle was not taken, although it seemingly was left unsecured in the vehicle. However, the officer states that their gun magazine was taken from the vehicle.

#### FIGURE 5: UNMARKED CPD VEHICLE WITH TIRES SLASHED AND REAR WINDSHIELD SHATTERED



Source: CPD body-worn camera footage.

CPD members described protesters throwing projectiles at them, spitting, and verbally abusing them. CPD members also described being battered by demonstrators. In another instance, BWC footage shows a group of officers standing together on the corner of Madison Street and Dearborn Street. One officer warns another that protesters are throwing objects, including bricks. The camera captures an individual rolling a Divvy bike forcefully towards an officer, then throwing a water bottle at the officer. The officer knocks the bike to the ground, and the water bottle falls short and does not hit the officer.

Protesters reported seeing and experiencing apparently indiscriminate uses of force by CPD members. They described seeing CPD members tackle, punch, and use batons to strike peaceful protestors in the head and neck.<sup>69</sup> Some of these observations are supported by BWC footage from that day. For example, in one encounter at State Street between Van Buren and Adams, seen from different angles on two different BWCs reviewed by OIG, a person is standing astride a bicycle and filming an arrest in process on their smartphone. Two officers take this person by the arms and push them backwards—still astride the bicycle—to clear them away from the scene of the arrest. The person continues to film but does not appear to resist the officers moving them, nor do they verbally protest. Once the person has been moved back some distance from the arrest in process, the two officers let go of the person's arms. A third officer walking by grabs and pulls the handlebar of the bicycle, knocking both the person and their bicycle to the ground. The third officer then continues to walk on without stopping. The officer does not attempt to effect an arrest or talk with the bicyclist. Figure 6 shows this scene as the third officer grabs and pulls the bicycle handlebar. Figure 7 shows the scene moments later from a different camera angle, as the bicyclist has fallen to the ground and the officer continues to walk past.

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
<sup>69</sup> Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitoring Listening Sessions at 30, 39, 49, 56, 68, 78, and 81, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2020).  
Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitor Listening Sessions at 159 and 143, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2020).

FIGURE 6: A CPD OFFICER KNOCKS A PERSON OFF A BICYCLE (1/2)



Source: CPD body-worn camera footage.

FIGURE 7: A CPD OFFICER KNOCKS A PERSON OFF A BICYCLE (2/2)



Source: CPD body-worn camera footage.



a) Assistance from the Illinois State Police

The Illinois State Police (ISP) began monitoring intelligence after George Floyd was killed in Minneapolis. ISP expected protests and unrest by the end of the week and began to ready its crowd control teams. ISP reported to OIG that, by the middle of the week of Floyd's death, ISP was in contact with CPD senior command members to share intelligence and to discuss CPD's planned posture in response to any demonstrations. Specifically, ISP personnel reached out to leadership in CPD's Office of Operations and Bureau of Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations to share information and plan for a response. On Saturday, May 30, 2020, ISP deployed its officers to the Illinois Department of Transportation's Chicago Headquarters and awaited a request from CPD to deploy further. Around midday, CPD contacted ISP to request its deployment, and ISP made determinations about which resources to deploy, including crowd control teams, canine units, videographers, drones, and SWAT teams. ISP assisted CPD by helping manage crowds downtown, including at Trump Tower. According to radio traffic, ISP arrived at Trump Tower at approximately 4:49 p.m., and shortly after arriving, they were attacked with bottles at State Street and Kinzie Street. At approximately 5:30 p.m., near the Trump Tower and the Wrigley Building, those engaged in protests and unrest continued to clash with officers. According to Mayor Lightfoot, the Superintendent requested that she authorize the use of OC spray at this location, and the Mayor gave the authorization.<sup>70</sup> According to CPD records, four SWAT officers deployed OC spray into the crowd.

b) Chicago Department of Transportation and the Challenge of Raising the Downtown Chicago River Bridges

The Chicago Department of Transportation (CDOT) is responsible for the operation of the City's bridges. CDOT reported to OIG that, on either May 28 or 29, an Office of Emergency Management & Communications (OEMC) representative contacted a member of CDOT to discuss the possibility of raising the downtown bridges over the Chicago River during the weekend. However, there was no standing plan to do so. There was no advance notice to CDOT to have necessary personnel on call for the weekend in case they were needed.

Early Saturday afternoon, after the Mayor decided to raise the bridges, a senior staff member from the Mayor's Office and the Chief of CPD's Bureau of Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations spoke with a senior member of CDOT, and instructed CDOT to begin the process of raising the bridges, on the decision of the Mayor.

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<sup>70</sup> The Mayor could not recall what type of spray was used, but according to CPD records, OC spray was used.

CDOT reported that the process of raising the bridges was challenging. Under ordinary circumstances, during the spring and fall months, CDOT raises downtown bridges on a regular schedule. In May 2020, however, the COVID-19 pandemic had led to the closure of Lake Michigan harbors and, therefore, CDOT had not been regularly raising the bridges. Usually, beginning in March and April, CDOT would have been testing each bridge to identify any mechanical problems and ensure proper functioning. Furthermore, the weeks leading up to May 30, 2020, had seen unusually heavy rainfall, resulting in the flooding of some parts of the bridges' mechanisms, affecting their operation. These conditions complicated CDOT's efforts to raise the bridges on short notice. Raising the bridges in response to an emergency situation was unusual; one senior CDOT official told OIG that this had not been done within recent memory, and certainly not since at least 2010. During protests at the 2012 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Chicago, raising bridges had been discussed and rejected as an ineffective tool for emergency crowd control.

Furthermore, CDOT needed to call in off-duty personnel and deploy them downtown, starting at Michigan Avenue and Wabash Avenue. CDOT reported that its necessary tradespeople—including electricians, ironworkers, machinists, bridge workers, and perhaps motor truck drivers—arrived on scene within two hours, despite not being on-call, needing first to pick up their equipment from CDOT's facility in Little Village, and facing transportation obstructions and safety issues from the protest and unrest occurring downtown. CDOT personnel wore City of Chicago safety vests, which raised concerns among members of CDOT's senior management that the personnel would be targeted by protestors. One CDOT vehicle was overtaken, graffitied, and had its windows broken. There was a concern that CPD's lines stopping protestors from moving onto the bridges might not hold and therefore that the safety of protestors might be at risk if the bridges were raised with people on them. When CDOT personnel attempted to raise the Wabash Avenue Bridge, there was debris jamming the center lock, which required CDOT personnel to clean out the debris manually and then hand-crank the bridge open. With the limited personnel they were able to get downtown on short notice, CDOT could only assemble two crews who could raise two bridges at a time.

Beginning at around 4:30 p.m., the Michigan Avenue Bridge was raised, followed by the Dearborn Street Bridge at 5:00 p.m.<sup>71</sup> By 5:30 p.m., all but the State Street, LaSalle Street, and Wabash Avenue bridges had been raised.<sup>72</sup> The Wabash Avenue Bridge provides the nearest point of access from the south side of the Chicago River to

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<sup>71</sup> Martha Bayne and Jason Schumer, "What Happened May 30?," South Side Weekly, accessed June 25, 2020, <https://protesttimeline.southsideweekly.com/>.

<sup>72</sup> Tyler LaRiviere (@TylerLaRiviere), "State Street and Wabash are the only bridges now not raised. #Chicago #GeorgeFloyd," Twitter posts, May 30, 2020 5:24 p.m., <https://twitter.com/TylerLaRiviere/status/1266857929724121098>.

Trump Tower, and CDOT had difficulty raising that bridge because of protesters occupying the space.<sup>73</sup> CPD formed a skirmish line of around 150 officers and horse-mounted units on the Wabash Avenue Bridge to stop the flow of protesters from reaching Trump Tower. At 4:50 p.m., a CPD supervisor working on the Wabash Avenue Bridge ordered all officers present to “form the line on the north side of the bridge,” “facing south” so that officers could push the protestors southbound on to Lower Wacker Drive. By 5:03 p.m., CPD had begun to “push” the crowd. During this push, a member of command staff in charge told their officers over the radio that they were doing a “great job” and to keep pushing the crowd “slowly” and to “take a breath.” CPD officers used their batons to push protesters off the bridge onto Lower Wacker Drive. Accounts from protesters on the bridge note that they did not hear a dispersal order before officers began to push them with batons.<sup>74</sup> In radio transmissions, CPD members question the absence of a long-range acoustic device (LRAD)—essentially a large speaker—which could have been used to broadcast such an order. Specifically, at 5:16 p.m., 13 minutes after CPD began its southward push on the Wabash Avenue Bridge, the District Commander working around Trump Tower declared over the radio that they were still waiting on the LRAD. At 5:29 p.m., the District Commander informed the radio dispatcher for the first time that they had given a dispersal order.

During the push, protesters described being beaten with officers' batons, punched, and kicked as CPD tried to clear the bridge.<sup>75</sup> Radio transmissions capture CPD members in the area of Trump Tower, including on the Wabash Avenue Bridge, repeatedly describing being targeted with thrown objects, including bottles and fireworks. Accounts from both protesters and CPD members were corroborated, at least in part, by television news footage.<sup>76</sup> At around 7:00 p.m., the Wabash Avenue Bridge was cleared and raised.<sup>77</sup>

Mayor Lightfoot, who watched the events unfold over live video feed, recalled the process of clearing the Wabash Avenue Bridge taking more than four hours, and that “in clearing it, people fought viciously against the police, hurling objects that were

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<sup>73</sup> Martha Bayne and Jason Schumer, “What Happened May 30?,” South Side Weekly, accessed June 25, 2020, <https://protesttimeline.southsideweekly.com/>.

<sup>74</sup> Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitoring Listening Sessions at 39, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2020); Bayne and Schumer, “What Happened May 30?”

<sup>75</sup> Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitoring Listening Sessions at 39, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2020); Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitor Listening Sessions at 142, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2020); Bayne and Schumer, “What Happened May 30?”

<sup>76</sup> WGN News, “Tension Escalates On Wabash Bridge Between Protesters and Chicago Police,” YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ZKP-aEuARl>.

<sup>77</sup> Bayne and Schumer, “What Happened May 30?”

clearly intended to cause harm. . . [T]hat was literally like a battlefield, watching what was transpiring, and that's not peaceful protest."

Some sources estimated that by 8:00 p.m., of the seven bridges between Franklin Street and Michigan Avenue, all except the LaSalle Street Bridge—which was left unraised and secured to allow for emergency vehicle access to downtown—were raised (see Figure 8).<sup>78</sup> On the other hand, CDOT personnel estimated that the bridges were raised by 7:00 p.m.—within three hours of CDOT's arrival. CDOT, which had a representative in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), highlighted that there was very little understanding among those in the EOC about the complexity of raising bridges.<sup>79</sup> A senior CDOT official who was in the EOC until late in the evening on May 30, reported that, while there during that time, CPD's Superintendent asked questions to try to understand what was happening with the bridges. The Superintendent asked whether there was a bridge operator in every bridge tower, and reportedly wondered whether there was not simply one person who could press a button and raise a bridge; he also inquired as to why CDOT needed tradespeople onsite.


CPD command staff members held conflicting opinions as to whether raising the bridges helped manage the situation. Many reportedly believed that it impeded CPD's movements. Others believed that raising the bridges needed to be part of a broader plan from the onset but that such a plan did not exist.

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<sup>78</sup> Martha Bayne and Jason Schumer, "What Happened May 30?," South Side Weekly, accessed June 25, 2020, <https://protesttimeline.southsideweekly.com/>. No records reviewed by OIG contained a clear, official record of the times at which each of the bridges were raised. South Side Weekly reported that the Michigan Avenue Bridge was raised at approximately 4:30 p.m., the Dearborn Street Bridge at approximately 5:00 p.m., and the Wabash Avenue Bridge at approximately 7:00 p.m. A photograph posted to social media by a photojournalist suggests that, by 5:30 p.m., all but the State Street and Wabash Avenue bridges had been raised. See <https://twitter.com/TylerLaRiviere/status/1266857929724121098?s=20>.

<sup>79</sup> OIG heard various accounts about how CPD's central command functioned during the May and June protests; at times the details in these accounts differed from each other. Generally, OIG understood that CPD's central command was housed within OEMC and functioned out of two neighboring rooms. The first was the CPD Command Post, which was responsible for coordinating department resources such as deploying tactical teams downtown. The second was the EOC, where CPD coordinated its response with other City agencies (e.g., CTA, CDOT) and state agencies (e.g., National Guard, ISP). For simplicity, this report describes the functions of both of these rooms under the EOC title.

FIGURE 8: DOWNTOWN CHICAGO RIVER BRIDGES RAISED ON SATURDAY, MAY 30



Source: OIG-generated map.

PERSPECTIVES: TRUMP TOWER AND THE WABASH AVENUE BRIDGE

<i>Interviewee</i>	<i>Interviewee Comments</i>
<i>Protester #3</i>	<p>"In the afternoon, I ended up on the Wabash Bridge. The police formed a line and had horses behind them. And they did not call to disperse at that time.</p> <p>I was between the police and some Black people that I didn't know. And the police—there was an officer pushing into my chest horizontally with a baton...and he was pushing me very, very hard. And I was afraid of stumbling. I was trying to hold my ground, but I wasn't fighting. I never raised my voice. And I was afraid that I was going to fall on the ground and get trampled because the police were advancing, but also because of how much it hurt to have the baton pushed into my ribcage and my chest. I asked him to stop and he wouldn't. He kept shoving me. So I put my hands up. I thought he would stop if I was protecting myself, but he shoved the baton into the fingers of my bone and was pushing with his body weight. And so I screamed and I said, 'Stop. Please stop.' So he gave me a look, and he jumped to a person next to me, which was a Black person and started shoving him even harder. And I said, 'Stop. Stop. Please stop.' And the police officer next to him looked at me and said, 'You want to be in it. Now you're in it.' And he grabbed me by my neck and he lifted me up, and I flew. I went airborne by my neck. He dragged me backwards so quickly that my shoe flew off and my hat flew off. He dragged me down the street through horse poop so hard that my back was scraped up and bleeding. And then two other officers jumped on me and I was screaming, 'Stop. You got me. You got me. You won.'</p> <p>They put me in zip ties. I sat on the curb of the Trump Tower for three hours. They—this is when the bridge went up. I sat on a sheriff's bus for three hours."<sup>80</sup></p>
<i>Protester #1</i>	<p>Once Protester #1 got to the Wabash Avenue Bridge, the police held the line there. Police started pushing the protesters back, but it was not clear where the protesters were supposed to go. CPD gave dispersal orders only after they had begun to push protesters back. They did not provide a reason, nor any instructions as to where the protesters could or should go. Protester #1 took the dispersal order as a violation of their constitutional rights. CPD officers were yelling "move back" and pushing protesters back with</p>

<sup>80</sup> Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitoring Listening Sessions at 39, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2020).

	<p>their batons. Protester #1 described seeing officers grab protesters by their shirts and throw them back. On one occasion, Protester #1 saw an officer stop another officer who was beating a protester with a baton. They also saw protesters covered in blood after police had struck them with batons.</p> <p>At one point, Protester #1 said that a police officer “threw” a baton at them, though they said it may have just slipped out of the officer’s hand. The protester caught the baton. Another police officer then rushed at them and was preparing to hit them, but they threw the baton back to the original officer and said, “He threw it at me!” and didn’t end up getting hit.</p> <p>The scene felt like an “us versus them” situation, with the police there to protect property rather than people. After protesters were pushed off the Wabash Avenue Bridge, they were dispersing when the police created a line at State Street and Lake Street and started pepper spraying people. Protesters were saying things like “Fuck 12,” but didn’t have any tools or weapons.<sup>81</sup> CPD members were spraying individual people with pepper spray cans.</p>
<p><i>Protester #4</i></p>	<p>“As I approached a bridge near the Trump Tower, I realized that we had been kettled. Hundreds were surrounded by police officers. This felt incredibly unsafe. Not only because the police were closing in on us, but also because there was little room for space to protect ourselves from COVID-19. At that point, many people started sitting on the bridge, unsure of where to go next.</p> <p>I noticed the officers began to ready themselves to move because they positioned their batons across their bodies and formed a stronger line. Officers began to synchron[istically] say ‘move,’ while pushing the people who were already packed like sardines on the bridge. People were screaming for them to stop, yelling that they couldn’t breathe and demanding that—to let people through.</p> <p>It felt like I was in the middle of a rugby scrum, squeezed between people and often being lifted off of the ground because the pressure of my body was so intense. I repeatedly told officers [to] stop pushing because someone behind me was having trouble breathing and was laying on the ground. I repeatedly told officers to stop pushing because they were hurting me. An officer hit my leg with a baton multiple times during an arrest of someone beside me who was dragged in, head-first, and thrown across the police</p>

<sup>81</sup> “Fuck 12” is anti-police slogan. The “12” may refer to a police radio call code. See Wikipedia, “List of Police-Related Slang Terms,” accessed November 17, 2020, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_police-related\\_slang\\_terms](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_police-related_slang_terms).

	<p>line by police officers. Because of the police pushing, I was separated from the people that I came with, the people who would keep me safe.</p> <p>On that day, police participated in reckless endangerment. They put the lives of so many people in jeopardy, while—who were protesting, practicing their First Amendment right to protest. Police presence escalated tensions and created a dangerous space for everyone near or around the protest.”<sup>82</sup></p>
<i>Commander #3</i>	<p>According to Commander #3, a crowd came across the bridge toward Trump Tower and then made its way up the stairs to the Tower. CPD did not have a lot of members stationed there and began calling for more help. Protesters began climbing on planters and throwing items at the officers. They were also surrounding squad cars and damaging them. Officers were able to push the crowd back. At that time, CPD gave dispersal orders and the peaceful protesters left; the “nonpeaceful” individuals remained. They were throwing paint cans, peanut butter jars, bottles, bricks, and other things at the officers. ISP “appeared”; Commander #3 did not know who instructed them to help but was thankful they were there.</p> <p>A CDOT member warned Commander #3 that the City was planning to raise the Wabash Avenue Bridge. No one from CPD had communicated to Commander #3 that the bridge was going to be raised. After pushing protesters south off the bridge and forming a line to keep protesters off the bridge as it was being raised, all of Commander #3’s tactical officers became separated from the Commander south of the river when the bridge went up. Those tactical officers had to form that line south of the bridge because that group of demonstrators was completely unruly.</p>
<i>CPD Director #1</i>	<p>According to CPD Director #1, events exploded in front of Trump Tower. CPD members with helmets and riot shields formed skirmish lines. On the bridge, it was an out-and-out shoving match between officers and protesters, who were determined to get to Trump Tower. Protesters began throwing things at officers. It was a battle, and officers were getting hurt. Protesters were being taken into custody. The protesters had a mob mentality, with no fear of battling the police. Protesters started throwing fireworks and other items at officers.</p>
<i>Superintendent</i>	<p>All of CPD’s resources were expended holding the line protecting Trump Tower. The Superintendent never felt like the line was secure. Protesters continued to throw rocks and bottles at CPD</p>

<sup>82</sup> Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitor Listening Sessions at 129, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2020).



	members. Despite the violence, CPD did not use OC spray or less-lethal force. The Department's goal was to push the crowd back off the Wabash Avenue Bridge, onto the street, so that they could raise the bridge. This effort took several hours, which took too much time away from addressing the looting that was occurring elsewhere in the Loop.
<i>Sergeant #2</i>	When Sergeant #2 arrived at the Wabash Avenue Bridge, they noticed that officers were all boxed in on the bridge. As protesters were throwing items at officers, including Sergeant #2, they asked a CPD command staff member on the bridge for instructions, but the command staff member ignored Sergeant #2.

c) Public Transportation: Suspension and Rerouting of Bus and Train Service

CPD first communicated with the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) on Saturday afternoon regarding the demonstrations happening downtown. As a matter of routine operational practice, CTA had already been monitoring the situation by way of live video feeds on its routes and location data from its buses. Based on field data and reports, CTA suspended bus service in the Loop when two buses had become stuck in crowds. In coordination with OEMC, CTA enlisted the help of CPD to escort buses out of the Loop. During the day, CTA vehicles were burned and stations vandalized, and CTA officials were concerned for the safety of their personnel. CTA personnel reported that in some cases, requests for rerouting required back and forth between CTA and CPD before they could be implemented. CTA personnel stated they would question CPD if requests appeared illogical or unsupported by what CTA personnel could observe with their own cameras. In this conversation, CTA personnel expressed doubts as to whether CPD command staff knew the CTA system well enough to know what service changes would achieve the desired crowd control objectives.

At 6:00 p.m., all CTA train stops into the Loop were suspended.<sup>83</sup> The decision to bypass downtown CTA stops was made by the Mayor's Office at the recommendation of CPD senior command staff. Proponents of this decision within CPD believed that peaceful protesters had left downtown by this time, and that suspending train service would stop people from coming to vandalize and loot the area. One command staff member specifically mentioned stopping people coming from the City's South Side as an objective. Protesters told OIG about the difficulty they had leaving downtown, given the raised bridges and bypassed CTA trains.<sup>84</sup>

<sup>83</sup> Martha Bayne and Jason Schumer, "What Happened May 30?," South Side Weekly, accessed June 25, 2020, <https://protesttimeline.southsideweekly.com/>.

<sup>84</sup> Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitor Listening Sessions at 185, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2020); Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitoring Listening Sessions at 57, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2020).

CTA was also involved in raising the bridges, as buses and trains needed to be rerouted.<sup>85</sup> CTA personnel were occasionally asked to do things that were not operationally feasible; for example, there was a push to get people out of downtown, but bus and train services into and out of the area had been stopped. CTA had to make the case to allow some buses to run in order to get people out of downtown.

#### d) Downtown Curfew

In an order issued jointly with the Commissioner of the Chicago Department of Public Health, Mayor Lightfoot imposed a curfew from 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., stating in the order that “[r]ecent protests have brought large numbers of people together engaging in illegal acts of violence and destruction, and further acting in violation of necessary guidelines for [COVID-19-related] social distancing.”<sup>86</sup> At a press conference, Lightfoot announced the curfew approximately 35 minutes before it was scheduled to begin, characterizing that time as “ample” notice and noting her “total disgust” for those committing crimes downtown.<sup>87</sup> The Superintendent believed that the curfew would be an effective tool to stop the looting downtown, as it could be used to provide probable cause to stop potential looters. On the radio, a few minutes after 9:00 p.m., someone announced that a curfew had been put into place at 9:00 p.m., and that arrests should be made if people did not clear the streets. However, officers who were downtown reported that they received no guidance from supervisors on how to handle the curfew, including whether arrests should be made for curfew violations. After the curfew was announced, “hundreds” of protesters sought refuge in the Chicago Freedom School (CFS)<sup>88</sup> at 719 South State Street, where they were provided shelter until they could find a way home.<sup>89</sup> CFS leaders also provided snacks,

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<sup>85</sup> Raising downtown bridges required the rerouting of buses which would otherwise travel over them. Furthermore, CTA personnel needed to be on site in order for CDOT to raise the Lake Street and Wells Street bridges, because CTA trains run over them. CTA must stop those trains and transfer power supply control to CDOT in order for CDOT to raise those bridges.

<sup>86</sup> Order of the Mayor of the City of Chicago and the Commissioner of Health of the City of Chicago, No. 2020-8—Curfew, issued and effective May 30, 2020.

<sup>87</sup> Alison Martin and Mitchell Armentrout, “Lightfoot Imposes Curfew Starting at 9 P.M. Saturday,” Chicago Sun-Times, May 30, 2020, accessed January 18, 2021, <https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/2020/5/30/21275833/lightfoot-chicago-curfew-george-floyd-protests>.

<sup>88</sup> The Chicago Freedom School is a nonprofit organization that provides trainings, workshops, and youth programs that focus on anti-oppression practices, popular education, and healing practices. CFS “takes an innovative approach to civic engagement, leadership development, and movement building. Our programs, resources and trainings invite young people and adult allies to study of the work of past movements, deepen their understanding of current social problems, build new coalitions and develop strategies for change.” “Our Approach,” Chicago Freedom School, accessed October 7, 2020, <https://chicagofreeschool.org/about-us/approach/>.

<sup>89</sup> Justine Laurence, “City Settles Chicago Freedom School Lawsuit After Group Was Cited For Offering Food To Protesters Trapped Downtown,” Block Club Chicago, July 4, 2020, accessed September 28, 2020, <https://blockclubchicago.org/2020/07/04/city-settles-chicago-freedom-school-lawsuit-after-group-was-cited-for-offering-food-to-protesters-trapped-downtown/>; María Inés Zamudio, “City Drops Cease-And-

water, and pizza to the protesters. Before 11:00 p.m., Department of Business Affairs and Consumer Protection investigators and CPD officers entered the school and issued a cease and desist order for “preparing and serving large quantities of food without the proper retail food establishment license.” According to CFS’ Wellness Director, the school was threatened with daily fines between \$500 and \$1,000. CFS subsequently filed a lawsuit against the City “seeking an injunctive relief from the cease and desist order and monetary damages” based on allegations that the regulatory action was pretextual and improper. In July 2020, CFS and the City settled the lawsuit, with the City rescinding the cease and desist order.<sup>90</sup>

The protests and unrest continued through Saturday evening and night. The Superintendent provided, at various times, permission to command staff in the field to deploy OC spray. According to General Order G03-02-05, approval of the Superintendent or his designee is required when Department members use personal OC devices against active or passive resisters who are a part of a group or crowd. Authorization from the Superintendent or his designee is also required when “special weapons that dispense the Capsaicin II powder agent<sup>91</sup> or larger volumes of chemical agents” against active and passive resisters that are part of “noncompliant groups, crowds, or an individual taking part in a group or crowd.”<sup>92</sup> CPD’s SWAT team handled all of the deployments of OC spray for crowd control during the protests. According to SWAT reports, SWAT members deployed OC spray 85 times for crowd control at a total of 19 distinct locations on May 30, 2020. Finding 2 below provides additional detail on the chain of command to authorize OC spray use for crowd control, SWAT’s role in deploying OC for crowd control during the protests, and CPD’s compliance with its OC spray policies and force reporting policies.

Around 7:00 p.m., into the early morning of Sunday, May 31, there was looting throughout the Loop and South Loop neighborhoods. CPD had a few mobile teams

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Desist Order Against Chicago Freedom School For Feeding Protesters,” WBEZ, July 3, 2020, accessed October 7, 2020, <https://www.wbez.org/stories/cease-and-desist-order-dropped-against-chicago-freedom-school/87e68cf9-94d5-44a2-81eb-23d7f0e451f3>.

<sup>90</sup> Justine Laurence, “City Settles Chicago Freedom School Lawsuit”; María Inés Zamudio, “City Drops Cease-And-Desist Order.”

<sup>91</sup> Capsaicin II, also known as PepperBall, is a specific type of OC projectile. “PepperBall,” Britannica, accessed February 4, 2021, <https://www.britannica.com/technology/PepperBall>.

<sup>92</sup> General Order G03-02-01 defines “resister” as a person who is uncooperative. Resisters are categorized as either passive or active. A passive resister is someone who fails to comply with verbal or other direction. An active resister is someone who attempts to create distance between themselves and a CPD member with the intent to avoid physical contact and/or defeat arrest. “General Order G03-02-05 Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Devices And Other Chemical Agent Use Incidents,” February 20, 2020, accessed August 14, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b9b-15f2592c-33815-f25c-5c8e6a6716bbf194.html>; “General Order G03-02-01 Force Options,” February 29, 2020, accessed October 8, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-9001-1d970b87782d543f.html>.

downtown, with one command staff member estimating that CPD had only ten cars. CPD members would respond to one looting call after another, attempting to clear impacted businesses by making dispersal calls or arrests. On the radio, officers were instructed to make arrests after a group of officers was seen not making arrests as looting was happening in front of them. Between 12:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. Sunday morning, CPD arrested 130 people in the 1<sup>st</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Districts. CPD command staff was in the area responding to looting into the early morning hours on Sunday—many reported leaving downtown between 4:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. A Commander estimated that every business north of Roosevelt Avenue was looted. According to CPD, 86 businesses in the 18<sup>th</sup> District experienced criminal damage to property, burglary, looting, and theft on May 30.

#### PERSPECTIVES: LOOTING

<i>Interviewee</i>	<i>Interviewee Comments</i>
<i>Superintendent</i>	<p>The Department approached individuals engaged in peaceful protest differently from those who participated in criminal activity. The Superintendent explained that CPD protected certain areas by creating a barrier of officers between high-value target buildings and the protesters (i.e., holding a line). However, among the large group of demonstrators, one contingent was extremely violent. CPD ran into personnel limitations because CPD could not “give up the line” at Trump Tower and did not have enough members to scramble throughout downtown to prevent smaller groups of people from looting. The Superintendent described CPD’s approach to controlling the looting as a game of “leapfrog” or “whack-a-mole,” with officers deployed to areas impacted by looting and moving as needed. From CPD’s EOC, they could see everything happening live. At first, the looting was spontaneous, but as the night continued, the looters became more organized. CPD ultimately approved the use of large-capacity OC spray on looters who had become violent.</p>
<i>CPD Director #1</i>	<p>According to Director #1, after clashes at Trump Tower, CPD transitioned away entirely from responding to demonstrations and turned its attention to looting. CPD was eight to ten hours into responding to demonstrations when the looting started. Director #1 described the situation as horrendous and referred to it as a sad day. The Director remembers hearing the first call: “They’ve broken into Macy’s. They’re in Macy’s.” At first, CPD attempted to form a perimeter around areas being looted, but looting spread all over downtown. Director #1 added that CPD was chasing looters from one store to another. CPD would try to secure one location while looting began at another location. The looters were Chicagoans who were attempting to take advantage of an opportunity.</p>

<i>Sergeant #1</i>	Sergeant #1 reported arresting three people exiting a store after looting it. They waited 30 minutes for a transport. The transport driver handed Sergeant #1 a mass arrest card and told them to either charge the three people with looting or a curfew violation. Sergeant #1 does not know where the arrestees were taken or what came of their arrests. The process took so long that the officers under Sergeant #1's supervision stopped making arrests that night.
<i>Protester #5</i>	At 7:30 p.m. near Wabash Avenue and Adams Street, Protester #5 reported seeing three men place large garbage dumpsters, which were on fire, in the street to create a roadblock. Protester #5 did not believe that the three men were from Chicago and felt like there was something off about them. Protester #5 avoided the situation by moving to State Street, where they saw a group of looters who were mostly kids. CPD's response was a "clear routine": the kids would break into a business, CPD would watch and let them break in, and then attempt to catch them as they were leaving. CPD would attempt to effect arrests and beat the kids up. Protester #5 watched this go on for around three hours. Protester #5 saw a looter, who looked to be about 13 years old, being arrested and saw the arresting officer rubbing the kid's face on glass that was on the sidewalk. Officers used their fists and batons to beat on people, including one instance where the protester saw four officers on one kid, beating the kid bloody. Protester #5 was confused as to why CPD was letting kids break into stores and then only attempting to arrest one kid. Protester #5 had never seen humans acting so violently against each other and was struck by seeing CPD officers take out their anger on kids; Protester #5 said, "I will never forget that, between the explosions, the blood, the glass."

BWC footage from May 30 captures a wide range of interactions between CPD members and members of the public. Among those interactions is an instance in which a male arrestee within a transport wagon asks a CPD transport officer for their seizure medicine; no response to that request from any CPD member is captured in the footage. When the transport wagon arrives at the CPD detention facility, the transport officers exit the wagon, leaving the arrestees in the back. After one of the arrestees begins banging on the wagon from within, a transport officer opens the back door to find a female arrestee lying face-down on the floor. The CPD member comments, "chick's having a seizure, I guess" and further notes that she appears to be breathing and that there is nothing to be done. The member then closes the door of the transport vehicle with the occupants still inside, without rendering aid. Comments from CPD members captured on other pieces of BWC footage include an officer telling an apparently passive arrestee, "I will tase you if you move, do you hear me?" and an officer calling an arrestee a "little bitch" after the arrestee complained about being in pain. A CPD member is also captured recounting to fellow officers how the member made an arrestee cry by telling the arrestee that they would be raped in

jail given their thin physical stature. In the same video, after a radio call related to a car pursuit, an officer can be heard telling other officers that CPD should just shoot the tires out and shoot the occupants of the vehicle in the head.

#### FIGURE 9: AN ARRESTEE EXPERIENCES A SEIZURE IN THE BACK OF A CPD TRANSPORT WAGON



Source: CPD body-worn camera footage.

#### e) Chain of Command on May 30

During Saturday's protest, CPD's operational chain of command was unclear. CPD practice, in preparation for a large protest, had been for the Special Events Unit to create a memo known as the incident action plan, which lists the Incident Commander for an event as well as which units are required to deploy.<sup>93</sup> The Incident Commander directs Department operations including the use of resources, development of strategies, and incident operations.<sup>94</sup> For the protest on May 30, 2020,

<sup>93</sup> The Special Events Unit "is responsible for planning police coverage at public events and maintaining liaison with other municipal departments as well as federal and state law enforcement agencies." G01-02-02, "Organization and Functions of the Office of the First Deputy Superintendent," May 10, 2018, accessed January 18, 2021, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-1291da66-88512-91e5-fcc6be8617d83e35.html#:~:text=The%20Special%20Events%20Unit%20is,and%20state%20law%20enforcement%20agencies>.

<sup>94</sup> While this definition of "Incident Commander" comes from a Department notice issued November 2, 2020, the defined responsibilities of an Incident Commander were similar to the events covered in this report, as described to OIG in interviews. D20-08, "Department Notice: Reporting The Response To

CPD members—both officers and front-line supervisors alike—either did not know who the Incident Commander was or identified several different individuals as the Incident Commander, ranging from the Superintendent to the Commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> District. The incident action plan distributed by the First Deputy Superintendent on May 29, 2020, named a particular Deputy Chief as the Incident Commander for the protest. However, this was not widely understood by deployed CPD members.

The incident action plan did not outline or communicate specific expectations for different CPD units, nor was there any other formal, written plan in place to do so. According to a Deputy Chief, such detailed plans are not typically documented. Strategic considerations and direct orders are provided verbally the day before the start of a protest. Two senior CPD members highlighted the Department's "experience" in handling large protests, explaining that this experience allows the Department to respond to protests without formalizing a plan. Still other CPD members, including those with some experience with large crowd events, believed that protests are dynamic and therefore impossible to plan ahead. One member of CPD's command staff offered, apparently by way of explanation, that there was no way for CPD to have predicted the unrest and looting that occurred Saturday.

The lack of planning, in the assessment of many command staff, supervisory, and rank-and-file officers, affected CPD's response on May 30. One District Commander—who pointedly highlighted and critiqued CPD's lack of planning and its impact—noted that there was insufficient supervision of officers that day. Generally, officers who spoke with OIG agreed that there seemed to be no organized plan driving CPD's response to the protests. In the midst of confusion, radio chatter reviewed by OIG captured unidentified personnel expressing frustration and anger at the command staff and at the Mayor. Throughout Saturday, OIG heard consistent interruptions from unofficial radio transmissions which disrupted CPD's communications. Comments discernable on the radio include the following: "Fuck these bosses. Take care of yourselves. Let 'em burn it down"; "Where's the contract? Stay off of here with the bullshit"; and "Stand the fuck down and go home tonight." It is important to note, however, that CPD members of various ranks also reported that CPD's radio channels were intercepted by non-CPD members during the protests. It is therefore not possible to identify this radio chatter as originating solely from CPD personnel. That said, the sentiments and commentary heard in the recordings of the radio chatter were consistent with the sentiments of officers and front-line supervisors who spoke to OIG.

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Crowds, Protests, And Civil Disturbances," November 2, 2020, accessed November 3, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b9d-1758a052-2d317-58a0-53d7992e15113270.pdf?hl=true>.

The specific identity of the Incident Commander aside, OIG heard repeatedly from officers about the lack of leadership they observed during the protests. One officer told OIG that most “white shirts” (supervisors) were unwilling to take charge, leaving veteran “blue shirts” (police officers) to self-direct. A Sergeant who was downtown on May 30 recalled not knowing who was in charge and getting no direction or leadership at all from CPD command staff.

During the course of the day, as the protest and unrest grew, CPD began to convert the Summer Operations Center at OEMC—used to monitor and respond to summer violence—into an EOC. The EOC was used to manage both CPD and non-CPD resources in response to the protest and unrest. The EOC housed representatives from the Mayor’s Office, ISP, Illinois National Guard, CPD’s SWAT team and Intelligence Section, and the City’s Department of Streets and Sanitation (DSS), among others. The EOC also had access to Police Observation Device cameras, allowing CPD personnel and others present to monitor activity in real time. According to Mayor’s Office staff, decision-making around non-CPD resources—including raising bridges, bypassing the CTA, and calling in the National Guard—was done in a collaborative manner with the Mayor’s Office, CPD, and other relevant agencies at the EOC. According to Mayor Lightfoot, who was at the EOC, several decision points were brought to her directly, including raising the bridges, enacting the curfew, and calling in the National Guard.

In the EOC, CPD coordinated its own resources downtown. However, many command staff members mentioned that resources were not being coordinated sufficiently or effectively. One Commander reported that CPD had resources downtown, but no one was coordinating their deployment. On Saturday, the EOC did not have an effective system to track where officers were being deployed. Furthermore, many resources were distributed, including mass arrest kits and riot shields, without communication or coordination with the EOC.<sup>95</sup>

Many CPD members from across the city self-deployed or were sent downtown as the protests became contentious; they arrived, however, without specific assignments or clear direction from an Incident Commander or the EOC. For example, one District Commander was instructed to deploy to Michigan Avenue by their Deputy Chief, however, when they arrived, no one was there to provide instruction. Therefore, on the Commander’s own initiative and without coordinating with others, the Commander took charge of their tactical teams who were at the scene. At least one of the Deputy Chiefs with whom OIG spoke had self-deployed without announcing their presence downtown to the EOC. To those in the field, it was unclear who was in charge, what resources were available downtown, and how those resources were being used. CPD

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<sup>95</sup> Mass arrest kits contain: one-time use handcuffs called “flex cuffs,” the Mass Arrest Card on which to document an arrest, and black markers to write information on an arrestee’s arm, if necessary.



members described their strategy as “whack-a-mole,” running from one situation to another, lacking coordination and communication. In interviews with OIG, CPD members from all ranks assessed the Department’s command staff and supervisors as lacking skills and expertise in crowd control. Various members of CPD’s command staff stated that, since the NATO Summit in 2012, training for crowd control has been insufficient. A Deputy Chief described Captains, Commanders, and officers who did not know different crowd control techniques because they lacked the training. The Deputy Chief added that the Department is young and estimated that only half were on the force during the NATO Summit. Reportedly, for some, it was the worst day they had experienced during their time with the Department. Command staff also described Saturday, May 30, as a loss for the Department. One command staff member said of Saturday’s events, “this can never happen again.” Later in the morning of Sunday, May 31, CPD announced that 240 people had been arrested. CPD also documented that many CPD vehicles were damaged including some which were burned or flipped over.<sup>96</sup> CPD documentation indicates that 101 officers were injured on May 30, 2020.

Early the next morning, the Mayor emailed senior leadership at OEMC to ask that footage from City cameras across a wide swath of downtown be preserved from much of the day on Saturday and through the night. She wrote, “I know that is a huge volume, but we need to make sure that if there are any accusations of misconduct by CPD, we have the video to disprove it, and also if we need evidence for any of the arrests made or TBD, we have the video support.”<sup>97</sup>

Later in the morning, a senior member of CPD’s command staff who was a long-time Department veteran wrote to a colleague, “It was so bad yesterday. I’ve never see[n a]nything like it.”

#### 4. Sunday, May 31, 2020

In the early morning hours of May 31, 2020, a senior CPD official circulated a “perimeter plan” by email to senior CPD command staff and high-ranking staffers in the Mayor’s Office. Pursuant to that plan, with its goal to “set up an outer perimeter footprint around the Central Business District,” CPD would “utilize city heavy equipment including salt trucks, water trucks, or garbage trucks to block ALL traffic into the central business district.” The plan also notes, “[w]e also want to choke and reroute all the traffic on the expressways. State Police was not available when we came up with this and are not yet aware of this plan.” (Emphasis in original.) The

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<sup>96</sup> Between May 29 and June 2, 2020, CPD records indicated that 17 vehicles were totaled with an additional 11 vehicles destroyed by fire.

<sup>97</sup> The Mayor reported in an interview that, while she did not recall sending this email specifically, she did recall seeing reports of violence by CPD members on social media, and given her impression that “the police were really under siege,” she wanted to ensure that any available video evidence was preserved.

plan was met with some confusion; one Deputy Chief responded asking, "What is the plan/messaging for access to the area? Utilities, residents, hospital staff, expecting mothers trying to get to [Northwestern Memorial Hospital] etc? Who can come in and what is being told for vehicle entry & exit points? Where will CPD resources come from to control those gates for vehicular access? Assuming we are only concerned with vehicles for this plan correct?" Further, when one recipient of the email forwarded it to an ISP member, they responded, adding other ISP officials to the email chain, "I have several concerns with this plan... also I talked to (2) CPD senior Command last night after [the email was sent] and they never mentioned this plan to me." A senior ISP official then wrote to the CPD official who originally sent the plan, "We've been available all night, all morning and are still available now. There have been multiple comms at multiple levels between CPD and ISP during that time. No mention of this plan. We'll figure it out though."

Later that morning, during a press conference, Mayor Lightfoot publicly announced that downtown access would be restricted to those who lived or worked in the area, and that public transit would be suspended in and out of the Loop. The Mayor also announced an indefinite extension of the 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. curfew.<sup>98</sup> On their social media pages, ISP also announced the closure of various expressway ramps near downtown.<sup>99</sup>

The EOC, established on Saturday, continued to be used on Sunday. It continued operating 24 hours a day and was used to make decisions on all large resource movements. CPD moved personnel with experience from the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago to the EOC to help organize the Department's response. One of the members with NATO Summit experience immediately encountered the absence of any plan in place for Sunday. These experienced members attempted to track Department assets, procure supplies, and create mobilization plans. Prior to Sunday, for example, Department members were deploying downtown without any mechanisms in place for tracking who was deployed, where, and for how long.

The May 31 incident action plan focused on staffing a planned protest at Federal Plaza. The plan did not include any planning for any other events.<sup>100</sup> To maximize the

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<sup>98</sup> Mayor Lori Lightfoot, "Mayor Lightfoot Gives Impassioned Response to Protests, Looting, Vandalism, In Chicago," NBC Chicago, May 31, 2020, accessed January 20, 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8VfOJF36FsQ>.

<sup>99</sup> Illinois State Police (@ILStatePolice), "The following ramp closures are in effect until further notice: I290 E/B to Congress I-94 N/B ramp to Congress I-90 N/B ramp to Ohio I-90 S/B to Ohio #ILTraffic," Twitter, May 31, 2020, <https://twitter.com/ILStatePolice/status/1267114604238376960>.

<sup>100</sup> A CPIC report updated on May 31 at 9:00 a.m. identified three separate protests planned for the day: two at Federal Plaza (scheduled to begin at 1:00 p.m. and at 2:00 p.m., respectively), and one at Daley Plaza four blocks north (scheduled to begin at 10:00 a.m.). CPIC identified the event at Daley Plaza to be a "protest against mass evictions," while the two at Federal Plaza were identified with "Black Lives Matter"

number of officers available to deploy in response to unrest and looting, in an incident action plan, CPD canceled RDO for all officers and implemented 12 hour watches,<sup>101</sup> but clear direction for how to deploy the extra manpower did not filter down to officers on the street until late morning at the earliest. On the morning of Sunday, May 31, at 8:25 a.m., a member of the Special Events Unit wrote in an email to the First Deputy Superintendent requesting clarification on “how you want to proceed with the extra manpower... we [Special Events, the unit responsible for writing the incident action plan] did not receive anything from patrol about this. We need to know if there needs to be a separate IAP [incident action plan] for this or just add this info to the current memo. Please advise.” The First Deputy responded at 8:42 a.m. that “we will work out all the details” on a call to be held at 10:00 a.m.

On Sunday morning, CPD began to stage its citywide mobilization efforts from Guaranteed Rate Field (hereinafter “mobilization center”).<sup>102</sup> Each day, third watch officers were required to deploy from the mobilization center, regardless of whether they were scheduled to work or had their RDO canceled. First and second watch officers who had their RDOs canceled were also required to deploy from the mobilization center, rather than from their home districts, whereas officers scheduled to work first and second watch remained in their assigned districts. Officers assigned to the mobilization center were expected to report there directly at their scheduled start time instead of to their assigned districts. According to one command staff member, officers from some districts—including downtown and “Tier 1” districts—were excluded from deploying to the mobilization center; officers from those districts stayed in their regular assignments.<sup>103</sup> Another command staff member identified an additional set of districts from which district personnel should not have been drawn for emergency mobilization deployment elsewhere, but at least three of those districts did deploy officers to the mobilization center. The incident action plan for May 31 does not indicate any district exclusions.

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and “Chicago Solidarity with George Floyd and Breonna Taylor.” In the early afternoon, the First Deputy Superintendent sent a message to a command staff member with authority over CPIC, writing, “I don’t want any cryptic messages today...If we know the cause [of a protest], share it. There is a big difference between the cause being forced evictions, and George Floyd.”

<sup>101</sup> CPD officers are typically assigned to work one of three 8-hour watches: first watch from 12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.; second watch from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.; or third watch 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. During this period, CPD’s first watch officers were scheduled from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; second watch officers from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.; and third watch officers (regularly scheduled and those with RDO canceled) from 3:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. Officers from the first watch who had their RDO canceled were scheduled from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m., while second watch officers who had their RDO canceled were scheduled from 11:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m.

<sup>102</sup> According to CPD documents, use of the mobilization center continued through, at least, mid-June.

<sup>103</sup> “Tier 1” districts are identified by CPD as having the highest levels of violent crime. CPD defines six districts as Tier 1: Gresham (006), Englewood (007), Deering (009), Ogden (010), Harrison (011), and Austin (015).

Officers positioned at the mobilization center would be deployed to areas throughout the city as needed. For example, a District Commander could request extra officers if activity overwhelmed available resources. At the mobilization center, platoons of officers were organized for deployment throughout the city. Command staff members charged with leading the deployment effort from the mobilization center had no roster of who was there, which presented logistical and operational issues as various officers deployed to the mobilization center each day. According to these command staff members, they instructed members to organize themselves into platoons in accordance with their normal command structure; however, this did not always occur (e.g., Lieutenants were not necessarily supervising their own district's officers). A typical platoon of officers was made up of one Lieutenant, four to five Sergeants, and 40 to 50 officers.

#### PERSPECTIVES: MOBILIZATION CENTER

<i>Interviewee</i>	<i>Interviewee Comments</i>
<i>Deputy Chief #1</i>	Sunday's biggest complication was not knowing who was coming to the mobilization center. There was no roster provided to leadership, nor an estimate of the number of officers to be deployed there.
<i>Deputy Chief #2</i>	On Sunday, Deputy Chief #2 arrived at the mobilization center without definitive orders; the command structure above them was "sketchy." There was confusion about who was sending officers to the mobilization center, to which locations officers would be sent, and when. Once officers arrived at the mobilization center, there was also confusion about how platoons would be organized. Command staff at the mobilization center would simply get a call requesting officers and would deploy platoons wherever they were requested. There were some benefits to using Guaranteed Rate Field as the site for the mobilization center; there was plenty of space and the Department was able to distribute food and water.
<i>Lieutenant #1</i>	Organizing a platoon at the mobilization center was like "The Dating Game." Lieutenant #1 was told to find Sergeants and officers in the Guaranteed Rate Field parking lot to form a platoon. Lieutenant #1 would randomly approach Sergeants and officers to inquire if they were in a platoon; if not, Lieutenant #1 would take them under their command. Command staff distributed only one radio for every two officers, or sometimes one radio for every four officers. Because everyone was coming directly from their homes rather than from or through their districts, and was therefore unable to collect equipment at their stations, no one deployed from the mobilization center was wearing a body worn camera. Lieutenant #1 put together a platoon which then boarded a CTA bus and was told where it was going. The platoon members were

	given no direction about what they were to do when they got there, besides that they had to check in with the District Commander. When the platoon arrived at its assigned location, however, it was unable to locate the Commander.
<i>Police Officer #4</i>	Officer #4 was told to be at the mobilization center at 6:00 a.m. on Monday. From there, they were deployed to the Gold Coast neighborhood, where they sat "doing nothing." Officer #4 was bothered by the fact that their assigned district was being looted at that time, but they were unable to help their "brothers and sisters" in the district. Additionally, Officer #4 did not have access to a bathroom during their shift.
<i>Police Officer #1</i>	Officer #1, assigned to the first watch, worked their normal shift in their assigned district on Saturday night, and finished at about 10:00 a.m. on Sunday morning. Officer #1 was then told to report to the mobilization center at noon that same day to start their next shift, two hours after having finished their last. The mobilization center was a "clusterfuck." Officer #1 was told to find officers from their district in the Guaranteed Rate Field parking lot and wait to be deployed. Eventually, Officer #1 was able to contact their Lieutenant and find other officers from their district. They sat together, under a lamppost in the parking lot, waiting to be deployed until 9:00 p.m., when they were taken by a CTA bus to an area outside of their assigned district.

Because a number of CPD vehicles had been damaged or destroyed the day before, CPD attempted to rent 150 vans for officer transport on Sunday. The rental company did not have 150 vans in the area available, so CPD personnel travelled around the state to pick up vans from approximately a dozen locations and drive them back to Chicago. Over the next two days, CPD rented 133 vans, deploying them throughout the City.<sup>104</sup> Various CPD units received vans, with three vans sent to most districts and five vans sent to most Areas. CPD also continued to use CTA buses to transport platoons of officers from the mobilization center to areas of the city where they were needed.

The Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA)—a state agency responsible for preparing Illinois for disasters, hazards, and acts of terrorism—reported to OIG that it contacted OEMC leadership in the days leading up to May 30, 2020, to inquire whether the City was going to need state resources (e.g., the National Guard or ISP). IEMA is, by its enabling ordinance, "responsible for coordination of the overall emergency management program of the State and with private organizations, political subdivisions [of the State], and the federal government."<sup>105</sup>

<sup>104</sup> Between June 1, and July 10, 2020, the Department rented 140 passenger vans (seating 12 to 15 people) at a total cost of \$286,124.

<sup>105</sup> 20 ILCS 3305/4, sec. 4. <https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=368&ChapterID=5>

According to Mayor Lightfoot, the Mayor made the decision to call the Governor late Saturday night to request the National Guard, after the Superintendent communicated the need for more resources to respond to the violence the Department was seeing. The Mayor has pointedly disputed any suggestion that the State reached out to the City to offer assistance prior to the Mayor's calling the Governor to request it. The Governor approved the Mayor's request and deployed the National Guard. A mix of National Guard troops and military police arrived at CPD's mobilization center on Sunday afternoon, while some National Guard representatives reported to the EOC.<sup>106</sup> The National Guard initially deployed 375 military police officers; late Sunday, the City requested an additional 250 troops. CPD deliberated with the National Guard about the risks and benefits of deployment options. A senior State official stated in an interview with OIG that the State sought to deploy the National Guard military police first, because these officers have the most training in law enforcement in a civilian setting. The City did not request the use of the National Guard to patrol neighborhoods on Sunday, because the Mayor's Office did not want the National Guard exercising police powers. CPD's command staff was also concerned about having a militarized appearance in the neighborhoods. Instead, having the National Guard control access to downtown freed up CPD officers for deployment to the neighborhoods. At CPD's request, ISP accompanied the National Guard to steward them, because CPD did not have the resources to do so. ISP was responsible for making arrests arising out of National Guard contacts.

On Sunday, there were various peaceful protests around the city including at Daley Plaza, Public Safety Headquarters at 35<sup>th</sup> Street and Michigan Avenue, and across the South Side.<sup>107</sup> At around 5:00 p.m., CPIC sent notice to CPD command staff of a group of 700 people marching towards the 1<sup>st</sup> District. Later, that same group, now with 300 people, gathered near CPD Headquarters. CPIC's notification described this group as "peaceful." Later that night, around 8:00 p.m., 200 people gathered downtown and marched north across the LaSalle Street Bridge, while a different group of hundreds of people marched toward Mayor Lightfoot's home in the 14<sup>th</sup> District.

CPD reported that it focused a significant portion of its Sunday response on looting throughout the city, which various districts began to experience in their business corridors between 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. The Superintendent reported that CPD had received no intelligence to suggest that looting would spread throughout the

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<sup>106</sup> "LIVE UPDATES: Another Day Of Unrest, Protests In Chicago," CBS, May 31, 2020, accessed September 10, 2020, <https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2020/05/31/live-updates-national-guard-called-into-chicago-as-unrest-persists/>.

<sup>107</sup> Jonathon Berlin and Kori Rumore, "How The Weekend Unfolded: Timeline Of Chicago Protests, Looting and Unrest," Chicago Tribune, June 1, 2020, accessed September 9, 2020, <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-viz-george-floyd-protest-chicago-timeline-20200531-lfk7p6ejbennfezhxk2u5kkmm-story.html>.

neighborhoods, and suggested that there were no events in other cities which might have foretold this. The Department did not have plans in place to respond to the looting. District command staff described their districts as being in “complete chaos.” One Commander stated that conditions in their district on Sunday were worse than those downtown on Saturday. In some districts, in addition to looting, there were also concerns of violence due to the chaos. In the 10<sup>th</sup> District, gang conflicts led to shootings between gangs and shots fired at CPD officers. According to CPD records, 92 officers were injured on Sunday. Several District Commanders reported that there was little they could do to stop the looting because they were outnumbered. One District Commander estimated that they had 50 officers for around 300 to 500 looters, but they still attempted to make arrests. This Commander recounted seeing a group of people using moving trucks to loot business after business. Another District Commander believed that it was counter-productive to make arrests, given that there were so few officers deployed in their district, and processing arrests would take officers off the street. A command staff member explained that officers would chase a looter to make an arrest while another 30 to 40 individuals kept looting. The looting continued into Monday morning.<sup>108</sup>

#### PERSPECTIVES: LOOTING IN CHICAGO NEIGHBORHOODS

<i>Interviewee</i>	<i>Interviewee Comments</i>
<i>CPD Director #1</i>	Director #1 woke to a panicked call from a City Council member informing them that a Walmart was being looted. Director #1 coordinated with the District Commander to deploy officers and close off the street where the Walmart—an anchor for development in the area—was located. There were not enough available officers to go into the business and safely control the looters. Officers acted responsibly. If an officer had used deadly force in an effort to protect a store, the Department would have lost the City. A neighborhood business lost \$15 million worth of inventory during the looting. It became clear that a mob mentality had taken over. After two looters were arrested, they cried and stated that they did it because everybody was doing it.
<i>Commander #4</i>	Commander #4's district was hit very badly by looters starting around 11:00 a.m. When Commander #4 arrived with officers to the scene of the looting, there was little to

<sup>108</sup> Jonathon Berlin and Kori Rumore, “How The Weekend Unfolded: Timeline Of Chicago Protests, Looting and Unrest,” Chicago Tribune, June 1, 2020, accessed September 9, 2020, <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-viz-george-floyd-protest-chicago-timeline-20200531-lfk7p6ejbennfezhxk2u5kkmm-story.html>.

	<p>do given the amount of chaos. Cars were being stolen from the dealerships in the vicinity. In the midst of the looting, people were throwing items at officers. There was also a shooting that resulted in one homicide and four people being injured. Commander #4 requested additional officers from the mobilization center because the need was so great. Two hours later, additional officers arrived, including some third watch officers from Commander #4's very own district, who had been deployed to the mobilization center per CPD's mobilization strategy. Commander #4 believed that the mobilization center did not work. At a minimum, each area should have had their own mobilization center. If the district's third watch had been allowed to stay, looting could have been stopped. Commander #4 believed that officers from other districts, deployed from the mobilization center, did not know the district and had no stake in it.</p>
<p><i>Lieutenant #1</i></p>	<p>After receiving no instructions from superiors, the officers under Lieutenant #1's command had to make real-time decisions about what businesses to protect from looting. Officers were left to stand like "scarecrows" in front of businesses. Sometimes the officers needed to let people loot a store to occupy them and draw their focus away from the police. For the first time in their career, Lieutenant #1 was scared of being unable to protect the officers under their command. When the District Commander appeared at the location where Lieutenant #1's platoon had been deployed, they asked for direction, and were told by the Commander to just "get through it."</p>
<p><i>Protester #7</i></p>	<p>"On May 31 in Hyde Park, a mob of police officers in riot gear did what they do best—defend private property—[a] storefront. Despite multiple attempts to speak with multiple officers (1) to understand their reasoning for surrounding that particular storefront and (2) to learn the identity of the White man in full military gear behind them (complete with a very large gun strapped across his torso, a bullet-proof vest, multiple grenades, a number of handguns on leg and hip holsters, and no patch or insignia to identify himself or his organization), not a single one looked me in the eye or even acknowledged my existence. At one point, after about an hour of being ignored by the officers in front of me, chanting, and singing with the other protesters, someone threw an empty plastic bottle from the back of the crowd. After the empty plastic bottle hit the pavement and bounced</p>



	away, harming no one, the officer directly in front of me looked me in the eyes for the first and only time, and said something along the lines of "You do shit like that and think you deserve our respect?", shaking his head back and forth." <sup>109</sup>
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Many District Commanders requested additional officers from the mobilization center at Guaranteed Rate Field to assist within their districts. Some complained that it took too long for those platoons of officers to arrive. When the platoons arrived in the districts, the District Commander would assign them to various locations; however, some platoons would arrive without notice to the District Commander. This resulted in officers sitting in districts without knowing what to do. Platoons were transported to districts on CTA buses, which meant that, once they were dropped off, their mobility was limited to where they could travel on foot. The lack of radios further limited their mobility. Commanders had to keep platoons together because breaking them up would create communications problems and pose risks to officer safety. Officers in platoons were frequently from multiple districts, and district Commanders were not always sure who exactly those officers were. Some command staff members questioned why they could not keep their own third watch and canceled RDO officers; they sent those to the mobilization center, only to end up requesting additional officers from the mobilization center on the same day. Officers in platoons also required special attention as they were unfamiliar with the districts into which they were deployed. This created operational and safety issues.

PERSPECTIVES: CPD'S RESPONSE DOWNTOWN V. IN NEIGHBORHOODS

<i>Interviewee</i>	<i>Interviewee Comments</i>
<i>Chief #2</i>	Chief #2 reported that, on Sunday, looting spread into the neighborhoods, but there was still a contingent of officers deployed downtown. The looting was done systematically—the looters used the peaceful protesters as a decoy. The Department was not sure whether conditions downtown would be as bad on Sunday as they had been on Saturday, but it turned out that Sunday was not as bad as Saturday. The Department was sensitive to the criticism that the City left the neighborhoods to fend for themselves. This was a false media narrative. The vast majority of resources were in the neighborhoods. Those looting in the neighborhoods were opportunists taking advantage of the situation. The downtown looting was more strategic than what happened in the neighborhoods. However, no matter how many officers were

<sup>109</sup> Written Comments On The Response Of The City Of Chicago To The Protests Since The Death Of George Floyd at 11, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2020).

	<p>deployed, CPD would have had a difficult time effectively managing the weekend's events.</p>
<p><i>Chief #1</i></p>	<p>CPD's initial response was focused on downtown because that is where the protesting and unrest started. Seventy to 75% of the City's revenue comes from downtown, and CPD therefore needed to protect downtown. Chief #1 added that this was not to minimize the importance of the neighborhoods. Once CPD had "occup[ied]" downtown, people saw it as an opportunity to quickly spread into the neighborhoods. CPD was a "half step" slow to react and did not have enough manpower to cover all of the impacted neighborhoods.</p>
<p><i>Protester #8</i></p>	<p>"In my experience, I have been to protests Downtown and in different neighborhoods and the leaders of the protests have the same demands and act the same way. We (protesters) say the same chants, dress the same, and overall act the same way we do at every other protest. However, I have started to see a trend. When we protest in our own neighborhoods the police do not interact with us. They do not touch us, talk to us, or otherwise threaten us in any way. But every single protest I have been to Downtown has had the opposite response. When we are Downtown the police will agitate us, forcefully remove us, pepper spray, and beat us to make sure we leave downtown immediately. When we are Downtown the police will block streets off in order to curb our march and stand, unprovoked, with their riot gear. They will often wear riot gear downtown and not in the neighborhoods. This is because they know when the aggression will occur as they are the ones instigating it. Again, in my experience, I have seen the police escalate situations by threatening us, waving batons, and taking our belongings (such as bikes)."<sup>110</sup></p>

Early the next morning, the Mayor sent an email to senior leadership at CPD and OEMC, asking for statistics on how many calls for service had been received on Sunday, how many calls were for looting, where the calls for service originated, and information on how many CPD members were assigned to various districts. She wrote, "we need to be able to demonstrate that in fact police were assigned to the south and west sides because the narratives that we saved the downtown and let black neighborhoods burn persists. Of course, totally untrue, but it persists."<sup>111</sup>

<sup>110</sup> Written Comments on The Response Of The City Of Chicago To The Protests Since The Death Of George Floyd at 27, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2020).

<sup>111</sup> A senior aide from the Mayor's Office emailed early Monday morning to say that they were "pushing" DSS to be done "cleaning up" downtown by noon, and "[w]e will then be working to push crews into neighborhoods for clean up. We will work with [DSS Ward Superintendents] and CPD to determine where we should focus. DSS will be working 12 hour shifts for the rest of the week."

## 5. The Week of June 1 Through June 7, 2020

On Monday June 1, 2020, Governor JB Pritzker made a “Gubernatorial Disaster Proclamation,” designating nine counties in Illinois as disaster areas, including Cook County, in which the City of Chicago is located. The proclamation was made due to the protests and unrest that began on May 30. The proclamation suspended impediments to the procurement of resources needed to respond to the disaster and directed state agencies, such as IEMA and ISP, to transfer personnel and functions to facilitating emergency response.<sup>112</sup>

From Monday, June 1, through the remainder of that week, protesting continued around the city.<sup>113</sup> Like the May 31 incident action plan, the First Deputy Superintendent distributed an incident action plan focused on staffing a protest at Federal Plaza only, despite citywide protests and unrest on May 31.<sup>114</sup> CPD described most protests during the week to be peaceful. On June 1, there were several protests throughout the city including several at police district stations, the Mayor’s home, and downtown.<sup>115</sup> For example, protests at the 1<sup>st</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Districts’ police stations demanded the release of people arrested in Chicago during the previous days. On June 2, a group of 3,500 to 4,000 protesters marched near Wrigley Field. Some police districts continued to experience looting and unrest on June 1, but this subsided as the week progressed.<sup>116</sup>

In the early morning of June 1, video footage from Congressman Bobby Rush’s campaign office showed many officers and supervisors lounging and eating. According to the Congressman, this occurred while businesses nearby were being looted. In response, Mayor Lightfoot promised that the incident would be investigated, and the involved officers would be held accountable.<sup>117</sup> Multiple officers expressed frustration to OIG over the Mayor’s comments. OIG was told by another officer that the officers in that video had been assigned to that area, were protecting

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<sup>112</sup> State of Illinois Executive Department, “Gubernatorial Disaster Proclamation,” June 1, 2020, <https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/gov/Documents/DisasterProc-6-1-2020.pdf>.

<sup>113</sup> Jonathon Berlin and Kori Rumore, “How The Weekend Unfolded: Timeline Of Chicago Protests, Looting and Unrest,” Chicago Tribune, June 1, 2020, accessed September 9, 2020, <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-viz-george-floyd-protest-chicago-timeline-20200531-lfk7p6ejbennfezhxk2u5kkmm-story.html>.

<sup>114</sup> This incident action plan excluded some districts from deploying their third watch officers from the mobilization center, including the 1<sup>st</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup>, 9<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup>, and 15<sup>th</sup> Districts.

<sup>115</sup> Jonathon Berlin and Kori Rumore, “How The Weekend Unfolded.”

<sup>116</sup> “LIVE UPDATES: Another Day Of Unrest, Protests In Chicago,” CBS, May 31, 2020, accessed September 10, 2020, <https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2020/05/31/live-updates-national-guard-called-into-chicago-as-unrest-persists/>.

<sup>117</sup> “Rep. Rush Says Officers Caught On Cam “Lounging” in Campaign Office Amid Looting,” June 11, 2020, accessed January 20, 2021, <https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/rep-rush-says-officers-caught-on-cam-lounging-in-his-campaign-office-making-popcorn-amid-looting/2288379/>.

it, and had been encouraged to get rest when possible—yet they were publicly humiliated by the Mayor. On January 14, 2021, Fraternal Order of Police President John Catanzara stated publicly that 17 officers had been suspended as a result of the incident, with their suspensions ranging from one to 20 days.<sup>118</sup>

On June 1, a social media post circulated among CPD and City Hall leadership which announced a plan to “burn the northside to ashes” on that day. The Mayor forwarded the post to the Superintendent, noted that the child of a City Council member had seen it online, and wrote, “I want to find and [arrest] the people who are propagating this nonsense. This is not protected speech.”

On Tuesday, June 2, the Department circulated a new incident action plan internally, which was more detailed and expanded its focus beyond Federal Plaza, but it was not widely read or used.<sup>119</sup> One high-ranking command staff member described the document as “useless,” while another highlighted that it had little value for areas of the city outside of downtown. Area and district command staff continued to request platoons of officers throughout the week to manage activity in the neighborhoods. Some reported that they requested more assistance than necessary to err on the side of caution.

Many members of CPD’s command staff reported that as the week progressed, CPD’s operations and resource deployments improved. CPD began to track resource requests and deployments from the mobilization center to CPD districts. To facilitate requests and tracking, five Forward Command Posts, one for each CPD Area, were developed to improve communication from the districts to the EOC and to document the movements of various resources throughout the city. In practice, District Commanders would request additional resources through their Forward Command Post, which would then communicate this request to the EOC. The EOC would determine where to submit requests, depending on their type; for example, requests for more officers went to the mobilization center while requests for buses went to CTA. During the week, the EOC also began to request the number of personnel working within each district. Within each Area, the Forward Command Post would also track what resources were within each district and where they were located. An internal CPD email in the early hours of June 4 explained that “if your District is having a large protest, the coordination of Area Teams, BIA, Videographers, Prisoner Vans, and Legal Affairs will all be coordinated and documented at the Area 2 [Forward Command Post].”

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<sup>118</sup> Fran Spielman, “Union: CPD Suspended 17 Officers, Supervisors Who Lounged In Congressman’s Burglarized Office,” Chicago Sun-Times, January 14, 2020, accessed January 20, 2021, <https://chicago.suntimes.com/city-hall/2021/1/14/22231310/bobby-rush-office-chicago-police-sleeping-popcorn-riots-suspensions-fop-union>.

<sup>119</sup> The June 2 incident action plan lists the First Deputy Superintendent as the Incident Commander.

Twelve hour shifts and cancelled RDOs continued the week of June 1, 2020. On Wednesday, June 3, a representative of the Sergeants' union, the Police Benevolent and Protective Association, sent an email to a senior CPD official and a representative of the Management and Labor Affairs Section, decrying the "unsatisfactory, extremely inadequate, and unsafe time between the 12 hour tour of duties [sic]." Mayor Lightfoot reported concerns about work schedules as well, saying, "[Y]ou can't keep canceling people's days off and making them work 12 hour shifts back to back to back and expect that they are going to perform at their highest and their best." She noted that "[t]his was something unlike any person in the Department had ever experienced before. They were not trained to handle this kind of circumstance, the stress, the abuse."

On June 3, the Mayor announced the reopening of downtown transportation routes and disrupted services, including the reopening of Lake Shore Drive (with some exits remaining closed) and the entrance and exit ramps to I-290 and I-90/I-94, lowering of the Chicago River bridges, and restoration of CTA train and bus services (with some selected stops remaining closed). The 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. curfew stayed in effect, and on June 5, the Mayor announced that the curfew would continue through June 7. The City also continued to use CDOT, DSS, and Department of Water Management trucks to support commercial corridors. Travel restrictions into downtown also continued through road restrictions, expressway closures, bridge closures, and CTA service bypasses.<sup>120</sup>

On Friday, June 5, a large protest began at Union Park near the Fraternal Order of Police Hall.<sup>121</sup> CPD documentation reflected extensive planning and coordination in preparation for this event, including internal resource requests for personnel (e.g., bike teams and SWAT teams) and external resource requests for cameras from OEMC, ISP personnel and drones, and DSS salt and tow trucks. CPD also considered other buildings in the area that could draw protestors' attention; for example, CPD's Training Academy was four blocks away from Union Park. According to news reporting, thousands marched peacefully without major incident.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> City of Chicago Office of the Mayor, "Mayor Lightfoot Announces Additional Resources To Protect Neighborhoods And New Precautionary Measures To Ensure Peaceful Protests This Weekend," Press Release. June 5, 2020, <https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/mayor/Press%20Room/Press%20Releases/2020/June/PrecautionaryMeasuresProtests.pdf>.

<sup>121</sup> Paige Fry, "Thousands Peacefully March To Call For Defunding The Chicago Police Department," Chicago Tribune, June 06, 2020, accessed November 16, 2020, <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-union-park-march-060620-20200606-6xf4ygtcmjhbjh3pdlafn6qrmu-story.html>.

<sup>122</sup> Paige Fry, "Thousands Peacefully March."

On June 6, the Mayor also announced the City's procurement of three private security firms—including Monterrey Security<sup>123</sup>—to provide 100 unarmed security guards to monitor commercial corridors and notify CPD of crime.<sup>124</sup>

In reflecting on the unrest, Mayor Lightfoot said, "There was a level of sophistication that we saw in some of these groups that were clearly coming to these protests for a fight... [T]his was clearly a concerted effort to bring chaos to our cities. Who were these people?... [T]his was a conspiracy, sophisticated, paid for and promoted by someone in multiple cities across the country at the same time. That's not a coincidence."

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<sup>123</sup> Monterrey Security is a private security firm founded by Juan Gaytan, a former CPD member, which has run afoul of City contracting rules and has long counted among its leadership a number of former high-ranking CPD officials. In October 2020, Monterrey Security announced that those ranks would be joined by two more recently retired CPD officials; they had served, respectively, as CPD's First Deputy Superintendent and Chief of the Office of Operations during the events of May and June 2020. Frank Main, "Politically Connected Monterrey Security Lures Two High-Ranking Chicago Cops Into Post-Retirement Jobs," Chicago Sun-Times, October 27, 2020, accessed January 18, 2021, <https://chicago.suntimes.com/2020/10/27/21535203/politically-connected-monterrey-security-lures-two-high-ranking-chicago-cops-post-retirement-jobs>.

<sup>124</sup> Heather Cherone, "City To Spend Up To \$1.2M For Security Guards To Patrol South, West Sides," WTTW, June 6, 2020, accessed November 17, 2020, <https://news.wttw.com/2020/06/06/city-spend-12m-security-guards-patrol-south-west-sides>.

## IV. FINDINGS

**FINDING 1: BREAKDOWNS IN THE MASS ARREST PROCESS RESULTED IN CPD'S FAILURE TO ARREST SOME OFFENDERS, THE UNSUBSTANTIATED DETENTION AND SUBSEQUENT RELEASE OF SOME ARRESTEES WITHOUT CHARGES, AND RISKS TO OFFICER AND ARRESTEE SAFETY**

### A. CPD MASS ARREST PROCEDURES

CPD's procedures for mass arrests are contained in Special Order S06-06, which has been in place in its present version since September 27, 2018.<sup>125</sup> At a high level, the procedures describe how the documentation and processing of arrests are different once a mass arrest situation is declared. The decision to make a mass arrest designation is entrusted to an Incident Commander or the highest-ranking member of the Bureau of Patrol on the scene. CPD's policies do not precisely define the circumstances that should give rise to the declaration of a mass arrest situation. Instead, the procedures list several general "factors" that the designating official must consider. According to CPD's procedures, once a mass arrest situation is declared, arresting officers complete a "mass arrest card" in the field. That mass arrest card documents information about the probable cause for each arrest. The arresting officer then gives custody of the arrestee to a transporting officer, who takes the arrestee to a processing center removed from the field, permitting the arresting officer to remain deployed in the field. The transporting officer then gives custody of the arrestee to a processing member, who completes an arrest report—reflecting information captured on the mass arrest card—and completes other processing tasks, such as fingerprinting the arrestee. These procedures contrast with the typical arrest procedure, in which an arresting officer transports an arrestee to a processing center and records the requisite information about the arrest, including the probable cause for it, in an arrest report before returning to the field. The mass arrest procedures are thus primarily intended to leave sufficient police personnel at the scene of a large-scale incident by obviating their need to return to a station and spend time processing each arrest. Because they involve members other than the original arresting officer to document the arrest, the success of the mass arrest procedures depends critically upon the successful communication of the


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<sup>125</sup> "Special Order S06-06 Mass Arrest Procedures," September 27, 2018, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12b3f6c9-62812-b3f6-c9f7463f28e17719.html>.

circumstances of and probable cause for an arrest from the arresting officer to the processing officer; otherwise, the arrest may fail for lack of probable cause.

Figure 10 below visually depicts the mass arrest process, and the text that follows describes the stages and personnel responsibilities in further detail.

FIGURE 10: CPD MASS ARREST PROCEDURES<sup>126</sup>



Source: OIG analysis of CPD's mass arrest procedures.

### 1. Classification of Mass Arrest Incidents

Under Section III of Special Order S06-06, the Incident Commander or "highest-ranking on-scene member of the Bureau of Patrol" has the authority to declare a

<sup>126</sup> As discussed in further detail below, S06-06 defines three "levels" of mass arrest incident. Figure 10 reflects the responsibilities and procedures for a Level Two or Level Three incident (which are procedurally identical). By the definitions given in the directive, the mass arrest incident during the protests and unrest was a Level Three incident, because mass arrests occurred in several locations around the city.



mass arrest incident. The policy does not describe any particular situation or number of arrestees that automatically constitutes a mass arrest incident. Instead, it describes a set of factors that the Incident Commander or patrol supervisor "will" consider when declaring a mass arrest incident:<sup>127</sup>

- (1) The probable charges to be placed against arrestees;
- (2) The total number of arrestees or potential arrestees;
- (3) The capacity of available detention facilities;
- (4) The physical condition, sex, and age of the arrestees; and
- (5) The nature of the situation and circumstances surrounding the mass arrest incident.<sup>128</sup>

A CPD Legal Affairs officer told OIG that, in their mind, a mass arrest situation should be declared whenever it is necessary that arresting officers remain at their posts instead of taking arrestees to processing centers themselves.

The mass arrest procedures themselves do not define "Incident Commander."<sup>129</sup> One senior CPD member interviewed by OIG said that who is assigned as the "Incident Commander" is incident-specific and varies across CPD directives. This same member said that the "custom" is that the highest-ranking officer on scene is the Incident Commander.<sup>130</sup> This comports with the definition of that term found in General Order G05-03, "Critical Incident Response System," which outlines CPD's prescribed response to, among other things, instances of "civil disobedience" and those that require the Department to "protect the lives of the public."<sup>131</sup> Under that directive, the Incident Commander is determined by either the Superintendent, the First Deputy Superintendent, or the highest-ranking Department member on the scene. If the highest-ranking member on scene is represented by multiple Department bureaus, the Incident Commander will be from the Bureau of Patrol.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> "Special Order S06-06 Mass Arrest Procedures," September 27, 2018, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12b3f6c9-62812-b3f6-c9f7463f28e17719.html>.

<sup>128</sup> "Special Order S06-06"

<sup>129</sup> While they do not define Incident Commander, the mass arrest procedures do indicate "to the extent possible, procedures for mass arrest incidents will be predetermined in writing, in the Operational Order entitled 'Incident Action Plan.'" For May 29, 2020, such a plan was not produced by CPD. For May 30, an incident action plan was produced by CPD, which did indicate who the Incident Commander was for that planned event.

<sup>130</sup> "Special Order S06-06 Mass Arrest Procedures," September 27, 2018, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12b3f6c9-62812-b3f6-c9f7463f28e17719.html>.

<sup>131</sup> "General Order G05-03 Critical Incident Response Program," December 07, 2017, accessed October 16, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12931f77-d3712-9330-381d86990a5826e4.html>.

<sup>132</sup> As discussed in further detail below, at the time of the protests, CPD's organization chart did not include a separately designated "Bureau of Patrol." In that version of the organization chart, district law enforcement units reported up to the Office of Operations. See Appendix B. "General Order G05-03

There are three possible classification levels for mass arrest incidents.<sup>133</sup> A mass arrest incident classified as “Level One” is one in which there will be “multiple arrests” and a situation “where a continued police presence is necessary to ensure public safety.”<sup>134</sup> A “Level Two” incident is one in which “arrestees are taken to the appropriate area detention facility or central detention... until the number of arrestees has reached the facility’s emergency arrestee capacity.”<sup>135</sup> A “Level Three” incident is one in which “the number of arrestees exceeds the Level Two capacities or incidents of mass arrests are occurring in several locations of the city.”<sup>136</sup>

## 2. Responsibilities and Procedures

The mass arrest procedures provide that during a “spontaneous” or a “preplanned” event, the “ranking Bureau of Patrol supervisor or the Incident Commander” will “assess the situation and determine if a mass arrest incident will be declared.”<sup>137</sup> If so, the Incident Commander will immediately “establish a command post” and “notify the OEMC dispatcher and the Crime Prevention and Information Center (CPIC) of the incident.”<sup>138</sup> Furthermore, the Incident Commander will “ensure [that] mass arrest kits are brought to the scene.”<sup>139</sup> A mass arrest kit contains one-time-use handcuffs called “flex cuffs,” a mass arrest card, and black markers to write information on an arrestee’s arm, if necessary because mass arrest cards are unavailable.<sup>140</sup> The Incident Commander will then “request sufficient personnel to ensure the safety of the Department members, the public, and the arrestees” and “assign a sergeant to oversee the processing of arrestees on-scene prior to transport.”<sup>141</sup> CPIC, in turn, will inform a number of Department officials of the mass arrest declaration.<sup>142</sup> Moreover, CPIC will notify a number of “support agencies,” including the Cook County State’s

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Critical Incident Response Program,” December 07, 2017, accessed October 16, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12931f77-d3712-9330-381d86990a5826e4.html>.

<sup>133</sup> “Special Order S06-06 Mass Arrest Procedures,” September 27, 2018, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12b3f6c9-62812-b3f6-c9f7463f28e17719.html>.

<sup>134</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>135</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>136</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>137</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>138</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>139</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>140</sup> A mass arrest card is a small paper form used to record arrest details, information supporting probable cause, control tactics and low-level force (i.e., takedowns or open hand strikes) used in effecting the arrest. Higher level uses of force, including use of weapons, is required to be reported on one or more different forms. See Finding 2 below.

<sup>141</sup> “Special Order S06-06 Mass Arrest Procedures,” September 27, 2018, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12b3f6c9-62812-b3f6-c9f7463f28e17719.html>.

<sup>142</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

Attorney Office, if “deemed necessary by the circumstances of the event.”<sup>143</sup> For all “declared mass arrest incident[s] an RD number will be generated” by the Incident Commander or “highest-ranking member on-scene from the Bureau of Patrol.”<sup>144</sup> For preplanned events, to the extent possible, “procedures for mass arrest incidents will be predetermined in writing, in the Operational Order entitled ‘Incident Action Plan.’”<sup>145</sup>

### 3. Case Reporting Responsibilities

Section IV of the mass arrest procedures provides that the “Incident Commander or highest-ranking on-scene member of the Bureau of Patrol will designate one member to generate the case report associated with the event/RD number.”<sup>146</sup> For all incidents related to the mass arrest which do not require follow up investigation, the report will contain “the date and time of the occurrence,” “the location of occurrence,” “the identifying information for persons arrested or issued an Administrative Notice of Ordinance Violation,” and “any other information as directed by the Incident Commander, or highest-ranking on-scene member of the Bureau of Patrol.”<sup>147</sup>

However, for all incidents requiring follow-up investigation or having a citizen complainant, the mass arrest procedures require that an additional RD number be assigned.<sup>148</sup>

### 4. Assignment of Additional Personnel

Under Section V of Special Order S06-06, the declaration of a Level Two or Level Three mass arrest incident requires a number of Department officials to deploy their personnel in support. The Chief of the Bureau of Detectives must “assign a sufficient number of arrest processing teams to each designated processing/detention facility.”<sup>149</sup> Those teams must “consist of one supervisor and four detectives.”<sup>150</sup> The Commander of the Forensic Services Division must “assign a sufficient number of evidence technicians to the arrest scene for photographing arrestees prior to

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<sup>143</sup> S06-06 does not include any information to suggest which circumstances might necessitate notification to any or all of these support agencies. “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>144</sup> RD numbers are unique, sequential identifiers assigned to reportable incidents (CPD-22.110). An RD number is used to identify an event, and multiple reports regarding that event may be associated with a single RD number. “Special Order S06-06 Mass Arrest Procedures,” September 27, 2018, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12b3f6c9-62812-b3f6-c9f7463f28e17719.html>.

<sup>145</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>146</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>147</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>148</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>149</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>150</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

transportation.”<sup>151</sup> The Chief of the Bureau of Organized Crime will “assign a videographer to report to the on-scene Incident Commander for assignment.”<sup>152</sup>

## 5. Processing Arrestees on Scene

Section VI of Special Order S06-06 contains guidance for arresting and transporting officers. It provides that arresting officers will “identify probable cause for the individual being arrested.”<sup>153</sup> Officers will then “escort each arrestee to the transporting vehicle and complete a mass arrest card for each arrestee and annotate their star number.”<sup>154</sup> The order specifically provides that “if circumstances do not allow for the immediate completion of a mass arrest card,” then “arresting officers will use a black felt tip marking pen to print legibly their star number on the inside of the arrestee’s forearm along with an understandable word abbreviation of the arrestee’s offense.”<sup>155</sup> The arresting officers will “retain the hard copy of the Mass Arrest Card” and give the original card to transporting officers.”<sup>156</sup> Arresting officers will then “turn the arrestee over to transporting personnel.”<sup>157</sup> The officer will “return to their duty assignment until relieved by the Incident Commander,” at which point they will “proceed to the designated processing facility for completion of arrestee processing upon release by or as directed by the Incident Commander.”<sup>158</sup>

The order further provides the following:

1. “[T]he on-scene arrest processing supervisor will ensure that a mass arrest card is completed for all arrestees unless exigent circumstances preclude same.”<sup>159</sup>
2. Evidence Technicians at the mass arrest scene will complete a Photo Identification Card, record a mass arrest card sequential number on the card, and “photograph all arrestees with the Photo Identification Card prior to transporting the arrestee.”<sup>160</sup>
3. Transporting officers will “accept custody of all arrestees” from arresting officers and search the arrestees for “contraband and weapons.”<sup>161</sup> They will then write the mass arrest card sequential number on “both copies of the

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<sup>151</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>152</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>153</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>154</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>155</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>156</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>157</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>158</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>159</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>160</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>161</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

Mass Arrest Card” and the handcuffs.<sup>162</sup> Transporting officers then bring the arrestee to the designated processing or detention site.

4. The arrest processing supervisor will designate one “security officer” to “maintain a log containing the name of each arrestee, transporting officer, transporting vehicle, and the date and time of transportation.”<sup>163</sup>

## 6. Processing Arrestees at the Detention Facility

Upon the arrival of the arrestee at the detention facility, the processing officers—detectives assigned by the Chief of the Bureau of Detectives—will identify the arrestee and match the mass arrest card sequential number to the number on the arrestee’s handcuffs and property bag.<sup>164</sup> The processing officers then “determine the proper charge[]” and complete the arrest report.<sup>165</sup> The processing officer will “sign the complaints with the arresting officer’s name along with the processing officer’s initials and star number.”<sup>166</sup> This is a departure from the typical arrest policy, which provides that the arresting officer is responsible for “completing the Arrest Report” and “setting forth in the Arrest Report narrative sufficient information (elements of the offense and probable cause to arrest) to substantiate all charges placed against an arrestee.”<sup>167</sup> During mass arrest processing, the completed arrest report and the mass arrest card will then be presented to the Watch Operations Lieutenant for approval of probable cause.<sup>168</sup> Moreover, “the station supervisor will ensure the mass arrest card is attached [to] the ‘Court Copy’ Arrest Report and forwarded to the appropriate court.”<sup>169</sup> Finally the “booking member” will fingerprint and photograph the arrestee and complete the necessary booking documents.<sup>170</sup>

As is the case for any arrest made by a CPD member, if the station supervisor determines there is no “probable cause to detain the arrestee” and the elements of the offense have not been documented “in the narrative portion of the Arrest Report,”

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<sup>162</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>163</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>164</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>165</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>166</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>167</sup> “Special Order S06-01 Processing Persons Under Department Control,” January 29, 2015, accessed October 16, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a56e4b-12ccbe26-df812-ccbfb66447d9a33ff3e.html>.

<sup>168</sup> “Special Order S06-06 Mass Arrest Procedures,” September 27, 2018, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12b3f6c9-62812-b3f6-c9f7463f28e17719.html>.

<sup>169</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>170</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

the station supervisor is responsible for making the final determination that an arrestee should be released without charging.<sup>171</sup>

## B. CPD-REPORTED MASS ARREST DATA

OIG conducted independent analysis of arrest data collected by CPD. Identification of arrests related to the civil unrest and protests in late May and early June is an imperfect exercise, primarily because CPD did not follow its mass arrest procedures and generate a single RD number for use with all related arrests. Thus, there is no single criterion by which arrests that were related to protests or unrest can be distinguished from all arrests over the relevant time period. As described in further detail below, CPD's data indicates 3,775 total arrests between 5:00 p.m. on May 29, 2020 and 11:59 p.m. on June 7, 2020. To identify arrests from this total population that were related to protest or unrest, OIG applied several criteria. Arrests that met one or more of the following conditions were included in this analysis:

- Arrests with associated arrest report narratives that contain one of the following keywords: "Protest," "Unrest," "Mass Arrest," "Disturb the Public Peace," "Curfew," "Disperse," "Dispersal," "Riots," "Looter," "Looted," "Looting"
- Arrest reports associated with a known mass arrest RD number
- Arrest reports for which the RD number matched the RD number on a TRR that indicated the use of force took place in the context of a "Riot/Mob Action/Civil Disorder"<sup>172</sup>

OIG also identified 174 charges potentially relevant to protests and unrest (a list of these charges is contained in Appendix C). The narrative portion of arrest reports that included at least one of these charges and were not already included in the sample on the basis of one of the above three criteria were reviewed by OIG. Arrest reports that were determined to be relevant to unrest or protests on the basis of these narrative reviews were included.

Finally, arrests were *excluded* from OIG's sample for analysis unless they also met the following criteria:

- The arrest occurred within the city limits of Chicago

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<sup>171</sup> "Special Order S06-01 Processing Persons Under Department Control," January 29, 2015, accessed October 16, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a56e4b-12ccbe26-df812-ccbfb66447d9a33ff3e.html>.

<sup>172</sup> The TRR form gives this option as the section where members indicate the "type of activity" that led to the use of force. "CPD-11.377 Tactical Response Report," March 2019, accessed August 14, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/forms/CPD-11.377.pdf>.


- For May 29 or May 30, the arrest must have occurred in the 1<sup>st</sup> or 18<sup>th</sup> Districts, based on OIG's understanding that during these dates, protest and unrest-related arrests were primarily concentrated in these districts<sup>173</sup>

With these selection criteria, OIG identified 1,519 arrests as likely related to protests or unrest. Figures 11 through 14 below give descriptive information about the location, date, and primary charges of these arrests. Arrests were concentrated in the 1<sup>st</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Districts (Figures 11-12) and concentrated on May 30 through June 1 (Figure 13). The most frequently applied charge was "Disorderly Conduct – Assembly >3 Persons/Breach of Peace" (Figure 14).

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<sup>173</sup> This final criteria was based on OIG's understanding that protests and unrest began downtown on May 29 and May 30 and only afterwards spread to the neighborhoods.


FIGURE 11: MAP OF ARRESTS RELATED TO PROTESTS OR UNREST, BY DISTRICT



Source: OIG analysis of CPD arrest data.



FIGURE 12: ALL ARRESTS RELATED TO PROTESTS OR UNREST, BY DISTRICT



Source: OIG analysis of CPD arrest data.

FIGURE 13: ALL ARRESTS RELATED TO PROTESTS OR UNREST, BY DATE AND DISTRICT

District	29-May	30-May	31-May	1-Jun	2-Jun	3-Jun	4-Jun	5-Jun	6-Jun	7-Jun
001	2	242	95	16	0	0	1	1	0	0
002	0	0	27	17	5	1	0	3	0	0
003	0	0	9	13	1	0	0	0	1	0
004	0	0	10	1	4	1	3	3	0	0
005	0	0	26	4	4	2	2	0	0	0
006	0	0	12	33	28	6	2	2	0	2
007	0	0	11	11	0	1	2	0	2	0
008	0	0	42	17	2	1	0	0	0	1
009	0	0	46	20	9	1	0	0	0	0
010	0	0	15	5	7	0	0	0	2	0
011	0	0	14	21	12	2	0	0	1	0
012	0	0	14	7	2	0	0	1	0	1
014	0	0	10	16	2	1	1	2	0	2
015	0	0	5	8	8	1	1	0	0	0
016	0	0	8	1	2	1	1	0	0	0
017	0	0	6	4	2	0	0	0	0	0
018	2	179	106	2	2	0	0	0	0	0
019	0	0	12	44	18	0	0	0	0	0
020	0	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
022	0	0	38	17	0	0	0	0	0	1
024	0	0	2	3	5	0	0	0	0	0
025	0	0	86	38	14	6	4	1	0	3
Total	4	421	595	302	127	24	17	13	6	10
GRAND TOTAL	1,519									

Source: OIG analysis of CPD arrest data.

FIGURE 14: MOST FREQUENT CHARGES MADE IN ARRESTS RELATED TO PROTESTS<sup>174</sup>

	Source of Law <sup>175</sup>	Charge Description	Total Count of Charges	Percent of Arrests with Charge Listed
1	MCC	DISORDERLY CONDUCT - ASSEMBLY >3 PERSONS/BREACH OF PEACE	913	61%
2	ILCS	BURGLARY	105	7%
3	MCC	DISORDERLY CONDUCT-FAILS TO OBEY A LAWFUL ORDER TO DISPERSE	91	6%
4	MCC	CURFEW VIOLATION	65	4%
5	MCC	DISORDERLY CONDUCT - FAIL TO OBEY POLICE	54	4%
6	ILCS	ISSUANCE OF WARRANT	51	3%
7	ILCS	LOOTING BY INDIVIDUAL	46	3%
8	MCC	VIOLATE BOARD OF HEALTH RULE, ORDER, OR REGULATION	39	3%
9	ILCS	RECKLESS CONDUCT	36	2%
10	MCC	DISORDERLY CONDUCT - BREACH OF PEACE	32	2%
11	ILCS	CRIMINAL TRESPASS TO REAL PROPERTY	30	2%
12	ILCS	CRIM DAMAGE TO PROPERTY LESS THAN \$500	25	2%
13	ILCS	RESISTING OR OBSTRUCTING A PEACE OFFICER OR FIREFIGHTER	24	2%
14	ILCS	DISORDERLY CONDUCT - BREACH OF PEACE	21	1%
15	ILCS	THEFT OF LOST OR MISLAID PROPERTY LESS THAN \$500	18	1%
16	ILCS	CRIMINAL TRESPASS TO LAND	16	1%

Source: OIG analysis of CPD arrest data.

### C. BREAKDOWNS IN CPD'S MASS ARREST PROCEDURES

As OIG's review of the protest arrest data shows (Figure 13 above), on Saturday, May 30, CPD data reflects that the Department made over 400 protest-related arrests. The following day, Sunday, May 31, CPD made close to 600 protest-related arrests. All told, based on OIG's analysis, between May 29 and June 7, CPD made 1,519 arrests related to the unrest or protests.

<sup>174</sup> Many arrests have multiple charges applied. The 1,519 arrests identified by OIG as related to protests or unrest had, on average, 1.2 charges associated with them.

<sup>175</sup> MCC denotes a charge under the Municipal Code of Chicago, an ordinance violation prosecuted by the City of Chicago's Department of Law. ILCS denotes a charge under the Illinois Compiled Statutes, a violation of state law prosecuted by the Cook County State's Attorney's Office.

CPD was unprepared to deal with protests and unrest on a scale which required it to arrest 1,000 people in concentrated time periods over the course of two days, and this led to breakdowns in the mass arrest process. As a result, arrestees were held without proper processing providing the substantiation for the reason for and duration of their detention, with some eventually being released without charges, and some being charged with something either less or more serious than their actual conduct may have warranted. Moreover, the safety of arrestees and officers was threatened by the lengthy delays in transportation and processing and, finally, officers arrested fewer offenders than they might have otherwise due to the long transportation and processing times.

### 1. CPD Failed to Adequately Train Members of All Ranks in Mass Arrest Procedures

CPD members at all ranks lacked training in mass arrest procedures. Numerous CPD command staff members expressly noted the lack of training on mass arrest procedures as being among the causes of the breakdown in the mass arrest procedures during the May and June protests and unrest. One senior member in particular stated that command staff was unable to lead their subordinates to comply with the policies because the command staff itself lacked the requisite training.

After reviewing lawful demonstrations and crowd control training materials from the present to 2014, OIG was unable to identify any training on mass arrest procedures. Further, the lapse in time for training may have predated 2014.<sup>176</sup> One member recalled that training on mass arrest procedures was done in preparation for NATO Summit protests in 2012, but another member recalled that as merely crowd control training.<sup>177</sup> Regardless of the state of mass arrest training in anticipation of the NATO Summit, multiple members, including a number of those in senior command ranks,

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<sup>176</sup> The IMT and OIG requested that CPD produce the “most recently used CPD training materials regarding crowd control and lawful demonstrations.” In response, CPD produced crowd control trainings given to CPD members and recruits back to 2014. None of those materials mention or describe CPD’s mass arrest procedures or policies. According to CPD’s after-action report, recruit training “includes exposure to...mass arrest situations.” However, no such training materials were produced to OIG in response to the requests detailed above.

<sup>177</sup> NATO is an intergovernmental military alliance between 30 European and North American countries. The organization’s stated purpose is “to guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means.” In May 2012, NATO held its annual summit meeting in Chicago, and there were large-scale protests which led to clashes between police and protestors. Numerous CPD members who spoke with OIG discussed CPD’s thorough and lengthy preparation for the protests that were expected in advance of the NATO summit. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Welcome,” accessed November 17, 2020, <https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html>; Steven Yaccino and Monica Davey, “Protestors and Police Clash At NATO Meeting; 2 Held On Terrorism Charges,” New York Times, May 20, 2012, accessed Nov. 17, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/21/us/two-held-on-terrorism-charges-at-nato-meeting.html>.

said that CPD stopped training on mass arrests after the NATO Summit because it was not expecting any mass arrests. There has been significant turnover in the Department since 2012, and many newer officers had never received any relevant training. Of CPD's 12,971 officers (as of June 2020), 4,863 (approximately 37%) have appointment dates to City service more recent than the NATO Summit eight years ago.<sup>178</sup>

The lack of mass arrest training was evident in CPD's response on May 30. Senior level command staff members were unfamiliar with or confused about mass arrest protocols. One District Commander who deployed around Trump Tower—one of the epicenters of the arrests—described themselves as unsure how the procedures worked. Two other senior CPD members, who played key roles in mass arrest procedures, described refamiliarizing themselves with the policy on May 30. Due to confusion about roles in a mass arrest situation, one senior CPD member arrived at a processing center to monitor compliance and found that this role was already being performed by another member. This confused state of affairs was generally confirmed by multiple CPD officers at the ranks of officer, Sergeant, and Lieutenant. They commented generally on the unorganized nature of CPD's response on May 30. One officer described CPD's general lack of organization as the "saddest shit ever."

Moreover, CPD members in ranks ranging from Commander to police officer described how they had never seen or filled out a mass arrest card in their entire career before May 30. One police officer described how their supervisor gave them a mass arrest card to fill out on May 30, but they had never seen such a card before. Their supervisor subsequently told them to write their own information and the charge on the arrestee's arm with a Sharpie. The officer did not know that was part of the mass arrest procedures until OIG informed them that it was during an interview with the officer.

In the late morning of May 30, a CPD Commander involved in the mass arrest situation on the night of May 29 sent an email to CPD command staff making several recommendations for improved arrest procedures, "in case we see a repeat of last night." The Commander's first suggestion was that "[a]t least four Sergeants" should be assigned, "two to each central detention van to supervise arrestee processing" and to "ensure mass arrest cards are completed." The Commander also noted that "[m]any officers appeared very reluctant to engage and make arrests." The Commander wrote that he believed that if officers "are briefed at roll call that there will be processing teams and they have clear direction on the charging used we will get more buy in when action must be taken. The Commander emphasized that "[d]amage to property needs to be stressed as a hard line where there is no tolerance."

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<sup>178</sup> OIG Center for Information Technology and Analytics, internal data dashboard.

A Chief replied to this message to say, “all good points and suggestions that should be implemented.”

## 2. CPD Failed to Adequately Prepare for a Mass Arrest Event in Advance of the Protests<sup>179</sup>

By Thursday, May 28, a series of major American cities had experienced property destruction and violence in the wake of George Floyd’s killing. However, there is no evidence that CPD made any organized, Department-wide attempts to plan or prepare for out-of-the-ordinary events, including a mass arrest declaration, prior to Friday, May 29. Other senior CPD members, discussing a lack of planning in advance of the protests, pointed toward a lack of intelligence. The Superintendent told OIG that CPD did not “pre-designate”—which appears to mean declaring a “preplanned” mass arrest event—a mass arrest order before Saturday, May 30, because they did not believe looting would occur. The Superintendent’s view that looting should be the trigger for a mass arrest is not grounded in the mass arrest procedures directive, which, as described above, grants the Incident Commander wide discretion to declare a mass arrest situation after a holistic analysis of several factors. Moreover, as discussed below, CPD was making arrests and filling out mass arrest cards on Saturday, May 30, well before widespread looting had occurred. A senior CPD member involved with mass arrest processing concurred that no one expected a mass arrest situation on Saturday, May 30.

Characterizations of senior-most CPD leadership notwithstanding, the available evidence indicates that planning of measures for potential mass arrests occurred at least as early as Thursday, May 28, when CPIC issued a notification regarding a march at Federal Plaza planned for Saturday. As described above, in response, the Deputy Chief responsible for downtown emailed the Chief of Operations requesting the “full package” of support resources for Saturday’s march, which included “videographers” and “prisoner vans,” both essential parts of the mass arrest procedures. The email did not, however, designate a mass arrest processing center, assign detectives to staff that processing center, or assign any of the other responsibilities designated by the mass arrest procedures.

On Friday, May 29, the First Deputy Superintendent issued a two-and-a-half-page memo regarding the “Planned Gathering/March” at Federal Plaza on May 30. That

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<sup>179</sup> At OIG’s request, CPD reviewed a draft of this report and provided comments. In those comments, CPD wrote, “Given the unexpectedly quick escalation of protests and civil unrest in response to George Floyd’s death, the Department understands the criticism of its preparedness for implementing its mass arrest protocol. That said, although the Department did not follow the Mass Arrest Order in every respect, it did quickly adapt its response to effectively address the need for mass arrests.” CPD’s full response is available on OIG’s website at <https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/CPD-Response-to-OIG-Report-on-Civil-Unrest.pdf>.

memo provided that two prisoner vans “with mass arrest kits” as well as a videographer team—which is assigned to capture large demonstration events from CPD’s perspective and document CPD actions, like orders for crowds to disperse—would be assigned to the Deputy Chief at Federal Plaza beginning at 1 p.m. on May 30. The memo made no further provisions for mass arrests: it did not request a greater number of prisoner vans or officers to assist with the arrest and transport of prisoners, nor did it provide for the Chief of Detectives to assign detectives to process prisoners, nor did it require Forensic Services to assign evidence technicians to photograph arrestees.

There is, however, some evidence that some preparations may have been happening. For instance, though not provided for in the First Deputy Superintendent’s memo, there is evidence that contingents of detectives were “in place” for processing in the 1<sup>st</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> District stations. Additionally, there were CPD Legal Affairs officers assigned to the protest.

The first written authorized plan describing a detailed mass arrest procedure in response to the protests was not distributed to command staff from the First Deputy Superintendent until Tuesday, June 2.

This lack of centralized planning and general state of unpreparedness led to the breakdowns of mass arrest protocols that were hastily activated. CPD’s general lack of planning impacted its ability to effectively manage a mass arrest incident in several ways.

First, there was significant confusion among senior command staff about the identity of the Incident Commander—and thus the person with the actual responsibility for assessing and declaring a mass arrest incident—for the events on May 30.<sup>180</sup> The First Deputy Superintendent’s memo on the May 30 protest designated one of the Area Deputy Chief as the Incident Commander. In discussing who was in charge on May 30, the Superintendent told OIG that the Deputy Chief of Operations was the Incident Commander in the Summer Operations Center during that time period, but that the Area 3 Deputy Chief was the Incident Commander for the May 30 protest. The Superintendent said, however, that the Deputy Chief of Operations was likely the member who issued mass-arrest declarations. Indeed, the Deputy Chief of Operations

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<sup>180</sup> As an initial matter, as described above, the mass arrest procedures assign the decision to declare a mass arrest incident to the Incident Commander or the “ranking Bureau of Patrol supervisor.” Notably, by May 30, 2020, CPD had undergone a structural reorganization and the Bureau of Patrol did not exist as such at the time of the protests. CPD revised its organization chart again in January 2021 and reintroduced the designation of the Bureau of Patrol. “Special Order S06-06 Mass Arrest Procedures,” September 27, 2018, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12b3f6c9-62812-b3f6-c9f7463f28e17719.html>.

frequently gave instructions on the police radio on the afternoon and evening of May 30. The Superintendent also stated, however, that when they were in the EOC, the Superintendent was in charge and the Chief of Operations and First Deputy Superintendent were both in the field making decisions on May 30.

Many other senior command staff members apparently had considerably less clarity about who was in charge on May 30. A senior command staff member told OIG that they were not sure who was in charge. Other senior command staff members who had important roles in handling the protests concurred that they were unsure who was in charge of the response on Saturday. At least one senior command staff member thought the 1<sup>st</sup> District Commander was possibly in charge or, at the very least, that other senior CPD members were deferring to that Commander. Indeed, a review of police radio from the afternoon and early evening on Saturday indicates that the 1<sup>st</sup> District Commander was making tactical decisions and giving instructions for the protest response. When some units became available, they would ask the 1<sup>st</sup> District Commander where they should be deployed. However, for their part, the 1<sup>st</sup> District Commander recognized that the Deputy Chief of Operations had a “10,000-foot view” of the protest response and would be best positioned to make deployment decisions. Another senior command staff member thought the Chief of Operations was the Incident Commander. The Chief of Operations, too, was frequently on the police radio giving information and instructions. The Chief of Operations reported that incident command responsibilities were divided between themselves and the First Deputy Superintendent. One senior CPD member noted, by way of a contrasting example, that in more recent protests, CPD members had a much better understanding of the identity of the Incident Commander, leading to more order and less chaos in CPD’s response.

In sum, even after the fact, and with the benefit of an after-action review and report officials purported to have undertaken and generated by the time of the senior command interviews, the accounts of senior leadership on this point were sharply conflicting and profoundly confused. The effect on field operations—in real time, in fluid, tense and at times dangerous conditions—is manifest in the broadly-reported confusion of members from all district and front-line ranks over when a mass arrest situation was actually declared, and therefore what protocols and expectations existed for what is among the most basic of policing functions.

After the Friday evening protests evolved into unrest in the overnight hours, at 1:00 a.m. on Saturday, the Chief of Operations ordered officers to arrest people who failed to disperse from downtown after being ordered to do so. By 3:00 a.m. on Saturday, the Chief of Operations had authorized multiple mass arrest RD numbers to be used for arrests. However, the record suggests that there was confusion about whether a mass arrest situation was declared Friday evening into Saturday morning and what



procedures to follow. At least two senior members believed that a mass arrest declaration was made; members of CPD's Office of Legal Affairs also believed that mass arrest procedures had been enacted. However, there was confusion among rank-and-file officers about whether a mass arrest situation was declared that night. OIG reviewed at least one arrest report which referred to a mass arrest "situation" that occurred early Saturday morning. A CPD officer who was downtown on Friday evening reported that they were unaware of any mass arrest declaration, and that this caused confusion among officers regarding arrest procedures. At the beginning of the evening, officers followed normal procedures and transported arrestees to the lockup facilities themselves. However, once people started breaking into stores on Wabash Avenue, transport vehicles arrived to take arrestees from the field to lockup facilities for processing. Officers lacked clarity over who would complete the paperwork and processing after custody was transferred to the transport officers. Eventually, at some point on Saturday morning, arresting officers were told to follow arrestees to the districts. Further confounding the question of whether a mass arrest situation was declared Friday night is that, according to a senior CPD member, detectives were processing arrestees on an "as-needed" basis on Friday evening. The 1<sup>st</sup> District Commander also noted that detectives were at Central Detention processing arrestees pursuant to mass arrest duties on Friday night.<sup>181</sup>

Contributing to delays was a drop-off and processing bottleneck at the 1<sup>st</sup> District, which handled the initial arrestees from the Loop and was a mass arrest processing center. A senior CPD member who was at the 1<sup>st</sup> District station on May 30 reported that there was a long line of transport vehicles waiting to drop off arrestees during that evening and that the congestion was caused by a lack of available computers in the station to write arrest reports. This member described the processing system inside the station and the detectives assigned to it as overwhelmed. At one point, officers began getting arrestees out of transport vehicles in the sally port outside of the station, so that the transport vehicles could be released back downtown, but this increased pressure on the detectives and officers who were processing arrestees once they came inside the station. A CPD Legal Officer concurred in the assessment that the 1<sup>st</sup> District is not well-equipped to be a mass arrest processing center because it lacks a processing area with computers. The congestion at Central Detention is supported by BWC footage from approximately midnight on May 30 into May 31, which shows a transport vehicle officer telling an arrestee that they were in line behind 10 other transport vehicles.

This early confusion about mass arrest declarations and procedures persisted through the weekend. Some senior members first heard about a mass arrest declaration on Saturday, May 30. The Superintendent stated that a mass arrest declaration was

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<sup>181</sup> "Central Detention" refers to the arrestee processing facility located in the 1<sup>st</sup> District.

made on Saturday, but not until looting started in the evening. The Deputy Chief that the Superintendent identified as responsible for any mass arrest declarations reported that the mass arrest process was put into place on Saturday. A CPD Legal Officer said that it was the Superintendent's decision to authorize the use of OC spray on crowds, which triggered the Bureau of Internal Affairs (BIA) Chief and Chief of Detectives to generate a mass arrest RD number, but to the Legal Officer's knowledge, there was no other formal mass arrest declaration. Other senior members reportedly did not hear about a mass arrest declaration until Sunday, or never heard about a declaration at all. Functionally, however, mass arrest procedures were being used, in some measure, on early Saturday afternoon. By 2:22 p.m., a District Commander assigned downtown told the prisoner vans over the radio to "open up the doors" and be "ready to go" for arrests. Approximately 20 minutes later, the Commander can be heard on the radio instructing the officers manning those prisoner vans to ensure that a mass arrest card was filled out for each arrestee they transported.

Eventually, on Saturday evening, an order was issued for processing and detainment to bypass the 1<sup>st</sup> District, in favor of the 2<sup>nd</sup> District/Area 1 station at 51<sup>st</sup> Street and Wentworth Avenue. Different rationales for bypassing the 1<sup>st</sup> District were offered to OIG. The First Deputy Superintendent stated that the 1<sup>st</sup> District was bypassed in favor of the 2<sup>nd</sup> District because of the latter's higher arrest capacity and its distance from the events downtown. The First Deputy Superintendent recalled that either the Chief of Operations or the Area 3 Deputy Chief gave the order to bypass. However, several other members recounted that the bypass was ordered after Central Detention in the 1<sup>st</sup> District had a COVID-19 exposure. After Central Detention was cleaned, per CPD's COVID-19 protocol, the facility was reopened later in the evening and began to process arrests related to looting. The 2<sup>nd</sup> District ultimately experienced some of the same challenges that impaired operations in the 1<sup>st</sup> District. A senior CPD member at the 2<sup>nd</sup> District processing center reported that they, too, lacked enough computers to process arrestees quickly. Further, the 2<sup>nd</sup> District lockup reportedly could not operate at its stated capacity because much of the plumbing did not work and the detention facilities were in a general state of disrepair, despite multiple requests for remediation.

Among the sources of confusion about whether, when, and who declared the mass arrest event is the available record which suggests that there may not have been notifications to certain external law enforcement agencies. For instance, a senior official at the Cook County State's Attorney's Office (CCSAO) told OIG that conversations between CCSAO and CPD were limited to felony charges which, per CPD command staff, are not a part of the mass arrest process.<sup>182</sup>

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<sup>182</sup> Relatedly, this same CCSAO official said that CPD leadership never communicated information to CCSAO regarding the number of officers deploying (and making arrests) without BWCs during the

Additionally, the confusion left unclear when arrests should be made and for what offenses. While there may have been a shared understanding that arrests for low-level offenses were discouraged, there was confusion about what constituted a low-level offense. The Superintendent told OIG that he instructed CPD members not to enforce low-level offenses and to avoid using force unless there was “significant” violence or an officer was assaulted. The Superintendent described his philosophy as “bend[ing] over backwards” and “go[ing] as far as you can” to allow people space to engage in protests. Other senior CPD members concurred that arrests for low-level offenses were discouraged. One stated that, while trailing the march from Federal Plaza to Trump Tower on May 30, he observed protesters climbing poles and when the member asked them simply to get down, the protesters were themselves surprised the member was not arresting them. A Deputy Chief added that officers did not know whether they could arrest people. Eventually, however, this Deputy Chief stated that a commanding officer instructed officers to arrest anyone not following dispersal orders.

A senior command staff member described a general institutional hesitancy about initiating mass arrests, because they can agitate and even cause more people to join the protest. Other senior command staff members described mass arrests as very rare and something to be used in only limited circumstances. One member who is regularly deployed to protests said the last time they could remember a mass arrest being declared was during the 2012 NATO summit.<sup>183</sup> One District Commander stated that people were not arrested for failing to disperse, but only for physically fighting with officers.

The treatment of “low-level offenses” itself lacked clarity and consistency, resulting in some degree of strategic and tactical incoherence in execution. One officer reported that, on Friday night and early Saturday morning, officers were mostly not making arrests when people started vandalizing property. Yet, by Saturday, officers were being instructed to make arrests for all instances of property being vandalized. One District Commander instructed officers over the police radio to adopt a “zero

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protest and unrest response. Not long after the initial weekend of protests, CCSAO announced a policy that there would be a rebuttable presumption against proceeding with the prosecution of certain charges against demonstrators—including assault, mob action, aggravated battery to a police officer, and battery—absent BWC footage, unless other evidence existed in support of those charges. Kimberly M. Foxx, Marny Zimmer, and Joe Magats to All Assistant States Attorneys, June 30, 2020, [https://www.cookcountystatesattorney.org/sites/default/files/files/documents/policy\\_position\\_protest\\_related\\_charges\\_6302020.pdf](https://www.cookcountystatesattorney.org/sites/default/files/files/documents/policy_position_protest_related_charges_6302020.pdf). CCSAO personnel related that judges and juries may take an exceedingly dim view of officer testimony when Department policy requires the use of BWC and an officer does not have footage to support a charge. Better communication between CCSAO and CPD during the mass arrest situation itself may have resulted in steps to mitigate the effect of CPD's deployment of officers without BWCs on eventual prosecutions.

<sup>183</sup> OIG is unable to verify how rarely mass arrest situations have been declared because OIG did not seek or receive data or records relating to mass arrest situations prior to May 2020.

tolerance” policy for damage to property: “If somebody breaks anything, they go to jail.” That District Commander similarly told officers “everyone goes to jail” if they damaged a police car, punctuating that statement with the instruction: “[T]ake your handcuffs out and put them on somebody.” That same District Commander told officers over the radio, in response to a report that protestors were beginning to spray-paint the bus shelters at 131 N. Dearborn Street, to “grab” the spray-painters and “extract them,” warning that “this is not going to get better if we don’t take action now.”

This confusion was further compounded by CPD’s ongoing response to and handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. At the time of the protests, CPD had a directive in place which encouraged officers to “whenever possible, use an Ordinance Complaint Form or an Administrative Notice of Ordinance Violation (ANOV) rather than a physical arrest to enforce...misdemeanor offenses [not requiring a judge’s bond].”<sup>184</sup> As one member reported, this amounted to officers effectively being told to stop arresting people and to issue ANOVs during COVID-19. According to this member, officers were never told to start arresting people again, even during the demonstrations.

The City’s institution of a curfew Saturday night introduced more confusion into what constituted grounds for arrest. Not a single officer who spoke with OIG recalled having ever been trained or instructed on any plans regarding the enforcement of a curfew. Without instruction or planning for the issuance of the curfew, officers reported having had no idea how to respond and whether they should arrest people for curfew violations, having previously been discouraged in some cases, but not others, from making arrests for low-level offenses.

The Superintendent described the curfew as useful for addressing unrest because it supplied probable cause to engage with people who were looting, damaging property, or assaulting officers. Yet, at least one Sergeant who spoke with OIG said they refrained from making any arrests for violation of the curfew, because doing so sounded unconstitutional, and they were afraid they would get sued if they did.

Finally, the unavailability of mass arrest kits further illustrates the impact of CPD leadership’s lack of planning and preparedness both from an incident and organizational operations and management perspective. As discussed further below, significant problems resulted from individuals arrested on May 30-31 arriving at the processing and detention centers without a mass arrest card or information written on their arm, indicative of both a lack of coordination or a shortage of mass arrest kit

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<sup>184</sup> “Special Order S04-09 Department Response To The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Revised 30 April 2020,” April 30, 2020, accessed October 16, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b85-17010e90-34c17-0119-53d7e59ce28d23f4.html?hl=true>.

materials in the field. Several senior CPD officials confirmed this to be the case. One such member stated, simply, that CPD “ran out” of mass arrest kits. However, other senior members insisted that, citywide, CPD had an adequate number of kits with which to handle the arrests that occurred on May 30-31. On Saturday, May 30 at 3:50 a.m., the Deputy Chief of Operations emailed another CPD command staff member requesting 3,000 flex cuffs for use the following day. The email recipient gave no indication that CPD could not supply that number of flex cuffs, simply replying “[o]kay, will do.” The differences in these incommensurable perspectives is reflective of a widespread, multi-faceted system failure from beginning to end, to the ultimate disservice of front-line CPD members and the public alike.

If indeed CPD had an adequate number of mass arrest kits available citywide, common localized shortages indicate seriously deficient planning for distribution appropriately calibrated to meet operational need. Some senior CPD members asserted that mass arrest kits were in the field ahead of time. Indeed, the two-and-a-half page memo regarding planning for the “Planned Gathering/March” on May 30 specifically instructed that mass arrest kits be placed on prisoner vans, but the Area 3 Deputy Chief said they ran out quickly and had no idea where to get more. An officer who was downtown on Friday night and Saturday morning, and then in their district during looting on Saturday night, told OIG that they *never* had a mass arrest kit. One senior member reported that no plan was in place to distribute the kits on May 30, and any distribution of was ad hoc—with a civilian Deputy Chief driving around Trump Tower handing out mass arrest kits to officers. Another command staff member added that a more senior command staff member should have called Lieutenants to locate mass arrest kits and distribute them to specific locations; such coordination did not occur on Saturday. The same member added that there was “absolute chaos” that day, and in order for the Department to have successfully implemented the mass arrest order, one of the “big boss[es]” would have needed to take a step back to see what the member described as the big picture of the ongoing events. One senior command staff member noted that, going forward from the events of late May, CPD needed to prepare for mass arrests by having the kits on “standby” in the districts

Even the mass arrest kits that CPD did have and distribute in the field were problematic. Many were left over from the NATO protests in 2012, and one senior CPD member described how the flex cuffs in many kits were decayed or broken. Additionally, mass arrest cards had undergone a revision between 2012 and 2020, and some of the left-over kits contained only outdated cards.

### 3. CPD Failed to Take the Necessary Steps to Ensure That Arrestees Were Transported with Arrest Paperwork or Charge Information

As described above, under the mass arrest procedures, the arresting officer is not the same officer who transports and eventually processes an arrestee.<sup>185</sup> Because of this, a key step in a mass arrest procedure is the completion of a mass arrest card, documenting the circumstances and probable cause for the arrest, or at the very least, writing the arresting officer's star number and the charge information on the arrestee's arm so that the arrestee can be charged and the arresting officer's identity is known for any necessary follow-up. One senior command staff member described this as the most critical part of the mass arrest process. Without this, the individualized probable cause that is required to support every arrest and the detention of a person is lost, generally rendering continued detention illegal and necessitating that the arrestee be released without charges. Under the mass arrest procedures, "the on-scene arrest processing supervisor [who, under Section III.A.1.e, was previously designated by the Incident Commander at the time of the mass arrest declaration] will ensure that a Mass Arrest Card is completed for all arrestees unless exigent circumstances preclude same."

This process suffered a breakdown on May 30-31. On those days in particular, CPD members described a number of arrestees being transported to processing centers without a mass arrest card or information about by whom and for what they were arrested. For example, at 5:50 p.m. on Saturday, a transport vehicle from the 22<sup>nd</sup> District—which had left Trump Tower en route to the 18<sup>th</sup> District lockup but was then diverted to the 2<sup>nd</sup> District—reported over the radio that they did not have arresting officer names for any of the 14 people they were transporting. According to OIG's review of the protest arrest data, 114 (11.2%) of arrestees on May 30–31 were released without charges. A District Commander said it was likely there were a number of arrestees who had to be released for lack of paperwork, given the day had been an "all-out disaster."

There are several reasons why arrests lacked documentation. As described above, mass arrest cards were poorly distributed and some members were unaware that arrest information could be written on an arrestee's arm in the absence of a mass arrest card. However, according to multiple senior command staff members, in the chaos of the violence and mayhem that enveloped Chicago that weekend, mass arrest cards were lost or officers simply did not have time to fill them out, forgot to fill them out, or were unable to fill them out.

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<sup>185</sup> "Special Order S06-06 Mass Arrest Procedures," September 27, 2018, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12b3f6c9-62812-b3f6-c9f7463f28e17719.html>.

Some CPD members realized early on that the lack of documentation was a potential problem. At 2:44 p.m. on Saturday, May 30, a District Commander downtown instructed all officers assigned to prisoner vans that they needed to document the arresting officer's star number, beat number, and "make sure we have a mass arrest card filled out documenting why [they were arrested]" for every arrestee loaded in their van. BWC footage reviewed by OIG showed a supervisor downtown insisting to a transport officer that "you've got to ask the questions" when the transport officer said they knew the "story"—apparently meaning the facts and circumstances of the arrest—for only one of the six people they had in the transport vehicle. Minutes later, as other prisoners were being loaded into the transport vehicle, this transport officer is seen telling other officers that no one goes in the back of the transport vehicle until they get a "story."

Compounding officers' failure to properly document arrests was the uncertainty regarding the transport process itself. Like many other aspects of the mass arrest process, there was substantial confusion around what unit was responsible for ensuring arrestees were transported with appropriate documentation. The mass arrest procedures assign this role to the "on-scene arrest processing supervisor," a position appointed by the Incident Commander when a mass arrest is declared.<sup>186</sup> As described above, there were conflicting understandings over who was the Incident Commander on May 30–31, a situation which may have hampered the appointment of an on-scene arrest processing supervisor. A high-ranking CPD official believed that, by policy, the Chief of BIA was responsible for ensuring that arrestees were transported with arrest information. However, this is not contained in the mass arrest policy. Another senior command staff member involved in mass arrest processing described how at preplanned events, BIA Sergeants and Lieutenants are designated to staff the transport vans and ensure that arrestees are transported with arrest information, handle any use of force complaints an arrestee wants to make, and ensure the arrestees are not mistreated. This member recognized that the mass arrest policy does not require BIA to fulfill this role, but they also stated that it is "traditionally" BIA's role.

Members of BIA's senior leadership, in contrast, understood their role to be present not in the field, but rather at the remote processing sites where arrestees arrived, to ensure their needs were addressed. BIA believed that there was a group of Captains assigned to CPD's Inspections Division who were supposed to be in the field ensuring that only arrestees with the requisite arrest documentation were transported. On Saturday, realizing that a mass arrest situation was likely developing, CPD members assigned to BIA were deployed to the processing sites. Without specific guidance or instruction, the BIA team tried to figure out the cobbled together mass arrest policy.

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<sup>186</sup> "Special Order S06-06."

Contrary to expectations of those in BIA, Inspections Division Captains were not in the field working to ensure that arrestees were only transported with arrest information. Instead, the inspectors were *also* at the processing sites monitoring booking processes, because they too believed that to be their role. The responsibilities of neither BIA members nor inspectors are formalized in the mass arrest procedures and, like BIA, the inspectors reported deriving their understanding of their role in mass arrests from past practice.

As a result, for much of Saturday and Sunday, no one, in fact, fulfilled the task of ensuring that only arrestees with requisite documentation of arrest information were transported. A District Commander said that they did not see a single transport vehicle for which a supervisor was present and attending to that need during that timeframe.

Some processing centers were seemingly more affected by this issue than others. For instance, the processing center at Area 4 estimated releasing six people without charge. Yet at Area 3 Headquarters at Belmont and Western, multiple CPD members estimated that upwards of 90% of mass arrestees brought there on May 30 were released without charges. OIG's own analysis of arrestee processing and release at the Area 3 Headquarters indicates that 66 of 162 arrestees (41%) processed there were released without charges. On May 30 alone, 54 of 74 arrestees (73%) processed at Area 3 Headquarters were released without charges. According to arrest report narratives and an interview with a CPD member, many or possibly all of the arrestees brought to Area 3 were transported there by Cook County Sheriff's Office personnel, including a bus that held dozens of arrestees. Multiple protesters described being transported in a Sheriff's bus from the area around Trump Tower to Area 3 and then being released without charges. One protester reported that their friend was arrested "on the bridge in front of Trump Tower... just for being there."<sup>187</sup> This person was reportedly "squeezed" onto a "police bus" with "around" 40 other people and was eventually released without charges.<sup>188</sup> Another protester recounted a similar story: they were arrested outside Trump Tower on the Wabash Avenue Bridge. They then sat on the curb outside Trump Tower for three hours before they were placed on a "Sheriff's bus," where they sat for another three hours before being taken to Area 3.<sup>189</sup> These accounts are supported by BWC footage, which depicts a number of arrestees sitting on a curb at Trump Tower at approximately 6:00 p.m. BWC footage depicts the same arrestees being walked from that curb to a large Cook County Sheriff's prisoner bus parked at Kinzie Street and State Street at approximately 8:50 p.m.

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<sup>187</sup> Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitor Listening Sessions at 29, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2020).

<sup>188</sup> Transcript of Proceedings, (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2020).

<sup>189</sup> Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitoring Listening Sessions at 39:10 and 40:13-18, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2020).



OIG was unable to determine if reliance on the assistance of Cook County Sheriff's Office personnel contributed to the large number of arrestees released without charges at Area 3 Headquarters. It is possible, however, that the involvement of an outside agency in a critical step in the mass arrest procedure—the handoff from arresting officer—was a factor in the large number of arrestees released without charges. Sheriff's Office personnel likely had little familiarity with the mass arrest procedures and also may not have heard the broadcast over CPD radio regarding the importance of identifying an arresting officer and charge for each person transported.

In addition to arrestees being released without any charge at all, a senior CPD member involved in mass arrest processing stated that another consequence of the often inadequate mass arrest documentation was that arrestees were charged with low-level disorderly conduct when a more serious charge, such as looting, might have been appropriate.<sup>190</sup> This same member said that when people came in without mass arrest cards, processing members relied upon whatever information the transport officers could give them to generate a charge. They described how a default alternative practice of charging most people with disorderly conduct during the mass arrest, coupled with the lack of documentation, may have led to undercharging.

Conversely, OIG gathered some evidence of overcharging, where—due to a lack of arrest documentation—an arrestee may have been charged when no charge was appropriate. One protester described a situation that may have led to this sort of overcharging. The protestor said that initially no charges were written on their arm. Later, however, the transport officers convinced an officer, who was not involved in the protestor's arrest, and who, according to the protestor, could not have known the circumstances behind it, to write a charge on their arm.

In all events, the possibility that disorderly conduct charges were used—in the absence of mass arrest paperwork—to both overcharge and undercharge people is supported by OIG's review of the protest arrest data (Figure 14), which found that disorderly conduct was by far the most common charge associated with relevant arrests.

When it became known among CPD's command staff that arrestees were coming to processing centers with no arrest information and were being released without charges, they began working on a solution. A high-ranking CPD official "ordered" BIA supervisors into the field so they could be present when arrestees were delivered to transport vehicles. While that official recounted this as an order to BIA to fulfill its assigned function during mass arrests, it was understood by BIA senior leadership as

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<sup>190</sup> On June 1, 2020, a member of CPD's Office of Legal Affairs emailed the exempt members to provide a "list of possible charges for mass arrests," which included violation of the curfew and three different kinds of disorderly conduct. The email provided "draft narratives as well" for each charge.

an ordered departure from normal practice. In any event, BIA may not have had enough supervisors to perform this task for every transport location. Instead, BIA supervisors were paired with Deputy Chiefs in Area-specific Forward Command Posts after the initial weekend. BIA supervisors would communicate with the processing centers about mass arrests taking place in the field, so that the processing centers could be prepared to handle the number of arrestees coming in. Reportedly, this made the mass arrest process more orderly and streamlined.

Detectives assigned to process prisoners made operational adjustments as well. One Bureau of Detectives Commander involved in processing arrests said they made it absolutely clear to transport officers that arrestees needed to arrive at processing with “mass arrest card, star number, and story” or they would not be processed. This Commander reported that once that message made its way back to officers in the field, the process got easier. As already described above, field supervisors too began to push transport officers to obtain this information.

In reflecting on the protests and unrest, Mayor Lightfoot reported her sense that “a lot of the people that were arrested got the charges dismissed, which breeds a lot of anger, a lot of resentment, [and] delegitimizes policing.”

Whether it was the changes by the detectives at the processing centers, having BIA supervisors in the field, increased awareness of and comfort with procedures attributable to reminders circulated by the Department, or simply the reduction in arrests due to an ebbing of street activity with reducing the levels of chaos, violence, and looting from the weekend—CPD made 302 protest- and unrest-related arrests on June 1 and 127 on June 2—senior CPD members largely believed that the mass arrest process improved markedly beginning Monday, June 1. Mass arrest designations remained in place at least through Sunday, June 7.

#### 4. Delays in Transporting and Processing Arrestees Due to Resource Constraints Posed Significant Risks to Officer and Arrestee Safety and Discouraged Officers from Making Arrests or Documenting Appropriate Charges

CPD members and community members reported significant delays in the transport and processing of arrestees, especially from mid-afternoon into the evening of May 30.<sup>191</sup> The first radio call indicating a shortage came at 3:16 p.m. from a District Commander assigned to downtown requesting more prisoner vans over the radio. A senior CPD member reported that there was a massive demand on May 30, with

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<sup>191</sup> In its comments on a draft of this report, CPD noted that “[m]any streets were blocked by protesters, rioters and looters. This limited access to these locations, and when transport vehicles did arrive on the scene, they were subject to attack and in some cases destroyed.”

radio traffic consisting of officers asking for transport vehicles nonstop. By way of example, just after 11:00 p.m., a dispatcher asked the officers driving one transport vehicle how many arrestees they could transport. When they replied that the transport vehicle could hold “at least 20” arrestees, the dispatch asked those officers to go to give different locations downtown to pick up waiting arrestees. Several minutes later, the dispatcher asked the same transport vehicle to go to a sixth location in order to pick up “three combative[]” arrestees.

OIG reviewed BWC footage of officers releasing a person they had arrested for burglarizing a 7-Eleven, apparently because they did not want to wait for a transport vehicle. A CPD Sergeant reported arresting three people coming out of a looted store in the Loop on that date and then having to wait for half an hour for a transport. The Sergeant reported that they simply stopped making arrests because it took too long for a transport vehicle to arrive. A District Commander likewise commented that it took “too long” to get transports, which generally was a huge problem. Another District Commander reported that because of the transport delays they told their officers only to arrest people who were looting. For any other offenses, officers were told to take the person’s information, because if too many officers were occupied with processing arrests, there would not be enough of them to protect property and lives.


Arrestees also described long delays in transport and processing. As described above, one arrestee reported waiting for three hours on a curb before being put on a transport bus, where they sat for another three hours.<sup>192</sup>

OIG’s analysis of protest-related arrests confirmed arrestee waited for transport, or were in transit, for many hours (Figure 15 below). On average, arrestees were detained for a total of 14.0 hours. The briefest total detention time recorded was 1.2 hours and the longest was 53.3 hours. Arrest reports record detention time in three stages: the time from arrest to transport, the time from transport to arrival in lockup, and the time from arrival in lockup to release. OIG’s analysis of this data also corroborates testimonials that some individuals spent several hours waiting for transport after their arrests. While 75% of arrest reports indicate that arrestees were transported within 30 minutes, arrest reports also indicate that 14 arrestees were not transported for 5 hours or more.

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<sup>192</sup> Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitoring Listening Sessions at 40:13-18, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2020).

FIGURE 15: DISTRIBUTION OF ARRESTEES' DETENTION TIMES<sup>193</sup>



Source: OIG analysis of CPD arrest data.

There also is reason to believe that the reported data on detention times may understate the problems of delay in transporting and processing arrestees. One CPD officer who spoke with OIG cautioned that in the chaos of that period, arrest, transport, and received times may have been estimated, rather than recorded precisely. At least one arrest report OIG reviewed specifically stated the recorded arrest time was an estimate. As described above, the mass arrest procedures require a “security officer” who keeps a log of arrestees who enter transport vehicles and at what times, but there is no evidence that such an officer was appointed or present, or that such a log was kept. On June 3, CPD internal emails indicate that CPD received a request from the Mayor’s Office for a “summary detailing the processes that people who are arrested go through, and why it took so long for some people to be processed and released.”

<sup>193</sup> Chart excludes arrests that are missing time stamps for one or more detention stages and excludes arrests with a time differential of less than zero reported for one or more stages. 234 arrest records (15.5% of the 1,519 total arrests) are excluded on this basis.

These delays raised significant safety concerns for both officers and arrestees, as both groups had to wait for transport in the midst of fighting and looting. For instance, OIG reviewed BWC footage showing officers and arrestees waiting for a transport vehicle at Van Buren Street and Dearborn Street, reporting that bottles were being thrown at them. One arrestee complained that broken glass had landed on them. In another instance, the safety concerns led to one District Commander telling their officers to make arrests only if they could safely get a transport.

Finally, CPD members commented that these delays discouraged them from charging people with more serious crimes, such as burglary or theft (looting). Officers instead charged them with disorderly conduct, because completing the booking process for that charge took significantly less time. For instance, according to one arrest report narrative from early Saturday morning, a CPD officer was assaulted downtown in an incident that was captured in BWC footage, but only charged the person with disorderly conduct. The officer wrote “felony charges are not being pursued at time of report in consideration of the overwhelming burden of the mass arrest incident on department detectives and supervisors.” This time differential is likely largely attributable to differences in processing requirements for charges of different classes.

All non-drug-related felony charges, including burglary and looting, require Assistant State’s Attorney approval in a process called “felony review,” which can be more time-consuming than bringing a misdemeanor or petty charge.<sup>194</sup> A senior CCSAO official told OIG that, because CPD was caught unprepared when the protests began, officers adopted the mentality of charging people quickly and figuring out the rest later. Internal CPD emails show that there was communication between CPD and CCSAO about the choice of felony versus misdemeanor charges. On June 2, 2020, a Chief wrote to several other senior command staff members that they had been in contact with CCSAO, which “want[s] to ensure CPD [sic] that they are reviewing and approving Felony Charges, specifically ‘looting.’”

The delays in transport and processing meant that many arrestees could not be located for lengthy periods until they were fully processed. For instance, one protester recounted during a community listening session that, after they were arrested and taken to the 18<sup>th</sup> District, “multiple attorney[s]...were unable to ascertain [their] location for hours.”<sup>195</sup> This same protestor testified that they were held for 12 hours at the 18<sup>th</sup>

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<sup>194</sup> “Special Order S06-03, Felony Review By Cook County State’s Attorney,” April 14, 2015, accessed November 5, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-1293c433-cb612-93ce-9c013ae422006b3e.html>.

<sup>195</sup> Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitor Listening Sessions at 143:13-19, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2020).

District before they were released without charge.<sup>196</sup> For arrestees ultimately released without charge because CPD could not substantiate any justification for holding them—that is, in the absence of a documented, lawful reason for any detention at all—these delays are of particular concern.

## FINDING 2: CPD DID NOT FULFILL ITS FORCE REPORTING OBLIGATIONS AND DID NOT PROVIDE CLEAR AND CONSISTENT GUIDANCE TO OFFICERS ON REPORTING OBLIGATIONS

### A. CPD USE OF FORCE POLICY PROVISIONS

CPD's policies on the use of force in crowd control situations and on reporting obligations related to uses of force are spread across several Department directives. A suite of nine related general orders, numbered G03-02 and G03-02-01 through G03-02-08, outline CPD's basic principles of use of force, the circumstances under which each force option is authorized for use, and the reporting obligations of officers who have engaged in a use of force. The most recent revisions to General Order G03-02 and its sub-directives prior to the protests and unrest were in February 2020.<sup>197</sup>

General Order G03-02-02, "Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report," outlines the types of incidents that do and do not require department members to report a use of force on a TRR.<sup>198</sup> This policy requires CPD members to report all takedowns, physical strikes (manual or with an impact weapon), and weapon discharges (including OC spray, Tasers, and firearms). Lower-level uses of force, such as emergency handcuffing or escort holds, must also be reported if the subject is injured or alleges injury, if the officer is subjected to an assault or battery, or if the subject's actions classify the subject as an "assailant."<sup>199</sup> Each officer who deploys

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<sup>196</sup> Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitoring Listening Sessions at 143:13-19, *State of Ill. v. City of Chi.*, No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2020).

<sup>197</sup> "General Order G03-02 Use of Force," February 28, 2020, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-8fff-44306f3da7b28a19.html?ownapi=1>.

<sup>198</sup> "General Order G03-02-02 Incidents Requiring The Completion Of A Tactical Response Report," February 28 2020, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-1291da66-88512-91e2-cdd76fd8ae76d83d.pdf?hl=true>; "CPD-11.377 Tactical Response Report," March 2019, accessed August 14, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/forms/CPD-11.377.pdf>.

<sup>199</sup> CPD's policy on permissible force options classifies subjects as "assailants," "active resisters," "passive resisters," or "cooperative subjects" based on their actions. An "assailant" is "a subject who is using or threatening the use of force against another person or himself/herself which is likely to cause physical

a reportable use of force must complete a TRR for each subject against whom force was used.<sup>200</sup>

The February 2020 revision to General Order G03-02-02 introduced a new paragraph to address reporting obligations when force is deployed in a mass arrest context:

“III.E.: When a reportable use of force has occurred during an identified mass arrest incident, members will follow the special procedures outlined in the Department directive titled ‘Mass Arrest Procedures [Special Order S06-06].’”<sup>201</sup>

The concurrent mandates of the then-newly revised G03-02-02 and S06-06 created considerable confusion within CPD’s command staff during the protests.

The use of force reporting obligations outlined in Special Order S06-06 fall into two categories: (i) reportable use of force incidents that require the completion of a TRR, and (ii) reportable use of force incidents that are required to be recorded on a mass arrest card.<sup>202</sup> Generally speaking, S06-06 provides that lower-level reportable uses of force (takedowns and diffused-pressure manual strikes) against resisters in a mass arrest context are to be documented on a mass arrest card, while higher-level uses of force (including focused-pressure manual strikes and use of impact weapons or discharge weapons) and all uses of force against assailants are required to be documented on a TRR. Under the cross-referenced policies G03-02-02 and S06-06, however, CPD members’ obligations to report focused-pressure strikes (punches and kicks, etc.) and baton strikes are vulnerable to confusion. Under G03-02-02, focused-pressure strikes manual and baton strikes are only authorized against an assailant, and under G03-02-02 and S06-06, all uses of force against an assailant must be reported on a TRR, even in a mass arrest context. Therefore, any in-policy use of a focused-pressure strike or a baton strike must result in the completion of a TRR. But G03-02-02 and S06-06, read together, do not explicitly require that *all* focused-

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injury.”; “General Order G03-02-01 Force Options,” February 29, 2020, accessed October 8, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-9001-1d970b87782d543f.html>.

<sup>200</sup> For example, if Officers A and B encounter civilians X and Y and both officers use force against both subjects, four TRRs should be generated from the incident: A-X, A-Y, B-X, and B-Y.

<sup>201</sup> “General Order G03-02-02 Incidents Requiring The Completion Of A Tactical Response Report,” February 28 2020, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-1291da66-88512-91e2-cdd76fd8ae76d83d.pdf?hl=true>. “Special Order S06-06 Mass Arrest Procedures” was most recently revised in 2012, and its provisions for reporting certain uses of force on a Mass Arrest Card instead of a TRR date back at least that far. However, before the February 2020 revision to G03-02-02, those provisions in S06-06 were not indicated in CPD’s primary set of use of force directives, G03-02 and G03-02-01 through G03-02-08.

<sup>202</sup> “Special Order S06-06 Mass Arrest Procedures,” September 27, 2018, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12b3f6c9-62812-b3f6-c9f7463f28e17719.html>. “CPD-11.433 Mass Arrest Card,” September 2018, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/forms/CPD-11.433.pdf>.

pressure strikes manual strikes and baton strikes require the completion of a TRR as opposed to a mass arrest card. In other words, a CPD member who deployed an (out-of-policy) focused-pressure strike or baton strike against a non-assailant did not, at the time of the protests, have clear guidance in the relevant policies on their reporting obligations. This is particularly problematic given that, as discussed further below, there is evidence that focused-pressure manual strikes and baton strikes were deployed against non-assailants during the protests. In November 2020, CPD introduced a new directive, D20-08 (discussed further below), which clarified this point.

S06-06 also speaks explicitly to reporting obligations when OC spray or LRADs are used as force options in crowd settings: “For instances that utilize OC/chemical agents or a LRAD for crowd dispersal efforts, the completion of one Tactical Response Report (CPD-11.377) by each deploying member will be required for each instance.”<sup>203</sup> In addition, “[t]he use of OC or a chemical agent by a team consisting of personnel designated by the Incident Commander or the highest-ranking on-scene member of the Bureau of Patrol, will document the factors which led to the need for the dispersal on the mass arrest card and generate a “To-From” subject report.”<sup>204</sup> Taken together, these two provisions of S06-06 require *three* official reports when OC spray is used in a crowd control context: a mass arrest card, a To-From report, and a TRR.<sup>205</sup>

Under CPD policy, completion of a TRR is not required when an officer points a firearm at a subject. A separate Department Notice (D19-01) governs reporting obligations after an officer points their firearm and provides, with some exceptions, that an officer must notify an OEMC dispatcher promptly upon pointing their firearm at a subject.<sup>206</sup> Among the exceptions to this reporting obligation is that members of

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<sup>203</sup> “Special Order S06-06 Mass Arrest Procedures,” September 27, 2018, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12b3f6c9-62812-b3f6-c9f7463f28e17719.html>.

<sup>204</sup> “Special Order S06-06.”

<sup>205</sup> CPD officers carry individual hand-held cannisters of OC spray as a less-lethal force option on their utility belts. Directive U06-01-25 outlines the standards and specifications for those devices, which, like an officer’s firearm, are personal devices to be purchased and maintained by the officer. These devices are designed for direct application to an individual subject in close proximity. CPD also has larger cannisters that dispense liquid, foam, or aerosolized OC spray for distribution over larger areas. These larger cannisters are used for crowd control. “Uniform And Property U06-01-25 OC Chemical- Spray And Holder,” August 26, 2019, accessed October 19, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b85-16cce6e9-66216-ccee-c9a7fb953a796c85.pdf?hl=true>.

<sup>206</sup> “Department Notice D19-01 Firearm Pointing Incidents,” October 19, 2019, accessed October 16, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b9b-1689a018-67e16-89a0-4d6cf7dbfc2535b3.pdf?hl=true>. Consent Decree at 62:190-191, *State of Ill. v. City of Chi.*, No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2019).



the SWAT team are exempted when pointing their firearms “during the course of a designated SWAT incident.”<sup>207</sup>

In August 2020—that is, after the protest events which are the focus of this report—CPD released Special Order S03-22, “Response to Crowds and Civil Disturbances.”<sup>208</sup> Special Order S03-22 gave direction on the coordinated action of CPD “squads” (“typically up to 10 police officers”) and “platoons” (“typically up to six squads”) in crowd control situations, including the appropriate use of batons for crowd management and the use of a “rake” procedure to arrest an individual from within a crowd.<sup>209</sup> S03-22 further introduced an additional reporting form for use in crowd control contexts: the “Incident Response” form (CPD-11.302).<sup>210</sup> This form is required for collective reporting the use of force by a CPD squad or platoon operating in concert “to use a push, shove, or diffused-pressure strike in response to a crowd.” The Incident Response form includes space for the reporting member to indicate that OC spray was authorized or used, although S03-22 does not indicate that use of OC spray for crowd control creates an obligation for completion of the Incident Response form.<sup>211</sup> Special Order S03-22 was issued, according to CPD and despite not bearing any facial indication of temporary status, under paragraph 631 of the consent decree, which provides for the issuance of “a temporary policy or procedure” under “extraordinary circumstances;” CPD notes that this “does not permanently exempt any new or revised policy or procedure from the review and comment process.”<sup>212</sup>

In November 2020, CPD released Department Notice D20-08, “Reporting the Response to Crowds, Protests, and Civil Disturbances.”<sup>213</sup> This directive rescinds Special

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<sup>207</sup> Neither D19-01 nor Special Order S05-05, “Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Incidences,” gives a specific definition of a “SWAT incident.” S05-05 provides that “the first Bureau of Patrol supervisor to arrive on the scene [of a potential SWAT Incident] will...determine if the situation requires implementation of the SWAT Incident Program and, if so, implement the program.” “Department Notice D19-01 Firearm Pointing Incidents,” October 19, 2019, accessed October 16, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b9b-1689a018-67e16-89a0-4d6cf7dbfc2535b3.pdf?hl=true>; “Special Order S05-05 Special Weapons And Tactics (SWAT) Incidents,” January 29, 2019, accessed October 19, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12937790-40c12-9380-a8e2fad9866b4ff7.pdf?hl=true>.

<sup>208</sup> “Special Order S03-22 Response To Crowds And Civil Disturbances,” August 27, 2020, accessed October 16, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b9d-17430276-f7617-4311-d84b8ba266a02209.pdf?hl=true>. CPD stated that S03-22, as enacted, “incorporate[d] feedback received from the IMT.” OIG was not a party to the provision of that feedback, nor have the form or substance of the feedback been disclosed to OIG.

<sup>209</sup> “Special Order S03-22.”

<sup>210</sup> “CPD-11.302 Incident Response,” August 2020, accessed October 16, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/forms/CPD-11.302.pdf>.

<sup>211</sup> S03-22 did state that any use of OC spray still requires the completion of a TRR.

<sup>212</sup> Consent Decree at 200:631, *State of Ill. v. City of Chi.*, No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2019).

<sup>213</sup> “Department Notice D20-08 Reporting the Response to Crowds, Protests, and Civil Disturbances,” November 2, 2020, accessed December 23, 2020,

Order S03-22 and includes a note that “the Department has determined extraordinary circumstances demand an immediate revision or clarification to this policy. The Department will work collaboratively with the Independent Monitoring Team (IMT) and the Office of the Attorney General to review and modify the procedures and responsibilities established by this directive, as appropriate. While this review is being conducted and until a revised directive is published, the procedures established by this directive remain in effect.”<sup>214</sup> D20-08 continues the use of the Incident Response form introduced under S03-22 and maintains the same provisions around the types of force that must be reported on a TRR form and the types of force that must be reported on the new Incident Response form. D20-08 states explicitly that focused pressure strikes—such as punches, kicks, and baton strikes—must always result in the completion of a TRR, effecting a clarification of CPD’s force reporting policies.

Figure 16 below outlines CPD’s directives that speak to use of force policy and force reporting obligations. Figure 17 below depicts OIG’s analysis of the reporting obligations that are attached to each force option, under all relevant directives.

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
<http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b9d-1758a052-2d317-58a0-53d7992e15113270.pdf?hl=true>

<sup>214</sup> “Department Notice D20-08 Reporting the Response to Crowds, Protests, and Civil Disturbances,” November 2, 2020, accessed December 23, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b9d-1758a052-2d317-58a0-53d7992e15113270.pdf?hl=true>. In its written comments on a draft of this report, CPD wrote that “the Department worked at length with the IMT and the coalition of organizations involved in the Consent Decree (Coalition) to create [D20-08]. The Department took the Coalition’s criticism into consideration as it drafted this notice. The Department also shared drafts of this directive with the IMT.” OIG was not privy to drafts shared with the IMT or to any conversations with the IMT regarding those drafts.

FIGURE 16: CPD USE OF FORCE POLICY PROVISIONS

Directive	Title	Issue Date	Topics Addressed
G03-02	Use of Force	02/28/2020	General CPD policy regarding use of force
G03-02-01	Force Options	02/28/2020	Expectations of CPD members in selecting force options and obligation to de-escalate incidents where safe and feasible
G03-02-02	Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report	02/28/2020	Use of force reporting obligations and supervisory review obligations
G03-02-03	Firearm Discharge Incidents	02/28/2020	Policy governing sworn members' discharge of a firearm
G03-02-04	Taser Use Incidents	02/28/2020	Policy governing the use of Tasers
G03-02-05	Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Devices and Other Chemical Agent Use Incidents	02/28/2020	Policy governing the use of OC spray and other chemical agents
G03-02-06	Canine Use Incidents	02/28/2020	Policy governing the use of canines as a force option
G03-02-07	Baton Use Incidents	02/28/2020	Policy governing the use of batons
G03-02-08	Department Review of Use of Force	02/28/2020	Process followed by the Force Review Division to review uses of force reported on TRRs
S06-06	Mass Arrest Procedures	09/27/2018	Procedures in mass arrest contexts, including outline of use of force incidents that must be captured on mass arrest cards and use of force incidents that must be captured on TRRs
D19-01	Firearm Pointing Incidents	11/01/2019	Procedures for reporting firearm pointing incidents and the reasonableness standard for Department members when pointing a firearm at a person
S03-22	Response to Crowds and Civil Disturbances	08/27/2020 <i>(rescinded 11/02/2020)</i>	Procedures for use of batons for crowd control, procedures for effecting arrests in crowd settings, and procedures for reporting coordinated force against a crowd using batons
D20-08	Reporting the Response to Crowds, Protests, and Civil Disturbances	11/02/2020	Procedures for use of batons for crowd control, procedures for effecting arrests in crowd settings, and procedures for reporting coordinated force against a crowd using batons

FIGURE 17: CPD USE OF FORCE REPORTING OBLIGATIONS



Source: OIG analysis of CPD use of force reporting directives.

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Notes on Figure 17:

1. The obligation to report OC spray used in a crowd setting on a mass arrest card and a To-From subject report is contained in S06-06 VIII-B. The obligation to report OC spray used in a crowd setting on a TRR is contained in G03-02-02 III-A-2-(b)-(4) and S06-06 VIII-C. Special Order S06-06 VIII-C requires the completion of a TRR for "all weapons discharge incidents." As described in G03-02-05, OC spray is a discharge weapon.
2. An "assailant" under CPD's policies is defined in G03-02-01 IV-C as "a subject who is using or threatening the use of force against another person or himself/herself which is likely to cause physical injury."
3. Special Order S06-06 VIII-C provides that TRRs are required to be completed for "all weapons discharge incidents" but does not have the same provision for takedowns, manual strikes, or use of non-discharge weapons. These force options fall under the provision in S06-06 VIII-A that "the mass arrest card will be used to record, in a mass arrest incident, all reportable uses of force concerning resisters unless otherwise indicated in Item VIII-C of this directive." However, batons used as impact weapons and focused pressure strikes (including kicks, elbow strikes, and punches), if conducted in accordance with CPD policy, should also always result in the completion of a TRR. These force options are only authorized against an assailant. See G03-02-01 IV-C. The policy limits on baton strikes to the head and neck are even more restrictive than on baton strikes in general; baton strikes against the head and neck are considered uses of deadly force and are never authorized except against assailants "whose actions constitute an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to a Department member or to another person." See G03-02-01 IV-C and G03-02-07 II-D. A use of force against an assailant requires the completion of a TRR, even in a mass arrest setting, per S06-06 VIII-C. At the time of the protests and unrest, there was no explicit guidance in CPD's policies on how members were to report a focused-pressure strike or a baton strike to a non-assailant, although CPD may have intended that such instances would be reported on TRRs, as evidenced by the policy change introduced after the protests. As of November 2020, Department Notice D20-08 has clarified that "any baton use as an impact weapon directed at an individual subject" and "any direct mechanical strike directed at an individual subject, such as a punch or kick" must result in the completion of a TRR. See D20-08 IV-D-2-3. D20-08 took immediate effect when it was issued in November 2020, but was issued with the notice that it was subject to "immediate revision or clarification."
4. The conditions that determine if a mass arrest event is in effect are given in S06-06. There is no single definition of such an event; see Finding 1 in this report.
5. Special Order S03-22 and Department Notice D20-08 describe use of force reporting requirements in the context of a "crowd management incident or civil disturbance." There is no single definition of such an event in S03-22 or D20-08. Neither S03-22 nor D20-08 equates crowd management incidents or civil disturbances with mass arrest incidents as described in S06-06.
6. CPD's Incident Response form (CPD-11.302) was not in effect at the time of the events discussed in this report.

## B. CPD PARTNER AGENCIES AND USE OF FORCE

CPD coordinated with partner law enforcement agencies during the protests: the Illinois National Guard, ISP, the Cook County Sheriff's Office, and the University of Chicago Police Department (UCPD).<sup>215</sup> The National Guard provided a perimeter around downtown; ISP provided officers to assist with patrolling downtown during the initial weekend and helped shut down expressways; and the Sheriff's Office provided prisoner transport vans and assisting officers. A senior member of CPD's command staff noted that there was no policy coordination effort in advance of initiating these efforts, and that CPD does not have joint training exercises with these agencies. OIG did not conduct a review of use of force reporting policy or practice of the aforementioned partner agencies; OIG did, however, contact all four agencies and review Cook County Sheriff's Office records to understand their role in the protest response, including any uses of force.

### 1. Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA)

In an interview with OIG, an IEMA senior official explained that National Guard troops generally are not trained in the non-lethal use of force, and that it was therefore a high priority to avoid putting them in a situation where they would need to respond with force. The gravity of such a situation arose in the context of the early deployment of the National Guard. Specifically, an IEMA senior official related that, at one point, the situation on the streets downtown became so dangerous that National Guard troops were allowed to "lock and load" their firearms. The chain of command to authorize the lock and load action would have included the ISP Director, the Adjutant General of the National Guard, and IEMA's Director, with the Governor of Illinois as the final decision-maker. National Guard troops may not fire their weapons unless ordered to do so, and no such order was given during the National Guard deployment to Chicago in the course of the events at issue here.

More generally, CPD's legal counsel emphasized different factors when explaining the role that the National Guard came to play in responding to the protests. On Sunday, CPD's Office of Legal Affairs was informed that the National Guard did not have rules of engagement with civilians, so CPD's legal counsel began to draft rules that would govern National Guard actions when they were deployed. These rules, however, were

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<sup>215</sup> On May 31, 2020, the Superintendent also received email communications from representatives of U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations unit offering "assets available to you to help with the violent protesting." The Superintendent acknowledged this offer and stated that "my Chief of Staff...will be in touch." The Chief of Staff received two further communications from ICE Homeland Security Investigations personnel on the same day, which were forwarded internally at CPD. CPD did not produce to OIG any emails indicating that CPD responded to the ICE offer beyond the Superintendent's initial message. Mayor Lightfoot reported that "we basically ran through what other assets we could—certainly federal assets that we could call upon, and my recollection is we were basically told they are not available to you."

never put into effect. CPD's legal counsel reported to OIG that at the eleventh hour of drafting the rules, CPD was advised that the National Guard did not have arrest authority and therefore could not detain anyone. This information led to CPD's decision to have ISP—which does have rules of engagement with civilians and arrest authority—accompany the National Guard on all their deployments. CPD's legal counsel reported to OIG that they did not independently review ISP's use of force rules before ISP deployments.

## 2. Illinois State Police

ISP has statewide jurisdiction and was able to deploy quickly in Chicago and operate under its own rules and policies. According to ISP senior staff, the entire Department is trained in crowd control techniques. ISP confirmed with OIG that its officers did use force in effecting arrests but did not deploy OC spray or any other chemical munitions. By ISP's accounting of their deployment in Chicago and their operating procedures, they used videographers and/or drone footage to capture records of potential uses of force and arrests. However, a review of ISP's force reporting obligations and compliance was out of the scope of this report.

## 3. Cook County Sheriff's Office

As described above, the Sheriff's Office deployment assisted CPD in transporting arrestees. In its review of video provided by the Sheriff's Office, OIG saw evidence of a few instances of Sheriff's Office personnel effecting or assisting in arrests but no evidence of Sheriff's Office personnel engaging in use of force.

## 4. University of Chicago Police Department (UCPD)

UCPD is a non-governmental police agency, governed by the Illinois Private College Campus Police Act, whose members are armed, authorized to use force, and trained by CPD's Education and Training Division. Its jurisdiction is established by the City Council and extends beyond the boundaries of the University of Chicago's campus into the city at large; it is bounded by 37<sup>th</sup> Street to the north, Lake Shore Drive to the east, 64<sup>th</sup> Street to the south, and Cottage Grove Avenue in the west.<sup>216</sup> As a general matter, UCPD exercises jurisdiction as the primary agency—that is, takes primacy over CPD—for incidents occurring on University of Chicago property or adjacent to it, except for deaths or matters classified as sex crimes. Elsewhere, UCPD functions in a role that is secondary to CPD; specifically, in this secondary capacity, UCPD will monitor radio traffic, respond to calls, and “hold the scene” until CPD arrives. UCPD played a role in response to the protest and looting events concentrated on 53<sup>rd</sup> Street and in the shopping center at 55<sup>th</sup> Street and Lake Park Avenue. In an interview with OIG, UCPD leadership declined to discuss UCPD uses of force during the protests, on

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<sup>216</sup> UCPD's jurisdiction is laid out in a City ordinance, most recently in O2011-7316.

the grounds that UCPD is a private organization, where any uses of force are reported and investigated within the department and any discipline is handled within the department; uses of force by UCPD members on the streets of Chicago may not be reported, therefore, in TRRs or any other CPD documents.

### C. CPD-REPORTED USE OF FORCE DATA

OIG analyzed CPD's TRR data in completing its analysis. Two hundred and fifty total TRRs were completed in relation to incidents between 5:00 p.m. on May 29 and 11:59 p.m. on June 7. To identify TRRs from this total pool that were relevant to protests or unrest, OIG applied several criteria. TRRs that met one or more of the following conditions were included in the analysis:

- All TRRs that indicated that the use of force took place in the context of a "Riot/Mob Action/Civil Disorder"<sup>217</sup>
- All TRRs with an RD Number that corresponded to an arrest identified by OIG as related to protests or unrest<sup>218</sup>
- All TRRs for which the narrative section included one or more of the following keywords: "unrest", "looting", "mass arrest", "disturb the public peace", "curfew", "disperse", "dispersal", "looter", "looted", or "riots"

With these selection criteria, OIG identified 113 TRRs likely related to protests or unrest. Figure 18 shows the distribution of those reported uses of force by District and by force option deployed.

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<sup>217</sup> The TRR form gives this option as the section where members indicate the "type of activity" that led to the use of force. "CPD-11.377 Tactical Response Report," March 2019, accessed August 14, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/forms/CPD-11.377.pdf>.

<sup>218</sup> See Finding 1 above for the selection criteria used to identify relevant arrests.



FIGURE 18: FORCE OPTIONS USED AND SUBJECT INJURIES IN TRR USE OF FORCE REPORTS<sup>219</sup>


District	Baton	OC Spray	Semi-Auto Pistol	Taser	Manual striking force	Take-down	Subject injury	Subject alleged injury
001	6	1	0	0	7	7	1	2
002	1	0	0	0	3	1	1	1
003	0	0	0	1	2	4	1	0
004	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
005	7	0	0	0	1	3	2	4
006	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
007	3	0	1 <sup>220</sup>	0	0	3	0	2
008	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
009	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
010	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
011	1	1	0	1	5	3	2	2
012	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
014	0	0	0	3	0	4	1	0
015	4	1	0	0	1	3	0	1
016	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
017	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
018	1	3	0	0	2	2	0	0
019	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
020	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
022	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
024	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
025	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
TOTAL	30	7	1	7	24	39	10	13

Source: OIG analysis of CPD TRR data.

<sup>219</sup> No TRRs reported for use of canines, less lethal shotgun, revolver, rifle, Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) or "Other Weapon." Some TRRs may record multiple uses of force; additionally, TRRs may be recorded to reflect an injury to an officer, or the use of a control tactic with an injury or alleged injury to a subject. Therefore, the total number of force options deployed reflected in this table (108) does not exactly match the number of TRRs identified as relevant by OIG (113).


<sup>220</sup> The one TRR reporting the use of a firearm within OIG's sample of cases is an incident of an officer shooting a dog that had bitten the leg of another officer. The officer stated in the narrative section of the TRR that "SPENT SHELL CASINGS WERE SELF-RECOVERED ON SCENE DUE TO CITY WIDE RIOTS AND CIVIL UNREST THROUGHOUT THE IMMEDIATE AREA."

FIGURE 19: TOTAL USES OF FORCE REPORTED BY TRR, BY DISTRICT



Source: OIG analysis of CPD TRR data.

FIGURE 20: MAP OF TOTAL USES OF FORCE REPORTED BY TRR, BY DISTRICT



Source: OIG analysis of CPD TRR data.

Two of the TRRs identified as relevant by OIG were “cancelled” by CPD after having been submitted and approved.<sup>221</sup> One of these appears to have been cancelled because it was a duplicate report of a baton usage; the other is a TRR completed by an officer to report their own injury but no injury to any subject. It is unclear why the latter of these two reports was cancelled.

OIG also reviewed “To-From” reports and Supplementary Reports generated by the SWAT team documenting 19 distinct times and locations where OC spray was used as a crowd control strategy on May 30 and into the early hours of May 31, then a further 5 times and locations where OC spray was used as a crowd control strategy later in the day on May 31. Of these 24 total recorded incidents of crowd control OC spray use, 20 were in 1<sup>st</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Districts. The remaining four incidents were one each in the 19<sup>th</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup>, 15<sup>th</sup>, and 25<sup>th</sup> Districts. No OC spray was used for crowd control between June 1 and June 7. As Figure 18 above shows, seven instances of OC spray were documented on TRRs. In each of these instances, the OC spray was targeted at a small group or an individual subject.

Finally, OIG reviewed OEMC data on all instances of firearm pointing notifications called in over the same period. Between 5 p.m. on Friday, May 29, and Sunday, June 7, OEMC data evidences 246 incidents of CPD members pointing their firearms.<sup>222</sup> The records of these events do not include any narrative description, so OIG was unable to determine which incidents were directly related to protests or unrest and which were part of unrelated police actions.

CPD’s completion of TRRs was slower than typical in the day following the protests and unrest. Eighteen percent of protest- and unrest-related TRRs from incidents occurring from May 29, 2020, through June 7, 2020, were approved within one week of the incident (20 out of 113), while 29% were not approved for 10 or more weeks (33 out of 113). By contrast, for all TRR incidents approved in 2019, 59% were completed within one week.

Even in normal times, CPD suffers from significant delays in finalizing approvals for a substantial subset of TRRs. Across all of 2019, 19.5% of TRRs were not approved for 10 or more weeks. But for incidents stemming from protest and looting, a larger proportion of TRRs were delayed longer than usual (Figures 21 and 22). G03-02-02, “Incidents


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<sup>221</sup> From OIG’s analysis of CPD TRR data, CPD appears to use the cancellation process to eliminate redundant TRRs—for example, duplicate TRRs when the officer accidentally submits the same form twice. CPD excludes cancelled TRRs from its reporting in annual reports and on its use of force dashboard, but from OIG’s analysis, cancelled TRRs do not appear to be dropped entirely from the CPD database. This means that OIG continues to have access to see the records of cancelled TRRs.

<sup>222</sup> CPD separately provided OIG with data on firearm pointing incidents between May 1 and June 30, in response to a production request from OIG. However, the CPD-provided data did not break out incidents by date. The data presented here therefore relies upon data from OEMC’s database.


Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report," does not mandate that reports be completed within a specified period, although it does require officers to immediately notify OEMC of a reportable use of force incident.<sup>223</sup>

FIGURE 21: DAYS ELAPSED BETWEEN USE OF FORCE INCIDENT AND TRR APPROVAL, PROTEST-RELATED USE OF FORCE INCIDENTS



Source: OIG analysis of CPD TRR data.

FIGURE 22: DAYS ELAPSED BETWEEN USE OF FORCE INCIDENT AND TRR APPROVAL, ALL TRRS APPROVED IN 2019



Source: OIG analysis of CPD TRR data.

<sup>223</sup> "General Order G03-02-02 Incidents Requiring The Completion Of A Tactical Response Report," February 28 2020, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-1291da66-88512-91e2-cdd76fd8ae76d83d.pdf?hl=true>.

## D. CPD'S FAILURE TO FULFILL USE OF FORCE REPORTING OBLIGATIONS

### 1. CPD Deployed Specialized Force Options for Crowd Control and Failed to Appropriately Document Those Uses of Force

During the protests, CPD deployed crowd-control force options that require special authorization. OC spray for crowd dispersal was deployed in at least two dozen distinct times and locations, as documented in the SWAT team's reporting. An LRAD (which can emit sound at frequencies intended to cause pain or discomfort) was also set up near Trump Tower on Saturday, May 30, and was used to broadcast dispersal orders to the crowd.<sup>224</sup> CPD members did not indicate that the LRAD was ever used as a force option, but the dispersal orders given did include the threat of deterrent noise. A senior command staff member who was working downtown noted that they asked for authorization to use the LRAD on Sunday, May 31 and that authorization—along with authorization to use OC spray for crowd control—was given to all Deputy Chiefs in the field. This command staff member also spoke to CPD's need for upgrading its equipment for deploying an LRAD, as the device was not properly mounted on the truck when it was deployed downtown.

As for the use of OC spray, CPD members consistently recognized that deployment of these specialized crowd-control uses of force required express authorization from the Superintendent or their designee. Some of the CPD members who spoke about the use of OC spray in reaction to the protests were also clear that the Superintendent initially expressly *prohibited* the use of OC spray in relation to the protests before ultimately giving that authorization.

In interviews, Superintendent Brown explained that he assessed the need for OC spray through radio communications and camera footage of events on the ground, where available. He reported that he only approved the use of OC spray when events crossed a threshold of subjects attempting to hurt officers—according to Brown's account, the need to control crowds or to stop looting were *not* sufficient rationale for him to authorize the use of OC spray. When asked if he ever gave a blanket authorization for the use of OC spray, Brown said no, but separately stated that he did give what he referred to as a general authorization for its use during a few limited time periods when looting and violence were widespread in the city. He indicated that these general authorizations occurred on Saturday, May 30 and Sunday, May 31, without specifying the timing of his authorizations.

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<sup>224</sup> As recounted in the Background of this report, the LRAD was used after CPD began to push demonstrators off the Wabash Avenue Bridge.

One command staff member who was a direct report to the Superintendent corroborated that Brown gave the first authorization to use OC spray on Saturday, May 30. This member described case-by-case requests and approvals for OC spray use, then a generalized authorization to Deputy Chiefs on the night of Saturday, May 30. A second direct report to the Superintendent likewise stated in an interview that the Superintendent's initial prohibition on OC spray was countermanded with an authorization to deputy chiefs to use OC spray as needed. This member placed this shift to general authorization to the Deputy Chiefs in the afternoon on Saturday, May 30.

Few, if any, of the command staff interviewed about the authorization of OC spray articulated the threshold that authorization should be in response to violence that Superintendent Brown stated in his interviews. Instead, the general recounting of command staff members associated the authorization of OC spray with the need to move protesters off the bridges, to protect property, and to slow down the movement of protesters through the city or against active resisters. However, one senior member of command staff explained that OC spray was to be used against "attackers," but extended this term to subjects assaulting officers, damaging property, or looting.

In an interview with OIG and the IMT, Mayor Lightfoot stated that Superintendent Brown sought and received her authorization before authorizing the use of OC spray for crowd control on Saturday, May 30 on the east side of Trump Tower. Neither the Superintendent nor the First Deputy Superintendent mentioned the Mayor's role in this decision in their interviews. By the Mayor's account, "[the Superintendent] asked for [the authorization] and I gave it to him." The Mayor further emphasized that her authorization was given in response to "a lot of violence that had broken out in and around Trump Tower." There were, by her recollection, "things like frozen water bottles, water bottles full of urine" being thrown at the police and "protesters that had hammers, pick axes, bats." These protestors were "physically challenging the police" and "not heeding commands to disperse or move back." The Mayor stated that she gave the authorization to use OC spray for crowd control not as a blanket authorization but as an authorization "unique to that specific circumstance" and specific place. As described above, at least one CPD Legal Officer believed that the authorization to use OC spray was what prompted the BIA Chief and the Chief of Detectives to generate a mass arrest RD number.

To-From reports completed on June 30 by a command staff member with authority over the SWAT team, documenting activity on May 30–31, state that "Superintendent David O. Brown and his designees...authorized the use of Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) during situations involving large crowds acting as noncompliant groups, active resisters, and assailants." These after-action reports confirm the timing of OC spray

authorization, but they also indicate that the SWAT team understood the use of OC spray to be authorized against “active resisters” and not only against “assailants.”<sup>225</sup>

CPD did not meet its reporting obligations for the use of OC spray, as set out in General Order G03-02-02. None of the incidents of OC spray deployed for crowd control by SWAT were recorded in TRRs. The SWAT To-From reports completed on June 30 note that “due to the mass arrest situation and the high number of use of force incidents requiring the completion of a TRR, all use of force incidents involving the SWAT Specialty Munitions Team (SMT) have been documented on the attached supplementary reports.” There is no indication in CPD policy, however, of any authority for the exemption of SWAT personnel from completing TRRs to document the use of OC spray.

In interviews, a supervisor with authority over the SWAT team confirmed that each SWAT member who deployed OC was obligated to fill out a separate TRR for each unique situation in which they deployed OC. However, this same supervisor stated that, after consultation with their commanding officer, the two of them agreed that the language of the mass arrest directive (S06-06) permitted them to resolve some use of force reporting requirements with supplementary reports. This supervisor also stated that they and their commanding officer concluded that, given the volume of uses of force they had deployed and the number of officer injuries (which also require the completion of TRRs), reporting with supplementary reports was their only option. It was not clear from context in the interview whether this command staff member understood S06-06 to permit SWAT to report OC spray usage in supplementary reports alone, or if they only understood S06-06 to permit SWAT to record officer injuries and lower level uses of force only in supplementary reports. In a subsequent interview, a CPD Legal Officer reported the understanding that the declaration of the mass arrest triggered an exemption for SWAT from reporting OC spray discharges on TRRs. The plain language of CPD's General Order G03-02-02, “Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report,” gives no indication that SWAT members are exempted from TRR reporting obligations, either in the ordinary course of events or in the special mass arrest circumstances covered by S06-06.

The Force Review Division (FRD) conducts internal and non-disciplinary reviews of TRRs with responsibilities that include but are not limited to ensuring that reporting

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<sup>225</sup> As noted above, CPD's policy on permissible force options classifies subjects as “assailants,” “active resisters,” “passive resisters,” or “cooperative subjects” based on their actions. An “assailant” is “a subject who is using or threatening the use of force against another person or himself/herself which is likely to cause physical injury.” An “active resister” is “a person who attempts to create distance between himself or herself and the member's reach with the intent to avoid physical control and/or defeat the arrest.” “General Order G03-02-01 Force Options,” February 29, 2020, accessed October 8, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-9001-1d970b87782d543f.html>.

obligations are met, and identifying tactical, equipment, or policy concerns.<sup>226</sup> A command staff member with authority over the Division indicated to OIG that FRD does not receive notice when the Superintendent authorizes the use of OC spray against crowds and that there is no mechanism in place for FRD to review SWAT's Supplementary Reports. As such, FRD was not notified of SWAT use of OC spray, and it is unclear what, if any, non-FRD after-action review of the SWAT team's uses of OC spray was conducted. A SWAT supervisor with whom OIG spoke described how SWAT force reporting is, in practice, distinct from other units' force reporting. The SWAT supervisor described a paper (i.e., non-electronic) management system for SWAT supplementary reports and seemed to suggest that these paper supplementary reports routinely function in place of TRR forms for SWAT members reporting uses of force.

The eight SWAT reports reviewed by OIG were completed by eight different members of the SWAT SMT, cataloguing a total of 25 OC spray discharges on May 30 and May 31. One SWAT report details a single use of OC spray against an individual by a SWAT team member, in the 19<sup>th</sup> District. All others report multiple discharges of OC spray against a crowd. All seven of the SWAT reports detailing OC spray discharges against a crowd contain a similar description, with only minor variations, of the events leading to the need to use OC spray:

"At the request of field Commanders in their respective geographic areas and with the verbal authorization of Superintendent Brown via radio frequency, Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) was deployed from MK-9 and MK-46 [and ISPRAH M-5] aerosol projectors with positive effect. This deployment prevented further injury, [and halted/dispersed] attacks against the public and uniformed police officers attempting to defend themselves. It should be noted that on numerous occasions, members of these crowds were throwing items at uniformed police officers and no OC was deployed because assessment at that time deemed it would not be effective. Significant restraint was maintained at all times and members deployed OC only when absolutely necessary."

All of the reports also note in identical language that, "All officers that responded to the scene were dressed in SWAT uniforms, clearly marked as Chicago Police Officers."

Most of the SWAT reports state that there were no subject injuries that resulted from the use of OC spray, and none of the SWAT reports name subjects targeted with the OC spray, including the one report that describes an OC discharge against an

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<sup>226</sup> "General Order G03-02-08 Department Review Of Use Of Force," February 29, 2020, accessed October 16, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b9b-15f2592c-33815-f25c-63b922690a1aba22.pdf?hl=true>.



individual subject.<sup>227</sup> In the “Victim(s) Name” data field in the SWAT Supplementary Report, all eight reports list either “City of Chicago” or “DNA,” presumably for “Does Not Apply.” However, two of the reports do catalog injuries sustained by the SWAT team and other police officers.

The narrative sections of SWAT Supplementary Reports on the use of OC spray are longer than narratives typically included in TRR narratives. However, an array of required information in TRRs does not appear in all SWAT Supplementary Reports, including information on force mitigation efforts,<sup>228</sup> subject “condition” including any injuries or allegations of injury, subject’s actions, basic descriptive and identifying information about the subject, and medical treatment performed or offered and refused.<sup>229</sup>

Of the seven instances of OC spray use that were reported in TRRs, none explicitly refer to OC spray being used for crowd control. One of these seven reports describes OC spray being used against a small group of looters; the remaining six describe OC spray used against an individual subject. The officer who completed the one report that describes OC spray being used against a small group stated in the narrative section of the TRR that the officer was “also aware of a Superintendent’s authorization to deploy OC spray against rioters.”

## 2. CPD Underreported Uses of Baton Strikes and Manual Strikes, Resulting in an Inadequate Record of Severe and Potentially Out-Of-Policy Uses of Force

CPD’s use of force policies allow for the use of a baton as a “control instrument... applied to joints and pressure sensitive areas of the body with non-impact pressure” against passive resisters.<sup>230</sup> The use of a baton as an impact weapon is authorized only

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<sup>227</sup> One report does describe two injured subjects who were members of the protest crowd and received medical attention from the SWAT team. The first was “a male (approximately 11 years old) who was injured by broken glass. The male had fallen on glass and had significant lacerations to his left knee, abrasions to his right knee and abrasions to both hands.” The second was “a man who had been shot one block east of [the SWAT SMT team] location. The SMT proceeded to that location and found a man with a gunshot wound to the lower right leg. [A SWAT team member] administered a tourniquet while [a second SWAT team member] contacted CFD for an ambulance to transport and aid in further assessment of the patient.”

<sup>228</sup> The TRR form includes a checkbox for “None” under “Force Mitigation Efforts,” for when no force mitigation efforts were used.

<sup>229</sup> “CPD-11.377 Tactical Response Report,” March 2019, accessed August 14, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/forms/CPD-11.377.pdf>.

<sup>230</sup> Further guidance is given on the use of batons in crowd-control situations in S03-22 (since rescinded) and D20-08, although neither of these directives were operative at the time of the protests and unrest. “General Order G03-02-01 Force Options,” February 29, 2020, accessed October 8, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-9001-1d970b87782d543f.html>.

against an *assailant*; it is *not* authorized for use as an impact weapon against a resister, regardless of whether resistance is passive or active.<sup>231</sup> An assailant is defined as someone who is “aggressively offensive” or whose “actions constitute an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to a Department member or to another person.”<sup>232</sup> Baton strikes to the head or neck are prohibited except “when deadly force is justified.”<sup>233</sup>

OIG analyzed the 30 TRRs indicating the use of a baton. Three of these instances are TRRs by three separate officers involved in a single incident of force used against a single subject—according to the narratives, only one officer used their baton, but all three officers reported the use of the baton in their separate reports. Two other TRRs were completed by a single officer reporting the same incident; one of which was later “cancelled” as a duplicate report. Of the 30 TRRs, the majority (25) reference striking the subject with a baton as an impact weapon. Two TRRs refer to use of a baton only to push the subject, and the final three TRRs are unclear in their narrative sections about how the baton was used.<sup>234</sup> None of the TRRs that reference use of a baton as an impact weapon state explicitly that the officer struck a subject in the head or the neck.<sup>235</sup>

Of the 25 TRRs where officers report a subject was struck (as opposed to pushed) with a baton, 16 are described in the TRR narratives as responses to looting. The TRRs that report baton strikes in crowd control contexts generally describe highly belligerent subjects in their narrative sections, for example: “during the incident, multiple unknown assailant offenders began to push and punch and scratch [officer] while attempting to pull patrol bicycles away from officers in order to break through the [CPD] skirmish line.” In another example, the reporting officer wrote, “[reporting

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<sup>231</sup> “General Order G03-02-01 Force Options,” February 29, 2020, accessed October 8, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-9001-1d970b87782d543f.html>.

“General Order G03-02-07 Baton Use Incidents,” February 29, 2020, accessed August 17, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b9b-1708ddaf-c6817-08e0-bfd58705b1eb3184.html?hl=true>.

<sup>232</sup> “General Order G03-02-01 Force Options,” February 29, 2020, accessed October 8, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-9001-1d970b87782d543f.html>.

<sup>233</sup> “General Order G03-02-07 Baton Use Incidents,” February 29, 2020, accessed August 17, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b9b-1708ddaf-c6817-08e0-bfd58705b1eb3184.html?hl=true>.

<sup>234</sup> Two of the three “unclear” baton use TRRs in fact reference the same incident. They are duplicate reports of the same incident by the same officer, and as noted above, the duplicate record was “cancelled” by CPD after having been submitted and approved.

<sup>235</sup> Two TRR narratives include ambiguous language that could indicate strikes to the head or neck: “[Officer] USED HIS BATON SKRIKES [sic] TO MULTIPLE UNKNOWN ASSAILANT OFFEDERS [sic] ABOUT THE UPPER DELIVERY SYSTEMS”; “ANY STRIKES LANDED BY R/O [reporting officer] THAT WERE NOT ON LARGE MUSCLE GROUPS WERE NOT INTENDED AND ARE A RESULT OF [offender] CONTINUOUS MOVEMENT, AND RESISTING.” Many of the others explicitly state that strikes were restricted to subjects’ legs, arms, or backs.

officers] were ordering large, unruly crowd [sic] to disperse... [reporting officer] issued verbal commands to disperse. [Offender] repeatedly ignored verbal direction to leave the immediate area. During this event [reporting officer] witnessed/heard offender turn to [officer], state 'shut the fuck up bitch' and then slapped [officer's] hand attempting to strike and remove the baton from [officer's] hand."

Reports from community members who participated in the protests suggest that CPD members' use of batons was both substantially more widespread and more dangerous than indicated in the TRRs completed by officers.

Testimonials offered during the federal District Court listening sessions included at least three reports of CPD using batons to strike the heads or necks of protesters or to exert choking pressure on their necks during the period covered by this report.<sup>236</sup> One community member stated, "At the protest on May 31<sup>st</sup>, I witnessed an officer deliberately hit a teenage girl in the face with his baton, visibly shattering the bridge of her nose."<sup>237</sup> Another said, "an officer hit me in the throat with his baton."<sup>238</sup> The third testimonial that clearly identified a baton used on a subject's head or neck described one officer using his baton as a pressure instrument against the individual's neck, as well as other officers using their batons as impact weapons against others.<sup>239</sup> This community member stated, "[the officer] pressed his baton horizontally against my chest and also my neck...He was pressing the baton against my neck so hard that I couldn't fall to my knees. I was hanging by his baton...Later that day [May 30], I also watched the police swing their batons and hit protesters in the head, the neck, the shoulders, the face."<sup>240</sup>

Testimonials given in-person and in-writing to the Court also include several reports of protesters being struck with batons in crowd control contexts where no looting was taking place—significantly more than the number of such incidents reflected in

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<sup>236</sup> Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitor Listening Sessions at 140, 143, and 159, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2020).

<sup>237</sup> Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitor Listening Sessions at 140, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2020).

<sup>238</sup> Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitor Listening Sessions at 143, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2020).

<sup>239</sup> CPD directive G03-02-07, "Baton Use Incidents," does not speak explicitly to the use of a baton as a pressure implement against the neck. However, directive G03-02-02, "Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report," identifies "using a chokehold, carotid artery restraints, or other maneuvers for applying direct pressure on a windpipe or airway" as instances of deadly force. "General Order G03-02-07 Baton Use Incidents," February 29, 2020, accessed August 17, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b9b-1708ddaf-c6817-08e0-bfd58705b1eb3184.html?hl=true>

<sup>240</sup> Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitor Listening Sessions at 159, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2020).

TRRs analyzed by OIG.<sup>241</sup> It is difficult to get a clear estimate of the total number of baton strikes against non-assailants that community members claimed to have witnessed in these testimonials, because some describe multiple instances of baton strikes. One community member reported seeing people beaten with batons at the protests “tens of times.”<sup>242</sup> Another described seeing someone beaten “on the ground while handcuffed.” The testimonials in court included descriptions of protesters beaten with batons “until they were bleeding,” and protesters struck with batons in response to minor provocations by someone else (e.g., the throwing of a water bottle). Ghian Foreman, President of the Chicago Police Board, gave a public statement that he was “a victim of police aggression” when he was struck five times in the legs with batons while walking through the scene of a protest.<sup>243</sup>

In one instance captured in BWC footage, an officer in a looted store is apparently attempting to subdue a subject. The subject is face-down on the ground with one arm behind their back and the other arm on their head. Before the officer strikes the subject, the officer calls out “Gimme your hand. Gimme your fucking hand,” three times and struggles to apply handcuffs to the subject. The subject calls out “help me” several times and appears to try to move their hand out from behind their back. The officer states, “That's my hand. Don't grab my hand” and “You're hurting me. Don't fucking hurt me.” The subject then moves the hand on his head to underneath his body, and the officer then strikes the subject in the head or neck three times. As the officer strikes the subject, the officer says, “stop fucking resisting,” punctuating each word with a closed fist strike. The subject immediately responds, “I'm not, I'm not.” The subject is subdued and cuffed shortly after this point. This incident was not reported on a TRR.

In interviews, members of CPD's command staff who were in the field during the protests were consistent in reporting that that they saw officers comport themselves well under pressure and saw little or no evidence of excessive force. One high-ranking member reported “no real trends” in policy violations by officers. This member gave an example of a reportedly one-off instance with an officer who “lost his cool” and used a homophobic slur after having something thrown at him. This member reported that the involved officer was severely penalized by CPD and that CPD did

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<sup>241</sup> Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitor Listening Sessions at 79, 81, 116, 130, 140, 142, and 153, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2020); Written Comments On The Response Of The City Of Chicago To The Protests Since The Death Of George Floyd at 3, 19, 23, and 38, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2020).

<sup>242</sup> The IMT's community member interviews were conducted separately from the testimonials given in federal District Court.

<sup>243</sup> Jeremy Gorner, “Chicago Police Board President Says Officers Hit Him With Batons At Weekend Protest: ‘I Walked In The Middle Of An Uprising,’” June 5, 2020, accessed October 19, 2020, <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-police-board-president-struck-by-police-protest-complaint-20200605-c4mzcnngzgdxmugdulkh4wgcm-story.html>.

not see anything like that again afterwards. Invoking the terminology of CPD's use of force policies, another command staff member noted that they saw "assailants" at the protests—that is, individuals whose actions would justify high-level uses of force, including direct mechanical strikes and baton strikes.

These perceptions of CPD's use of force during the protests are profoundly at odds with the reported experiences of many protest participants, as the courtroom testimonials and interviews with community members demonstrate. Many participants and observers who gave testimony after these events described dangerous baton strikes and other reportable uses of force that are not reflected in CPD's reported data. CPD's after-action report does not acknowledge and does not attempt to rebut these claims.

### 3. CPD'S Use of Force Policy Detailing Reporting Obligations (G03-02-02) and Special Order on Mass Arrest Procedures (S06-06) Create Important Ambiguities About Sworn Member Reporting Obligations

Despite the observed and likely failures in CPD's force reporting with respect to TRR completion to document the use of baton strikes and manual strikes, CPD's obligations in both of those areas were relatively clear as a matter of policy. However, there existed at the time—and persist now—ambiguities in CPD's policies in relation to other types of use of force and uncertainty within the command staff about force reporting obligations in crowd control contexts.

A CPD command staff member recounted confusion among the command staff over the reporting obligations associated with use of force in a crowd control context. That confusion became evident when on June 1 and 2, 2020, the member raised concerns with at least six senior command staff members that not enough TRRs were being completed to correspond with activity on the ground. The member encountered inconsistent and sometimes inaccurate understandings among those senior members about the uses of force that required a TRR and whether uses of force could be reported on a "blanket" form.

One of the command staff members involved in these conversations went to the relevant policies to resolve the question and determined that each distinct use of force required a separate TRR to be submitted. However, other command staff members reportedly understood a "blanket" TRR to be acceptable for all uses of force in a mass arrest situation.

A plain language reading of G03-02-02 and S06-06 suggests both conclusions were incorrect. As explained above, G03-02-02 cross-references to the Mass Arrest

Procedures Special Order (S06-06), directing members to “follow the special procedures outlined in [S06-06]... when a reportable use of force has occurred during an identified mass arrest incident.”<sup>244</sup> This cross-reference is a recent addition to G03-02-02, appearing only in the February 2020 revision of that policy and not in prior versions. S06-06 in turn outlines some types of use of force incidents that require individualized TRRs, others that can be reported on a mass arrest card, and one force option—the use of OC spray for crowd control—that under the two policies requires completion of a mass arrest card use of force report, a TRR, and a To-From report (see Figure 17 above).

The command staff interviewee who described for OIG the aforementioned deliberations on use of force reporting obligations identified the six other senior command staff members (all Deputy Chief rank and above) involved in one or more of these conversations. OIG separately interviewed five of the six members. Of those five, the one who spoke most at length about use of force reporting obligations did not recall being involved in conversations with anyone regarding use of force reporting that weekend. This member did describe hearing people say during the protests that there was a “blanket exception” to the TRR requirement in place, and the member reported confusion from sergeants in their chain of command over what exceptions were or were not in place. They further reported that they did not believe the “blanket exception” idea to be accurate, but they did not indicate ever receiving clear guidance on the issue from any other member of CPD’s command staff.

In summary, around the second or third day of protests, multiple conversations involving senior command staff made it apparent internally—or should have—that there was confusion in the senior ranks as to the use of force reporting obligations in mass arrest settings. At least one member identified as having been involved in these discussions was not aware of any common understanding reached within the command staff, and in practice, the question may have been resolved in contradiction to what G03-02-02 and S06-06, read together, actually require.

Beyond the confusion within CPD over what the use of force reporting policies required, there were practical barriers to proper use of force reporting in the field as well. As detailed elsewhere in this report, sometimes mass arrest cards were not available to arresting officers on the scenes of protests; sometimes only outdated mass arrest cards were available; and sometimes the chaos at the scene of the arrests was such that officers were unable to complete force reporting obligations on scene. All of this was exacerbated by the absence of on-scene arrest supervisors ensuring completion of the requisite arrest documentation before transport.

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<sup>244</sup> General Order G03-02-02 Incidents Requiring The Completion Of A Tactical Response Report,” February 28 2020, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-1291da66-88512-91e2-cdd76fd8ae76d83d.pdf?hl=true>.

CPD produced only some of the relevant mass arrest cards to OIG. As Finding 3 below describes in more detail, CPD does not have policies in place for the retention of these records, and only a fraction of the mass arrest cards completed were retained, by happenstance photocopying. Of the 153 mass arrest cards that CPD did produce, only one reported a use of force that, outside of a mass arrest setting, would have required a TRR. This mass arrest card reported a takedown on May 31 of a subject who was reported as having not followed verbal direction and pulled away as a CPD member attempted to effect the arrest. The mass arrest card reports that the subject alleged an injury. On three other mass arrest cards, all from Sunday, May 31, the reporting officer initially indicated a takedown but then scratched out that report (see Figure 23 below for an example of one of these three).

FIGURE 23: A TAKEDOWN REPORTED AND THEN SCRATCHED OUT ON A MASS ARREST CARD

MEMBER'S RESPONSE		FORCE MITIGATION EFFORTS	
	MEMBER PRESENCE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SPECIALIZED UNITS <input type="checkbox"/>	
	VERBAL DIRECTION/CONTROL TECHNIQUES <input type="checkbox"/>	ADDITIONAL UNIT MEMBERS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
	ZONE OF SAFETY <input type="checkbox"/>	NONE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
	TACTICAL POSITIONING <input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER <input type="checkbox"/>	
CONTROL TACTICS/RESPONSE WITHOUT WEAPONS			
	ESCORT HOLDS <input type="checkbox"/>	OPEN HAND STRIKE <input type="checkbox"/>	
	WRIST LOCK <input type="checkbox"/>	CONTROL INSTRUMENT <input type="checkbox"/>	
	ARMBAR <input type="checkbox"/>	PRESSURE SENSITIVE AREAS <input type="checkbox"/>	
	<del>TAKEDOWN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></del>	EMERGENCY HANDCUFFING <input type="checkbox"/>	
	OTHER <input type="checkbox"/>		

Source: CPD mass arrest card.

Finally, OIG’s arrest report review provides some limited additional insight into possible gaps between CPD uses of force and its reporting thereof. Fourteen of the 1,519 arrest reports include an affirmative statement that a TRR was completed to report a use of force deployed in effecting the arrest. One arrest report, describing a takedown, contains the following statement in the narrative section: “per 2564 no TRR’s will be done at this time.” The number 2564 is the beat identifier for a sergeant in the 25<sup>th</sup> District, where the arrest in question occurred. The narrative section of this arrest report narrative does not indicate whether a mass arrest card was completed to report the takedown.<sup>245</sup>

<sup>245</sup> A takedown would ordinarily require the completion of a TRR but in a mass arrest situation would require force to be reported on a Mass Arrest Card (see again Figure 17 above).

## FINDING 3: CPD'S OPERATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE PROTESTS AND UNREST AND GAPS IN ITS RELEVANT POLICIES CRIPPLED ACCOUNTABILITY PROCESSES FROM THE START

### A. BREAKDOWNS IN MASS ARREST POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR ACCOUNTABILITY

Where large gatherings, demonstrations, and unrest were accompanied by allegations of police misconduct, CPD's mass arrest procedures as written posed structural challenges to effective disciplinary and accountability systems.

First, CPD's mass arrest procedures call for the use of a single RD number in the event of a mass arrest incident. The single RD number should be used for any arrest that does not require a follow-up investigation (e.g., arrests without felony charges). For arrests that do require follow-up investigations, an additional RD number should be obtained. Because of confusion, inconsistency, and poor communication surrounding mass arrest procedures, CPD did not comply with this policy; this failure raises significant concerns for meaningful supervisory oversight and accountability. Non-felony arrests made during the protests were documented under many different RD numbers. This made it challenging to fully identify, collect, and analyze all BWC footage relating to a particular event, and therefore renders any after-action review of an event all but necessarily incomplete.<sup>246</sup> Additionally, several videos within CPD's system were missing event identification numbers, which compounded the challenge of finding relevant footage.

Second, CPD's mass arrest card process is flawed from an accountability and transparency perspective. Only 153 mass arrest cards from the period of May 30 to

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<sup>246</sup> In an early August letter to the Superintendent, COPA's Chief Administrator wrote that the practice of using a single RD number for the "vast majority of all protest-related arrests . . . thwart[ed] meaningful supervisory oversight of members' actions." Data reviewed by OIG does not support the proposition that a "vast majority of all protest-related arrests" were associated with a single RD number, and notes that COPA's letter does not appear to account for the accountability challenges posed by a failure to comply with the policy which would have required the use of that single RD number. COPA's letter does not include underlying data or accompanying analysis. For its part, during OIG's review of the City's response to the protests and unrest in May and June, there were difficulties in locating protest-relevant arrest reports and BWC footage when they were not associated with one of the mass arrest RD/event numbers, demonstrating an important disadvantage of the use of individual, unrelated RD numbers. Aug 7, 2020 Ltr. From S. Roberts, Chief Administrator, COPA, to D. Brown, Superintendent of Police, Chi. Police Dept. at 1.



June 2 were produced to OIG. It appears that records of a significant number of mass arrest cards were not retained by CPD at all. A CPD command staff member responsible for certain aspects of CPD's internal reviews, who characterized themselves as good at tracking down paperwork, said they were unable to locate copies of the mass arrest cards. There is no policy provision for mass arrest cards—which contains some information on uses of force—to be forwarded to CPD's FRD or otherwise retained by CPD. The card itself is paper, and there is no mechanism for its electronic storage. According to CPD, the mass arrest cards which were produced to OIG—153 in total from May 30 to June 2—were only available because a senior CPD member decided, on their own and on an ad hoc basis, to have the mass arrest cards photocopied during processing. CPD's failure to retain copies of arrest and use of force information raise concerns for the Department's compliance with the Local Records Act and a multitude of potential retention obligations in criminal and civil litigation.<sup>247</sup>

## B. BREAKDOWNS IN OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW OF THE USE OF FORCE; COMPROMISING OF KEY ACCOUNTABILITY PERSONNEL

Finding 2 above discussed the Department's uses of force during protests and unrest and its force reporting obligations, including areas of ambiguity and confusion regarding what the policies require. CPD's accountability for appropriate use of force depends not only upon clear policies and policy compliance, but also upon an effective system of independent, after-action review of use of force incidents. CPD lacks a mechanism for after-action review of uses of force reported on forms other than the TRR, which creates a major oversight and review gap when force is deployed in mass arrest settings and reported on mass arrest cards. Meanwhile, the emergency deployment to the field of the very personnel responsible for CPD's internal use of force review function compromised the integrity and effectiveness of that review.

The force reporting policies outlined in S06-06 are written in such a way as to make it likely that the required force review, as outlined in CPD's directive on "Department Review of Use of Force," G03-02-08, will not be completed.<sup>248</sup> G03-02-08 states that "the Force Review Division...functions in an after-action-review capacity for: (1) a representative sample of Level 1 reportable uses of force...[and] (2) all Level 2 reportable uses of force."<sup>249</sup> "Level 1" uses of force include takedowns and weaponless direct mechanical strikes that do not result in injury or allegation of injury; "Level 2" includes the use of less-lethal weapons (including baton strikes) that do not result in

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<sup>247</sup> 50 ILCS 205/4, 7.

<sup>248</sup> "General Order G03-02-08 Department Review Of Use Of Force," February 29, 2020, accessed October 16, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b9b-15f2592c-33815-f25c-63b922690a1aba22.pdf?hl=true>.

<sup>249</sup> "General Order G03-02-08."

fatality or hospitalization.<sup>250</sup> Therefore, under G03-02-08, the FRD is charged with reviewing use of force incidents that would be reported only on mass arrest cards if they occurred in the context of a mass arrest, according to the guidance laid out in G03-02-02 and S06-06.<sup>251</sup> There is, however, reportedly no mechanism in place by which FRD receives mass arrest cards—which are completed only in paper form—for review.

Members of FRD were deployed to police the protests in late May and early June. A member of CPD's command staff with subject matter expertise in force review raised concerns about CPD's ability to effect independent after-action reviews of TRRs if FRD personnel were deployed, where they would potentially be required to use force or be witnesses to uses of force they would later have to review. This command staff member further expressed concerns from their sworn staff about the ability to operate safely and effectively in the field due to other officers not wanting to work with FRD personnel. A command staff member with authority over FRD noted in an interview with OIG that they had communicated with peers at the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) as the protests were unfolding and learned that LAPD never deploys its FRD-equivalent unit, in order to avoid a conflict of interests in after-action force reviews.<sup>252</sup>

Personnel from BIA were also deployed to the field, posing similar risks. Command staff responsible for BIA reported believing that their deployment should be a last resort but did not object to their deployment when it was called for. By sending BIA personnel to the field, CPD risked those members being involved in or witnesses to acts of alleged misconduct, raising the specter of conflicts of interest in BIA's subsequent investigations of those allegations. Furthermore, by virtue of the emergency field deployments, BIA was reduced to a skeleton crew to take in and process misconduct complaints, and yet the scale and the nature of the police response acutely necessitated a robust and responsible complaint intake system.

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<sup>250</sup> "General Order G03-02-08 Department Review Of Use Of Force," February 29, 2020, accessed October 16, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b9b-15f2592c-33815-f25c-63b922690a1aba22.pdf?hl=true>.

<sup>251</sup> Takedowns and direct mechanical strikes with no injury or no allegation of injury would be Level 1 uses of force subject to FRD review.

<sup>252</sup> In written comments on a draft of this report, CPD's senior leadership took a different view, writing that "[w]hile members of BIA and the Force Review Division were deployed, they were deployed to assignments which were generally removed from the direct interactions between officers and members of the public...Moreover, even if members of BIA and FRD were later assigned to review an incident that they personally witnessed, there are steps that members can and must take to identify this conflict and recuse themselves from an investigation or review. Upon notification of a conflict the investigation or review would be immediately assigned to another member." CPD's response does not address the safety concerns voiced by FRD members.

## C. NON-COMPLIANCE WITH CPD'S BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY

Body-worn cameras should be used as a critical tool for the supervision and accountability of officers. CPD's BWC policy requires supervisors to review footage after an officer completes a TRR.<sup>253</sup> The policy also requires supervisors to randomly select footage to review officer compliance with CPD policy and assess the need for additional training.<sup>254</sup> The absence of footage makes such supervision impossible. COPA personnel, responsible for investigating alleged misconduct by CPD officers, cited not having BWC footage to review from the May and June protests and unrest as a major challenge to the agency's investigation of complaints.

Special Order S03-14: Body-Worn Cameras is CPD's directive on BWC use. Figure 24 shows CPD members' major policy obligations related to the use of BWCs.

FIGURE 24: CPD BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY PROVISIONS

Special Order S03-14: Body Worn Cameras		
Question	Directive Subsection	Directive Provisions:
Who Is Required to Wear BWCs?	II-C	All sworn members and their immediate supervisors assigned to a Bureau of Patrol district normally assigned to field duties and any other member at the discretion of the District Commander will be assigned and utilize BWC.
When Should They Be Activated?	III-A-2	The Special Order requires that members activate their cameras during law enforcement related activities, including but not limited to arrests, uses of force, traffic control, high risk situations, and any encounter with the public that becomes adversarial.
How Should Use Be Reported?	V-B-3	Department members will annotate all reports that relate to a recorded incident as "BWC." <sup>255</sup>

Source: CPD body-worn camera directive.

<sup>253</sup> "Special Order S03-14 Body Worn Cameras," April 30, 2018, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b38-151f3872-56415-1f38-89ce6c22d026d090.html?hl=true>.

<sup>254</sup> OIG published a report related to this supervisory review in 2019. OIG found that CPD was not compliant with its own policies related to these supervisor checks. The report can be found here: <https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/CPDs-Random-Reviews-of-Body-Worn-Camera-Recordings.pdf>.

<sup>255</sup> "Special Order S03-14 Body Worn Cameras," April 30, 2018, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b38-151f3872-56415-1f38-89ce6c22d026d090.html?hl=true>.

CPD command staff acknowledged that members' BWCs should have been activated throughout the demonstrations but were not. On Saturday, May 30, CPD personnel responsible for processing arrests indicated that BWC footage was not being captured during arrests, thus making it more difficult to identify arresting officers and charges (see also Finding 1 above). CPD command staff stated that some younger officers who were equipped with BWCs during the demonstrations were confused as to whether to activate their BWCs. At the request of CCSAO, CPD command began to send out emails on June 1, reminding officers to activate their cameras during the mass demonstrations, and continued to do so throughout the week.<sup>256</sup>

To contextualize the lack of BWC footage captured during the protests and unrest, OIG identified the number of arrests and reported use of force incidents captured on BWCs. These events always require BWC activation and documentation under CPD's directive S03-14. As cited in Finding 1, OIG was able to identify 1,519 arrests between May 29 at 5:00 p.m. and June 7 at 11:59 p.m. Arrest reports do not have a field to indicate whether an arrest was captured on BWC footage. Instead, CPD relies on officers to document the fact of BWC use in the narrative of the arrest report. To identify the number of arrests captured on BWC, OIG reviewed arrest report narratives to determine how many indicated that they were captured on BWC footage, as required by policy, by conducting a search using the following key terms:

- "Body Worn Camera"
- "Body Camera"
- "BWC"
- "B.W.C."

A second key word search was conducted to exclude arrest narratives with the following terms:

- "No Body Worn Camera", "Not Body Worn Camera", and "Not a Body Worn Camera"
- "No Body Camera", "Not Body Camera", and "Not a Body Camera"
- "No BWC", "Not BWC", and "Not a BWC"
- "Not recorded", "Not captured", "Not equipped with", "Non-BWC", "BWC not in use", "BWC not issued", and "not activated"

Applying these criteria, OIG found that 269 of 1,519 arrest reports (18%) included officer narratives affirming that there was BWC footage of the incident. Figure 25 below shows the percentage of arrests with associated BWC footage. Between May 30 and

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<sup>256</sup> According to CPD, CCSAO made this request on May 30.

June 1, when mass protests and unrest were at their peak, the percentage of arrests captured on BWC was at its lowest. On no day during the week did all arrest reports associated with the protests and unrest have BWC footage.

FIGURE 25: NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF ARRESTS CAPTURED ON BODY-WORN CAMERA, BY DATE

Date	29-May	30-May	31-May	1-Jun	2-Jun	3-Jun	4-Jun	5-Jun	6-Jun	7-Jun	TOTAL
Total Arrests	4	421	595	302	127	24	17	13	6	10	1,519
Arrests Captured on BWC	2	45	83	56	39	9	13	8	5	9	269
Percentage Captured on BWC	50%	11%	14%	19%	31%	38%	76%	62%	83%	90%	18%

Source: OIG analysis of CPD arrest data.

As cited in Finding 2, OIG was able to identify 113 reported uses of force between May 29 at 5:00 p.m. and June 7 at 11:59 p.m. that related to the protests and unrest. TRRs do have a field for officers to document whether the use of force incident was captured on BWC camera, as required by policy. OIG found that 49 of the 113 (43%) reported uses of force were captured on BWC footage. Figure 26 below shows the percentage of uses of force with associated BWC footage. On two days during the week, May 29 and June 5, all TRRs associated to the protests and unrest had BWC footage recorded.

FIGURE 26: REPORTED USES OF FORCE CAPTURED ON BODY-WORN CAMERA, BY DATE


Date	29-May	30-May	31-May	1-Jun	2-Jun	3-Jun	4-Jun	5-Jun	6-Jun	7-Jun	TOTAL
Total TRRs	4	18	54	21	6	4	4	1	1	0	113
TRRs Captured on BWC	4	12	17	12	1	1	1	1	0	0	49
Percentage Captured on BWC	100%	67%	31%	57%	17%	25%	25%	100%	0%	NA	43%

Source: OIG analysis of CPD TRR data.

CPD's deployment strategies during the demonstrations limited the number of officers deployed with BWCs. Starting on Sunday, May 31, CPD began to deploy district law enforcement members from the third watch and those who had their day off canceled from the central mobilization center at Guaranteed Rate Field. As these members reported directly to the central mobilization center, they did not have an opportunity to, nor were they instructed to, collect their BWCs from their districts where the cameras are docked. CPD did not have the technical capabilities to deploy

docked cameras outside of the districts, so BWCs were not available at the central mobilization center. This meant that officers deployed throughout the city to respond to numerous neighborhoods, often outside of their own districts, did so without BWCs.

FIGURE 27: MISSING BODY-WORN CAMERAS



Source: CPD body-worn camera footage.

Additionally, many of the officers deployed to the protests did not have BWCs assigned to them. SWAT team members—who deployed OC spray for crowd control, as recounted above in Finding 2—were not equipped with BWCs.<sup>257</sup> Detectives—who were mobilized to process arrests and secure CPD facilities—were also not equipped with BWCs. CPD members did not consistently capture critical incidents on BWC as required by its policy or in a manner that would ensure transparency and accountability.

#### D. VIOLATIONS OF UNIFORM POLICY: OBSCURED IDENTIFIERS

There have been widespread complaints—and evidence to demonstrate—that CPD members obscured identifying information on their uniforms during the protest response. It may have been impossible, therefore, to identify the perpetrators of any alleged misconduct.

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<sup>257</sup> According to CPD, financial limitations prohibited the SWAT team from being equipped with BWCs.

CPD's primary policy on uniforms is U04-01 "Uniform and Appearance Standards."<sup>258</sup> Section II.A.3 of that directive provides that "if attired in uniform or casual dress," all sworn members are required to "wear the prescribed star, name tag, unit designator, and rank insignia on their outer-most garment and in view to the public."<sup>259</sup> Outer-most garment means "uniform shirt, overshirt carrier, uniform jacket, fleece jackets, and approved sweater."<sup>260</sup> Directive U04-01 further provides that "[a]ll supervisors have the responsibility and authority to ensure that uniform standards are strictly observed by sworn" officers and that "[a]ppropriate action will be taken when members fail to meet standards."<sup>261</sup> Moreover, according to the directive, "[m]embers will not...conceal or alter the star, cap, shield, or nameplate/unit designator while in uniform."<sup>262</sup>

Officers may only wear "mourning bands"—strips of black tape or cloth, occasionally with other colors or words written on them, which officers wear over their star or badge to honor an officer who has died—"upon authorization of the Superintendent or a designee."<sup>263</sup> Such an authorization "will be announced in an AMC [Administrative Message Center] message and will be observed for a period of thirty days from the date of authorization."<sup>264</sup> CPD officers are further required to have a helmet with their star number affixed to the helmet.<sup>265</sup>

During and after CPD's response to the protests, BIA, COPA, and OIG received dozens of complaints about officers obscuring their badges and nameplates in violation of CPD policy.<sup>266</sup> The number of complaints likely understates the total number of incidents; a senior COPA official reported receiving, in addition to actual complaints, calls and emails about obscured identifiers from members of the public who did not want to file a complaint, but wanted COPA to know the scope of the problem. This was an issue of concern to City leadership; on June 3, 2020, the Mayor emailed the Superintendent a photograph of a CPD officer with red circles drawn where a star number and nameplate should have appeared, writing, "Here's the [image] we

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<sup>258</sup> "Uniform and Property U04-01 Uniform And Appearance Standards," March 11, 2020, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b9b-1562d157-70d15-62d1-a0e04429f1379599.pdf?hl=true>.

<sup>259</sup> "Uniform and Property U04-01 Uniform And Appearance Standards," March 11, 2020, accessed August 10, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b9b-1562d157-70d15-62d1-a0e04429f1379599.pdf?hl=true>.

<sup>260</sup> "Uniform and Property U04-01."

<sup>261</sup> "Uniform and Property U04-01."

<sup>262</sup> "Uniform and Property U04-01."

<sup>263</sup> "Uniform and Property U04-01."

<sup>264</sup> "Uniform and Property U04-01."


<sup>265</sup> "Uniform and Property U04-01."

<sup>266</sup> Jonathan Ballew, "Chicago Police Investigating 78 Complaints Of Officers Removing Or Covering Badges During Protests," Chicago Reporter, June 11, 2020, accessed October 19, 2020, <https://www.chicagoreporter.com/chicago-police-investigating-78-complaints-of-officers-removing-or-covering-badges-during-protests/>.

discussed.” Complaints about obscured identifiers in Chicago also received media coverage. Testimonials in federal District Court included reports by protesters who saw officers with their badges or nametags covered.<sup>267</sup> Interviews with CPD members also revealed instances of obscured identifiers. Several District Commanders related isolated incidents of seeing or hearing about a small number of officers covering up identifiers. These District Commanders reported telling the officers to remove the tape obstructing their identifiers, but, based on their statements, they apparently took no further action against the officers. At least one senior member said that no such incidents came to their attention.

OIG also saw numerous instances of obscured identifiers in its review of protest-related BWC footage. By way of example, Figure 28 below shows three officers who have obscured their star numbers with black tape.

FIGURE 28: CPD OFFICERS WITH OBSCURED STAR NUMBERS



Source: CPD body-worn camera footage.

Complaints regarding officers obstructing their identifiers came in the context of most available CPD members, regardless of assignment, being deployed to the field. One senior CPD member estimated that on Saturday alone, there were a couple thousand officers in and around downtown.

<sup>267</sup> Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitoring Listening Sessions at 49, State of Ill. v. City of Chi., No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2020).



In response to concerns raised regarding obscured identifiers, CPD issued daily notices, either in To-From reports or by email, from the Deputy Superintendent for Constitutional Policing and Reform concerning adherence to the uniform policy, on June 2 and daily from June 4 to June 7. Two senior CPD members stated that they spoke with their officers and their subordinates about the importance of complying with the uniform policy, including during roll calls. BIA later assigned two sergeants to investigate complaints of obscured identifiers. On June 5, 2020, Mayor Lightfoot publicly announced that any officer who was caught obscuring their identifiers would be stripped of their police powers.<sup>268</sup>

Several CPD members reported their belief that officers were covering up their stars or nametags in the interest of protecting their families from harassment. One District Commander related the story of an officer whose photo and name were taken at a protest, after which people found their partner on Facebook and began harassing them.<sup>269</sup> In connection with this inquiry, OIG requested records of these incidents where officers were threatened, harassed, or doxed in person, on social media or through any communication device or service. CPD produced records of four officers who were threatened, harassed, or doxed online during the time period covered by this report, one of whom was doxed, in part, because he had been photographed with a covered badge number.

CPD members' practice of obscuring their identifiers during the protests compounded significant structural accountability challenges. As discussed above, CPD has scant records of which officers were working and where for large parts of its response to the protests. Except for officers working their regular assignments on May 30, there are no records of which officers deployed downtown. There are few records of where officers were deployed to from the mobilization center. OIG requested that CPD provide records indicating the schedule and whereabouts of its senior command staff during the protests and CPD stated it was unable to do so because such records did not exist and creating them would be too "burdensome."<sup>270</sup> In fact, in a June 3, 2020 response to a request for deployment data from the Mayor's Office, a

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<sup>268</sup> "Chicago Police Officers Who Turn Off Body Camera or Cover Badge Will be Stripped of Powers: Lightfoot," NBC Chicago, June 5, 2020, accessed February 4, 2021, <https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/chicago-police-officers-who-turn-off-body-camera-or-cover-badge-will-be-stripped-of-powers-lightfoot/2285375/>.

<sup>269</sup> Another senior member suggested that it is possible that some reports of obscured identifiers were related to mourning bands that officers place over their stars in response to the death of a CPD member. A couple of community members seemed to describe a mourning band when testifying about obscured identifiers at the court listening sessions. However, as described above, CPD policy requires an administrative authorization to wear a mourning band. CPD produced, in response to a document request, two mourning band authorizations, neither of which covered the period at issue in this report. Transcript of Proceedings - Independent Monitoring Listening Sessions at 49 and 82, *State of Ill. v. City of Chi.*, No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2020).

<sup>270</sup> Letter from T. Dixon, Dep. Corp. Counsel, to M. Hickey, Indep. Monitor, et al., Oct. 23, 2020.

CPD member wrote, “I will look into a way to measure deployment by geography for the past several days. . .but to the best of my knowledge the exact whereabouts of area level staff and administrative staff deployed to the field (i.e. staff that don’t routinely work in a locale but are deployed there for added support) are not kept with precision in an electronic application.” One senior COPA official described CPD officers’ schedules and deployment records as “non-existent.” With unidentifiable officers, little in the way of BWC footage, and no records on which officers were working where, the obstacles to thoroughly investigating potential misconduct—and even identifying which officers might have committed misconduct—are enormous. COPA investigators reported relying on CPD members to identify other CPD members.

## V. CONCLUSION

The killing of George Floyd in late May 2020 precipitated nationwide social justice protests remarkable in their scale and intensity. The protests of the summer quickly drew comparisons to the civil rights marches of the 1960s and were described as “the largest movement in U.S. history.”<sup>271</sup> Occurring as they did alongside documented instances of looting and property damage, in the midst of a deadly global pandemic, the protests also presented extraordinary and unprecedented challenges to cities’ public safety operations.

A recurring theme in reports published from peer jurisdictions on the May and June protests and unrest is that the police were not adequately prepared to confront the scale of these challenges.<sup>272</sup> The picture of a response hindered by lack of preparedness likewise emerges from OIG’s study of the City of Chicago’s response. While this report documents some respects in which CPD and the City’s response improved as the protests wore on—for example, smoother mass arrest procedures in later days—the lack of preparedness at the outset crippled the effective implementation of mass arrest procedures, the ability to properly control the use of force and proper use of force reporting, and several critical accountability measures. Crucially, many in CPD’s senior command staff appeared to remain underprepared for an escalation of the protests even after the Englewood protest march on May 28 that resulted in the 7<sup>th</sup> District Commander’s use of force in arresting a subject, and even as city after city across the country saw protests and arrests escalate.

As the months since the protests of May and June 2020 wear on, it appears very likely that CPD and the City will be dealing with the negative repercussions of their unpreparedness for some time. Missing reports and documentation, including Tactical Response Reports and body-worn camera footage, may limit or preclude prosecution of some arrestees as well as accountability for individual officers and may

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<sup>271</sup> Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bul, and Jugal K. Patel, “Black Lives Matter May Be The Largest Movement In U.S. History,” *The New York Times*, July 3, 2020, accessed August 5, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html>.

<sup>272</sup> The New York City Department of Investigation’s report concluded, “In sum, the scope and nature of the Floyd protests posed several challenges to NYPD’s ability to respond, raised questions about the legitimacy of that response, and revealed some shortcomings in the NYPD’s approach and preparedness for policing First Amendment protected protest activity.” New York City Department of Investigations, “Investigation into NYPD Response to the George Floyd Protests” at 68, December 2020, accessed December 21, 2020, <https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doi/reports/pdf/2020/DOIRpt.NYPD%20Reponse.%20GeorgeFloyd%20Protests.12.18.2020.pdf>. The final recommendation of the Denver Office of the Independent Monitor was that, “[O]n May 28, the [Denver Police Department] was caught by surprise by the size and scale of the protests.” Denver Office of the Independent Monitor, “The Police Response to the 2020 George Floyd Protests in Denver, an Independent Review” at 20, December 8, 2020, accessed December 10, 2020, <https://ewscripps.brightspotcdn.com/60/23/9223ba544bb9a3e8d6597502d42b/2020gfpreport-oim.pdf>.

compromise CPD and the City's position in investigations or in litigation. OIG's interviews with rank-and-file CPD members laid bare that, at least in some quarters, chaos and confusion in the command staff ranks struck a serious blow to morale of front-line members who plainly felt failed by their Department. And to the extent that public video and public reporting captured out-of-policy, dangerous, and disrespectful actions by CPD members, the events of May and June 2020 may have set CPD and the City back significantly in their long-running, deeply challenged effort to foster trust with members of the community.

## ARREST PROCEDURE CONCLUSIONS

Prior to the summer 2020 protests, CPD had not trained its members on mass arrest procedures in years, meaning that a significant number of officers who responded to the protests and unrest had no familiarity with the policy. CPD did not plan for the possibility of mass arrest until it became necessary to implement one, which led to shortages of mass arrest kits where they were required, as well as problems implementing mass arrest procedures. Documentation of mass arrests was frequently inadequate during the initial response to the protests and unrests, leading to arrestees released without charges and undercharging. Finally, transportation and processing of arrestees took too long, leading to officer and arrestee safety concerns and undercharging.

## USE OF FORCE AND FORCE REPORTING CONCLUSIONS

CPD lacks an authoritative record of uses of force deployed in response to the protest. In this report, OIG has tried to construct a more complete picture of force deployments by incorporating testimonials from community members and video evidence in addition to official reports. These supplementary sources suggest that there were far more dangerous and potentially out-of-policy uses of force than CPD's official records indicated. By not having fulfilled all its use of force reporting obligations during the protests and unrest, CPD has missed opportunities to learn from the events and incorporate these lessons into training.

CPD's numerous policies outlining requirements for use of force reporting, which must be cross-referenced for members to understand fully their force reporting obligations in a mass arrest context, created confusion among command staff and rank-and-file during the protest response, and this confusion contributed to non-compliance. In the wake of the protests, CPD has introduced two additional directives—Special Order S03-22 (since rescinded) and Department Notice D20-08—and a new force reporting form for crowd control contexts—the Incident Response form.<sup>273</sup> Although CPD introduced changes to its directives governing the use of

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<sup>273</sup> "Special Order S03-22 Response To Crowds And Civil Disturbances," August 27, 2020, accessed October 16, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b9d-17430276-f7617-4311->

force on December 31, 2020, to take effect on April 1, 2021, these changes do not speak to the force reporting obligations covered under D20-08 or the new force reporting form for crowd control contexts, titled the Incident Response form. The addition of new force reporting requirements, absent efforts to clarify the previously existing directives, will not lessen the likelihood of confusion and non-compliance in future mass arrest and large-scale protest responses.

Furthermore, it is not clear that the newly introduced policy changes have been supported by a careful process of policy development. As noted above, after it was issued and absent any explicit indication to this effect in the order itself, CPD announced that Special Order S03-22 was issued under paragraph 631 of the consent decree, which provides for the issuance of “a temporary policy or procedure” under “extraordinary circumstances.” It was shortly thereafter replaced by Department Notice D20-08, which, as of February 2021, carries a notice that “extraordinary circumstances demand an immediate revision or clarification to this policy.” Four days after S03-22 (the first iteration of CPD’s new crowd control force and force reporting policy) went into effect, OIG interviewed the second-highest ranking member of the Department about, among other topics, the new policy.<sup>274</sup> This member was unable to state definitively whether they had reviewed the Special Order before it went into effect, was unable to recall whether they had submitted comments on the draft policy, and was unable to recall whether they were asked for or gave approval for the new policy.

In key respects, directive D20-08 and the new Incident Response form do not yet address the problems OIG has identified in its review of CPD’s force reporting procedures. D20-08 provides for Incident Response forms to be emailed to the Force Review Division. In the Department’s latest round of revisions to its use of force policies on December 31, 2020, there was no corresponding update made to the Department Review of Use of Force directive, G03-02-08, to delineate FRD’s duty to review Incident Response forms. The introduction of the Incident Response form does not explicitly override the provision in the Mass Arrest directive (S06-06) for reporting uses of force in a mass arrest context on a mass arrest card. So in a context that is both a “crowd management incident or civil disturbance” and a mass arrest, there is not, under the current suite of policies, much clarity on what uses of force should be reported on a mass arrest card, on an Incident Response form, and on both. There is,

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[d84b8ba266a02209.pdf?hl=true](http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b9d-1758a052-2d317-58a0-53d7992e15113270.pdf?hl=true); “Department Notice D20-08 Reporting the Response to Crowds, Protests, and Civil Disturbances,” November 2, 2020, accessed December 23, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b9d-1758a052-2d317-58a0-53d7992e15113270.pdf?hl=true>; “Incident Response CPD-11.302,” October 2020, accessed December 23, 2020, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/forms/CPD-11.302.pdf>.


<sup>274</sup> This member was promoted to the position of First Deputy Superintendent after the May and June protests. At the time of the protests, they held a different senior command staff position.

finally, still no provision in CPD's force reporting policies for mass arrest cards reporting uses of force to reach FRD or any other force review body.


## ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES CONCLUSIONS

The mass arrest procedure and force reporting policies in place in May and June 2020 hindered accountability in the context of large-scale protests or civil unrest. In particular, the lack of any policy requirement for CPD to maintain copies of all mass arrest cards after a mass arrest incident is a serious accountability liability. Similarly consequential is CPD's lack of a clear mechanism, under the existing force reporting policies, for after-action review of uses of force that take place in a mass arrest context. The decision to deploy members without BWCs, combined with obscured identifiers and scant deployment records, make it difficult and impossible in some cases, to implement individual-level accountability for misconduct.

# APPENDIX A: CPD AREA AND DISTRICT MAP DURING THE RELEVANT PERIOD



## APPENDIX B: CPD ORGANIZATION CHART DURING THE RELEVANT PERIOD, SHOWING UNITS INVOLVED IN PROTEST RESPONSE





## APPENDIX C: LISTING OF RELEVANT CHARGES

Count	Charge Statute	Charges <sup>275</sup>
1	720 ILCS 5.0/12-2-B-4.1	AGG ASSAULT PEACE OFF/FIRE/ER WRK
2	720 ILCS 5.0/12-2-B-4	AGG ASSAULT VOL/PRIV SEC OFF/UTIL
3	720 ILCS 5.0/12-2-C-3	AGG ASSAULT/DISCH FIR/MTR VEHICLE
4	720 ILCS 5.0/12-2-C-2	AGG ASSAULT/DISCHARGE FIREARM
5	720 ILCS 5.0/12-2-B-7	AGG ASSAULT/STATE OF IL EMP
6	720 ILCS 5.0/12-2-B-8	AGG ASSAULT/TRANSIT EMPLOYEE
7	720 ILCS 5.0/12-2-C-1	AGG ASSAULT/USE DEADLY WEAPON
8	720 ILCS 5.0/12-4-A	AGG BATT/HARM/POLICE/DOC/DHS
9	720 ILCS 5.0/12-3.05-E-1	AGG BATTERY/DISCHARGE FIREARM
10	720 ILCS 5.0/12-3.05-D-6	AGG BATTERY/GOVERNMENT EMP
11	720 ILCS 5.0/12-3.05-A-1	AGG BATTERY/GREAT BODILY HARM
12	720 ILCS 5.0/12-3.05-D-4	AGG BATTERY/PEACE OFFICER
13	720 ILCS 5.0/12-3.05-D-7	AGG BATTERY/TRANSIT EMPLOYEE
14	720 ILCS 5.0/12-3.05-F-1	AGG BATTERY/USE DEADLY WEAPON
15	720 ILCS 5.0/12-3.05-A-3	AGG BTRY/GREAT BOD HARM/PC OFF
16	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-2	AGG UUW W/ BODY ARMOR/NO FOID
17	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-2	AGG UUW/ON PERSON
18	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-2	AGG UUW/PERS/FIR LOADED/FOID
19	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-2	AGG UUW/PERS/LOAD/NO FCCA/FOID
20	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-2	AGG UUW/PERS/UNLOADED/NO FCCA
21	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-2	AGG UUW/PERSON/<21
22	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-2	AGG UUW/PERSON/<21/2+
23	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-2	AGG UUW/PERSON/DELINQ MINOR
24	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-2	AGG UUW/PERSON/LOADED FIREARM
25	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-2	AGG UUW/PERSON/LOADED/NO FCCA
26	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-2	AGG UUW/PERSON/NO FOID
27	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-1	AGG UUW/UNLOADED/NO FCCA/FOID
28	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-1	AGG UUW/VEH/FIR LOADED/NO FOID
29	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-1	AGG UUW/VEH/PREV CONVICTION
30	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-1	AGG UUW/VEH/UNLOADED/AMMO
31	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-1	AGG UUW/VEHICLE/<21
32	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-1	AGG UUW/VEHICLE/LOADED FIREARM 2+
33	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-1	AGG UUW/VEHICLE/LOADED/NO FCCA
34	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-1	AGG UUW/VEHICLE/LOADED/NO FCCA 2+
35	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-1	AGG UUW/VEHICLE/NO FOID
36	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-1	AGG UUW/VEHICLE/NO FOID/2+
37	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.2-A-1	AGGR DISCHARGE FIREARM - OCCUPIED BLDG

<sup>275</sup> Charge labels appear here as they do within CPD's system.

38	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.2-A-2	AGGR DISCHARGE FIREARM - OCCUPIED VEHICLE
39	720 ILCS 5.0/12-2-A	AGGRAVATED ASSAULT/PUBLIC PROP
40	720 ILCS 5.0/12-3.05-D-1	AGGRAVATED BATTERY/VICTIM 60+
41	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.7-A	ARMED HABITUAL CRIMINAL
42	720 ILCS 5.0/33A-2-A	ARMED VIOLENCE/CATEGORY I
43	720 ILCS 5.0/33A-2-B	ARMED VIOLENCE/CATEGORY I/II
44	720 ILCS 5.0/33A-2-A	ARMED VIOLENCE/CATEGORY II WEAPON
45	720 ILCS 5.0/20-1.1-A-1	ARSON - AGG ARSON/KNOW PERSON PRESENT
46	720 ILCS 5.0/20-1-A-1	ARSON/REAL/PERSONAL PROP >\$150
47	720 ILCS 5.0/12-1-A	ASSAULT - SIMPLE
48	720 ILCS 5.0/31-1A-B	ATTEMPT DISARM PC OFF/CORR INST EMP
49	625 ILCS 5.0/11-1427.4-3	ATTEMPT TO FLEE/ELUDE OFFICER
50	9-24-080	AUTHORIZED EMERGENCY VEHICLES
51	720 ILCS 5.0/12-3-A-1	BATTERY - CAUSE BODILY HARM
52	720 ILCS 5.0/12-3-A-2	BATTERY - MAKE PHYSICAL CONTACT
53	720 ILCS 5.0/12-3.1	BATTERY OF UNBORN CHILD
54	720 ILCS 5.0/19-1-A	BURGLARY
55	720 ILCS 5.0/19-2-A	BURGLARY - POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS
56	720 ILCS 5.0/19-1-A	BURGLARY W/O CAUSING DAMAGE
57	430 ILCS 66.0/65-A-10	CARRY CONCL/PUBLIC EVENT
58	720 ILCS 5.0/12C-5-A-1	CAUSE CHILD TO BE ENDANGERED
59	10-36-185 - VIOL. PARK DIST. CODE CH VII B 2	CPD AUTHORITY/PARK DISTRICT/USE OF PARKS/PARK HOURS
60	720 ILCS 5.0/21-1-A-1	CRIM DAMAGE TO PROPERTY <\$500
61	720 ILCS 5.0/21-1-A-1	CRIM DAMAGE/PROPERTY/>\$100K
62	720 ILCS 5.0/21-1-A-1	CRIM DMG TO PROP \$500-10K
63	720 ILCS 5.0/21-1.01-A-1	CRIM DMG/GOVT PROP/<\$500
64	720 ILCS 5.0/21-1.01-A-1	CRIM DMG/GOVT PROP/>\$500-\$10K
65	720 ILCS 5.0/21-5-A	CRIM TRESPASS TO STATE LAND
66	720 ILCS 5.0/21-1-A-1	CRIMINAL DAMAGE <\$500/SCHOOL
67	720 ILCS 5.0/21-1-A-1	CRIMINAL DAMAGE/\$10K-100K
68	720 ILCS 5.0/21-1.3-A	CRIMINAL DEFACEMENT PROP <\$500
69	720 ILCS 5.0/21-3-A-2	CRIMINAL TRESPASS TO LAND
70	720 ILCS 5.0/21-3-A-1	CRIMINAL TRESPASS TO REAL PROPERTY
71	10-8-526	CTA - DISORDERLY CONDUCT/BREACH PEACE (98-126-1.9A)
72	10-8-526	CTA - TRESPASS ON/REMAIN (98-126-1.14B)
73	8-16-020	CURFEW VIOLATION
74	8-4-120	DAMAGE TO PUBLIC PROPERTY
75	625 ILCS 5.0/18B-103.1-A	DISOBEY POLICE OFFICER ORDER
76	25 ILCS 5.0/12	DISORD CONDUCT/GEN ASSEMBLY

77	8-4-010(F)	DISORDERLY CONDUCT - ASSEMBLY >3 PERSONS/BREACH OF PEACE
78	720 ILCS 5.0/26-1-A-1	DISORDERLY CONDUCT - BREACH OF PEACE
79	8-4-010(A)	DISORDERLY CONDUCT - BREACH OF PEACE
80	8-4-010(C)	DISORDERLY CONDUCT - FAIL TO CEASE CONDUCT LIKELY TO PROVOK
81	8-4-010(E)	DISORDERLY CONDUCT - FAIL TO OBEY POLICE
82	8-4-010(B)	DISORDERLY CONDUCT - OFFENSIVE ACT OR GESTURE
83	8-4-010(D)	DISORDERLY CONDUCT-FAILS TO OBEY A LAWFUL ORDER TO DISPERSE
84	8-4-030	DRINKING ALCOHOL ON THE PUBLIC WAY
85	625 ILCS 5.0/6-112	DRIVER'S LICENSE/PERMIT - FAIL TO CARRY/DISPLAY
86	720 ILCS 5.0/31-7-E	ESCAPE - AID - FROM PEACE OFFICER - FELONY OFFENSE
87	720 ILCS 5.0/31-7-E	ESCAPE - AID - FROM PEACE OFFICER - MISD OFFENSE
88	625 ILCS 5.0/11-404-A	FAIL NOTIFY DMG/UNATTENDED VEH
89	430 ILCS 65.0/2-A-1	FIREARM W/O VALID FOID/ELIG
90	430 ILCS 65.0/2-A-1	FIREARM/FOID INVALID/NOT ELIG
91	720 ILCS 5.0/26-1-A-5	FLS REPT TO PUBLIC SAFETY AGCY
92	8-20-085(A)	HIGH CAP MAG AND METAL PIERCING BULLETS - SALE/POSS PROH
93	720 ILCS 5.0/12-6-A-1	INTIMIDATION - PHYSICAL HARM
94	720 ILCS 5.0/25-4-A	LOOTING BY INDIVIDUAL
95	720 ILCS 5.0/25-1-B-4	MOB ACTION/FAIL TO WITHDRAW
96	720 ILCS 5.0/9-1-A-1	MURDER - FIRST DEGREE
97	720 ILCS 5.0/9-1-A-2	MURDER - STRONG PROBABILITY DEATH/INJURE
98	720 ILCS 5/9-1(A)(2)	MURDER/STRONG PROB KILL/INJURE
99	515 ILCS 5.0/1-200	OBSTRUCTING AN OFFICER
100	720 ILCS 5.0/31-4.5-A	OBSTRUCTING IDENTIFICATION
101	625 ILCS 5.0/11-1103-A	OBSTRUCTING STREET CAR TRAFFIC
102	9-80-180	OBSTRUCTION OF TRAFFIC BY NON-MOTORIST
103	625 ILCS 5.0/3-707-A	OPERATE UNINSURED MTR VEHICLE
104	720 ILCS 570.0/402-C	PCS - POSSESSION - POSS AMT CON SUB EXCEPT (A)(D)
105	9-60-050	PEDESTRIAN TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY
106	430 ILCS 65.0/2-A-2	POSS AMMUNITION - W/O VALID FOID
107	720 ILCS 5.0/24-5-B	POSS FIREARM W/DEFACED SERIAL NUMBER
108	8-4-130	POSS OF PAINT/MARKER WITH INTENT TO DEFACE
109	430 ILCS 65.0/2-A-1	POSSESS FIREARM FOID EXPIRED/NOT ELIG
110	8-20-060(A)	POSSESS OF A LASER SIGHT ACC, FIREARM SILENCER, MUFFLER

111	625 ILCS 5.0/4-103.2-A-3	POSSESS STOLEN VEHICLE > \$25,000
112	8-4-180	POSSESSING BURGLARY TOOLS
113	4-120-110	POSSESSION FIREWORKS
114	8-20-075-A	POSSESSION OF ASSAULT WEAPONS
115	8-4-059	POSSESSION OF POLICE SCANNER
116	720 ILCS 5.0/31-5-B	PREVENT APPREH/AID FUGITIVE
117	720 ILCS 5.0/47-5-15	PUB NUISANCE/HARASS PERSON
118	720 ILCS 5.0/11-30-A-2	PUBLIC INDECENCY/LEWD EXPOSURE
119	625 ILCS 5.0/4-103-A-1	RECEIVE/POSSESS/SELL STOLEN VEHICLE
120	720 ILCS 5.0/12-5-A	RECKLESS CONDUCT
121	720 ILCS 5.0/12-5-A-1	RECKLESS CONDUCT/BODILY HARM
122	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.5-A	RECKLESS DISCH FIREARM - ENDANGER
123	720 ILCS 5.0/9-3-A	RECKLESS HOMICIDE/MOTOR VEHICLE
124	4-144-190	REPLICA FIREARMS/PELLET GUNS
125	520 ILCS 5.0/1.22	RESIST/OBSTRUCT OFFICER
126	2-84-300-A	RESISTING POLICE OFFICER OR AIDING ESCAPE
127	720 ILCS 5.0/31-1-A	RESISTING/OBSTRUCT/PC OFF/CORR EMP/FRFTR
128	720 ILCS 5.0/31-1-A-7	RESISTING/OBSTRUCT/PC OFF/CORR EMP/FRFTR INJ
129	720 ILCS 5.0/16-25-A-8	RETAIL THEFT - OBTAINS UNAUTHORIZED CONTROL <\$300
130	720 ILCS 5.0/16-25-A-1	RETAIL THEFT/DISP MERCH/<\$300
131	720 ILCS 5.0/16-25-A-1	RETAIL THEFT/DISP MERCH/<\$300/PRECONV
132	720 ILCS 5.0/16-25-A-1	RETAIL THEFT/DISP MERCH/>\$300
133	720 ILCS 5.0/16-25-A-1	RETAIL THEFT/MOTOR FUEL/<\$150
134	720 ILCS 5.0/16-25-A-5	RETAIL THEFT/SHOP CART/<\$300
135	720 ILCS 5.0/18-1-A	ROBBERY
136	720 ILCS 5.0/18-1-B-1	ROBBERY - AGG ROBBERY/INDICATE ARM W/FIR
137	720 ILCS 5.0/18-2-A-1	ROBBERY - ARMED - OTHER DANGEROUS WEAPON
138	720 ILCS 5.0/18-2-A-2	ROBBERY - ARMED W/ FIREARM
139	720 ILCS 5.0/18-1-A	ROBBERY/VIC HANDICAP OR 60+ YR
140	8-24-020	SALE OR POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON
141	10-8-515	SOLICITING UNLAWFUL BUSINESS
142	720 ILCS 5.0/16-1-A-1	THEFT - UNAUTHORIZED CONTROL/>\$10K<\$100K
143	720 ILCS 5.0/16-1-A-1-C	THEFT CON PROB DPRV/>\$100K-\$500K
144	720 ILCS 5.0/16-1-A-1-A	THEFT CONTROL INTENT<\$500
145	720 ILCS 5.0/16-2	THEFT LOST/MISLAID/PROP/\$500-\$10K
146	720 ILCS 5.0/16-2	THEFT LOST/MISLAID/PROP/<\$500
147	720 ILCS 5.0/16-1-A-4	THEFT/STOLEN/ > \$100K-\$500K
148	720 ILCS 5.0/16-1-A-4	THEFT/STOLEN/>\$500 <10K
149	720 ILCS 5.0/16-1-A-4-C	THEFT/STOLEN/PROB DPRV <\$500
150	720 ILCS 5.0/16-1-A-1	THEFT/UNAUTHD CON/>\$100K-\$500K

151	720 ILCS 5.0/16-1-A-1	THEFT/UNAUTHD CONTROL>\$500<\$10K
152	720 ILCS 5.0/16-1-A-1	THEFT/UNAUTHORIZED CON/\$500
153	720 ILCS 5.0/16-1-A-1-A	THFT CONTROL INTENT>\$100K-\$500K
154	8-4-050-B	TRESPASSING - REMAIN ON PROPERTY
155	8-4-250	TRESPASSING ON PROPERTY
156	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1-A-1	UNLAWFUL USE BLACK-JACK/KNIFE
157	8-4-081	URINATE OR DEFECATE ON PUBLIC WAY
158	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-1	UUW - WEAPON - AGG./VEH. OR CONCEALED
159	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1-A-9	UUW - WEAPON - POSSESS/CARRY /CONCEAL WEAPON
160	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1-A-10	UUW - WEAPON - PUBLIC STREET/ALLEY/LANDS
161	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1-A-6	UUW - WEAPON / SILENCER
162	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.6-A-2	UUW - AGG UUW/PERSON/VEHICLE/PREVIOUS CONVICTION
163	720 ILCS 5.0/24-3.1-A-1	UUW - UNLAWFUL POSSESS HANDGUN
164	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1-A-4	UUW - WEAPON - CARRY/POSSESS FIREARM/1ST
165	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.1-A	UUW - WEAPON - FELON POSS/USE FIREARM/PAROLE
166	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.1-A	UUW - WEAPON - FELON POSS/USE MACHINE GUN
167	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.1-A	UUW - WEAPON - FELON POSSES WEAPON/2ND+
168	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1.1-A	UUW - WEAPON - FELON/PAROLE-POSSESS/USE FIREARM PRIOR
169	720 ILCS 5.0/24-1-A-7-II	UUW - WEAPON - RIFLE<16IN - SHOTGUN<18IN
170	8-4-060	VANDALISM
171	2-112-340	VIOLATE BOARD OF HEALTH RULE, ORDER, OR REGULATION
172	430 ILCS 66.0/70-E	VIOLATE CONCEAL/CARRY ACT
173	720 ILCS 5.0/32-10-A	VIOLATION BAIL BOND - CLASS 4 OFFENSE
174	720 ILCS 5.0/32-10-A	VIOLATION BAIL BOND - CLASS A OFFENSE

## MISSION

The City of Chicago Office of Inspector General (OIG) is an independent, nonpartisan oversight agency whose mission is to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity in the administration of programs and operations of City government. OIG achieves this mission through,

- administrative and criminal investigations by its Investigations Section;
- performance audits of City programs and operations by its Audit and Program Review Section;
- inspections, evaluations and reviews of City police and police accountability programs, operations, and policies by its Public Safety Section; and
- compliance audit and monitoring of City hiring and human resources activities and issues of equity, inclusion and diversity by its Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Compliance Section.

From these activities, OIG issues reports of findings and disciplinary and other recommendations to assure that City officials, employees, and vendors are held accountable for violations of laws and policies; to improve the efficiency, cost-effectiveness government operations and further to prevent, detect, identify, expose and eliminate waste, inefficiency, misconduct, fraud, corruption, and abuse of public authority and resources.

## AUTHORITY

OIG's authority to produce reports of its findings and recommendations is established in the City of Chicago Municipal Code §§ 2-56-030(d), -035(c), -110, -230, and 240.

*Cover images courtesy of Creative Commons.*

### PROJECT TEAM

RICARDO ALVAREZ, SENIOR PERFORMANCE ANALYST  
ROBERT OWENS, CHIEF PERFORMANCE ANALYST  
NATHANIEL WACKMAN, ASSOCIATE GENERAL COUNSEL

### PUBLIC INQUIRIES:

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TO SUGGEST WAYS TO IMPROVE CITY GOVERNMENT, VISIT:  
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CALL OIG'S TOLL-FREE TIP LINE: (866) 448-4754 / TTY: (773) 478-2066

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[IGCHICAGO.ORG/CONTACT-US/REPORT-FRAUD-WASTE-ABUSE/](https://IGCHICAGO.ORG/CONTACT-US/REPORT-FRAUD-WASTE-ABUSE/)



Lori E. Lightfoot  
Mayor

Department of Police · City of Chicago  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue · Chicago, Illinois 60653

David O. Brown  
Superintendent of Police

February 11, 2021

Deborah Witzburg  
Deputy Inspector General for Public Safety  
Office of Inspector General  
740 North Sedgwick Street, Suite 200  
Chicago, Illinois 60654

**Re: Report on Chicago's Response to George Floyd Protests and Unrest**

Dear Deputy Inspector General Witzburg:

I have received the Office of Inspector General's Draft Report on Chicago's Response to George Floyd Protests and Unrest (Report) and I appreciate the opportunity for the Department to provide comments. As a preliminary matter it should be noted that the title of this Report refers to the City of Chicago's response to these events, but the analysis and findings are limited to the actions taken by the Chicago Police Department. The incidents that occurred during the time frame of the Report deserved a more comprehensive approach – one that encompassed an extensive review of **all** city agencies.

This Report covers the unprecedented events that occurred during May 29, 2020 through June 7, 2020. As you know, this was an incredibly difficult time both in Chicago and throughout the nation, especially as it compounded on restrictions and concerns caused by the COVID-19 outbreak. As a result of the outbreak, the Department was faced with circumstances beyond its control, which were not fully understood and which at the time called for restraints on enforcement characterized by distance and cautious pacing, a relaxing of consequences, and a sense that tolerance was prudent. Notwithstanding being faced with unprecedented civil unrest and an unknown virus, Department patrol officers continued to respond to calls for service throughout the City. Detectives still conducted criminal investigations. The Bureau of Internal Affairs investigated complaints. The men and women of the Chicago Police Department continued to carry out their duties and responsibilities even as resources were severely taxed due to civil unrest and a reduction in available personnel due to COVID. Moreover, the most important resource in the Department, the men and women who proudly serve this city were burdened beyond anything they had previously experienced. Many worked long hours without days off due to staffing shortages and despite what was asked of them, many served without issue. The Report focuses on the shortcomings of the Department, but it is just as important to acknowledge the successes of the Department as well.

While the Department struggled with certain aspects of its response, as noted by in the Report, even during this brief time span, the Department was able to address these shortcomings and improve its response. As you also mention in the Report, the Department undertook its own self-critical review of its response to these events, which culminated in an After Action Report. The Department recognized that it was imperative that it self-evaluate, and where it saw shortcomings it evaluated the steps needed to improve, and in some instances, correct its response to such protests and civil unrest. It is important to note that self-critique is not a

one-time event but is rather a process by which we continue to review our response to incidents to see where we need to improve, whether that be a policy change, training or structural organization. The Department appreciates your review and intends to use these findings as an additional tool to self-evaluate and move forward to be a better Police Department for the City of Chicago.

Following review of this Report, the Department identified several areas where the Reports fails to include certain facts in its analysis or fails to include remedial measures already taken by the Department. These matters are discussed in more detail below. The Department has categorized these comments by finding, and includes the findings made by OIG in this letter for ease of reference.

**Finding 1: Breakdowns in the mass arrest process resulted in CPD's failure to arrest some offenders, the release of some arrestees without charges, and risks to officer and arrestee safety.**

Given the unexpectedly quick escalation of protests and civil unrest in response to George Floyd's death, the Department understands the criticism of its preparedness for implementing its mass arrest protocol. That said, although the Department did not follow the Mass Arrest Order in every respect, it did quickly adapt its response to effectively address the need for mass arrests. The Bureau of Internal Affairs (BIA) and Bureau of Detectives (BOD) worked expeditiously to staff the Areas and transport vehicles to ensure that mass arrests could be facilitated. There was daily communication between a BIA Commander and a BOD Deputy Chief to coordinate assignments and ensure that posts were appropriately staffed. This information was included in BIA rosters, which also designate a Lieutenant as team leader for each Area. Further, there were ongoing communications with Central Detention personnel as to deployments of prisoner transport vehicles. To further facilitate staffing needs, the Chief of BIA was granted direct authority to cancel days off as necessary for mass arrest staffing, independent of other CPD decision makers. Additionally, as time went on there was a directive from the First Deputy Superintendent to the Area Deputy Chiefs that a Body Worn Camera (BWC)-equipped officer should partner with a BIA mass arrest Sergeant for all transports as a stop gap measure to ensure that necessary information to effectuate the arrest was received by the arresting officers.

While the Department had not engaged in formal training on mass arrest procedures for some time before the events of 2020, several units, including those in BIA, took it upon themselves to do roll call training for members as these events unfolded in order to reinforce the requirements of the mass arrest and use of force orders.

With respect to the delays in transport, the Report fails to consider the circumstances that existed at the time of the mass arrests. Many streets were blocked by protesters, rioters and looters. This limited access to these locations, and when transport vehicles did arrive on scene, they were subject to attack and in some cases destroyed. During the course of the interviews, at least one Commander related circumstances where they<sup>1</sup> were driving down a street to respond to a call and were attacked in their vehicle. The Commander was surrounded by people, unable to move the car, its windows were broken, and the Commander expressed fear that they would be killed. Streets were blocked by protesters, and in several cases protesters abandoned vehicles in the street. The Department presented evidence of the hundreds of its vehicles damaged or destroyed during the course of these events, which should be considered in a critique of response time to pick up arrestees and transport them to a District or Area for processing.

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<sup>1</sup> To mirror the Report the gender-neutral pronouns "they" and "them" are used in place of "he/him" and "she/her."



**Finding 2: CPD did not fulfill its force reporting obligations and did not provide clear and consistent guidance to officers on reporting obligations.**

These events occurred during a time when the Department was working to revise its use of force orders in its efforts to comply with the Consent Decree. Often as a result of amending one order, other orders are affected, and such was the case here. The amendments made to the order on Tactical Response Reports were not reflected in the mass arrest order and vice versa, which caused ambiguity. Once such ambiguities were identified, the Department worked swiftly to mitigate. For example, in response to one such issue, as noted in the Report, the Department issued S03-22, in consultation with the Consent Decree's Independent Monitoring Team (IMT). While this happened after the events addressed in the Report, it is an example of the efforts taken by the Department.

Further, in November 2020 the Department issued Department Notice D20-08, "Reporting the Response to Crowds, Protests, and Civil Disturbances." The Report quotes the relevant portion of this notice, which states "the Department has determined extraordinary circumstances demand an immediate revision or clarification to this policy. The Department will work collaboratively with the Independent Monitoring Team (IMT) and the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) to review and modify the procedures and responsibilities established by this directive, as appropriate." The Report, however, does not acknowledge that the Department worked at length with the IMT and the coalition of organizations involved in the Consent Decree (Coalition) to create this notice. The Department took the Coalition's criticism into consideration as it drafted this notice. The Department also shared drafts of this directive with the IMT. Furthermore, the Department continues to work toward amending its orders and directives with input from the Coalition and other groups.

**Finding 3: CPD's operational response to the protests and unrest and gaps in its relevant policies crippled accountability processes from the start.**

The Department refers to the remedial measures identified above that it took to mitigate the breakdowns in the mass arrest procedure, including assigning an officer equipped with a BWC to accompany sergeants assigned to transport vehicles. The use of BWC in those instances acted as a back-up for missing paperwork. An officer could relay the necessary information verbally and be recorded on BWC, which could be reviewed, if necessary, for processing. It should also be noted that once the Department declared a mass arrest scenario, it worked to quickly distribute mass arrest kits to the Districts that were experiencing a high volume of arrests.

The OIG notes that the deployment of key accountability personnel led to a breakdown in oversight. This is incorrect. While members of BIA and the Force Review Division (FRD) were deployed, they were deployed to assignments which were generally removed from the direct interactions between officers and members of the public. First, some members of BIA were assigned to transport vehicles which are typically parked away from the heart of the interactions between officers and the public, and the BIA Sergeants were required to stay with the transport vehicles. Second, members of BIA and FRD were deployed to secure Public Safety Headquarters (PSHQ) in response to threats by protesters and looters to enter and burn down the building. PSHQ has a large footprint, over one square block, and required significant manpower to secure. The Department took steps to keep these members back from the front line of interactions with the public. Moreover, even if members of BIA and FRD were later assigned to review an incident that they personally witnessed, there are steps that members can and must take to identify this conflict and recuse themselves from an investigation or review. Upon notification of a conflict the investigation or review would be immediately reassigned to another member.

Finally, as for the officers that obscured identifiers on their uniform, as stated in the Report, the Department took immediate steps to advise officers that this was not acceptable. Beyond the notifications made by the Department, complaints surrounding these actions are also investigated by BIA. It should be clear that although members explained during the course of their interviews why officers chose to remove or obscure these identifiers, the Department did not condone or consider these actions acceptable.

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to provide comments to this Report.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "D O Brown".

David O. Brown  
Superintendent



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 26, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID#** 57-53 JISC Delegates

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Aldersperson Taylor requested that the CPD provide a list of delegate agencies assisting with JISC/Juvenile Rehabilitation.

The below listed delegate agencies are currently assisting with JISC /Juvenile Rehabilitation:

- Delegate agency contracted for the JISC:
  - o Lawndale Christian Legal Center
  
- Additional delegate agencies assisting CPD with juvenile rehabilitation:
  - o Catholic Charities
  - o Chicago Family Case Management
  
- Additional programming provided by CPD:
  - o Peer Jury (CPD Special Order 02-02-05)
  - o CCT Community Workshop (Special Order 18-04-02)
  - o Center for Conflict Resolution (Special Order 17-01)
  - o CTTV Mentoring Workshop (Special Order 18-04-01) \*

\*is a CPD run program that youth are connected to via JISC

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 26, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-54 JISC Officers

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderspersion LaSpata requested that the CPD provide where the officers assigned that were cut from the Criminal Registration Unit/Juvenile Intervention and Support Center (JISC) are assigned.

The Criminal Registration Unit and the JISC are two separate units that shared the same reporting location of 3900 S. California. Criminal Registration personnel was not reduced. However, JISC personnel were moved from one central location and reallocated to the Areas to handle juvenile related arrests.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 5, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-55 Gun Shot Detection Alerts

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Aldersperson LaSpata requested that the CPD provide the number of ShotSpotter alerts that corresponded with a person shot.

Please see the table on the following page.

District <sup>2</sup>	Total Shooting Incidents <sup>3</sup>	Outdoor Shooting Incidents	SST Associated Incidents <sup>4</sup>
01	44	35	0
02	96	78	48
03	158	121	76
04	136	108	86
05	136	97	95
06	180	144	109
07	206	161	120
08	118	102	68
09	155	126	96
10	169	152	94
11	286	236	155
12	94	74	4
14	31	23	1
15	87	72	42
16	12	8	0
17	41	28	0
18	39	34	0
19	23	20	0
20	13	11	0
22	73	53	8
24	27	24	0
25	66	53	38
<b>Total</b>	2,190	1,760	1,040

Note: The date range is 01 Jan 2022 - 30 Sep 2022.

Note<sup>2</sup> Data is grouped by district of shooting incident.

Note<sup>3</sup> Totals are provided for shooting incidents with personal injury.

Note<sup>4</sup> SST associated incidents are those with at least one associated ShotSpotter alert event.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 24, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 56 GIS Beat Maps

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Moore requested that the CPD provide the beat maps for the 17<sup>th</sup> Ward districts.

Please see attached. Beat maps can be found at [gis.chicagopolice.org](https://gis.chicagopolice.org) under "PDF Maps."

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.





**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 24, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID#** 57 - 56

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.


Alderperson Moore requested that the CPD provide the beat maps for the 17<sup>th</sup> Ward districts.

Please see attached. Beat maps can be found at [gis.chicagopolice.org](https://gis.chicagopolice.org) under "PDF Maps."

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.

# 6th District and Aldermanic Boundaries

Ward 5



## Ward

### ALDERMAN, WARD


- Leslie A. Hairston, 5
- Roderick T. Sawyer, 6
- Michelle A. Harris, 8
- Anthony Beale, 9
- David H. Moore, 17
- Derrick G. Curtis, 18
- Howard Brookins Jr., 21

Office of Public Safety Administration  
PSIT GIS  
12-MAR-2021

6TH District  
Gresham  
7808 S HALSTED ST



# Beat 611



- Streets
- + + CTA Line

# Beat 612



- Streets
- - - CTA Line

# Beat 614



— Streets  
— CTA Line

Chicago Police Department  
PSIT GIS  
01-JUL-2020

# Beat 621



- Streets
- + CTA Line

# Beat 623




— Streets  
-+ CTA Line

Chicago Police Department  
PSIT GIS  
01-JUL-2020



# 7th District and Aldermanic Boundaries



## Ward

### ALDERMAN, WARD

- Pat Dowell, 3
- Roderick T. Sawyer, 6
- Raymond A. Lopez, 15
- Stephanie D. Coleman, 16
- David H. Moore, 17
- Jeanette B. Taylor, 20

Office of Public Safety Administration  
PSIT GIS  
12-MAR-2021



# Beat 724

W 63RD ST




Chicago Police Department  
PSIT GIS  
01-JUL-2020

- Streets
- - - CTA Line

# Beat 725

W 63RD ST



- Streets
- - - CTA Line

# Beat 726


W 63RD ST



- Streets
- + + CTA Line


# Beat 733

W 69TH ST



- Streets
- - - CTA Line

# Beat 734



Chicago Police Department  
PSIT GIS  
01-JUL-2020


- Streets
- + + CTA Line

# Beat 735





# 8th District and Aldermanic Boundaries




- Ward**
- ALDERMAN, WARD**
- 0811 Marly Quinn, 13
  - 0812 Edward M. Burke, 14
  - 0813 Raymond A. Lopez, 15
  - 0814 Stephanie D. Coleman, 16
  - 0815 David H. Moore, 17
  - 0816 Derrick G. Curtis, 18
  - 0817 Michael D. Rodriguez, 22
  - 0818 Silvana Tabares, 23

Office of Public Safety Administration  
PSIT GIS  
12-MAR-2021



Beat 823



Streets  
★ Police District Station  
—+— CTA Line  
Chicago Police Department  
PSIT GIS  
01-JUL-2020

# Beat 825



— Streets

— CTA Line

Chicago Police Department  
PSIT GIS  
01-JUL-2020

# Beat 831



— Streets  
 + CTA Line





**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** November 3, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID** 57 – 57 CAPS Supervisors

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Hairston requested that the CPD provide the number of CAPS supervisors at headquarters.

The Office of Community Policing has 3 civilian supervisors: 1 Director, 1 Deputy Director and 1 Assistant Director. Additionally, there are currently 2 sworn sergeants serving in the Office of Community Policing (OCP-Unit 135) - 1 assigned to the Unit and 1 detailed.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 26, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 58 Overall CAPS Budget

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Aldersperson Hairston requested that the CPD provide the overall CAPS budget and the CAPS budget in the Districts.

<b>2023 Budgeted Personnel</b>	<b>2023 Budgeted Personnel Amount</b>
67	\$ 5,670,591
Non-Personnel budget	\$ 2,613,105
<b>Total Budget</b>	<b>\$ 8,283,696</b>

Currently there no individual budgets for each district's CAPS Offices. Each CAPS office receives an annual allocation of between \$10,000 to \$15,000 to spend on light refreshments and restricted purchases. The amount is determined by the tiered classification of the district. Purchases are subject to the City's procurement process. Request for additional funds may be made through the Office of Community Policing. All expenditures are submitted for review for approval to the Office of Community Policing.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.





**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 27, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-59 Curfews

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Aldersperson Mitts requested that the CPD provide the number of curfew violations in each district.

Please see the table on the following page.

**Number of Curfew Violations in each District YTD 01 Jan - 23 Oct 2022**

<b>DISTRICT</b>	<b>Juvenile Curfew Violation</b>
001	31
002	20
003	10
004	8
005	10
006	6
007	13
008	27
009	9
010	3
011	12
012	7
014	9
015	8
016	12
017	10
018	6
019	8
020	13
022	20
024	18
025	47

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 27, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-60 Opioid Crisis Reports

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Mitts requested that the CPD provide the number of opioid crises reports.

The following data includes incidents in which the call event type was indicated as overdose or where a case report was generated for Narcan.

Date Range for 2022: 01 Jan 2022 - 30 Sep 2022

2021	2022	Grand Total
331	206	537

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 27, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-61 Missing Persons Reports

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Mitts requested that the CPD provide the number of missing persons reports for districts in her ward.

**Missing Persons Reports in 011th, 015th, and 025th District YTD 01 Jan - 23 Oct 2022**

District	Count
011	460
015	508
025	351

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 27, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-62 Sex Trafficking Reports

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Mitts requested that the CPD provide the number of sex trafficking reports for districts in her ward.

**Number of Sex Trafficking Reports in 011th, 015th, and 025th District YTD 01 Jan - 23 Oct 2022**

District	Count
011	1
015	0
025	0

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 27, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-63 Kidnapping Reports

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Aldersperson Mitts requested that the CPD provide the number of kidnapping reports for districts in her ward.

**Number of Kidnapping Reports in 011th, 015th, and 025th District YTD 01 Jan - 23 Oct 2022**

District	Count
011	9
015	4
025	8

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 26, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57 – 64 9165 Detectives

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Aldersperson Vasquez requested that the CPD provide the budget which is allocated to the 9165 designation.

Title	Title Description	2023 Budgeted Number	2023 Budgeted Amount
9165	POLICE OFFICER-A/DETECTIVE	1,192	\$ 135,104,748

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 27, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-66 Curb Stoning

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Vasquez requested that the CPD provide a strategy to combat vehicles being sold without license plates that are taking up parking.

The following strategy was developed to address curb stoning in the 024<sup>th</sup> District. Curb stoning is the illegal sale of cars by subjects attempting to evade the state sales auto tax and regulations rules.

- Beat 2413 will conduct a daily parking mission with the parameters of Peterson to Granville and Damen to Western. Purpose of citations is to establish a pattern of illegal parking leading to the tow/impoundment of vehicle when it meets established criteria. Totals for enforcement will be calculated by 024 administrative personnel.
- Contacted Illinois Secretary of State curb stoning unit to work a joint investigation targeting illegal dealers that are out of state contributors.



- Contacted NICB for potential funding for reverse sting vehicle purchases from targets of this investigation.
- Monitor targeted location within the 024<sup>th</sup> District that operates an illegal garage/repair/dealer operation located in the immediate area of curb stoning.
- Task community policing office to gain insight via tips and emails from community to further investigate illegal activity.
- Task SDSC analyst to monitor open source media (Craig's List, Facebook, Offer Up, etc.) regarding vehicle sales in the area.

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 27, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-67 Guns Recovered in Schools

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Ervin requested that the CPD provide the number of guns recovered in schools throughout the City of Chicago.

**Number of Guns recovered in Schools YTD 01 Jan - 23 Oct 2022**

Firearms in Schools	
Year	Total
01 Jan - 23 Oct 2022	43

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 26, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID** 57-68 Clearance Rate

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The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Dowell requested that the CPD provide the clearance rates by police districts.

The table on the following page provides clearance rates by district YTD.

### Homicides vs Clearance Rates by Year

The following visualization displays a running sum of homicide incidents by Area and District, indicating year-to-month based on the year selected.

	District	Homicides	Cleared	Clearance Rate
AREA 1	02	24	10	42%
	03	36	28	78%
	07	49	19	39%
	08	22	11	50%
	09	44	14	32%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>175</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>47%</b>
AREA 2	04	42	23	55%
	05	43	18	42%
	06	50	25	50%
	22	25	7	28%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>46%</b>
AREA 3	01	17	7	41%
	12	17	11	65%
	18	12	7	58%
	19	9	6	67%
	20	2	3	150%
	24	11	2	18%
<b>Total</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>53%</b>	
AREA 4	10	34	16	47%
	11	65	29	45%
	15	27	12	44%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>45%</b>
AREA 5	14	10	7	70%
	16	2	4	200%
	17	9	8	89%
	25	14	12	86%
<b>Total</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>89%</b>	
<b>Grand Total</b>		<b>564</b>	<b>279</b>	<b>49%</b>

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.



**Lori Lightfoot**  
Mayor

**Department of Police • City of Chicago**  
3510 S. Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653

**David O. Brown**  
Superintendent of Police

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**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Alderman Pat Dowell  
Chairman of Committee on the Budget & Government Operations

**From:** David O. Brown, Superintendent of Police

**CC:** Elizabeth Beatty  
Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

**Date:** October 27, 2022

**Re:** Request for Information from Annual Appropriation Committee Hearing

**ID:** 57-69 Response Times

---

The following information is provided in response to questions posed to the CPD during the 2023 CPD Budget Hearing of the City Council on October 21, 2022.

Alderperson Dowell requested that the CPD provide the average response time in 2021 vs 2022 in all the districts.

Please see the table on the following page.

**Average response times in 2021 & 2022:**

<b>Calls for Service Average Response Times (Minutes)</b>		
<b>District</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>01 Jan - 23 Oct 2022</b>
1	6.56	6.86
2	5.69	5.98
3	9.01	7.58
4	10.97	11.17
5	7.96	8.3
6	11.19	10.65
7	5.6	5.24
8	10.37	11.06
9	9.56	8.23
10	7.2	7.77
11	8.02	8.74
12	10.98	11.54
14	8.65	8.62
15	7.41	7.09
16	10.83	10.3
17	9.88	10.46
18	6.33	7.43
19	9.64	9.14
20	7.19	7.05
22	9.56	8.35
24	8.78	8.47
25	9.19	9.62

As always, please let me know if you have any further questions.